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PREFACE 
I have such a vast nunilier of acknowledgements to make that I 
hardly know where to begin. This study has taken five years to complete 
and has involved my being in contact with a wide variety of economists, 
not only over the length and breadth of the United Kingdom, but on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
£ 
My greatest debt is to Professor S.R. Dennison who has allowed me 
access to the p~ivate papers and correspondence of Sir Dennis Holme 
Robertson~ and has guided and advised me throughout this period. I 
have enjoyed immensely my viSits to Hull University and am very thank-
ful for the energy he has devoted to my work during a period when time 
for him has been a very precious commodity. 
The initial encouragement to undertake ·ills work came from three 
people in particular, - Professor R.D.C. Black, Pro~essor D.P. O'Hrien 
and Professor D. Swann. I ani wiry ·grateful to them. Professor D.P. 
O'Brien has continued to provide copious and constructive comments 
upon my drafts throughout Professor D. S,,'ann has remained my Head 
of Depart~ent and has succeeded in giving me all Lhe assistance 
possible at Loughborough University. I also wish to thank Dr. T. 
Weyman-Jones of Loughborough University for his valuable help in giving 
me a different perspective of certain parts of the work. 
My gratitude goes to all those who have talked and corresponded 
with me on this project, in particular to A. Bevan, Professor A.W. 
/ 
,Coats, P. Coffey, M. Danes, A. Dick, Professor M. Friedman, Sir J.R. Hicks, 
I 
Professor D. Patinkin, Lord Robbins, S. Shenoy, Professor o. Steinger, 
Dr. E. Owen Smith, Professor B. Te." Professor T. Nilson, and 
Professor J.N. Nolfe. Many people have allowed me to utilise and to 
quote from correspondence. In this respect I am grateful to Sir J .R. 
Hicks, Professor D. Patinkin, Professor T. Wilson and Sir Geoffrey 
Keynes. 
Extracts from this thesis .,ere presented at seminars in various 
places. I particularly benefitted from seminars given at the History 
of Economic Thought Conference at Durham university in 1975, at the 
Department of Economics, Lancaster University in March 1977, and from 
a staff seminar at Loughborough University in March 1977. My thanks 
go to all the members of these seminars. My undergraduate days were 
spent at Lancaster University) I was put through my paces by the late 
Professor P. W. s. Andrews, Professor A •. 'Macbean, J. Taylor, J. Rhodes, 
D. Pearce, A. Airth and G. McGregor-Reid. I will always remain in 
their debt for the encouragement and enthusiasm they showed to me and 
to economics. I could not have wished for a better baptism to the 
subject. 
I have been fortunate to receive financial assistance during my 
study of Robertson' s work. The Wincott Foundation put we on my feet, 
and the S. S. R. C. kept me there over the last blo years. 'I'his enabled 
me to gain access to a large volume of research material I would 
otherwise have been unable to digest. It. also meant that I could 
travel around the United Kingdom in search of information. Without 
this help the study would have been subst.anti.ally weakened, and I 
, 
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therefore thank my benefactors for their generosity. 
A study of this kind invariably puts many strains upon library 
staff. It never ceases to amaze me how librarians can remain so 
patient when faced with a borrower who cannot remember, or does not 
have, the full reference for a book or an article. I','have received 
great patience and help from a number cDf libraries;' in particular r 
wish to thank the library staffs of Loughborough University, the 
Harshall Library and Kings College Library, Cambridge, Newcastle 
University, Hull University, Sheffield University and the London School 
of Economics. My special thanks goes to Nottingham University 
Library >1hich was perhaps burdened more than most by my enquiries. 
The Department of Economics at Nottingham University also put up with 
my presence during my period of sabbatical from Loughborough University 
in 1976. I am very grateful to both Professor J.R. Parkinson and 
Professor B. Tew for allowing me all the facilities of their department 
during my stay with them and for making me so welcome. 
Despite the satisfaction yielded by work of this kind, the prepara-
tion of this thesis has taken a great amount of time, effort and 
energy. The sacrifices that have to be made however are not exclusively 
the author's alone. My wife and two daughters have suffered my absence 
of body and mind during the working out of 'Robertsonian Economics' • 
~lis lacking on my part was induced ruld not forced (see Part 11); I 
am therefore deeply grateful to them - to Barbara for being so under-
strulding and supportive" especially during periods of mental agony (:) -
I 
to' Joanne and Ca,therine for the happiness they offer to all around them. 
/'. 
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Finally I wish to thank I1rs. J. Tuson who has strljggled with my 
illegible handwriting over the years and helped to make this thesis 
pre"entable. l1y thanks also go to Mr. J. Kelly, currently an under-
graduate at Loughborough University, who has assisted me in the prepara-
tion of footnotes. 
The errors which still persist in this thesis are my responsibility 
alone. I hope they are few! 
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List of Abbreviations* 
1". Books written by Sir Dennis Holme Robertson: 
a) SIF A Study of Industrial Fluctuation, (1915) 
b) BPPL Banking Policy and the Price Level, (1926) 
c) EF Economic Fra911lents, (1931) 
d) EEA Economic Essays and Addresses, (with A.C. Pigou, 193J.) 
e) EMT Essays in Monetary Theory, (1940) 
f) UAT Utility and All That, (1952) 
g) EC Economic Commentaries, (1956) 
h) LEP Lectures on Economic Principles, (1957-9) 
i) EMI Essays in Honey and Interest, (1966) 
2. Other major books or journals referred to and abbreviated: 
a) GT The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
J.H. Keynes, (1936) 
b) CW The Collect<>d Writings of John l1aynard Keynes, 
Volumes XIII and XIV. 
c) Principles Principles of Economics, A. Marshall, (1890) 
d) EJ The Economic Journal, (various issues) 
e) QJE The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (various issues) 
*A' full bibliography is given on page' 495. , 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
'The chief difficulty Alice found at first was that the flamingo 
generallyj_ust as she had got its neck straightened out, and was 
going to give the hedgehog a blow with its head it would twist itself 
round and look up in her face I • Alice in Wonderland. 
This thesis is not intended as a biography of Sir Dennis Holme 
i Robertson. (1) It is an examination of ~ important aspect of his 
work as an economist - his theo~J of industrial fluctuation, before 
this examination is undertaken it is necessary to survey.the background 
against which Robertson put forward his views on economics. The scene 
must be set for later analysis and this task can only be accomplished 
by providing a brief biography. 
Sir Dennis Holme Robertson - in and out of Cambridge 
It is now 62 years since Robertson I s first book VIas published. (2) 
This contained the skeleton of his theory of industrial fluctuation, 
a tlleory which he held throughout his lifetime, and which was suitably 
covered with flesh in the multitude of publications which followed to 
his death in 1963. 
He was born in 1890, the youngest of six children and the son of 
the Headmaster of Haileybury School. The Robertsons originated from 
Scotland and had for generations been principally clergyomen or school-
/ 
masters. In the year D8nnis Robertson was born, his father resigned 
/ / from the post at Haileybury and became a country parson at Whittlesford 
2 
in Cambridgeshire. In many ways Dennis Robertson benefitted from this 
move, for his father was able to devote himself to his childrens' 
education. In 1902, already well educated in the classics, he went to 
Eton where he excelled; he made many friends and eventually became 
captain of the school. (3) 
From Eton he gained a classical scholarship to Cambridge in 1908. 
He continued to prosper both academically and socially, gaining a I-i 
in the first part of the classical tripos in 1910 whilst enjoying him-
self thoroughly in Cambridge. He took an active part in amateur 
dramatics and continued to develop his musical interest. (4) He won, for 
three successive years/the Chancellor's Prize for English Verse. 
Fortunately for the economics profession he was not to stay a 
classical scholar. In 1910 he turned to the economics tripos gaining 
a first in Part II of the tripos in 1912; this was achieved despite his 
many and varied non-academic interestG in .Cambridge, amongst which were 
numbered his activities as President of both the Liberal Society and 
the Union. 
Cambridge economics and Harshallian economics were synonymous at 
that time. Although Robertson was not taught by A. Harshall,who had 
retired in 1908,the Principles of Economics remained the recommended 
textbook. A.C. Pigou and J.M. Keynes, both former pupils of Harshall, 
continued to uphold the Harshallian tradition during Robertson's under-
graduate studies. It was J.M. Keynes who became Robertson's Director 
of Studies; t.his was the beginning of a very long and productive 
/ 
/ 
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partnership which flourished especially in the 1920s, but which was to 
suffer as a result of the 'Keynesian Revolution' in the late 19309. 
Robertson chose to defend Marshallian economics against the challenge 
of the Keynesians. (5) 
After graduation Robertson remained as a research student in 
Cambridge. In 1914 his research thesis won for him a Trinity Fellowship 
(in the previous year the thesis had gained the Cobden Prize); it also 
became his first book in 1915. But the war interrupted his academic 
f work; he joined the army and after service in England he was posted 
. to Egypt and Palestine. (6) He did not return to the Trinity Fellowship 
/ 
until 1919. 
This heralded the beginning of his most productive period as a 
monetary economist. His most widely read book, Mone~ was published in 
1922 as a Cambridge Economic Handbook. This was a textbook for under-
graduates, but it quickly established Robertson's ~eputation as a 
monetary expert. It remained in the forefront as a textbook on monetary 
theory until the 1950s and appeared in a new edition as late as 1948. 
M. Frie&nan has seen fit to remark that it: 'is a masterpiece of 
exposition as well as of content'. (7) But Money was only the first of 
a number of I<ritings ·in the inter-war period which attempted to 
·analyse the role of monetary factors in the tllade cycle. The Study 
had presented a real theory cf industrial fluctuation. It was a pur-
pose of later I<ritings to examine the behaviour of money, the rate of 
interest, and saving and investment in the cycle, and from this to 
establish the most appropriate types of counter-·cyclical policies. , . 
4 
The collaboration between Keynes and Robertson in the 1920s 
resulted in several major works, though none were published under joint 
authorship. These works included not only Money, but also the Tract on 
Monetary Reform, (B) BPPL, and the Treatise on Money. (9) The 1930s 
witnessed less of a combined effort. Each went their separate ways, 
Robertson developing the theory of fluctuation he had expounded in 
1915, whilst Keynes worked on the General Theory. After 1936 they 
became involved in a debate over the validity of Keynes' theory. This 
partnership was significant in the development of both Robertsonian and 
Keynesian economics; for this reason a later chapter explores their 
relationship in the inter-war period in· more detail. (10) 
Robertson also continued to be actively interested in liberal 
policy, again to SOme extent working alongside J. H. Xeynes. He had 
been brought up in ·a Cambridge which had little respect for state 
control, but which did tolerate some interference with the free enter-
. (11) 
r1se economy. He was not a socialist; he,for ~xample,regarded 
Cole's suggestion for the establishment of co-operatives as belonging 
to the realm of 'Cloud-Cuckoo Land'. (12) Yet at the same time he was 
not a staunch defender of capitalism. In fact in Mr. Ernest Benn's 
fourfold classification of economists according to their degree of 
support for capitalism, Robertson remarked: 'I knew that I should 
(13) 
come out, if not in the lowest class yet not very far away'. 
Robertson never had serious political ambitions; his involvement went 
as far as contributing to Liberal Party Summer Schcols, and to policy 
documents, but no further. 
I 
/ 
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With the exception of ei.yht months spent travel:ling in the Far 
East in 1926-7, and four ruonths spent in India (1933-4) working on a 
statistical enquiry with A.L. Bowley, Robertson remained in Cambridge 
until 1938. Then he was invited to become a member of the Appointment 
Board for the Chair in Banking at the London School of Economics. He 
declined this invitation instead preferring to be considered as a 
candidate for the post. He was duly elected to the. Chair and so Has 
able to escape from the ferment of the Keynesian Revolution taking 
place in Cambridge at that time. He taught at the London School of 
Economics for one year only before the outbreak of the second world 
war. 
During the war he worked as an economic adviser to Sir F. Phillips 
who was the Third Secretary in the Treasury with particular responsi-
bility for overseas finance. This '<ark took Robertson to Washington 
in 1943,where he assisted in the preparations for the Bretton Woods 
COnference. Here again he was to work with Keynes ?s a member of the 
British delegation. On Pigou's retirement he was able to return to 
Cambridge as Professor of Economics. He occupied this post until his 
retirement in 1957. (14) Much of his energy was devoted in this post-
war.period to his lectures in Cambridge (>lhich were published in three 
(15) 
volumes), and to general policy issues. After Keynes' death, he 
did not apply the same vigour to the theoretical debate surrounding 
the Keynesian revolution, but he still remained its strongest critic~ 
He gave evidence to the Committee on Finance and Industry in May 
1930, (16) and to the Canadian Royal Commission on Banking and Finance 
;' 
I 
, 
, 
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in 1962. (17) He was a leading member of the Royal Commission on Equal 
Pay (1944-6), and the only economist amongst the 'three wise men' of 
the Cohen Council on Prices, 'Productivity and Incomes, (1957-8). Honorary 
degrees were given to him by several British Universities as well as 
those he received with great pride from Louvain, Columbia, Amsterdam 
and Harvard. He had been a Fellow of the British Academy from 1932, 
and was knighted in 1953. 
He wrote nine books covering almost every aspect of economics. (18) 
His major articles, (19) of which no fewer than thirty appeared in the 
Economic Journal,were collected to form six furt.~er books Over the 
period 1931-66, the final collection being edited by Sir John R. Hicks. (20) 
Why study Robertson's work? 
From this brief biography one can begin to ascertain the importance 
of Sir D.H. Robertson in the development of economics; yet since his 
death in 1963 only one major article has appeared on Robertson; this 
was the critical obituary article written by P. Samuelson. (21) 
Robertson's work is of crucial importance to economists and economic 
policy makers for two main reasons: 
i) his publications provide a major contribution to the 
study of cyclical movements in the economy. 
Connnenting upon the ' .• stibj.ect matter of fluctuations, 
money, credit and employment, Robertson himself 
states: 'this has always been to me the most 
interesting part of economics - the only part to 
which I can hope to be remembered as having made any 
personal contribution'. (22). The importance of this 
7 
contribution has to some extent already been 
appreciated by economists. Fellner wrote in 1952: 
'after so many years a surprisingly small part of 
Robertson's early contribution is outmoded in the 
sense that a problem with which it is concenned 
seems to have lost the significance, or in the 
sence that a statement is clearly less adequate, 
than later statements of other authors 6n the same 
subject'. (23) One purpose of this thesis is to 
show that this statement is still valid in 1977. 
ii) We have already seen that Robertson worked with, a~d 
was influenced by, J .M~: Keynes in the inter-war 
period. Referring to the development of Keynes' 
work Lord Robbins argues: 'no-one with even a 
speck of justice in his make-up could deny to Sir 
Dennis a very appreciable share of the credit'. (24) 
The publication of the Collected Writings of John 
Maynard Keynes(25) enables not only a closer 
examination to be undertaken of the contribution 
by Robertson to the development of Keynes' thought, 
but also an assess'ment of the strength of Keynes' 
influence upon 'Robertsonian economics' to be made. 
The structure of the thesis 
The thesis chooses as its focus the theory of industrial fluctua-
tion/since this is where the majority of Robertson's writings were con-
centrated, where he made the greatest impact upon the study of economics 
and where much of the debate between Robertson and Keynes took place. 
The discussion is restricted to the case of a closed economy a~d 
therefore there is no examination of those aspects of Robertsonian 
theory which relate to the operations of international trade, of the 
international monetary system or the gold standard. Likewise there is 
no exploration into the field of micro-economics, where Robertson can 
claim to have contributed in:, particular to the development of the 
h ~ 't' d 'I' l' (26) t eory OL compet~ ~on an ut~ ~ty ana ys~s. 
// 
, The three parts into which this' thesis is divided reflect differences 
o 
in subject matter. But they also to a large degree indicate three 
stages in the development of Robertsonian ideas. Part I examines the 
Robertsonian theory of industrial fluctuation. It concentrat.es upon 
the ~ theory to be found in the Study and isolates the origins and 
major influences upon Robertson's IQork. It also seeks to establish 
the relationship between Robertsonian theory and the alternative 
theories of fluctuation existing in 1915. 
Par.t 11 examines the role of saving and investment and the opera-
tion of monetary forces in the cycle. The inter-war period saw a 
disposition amongst economists to discuss the trade cycle, and policy 
aimed at regulating the cycle, in terms of the relationship between 
saving and investment. Robertson was anxious after the Study to 
determine the influence of monetary forces upon the cycle and to investi-
gate the relationship between real and monetary forces. The attention 
devoted to saving and investment in this period gave Robertson a frame-
work in which to do this. The period came to an en~ with the debate 
surrounding the General Theory. This again centred upon the relation-
ship between saving and investment and the determining forces in the 
trade cycle; for this reason a large proportion of this part of the 
thesis is given to a consideration of the main arguments of the debate 
and Robertson's contribution to the~. 
The final part of the thesis is, by way of a conclusion, a survey 
of Robertson's proposals for regulating tile trade cycle. Attention is 
directed particularly to the problems of unemployment and inflation. 
, 
Robertson began by propounding a E~~~ theory of fluctuation; monetary 
9 
forces were then integrated into~this real theory in his work in the 
inter-war period, even after 1945 Robertson remained faithful to this 
theoretical analysis despite the intervening Keynesirul revolution. 
After 1945 he sought primarily to stress the policy implications of 
his theoretical appro.ach and to contrast and compare them with the 
Keynesian policy recommendations. It is therefore fitting that the 
final part of this thesis should similarly consider the policy aspects 
of Robertsonian rulalysis. 
! 
.I 
/ 
/ 
10 
Chapter 1 - Footnotes 
(1) A task already undertaken to some extent by Sir J.R. Hicks in 
EMI, pp.9-22. 
(2) DHR, SIF, P.S. King and Son Ltd., 1915. 
(3) The honour of a Fe11o>lship of Eton College was given to him in 
1948. 
(4) Being a member of the A.D.C. and the Mar10we Society. 
(5) See later, Part II, Ch.2. 
(6) He was in fact awarded the 14ilitary Cross. 
(7) Letter to the author, November 1972. 
(8) JMK, Tract on Monetary Reform, ,Macmi11an, London, 1923. 
(9) JHK, Treatise on Money, Macmi11an, London, 1930. 
(10) Part II, Ch.2. 
(11) See his comment in UAT, p.44. 
(12) DHR, EF, p.175. 
(13) Ibid, p. 212. 
(14) DHR continued to live in Cambrj!dge until his death in 1963. 
(15) DHR, LEP, 3 volumes 1957-9, Staples Press Ltd., London. Paperback 
edition, London, 1963, (The Fontana Library). 
(16) DHR, written and oral evidence to the (Macmi11an) Committee on 
Finance and Industry, on 8-9th May, 1930. 
(17) The Memorandum which Robertson submitted to ~~is Commission was 
reprinted in Essays in International Finance, No. 42, May 1963, 
University of Princeton; oral evidence is contained in Vol. 42, 
20th September, 1962, pp.5107-5208. 
(18) Including The Control of Industry, Cambridge Economic Handbook, 
1923, (1960 edition with S.R. Denison). 
(19) DHR had 91 articles published between September 1912 and 
September 1962; in addition he had published 64 reviews. 
(20) see bibliography, p. 496. 
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(21) P. Samuelson, 'Sir D.H. Robertson', Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, No. 4, November 1963; pp.528-36. 
(22) DHR, LEP, p.325. 
(23) W. Fellner, 'The Robertsonian Evolution', American Economic 
Review, June 1952, Vol. XLII, No. 3, p.266. 
(24) L. Robbins, The Evolution of Hodern Economic Theory, pp.248-53. 
(25) JMK, CW, Vols. XIII and XIV, edited by D. l1oggddge, l1acmi11an, 
published for the Royal Economic Society, 1973. 
(26) See especially DHR, UAT~: 
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Part I The Theory of Industrial Fluctuat.i.on 
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CHAPTER 1 
Background to A Study of Industrial Fluctuation in 1915 
"In the deathl~ss W~i?S of Dodo, everybody has won and all 
must have pr1zes. . 
Introduction 
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine the work of Sir Dennis 
Ho1D1e Robertson on the trade cycle. It must begin, however, in very 
much .the same way that the study by Robertson began. The main influences 
upon his early work are to be found in the theories of the trade cycle 
which had been expounded before 1915. This chapter provides a classifi·-
cation of these theories, such that they can be later examined in 
relation to the Robertsonian theory of industrial fluctuation. 
Robertson was aware, from the very beginning, where his labours 
should be concentrated. Economists had accumulated many, and varied, 
views on the subject of the trade cycle by 1915. Robertson saw his 
task to be: 'in the direction of developing and synthesising the 
various and often conflicting opinions which have already been 
expressed'. (2) His first approach to the study of industrial fluctua-
tion had in fact been to stll':lmarise a number of theories and to test 
these against empirical evidence. He was diverted from this course by 
A.C. Pigou, who wrote: 'You have collected an astonishing amount of 
material and have made comment on it in such a way that I feel sure 
I 
you will eventually make somethilO9 very good indeed. But, of course, 
/ at present, the thing is mainly a great mass of ra!' material. Marshall 
13 
used to instruct one that the bones of a piece of work, whIch was really 
one's own production, grew gradually and then the whole thing came 
tegether round them. You haven't yet got the bones; you haven't 
thought through the material. The next stage is to sit and stew on all 
these facts and partial explanations until some coherent unity grows up 
and the separate facts fall into their proper place'. (3) \'/hether or 
Ilot this advice did provide the direction for his future work is diffi-
cult to determine in retrospect; there may have been other, unknown 
influences; but ~he approach adopted by Robertson does bear a striking 
resemblance to this counsel. Robertson was recommended to take a 
posi tive rather than a critical line in his study. In part.icular, and 
this is very significant, Pigou instructed, though with some reservation: 
'You ought more consistently and thoroughly to dig down behind money 
appearances to real facts· ••••• and to 'distinguish more between 
causes of a general kind affecting industry as a whole and special 
causes affecting particular industries'. (4) 
By 1915 Robertson's Trinity Fellowship dissertation had become 
A Study of Industrial Fluctuation, providing economists with what 
h .(5) T.S. As ton describes as a 'Novum Organum. The following pages will 
yield witness to the extent to which the Pigovian trail was followed 
in this major contribution to trade cycle theory. 
The Evolution of 'l'rade Cycle Theory. 
Recognition of the cyclical movements in ,,'estern economies grew 
out of the concern of political economists, particular.ly in the latter 
part of the 18th century, with what were called 'commercial crises'. 
14 
Such crises had many descriptions ranging from a·state of 'melancholy 
decay of credit' to a state of 'sinking of trade', (6) and represented 
what is now considered to be one particular phase of the cycle. 
Having established that crises occurred at fairly regular intervals, 
economists naturally ventured to explain what happened between periods 
of crisis. Hence the birth of the now voluminous literature on the 
trade cycle. 
It has been customary to place much of the credit of original 
thinking on the trade cycle with Clement Juglar. (7) He put forward in 
1860 the idea that the trade cycle had three phases, a period of pros-
perity, followed by crisis, followed by a period of liquidation, cul-
minating once more in prosperity. Recognition of cyclical movements 
in economic activity had however taken place long before 1860. Willard 
Phillips had observed wavelike movements in business in the American 
economy in 1828, (S) declaring that: 'business ·will have its floods and 
ebbs' • In England, John Wade, a journalis.t, wrote on the 'comrnercial 
cycle' and the 'periods of prosperity and depression'; (9) later in 
1837 Lord Overstone described the cycle in the follm'ling manner: ' the 
history of what we are in the habit of calling "state of trade" is an 
instructive lesson. We find it subject to various conditions which 
are periodically returning; it revolves apparently in an established 
cycle. First we find it in a state of quiescence - next improvement, 
- drawing confidence, - prosperity, - excitement, - overtrading, -
convulsion, - pressure, - stagnation, - distress, - ending again in 
. , (10) 
qu~escence .. 
, 
, 
/ 
! 
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Spiethoff, despite referring to Juglar an the originator of 'the 
new study of crises,as phenomena of economic organisation', (11) regards 
the main original' contribution On the trade cycle as coming from T. 
Tooke (1774-1858). Tooke not only described commercial expansion, 
crisis and depression, but also pointed out that they exhibited cyclical 
characteristics. (12) Whoever deserves the credit for recognising the 
trade cycle, it is evident that by the middle of the last century. 
economists were aware of its existence, and. were beginning to devote 
more attention to studying it. 
The meaning of the trade cycle 
As a preliminary to discussing the theories of the trade cycle,it 
is important to determine what in fact economists meant by the business 
or trade cycle before 1915. The first problem is to decide which 
particular cycle merits attention. Is it a price cycle, a credit cycle, 
a cycle in general economic activity, or a cycle in output and employment? 
There is a tendency, particularly amongst Keynesians, to place 
early trade cycle theory within classical economic thinking, and, in 
doing so, to suggest that its major concern before 1936 was with 
fluctuations in prices not output" nor employment. This, is a gross 
misrepresentation of the situation; not only is it incorrect to imply 
that classical economists were solely interested in prices and money 
income, but, even allowing for tlus, it is incorrect to incorporate 
early ~lork on the trade cycle within the body of classical economic 
thought. As Wesley Hitchell has so rightly asserted: 'It was not the 
I , 
, 
orthodox economist hO>lever who gave the problem of crises and depressions 
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its place l.n economics, but sceptics who had profited by and then 
reacted against their teachings'. (13) 
Robertson was aware of this Keynesian misconception and was at 
pains to emphasise,and quite rightly so, in the ne~1 introduction to his 
Study, that the focus of his work was upon fluctuations in real national 
income. (14) Other trade cycle theorists were similarly disposed to 
/ 
study fluctuations in business or cOrrL'Ilercial activity, and not purely 
a price cycle. The aforementioned Wesley Mitchell defines business 
Cycles as:· 'a species of fluctuations in the economic acti\'ity of 
organised cOIlUDunities. The adjective "business" restricts the concept 
of fluctuations to activities which are systematically conducted on a 
commercial basis. The noun "cycles" bars out fluctuations which do 
not recur with a measure of regularity'. (15) Later sections will show 
that even the earlier economists had shown this disposition to concen~ 
trate upon fluctuations in economic activity, emphasising fluctuations 
in both output and emplo~"ent. (16) The latter quotation also brings 
out a further characteristic of the cycle which had been investigated 
before the turn of the century, this is its regularity. The cycle 
was seen to have a number of phases, each phase logically following 
on from another in every cycle. In 1860, for example, Juglar observed 
that crisis always followed prosperity, prosperity followed liquidation, 
and liquidation followed crisis. Furthermore,the period of the 
cycle was observed to be regular in length. Juglar found it to 
be of approximately 10 years duration. Earlier John Wade had 
witnessed a commercial cycle of depression and prosperity of 
/ 
, 
, 
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an average length of between 5 and 7 years. ,But, as Schumpeter remarks, 
the idea of the 10 year cycle seemed to gain popular support in the 
mid 19th century. (17) It was with an examination of this cycle that 
Robertson was occupied. He did not study microeconomic cycles, nor the 
Long cycle in business activity, recognised after 1915 by Kondratrieff 
as being an international cycle of between 48 and 60 years duration. (18) 
By 1850 therefore the various phases of the business or,trade 
cycle, and its periodicity, had already been the subject of discussion 
of many major works in economics. However it would appear that the 
impetus for the development of modern business cycle theories came with 
Juglar's work. (19) It was only after this had penetrated economic 
analysis that economists began to pay considerable attention to the 
study of the full cycle, rather than purely to commercial crises. (20) 
Theories of the trade cycle 
A complete theory of the trade cycle'must possess two specific 
features. It must be able to explain why both the upswing and downswing 
of the cycle occur; that is how one phase of the cycle is transformed 
/ 
into the next. A considerable number of theorists had, by 1915, put 
fon,ard their own explanation of the trade cycle. It is not true to 
say that: 'it. was widely taken for granted that short-term fluctuations 
in the economy reflected changes in the quantity of money, or in the 
terms of and conditions lmder which credi,t was available'. (21) This 
'again shows the error of labelling everything pre-General Theory. as 
belonging to classical economic thought. Many economists had challenged 
/ (22) Say's law. Supply was not seen to create its own demand, nor did 
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all theories propose that there was a natural tendency to full employment 
in a free enterprise economy. Trade cycle theo~y grew out of this dis-
content with the basic premises in classical economics. The ideas of 
Lauderdale, Malthus and Sismondi on the trade cycle resulted from their 
challenge of Say's law;. from 1890 onwards this challenge was accelerated 
in the works of Aftalion, Tugan-Baranowski, Spiethoff, Robertson and 
others. 
In '. the l880s no fewer than 180 separate causes of crises and 
depressions were submitted to the committee of Congress, and in 1895 
M. Bergmann accounted for 230 different opinions on the causes of the 
( 23Y business cycle. Such a multiplicity of thought on the cycle makes 
it impossible to develop any sane approach to their elucidation without 
some form of classification. 
The classification of theories itself raises numerous problems. 
It is extremely difficult to decide the appropriate basis on which to 
classify theories. W. Persons struggled with this difficulty in 1927. (24) 
He argued that: 'Helpful classifications of theories of business 
fluctuations might be made on the basis of various criteria; such as 
the nature of fluctuation, periodic or non-periodic, the origill (that 
is, the beginning) of the fluctuation, the cause assigned to the lapse 
from prosperity to depression, the remedies offered, or the element in 
the author's explanation which he emphasises most in his discussion of 
the causes'. (25) Persons finally decided the best classification was 
to divide theories into two groups - those which put the cause of the 
, i" 1 f (26Y d th h' I h' cycle on nst~ttJtlona actors an ase W l.e]. ernp aSl.se non-
i' 
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institutional factors. (27) Adopting this approach it would still be 
necessary to subdivide the two categories of theories, and hence the 
ne~d for further criteria. Cassel supported a classification based 
upon the type of economy to which t;rre theory relates, distinguishing 
between theories which are applied to agricultural economies and those 
which seek to explain cyclical movements in modern capitalist 
. (28) econo~es. The former theories were apparently considered unworthy 
of discussion since a study: '''hich is to be valid for the whole of 
Western Europe, cannot, in general,go back further than the beginning 
of the 70s (18705) .,(29) This implies that the disappearance of the 
agricultural economy, and the appearance of large amounts of fixed 
capital,can be dated to the 1870s. Others have similarly made a dis-
tinction on these grounds. Wesley Mitchell argues that: 'It is not 
until the use of money has reached an advanced stage in a country that 
. (30) its economic vicissitudes take on the character of bus1ness cycles'. 
The suggestion here is that the advent of the business cycle came 
alongside the development of modern capitalist production. This kind 
of distinction has led in the past only to a denial of the importance 
of agricultural theories of the cycle. 
A further possibility is to classify theories according to the 
methodology of the theory. Three basic a.pproaches to a theory of the 
trade cycle are discernable: the philosophical approach based entirely 
upon casual observation, the empirical or factual approach, as in the 
case of the studies of Clement Juglar and Tugan-Baranowski, Hhere a 
theory is the end product of a thorough statistical examination of past 
trends in the economic system, and the econometric or mathematical 
,/ 
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approach as in the case of so many modern theories, perhaps of which 
the best known is that of J.R. Hicks. (31) Although this may suffice 
for a modern classification of theories, the principal limitation for 
pre-19l5 classification is the non-existence of theories "hich would 
suitably fit into the third category - that of econometric studies. 
Likewise a distinction between theories which are endogenous and those 
which are exogenous becomes meaningless because endogenous theories 
have developed mainly within the mathematical approach to the trade 
1 
(32) 
eyc e. Classification must proceed therefore, not on the basis of 
the type of economy to which the theories relate, nor according to 
the approach of the theory, but according to how the theory explains 
the cause of the cycle. 
This is not to say that classification now becomes straightforward. 
Explanations of the trade cycle rarely lay blame upon one cause alone. It is 
also necessary to establish which cause the theorist is emphasising 
above all others. Differences between theories are often a difference 
in emphasis rather than a difference in absolute and indisputable 
terms. A further problem is to make a clear distinction between cause 
and effect, that is to decide which factors are active in creating the 
cycle and which factors are merely reacting themselves to the cause, 
and perhaps aiding or allowing the cyclical movement. In any classi-
fication there must therefore be a certain element of danger. This must 
follow Mhere classification is· based upon a subjective assessment of 
what each theorist is emphasising above all else; it is all the more 
difficult since an attempt is being made to fit each theory into a 
rigid, well-defined, compartment. 
, 
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The ultimate problem is the choice of compartments into which 
theories can be placed. Tugan-Baranowski visualised three groupings, 
theories of production, theories of exchange, credit and monetary cir-
culation, and theories of the distribution of income. (33) Wesley 
Mitchell similarly divided theories into three compartments, those which 
trace business cycles to physical processes, those tracing them to a more 
emotional process and finally those tracing business cycles to institu-
tional processes. (34) Each compartment contains separate smaller com-
partments. 
/ 
" 
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In the following chapters seven major compartments are discernable:-
1) includes the 'agricultural' and 'physical' theories of the 
cycle, comprising the works of W.S. Jevons, H.S. Jevons, 
H.L. Moore and W. Sombart. This type of theory seeks a 
connection between periodic agricultural cycles and per-
iodic industrial cycles, or, in the work of W. Sombart, 
2) 
. between the output of organic and inorganic materials 
and the industrial cycle. 
contains theories which put the cause'of the downswing of 
the cycle upon over-investment, or the nature of the modern 
capitalist production process; in this category one can 
include numerous writers of the 1890-1915 period, in par-
ticular Aftalion, Bickerdike, lugan-Baranowski, Spiethoff, 
Cassel, Schumpeterand G.B. Hull. The cormnon core of 
these theories is that during the prosperity phase each 
argues that over-production takes place in the capital 
good industries relative to the consumer good industries. 
This brings the downturn of the cycle. Despite this common 
core there is a great deal of variety amongst this partic-
ular group. It is importa.nt to realise that by 1915 there 
had been no development of the monetary over-investment 
theories which are associated ,.ith F.A. Hayek and L. Robbins 
amongst others. The major >Iritin~~5~f Hayek did not appear 
until the beginning of the 19305. These had a definite 
influence upon Robertson's later works, and although not 
included in this chapter will provide essential reference 
in later chapters. Although not within the over-investment 
group of theories, it is important to remember that Karl 
Marx had already written of the ultimate downfall of market 
economies based upon private investment decisions, and had 
studied, in particular, the influence ?~ t.he longevity of 
capital goods upon economic activity. 6) . 
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3) is occupied by the under-consumption theories of 
Malthus and Sismondi and later J.A. Hobson. 
there is a wide variety of theories within this group 
depending upon the nature of under-consumption in each 
theory. Foster and Catc~ings later developed an 
under-consumption theorY3~~) and in so doing they drew 
comment from Robertson. . 
4) The psychological theories drew accelerated support 
after 1915 with the publications of A.C. Pigou and 
J.M. Keynes' emphasis on the role of expectations. 
During the period in question they are to be seen 
in the works of John Stuart Mill and John Mills. 
5) includes the monetary theory of R.G. Hawtrey, which 
gained considerable support during the first part-of 
this century. The cause of the cycle is placed 
entirely upon the functions of money and credit in the 
. economic system. 
6) contains those theories which concentrate upon the. role 
of profits, wages ·and costs in the creation of the 
cycle. The most notable contribution(in)this field 
came from W. Mitchell and J. Lescure. 39 
7) includes a number of 'all embracing' and 'accident' theories 
where no one cause of the cycle is emphasised, but 
multifarious causes are suggested. Here the works of 
W. Roscher and T. Veblen dominate. 
Finally, and not within the general classification, this part· of the 
thesis will briefly discuss the neo-classical views on the trade cycle. 
Robertson must undoubtedly have been influenced by these since he was 
brought up within the neo-classical Cambridge tradition. Discussion 
will centre,wherever possible, upon those works which were known to 
Robertson at the time of writing his Study. These were the agricultural 
theories of W.S. and H.S. Jevons, the over-investment theories of 
Tugan-Baranowski, A. Aftalion (40) and G.H. Hull, (41) the monetary theory 
of R.G. Hawtrey, (42) and the work of Labordere. (43) 
/ 
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Chapter 1 - Footnotes 
(1) Taken 'from SIF, Introduction, p.lo The implication is that all 
those contributing to trade cycle theory have some validity 
on their side. 
(2) DHR, SIF, Ch. 1, p.2. 
(3) Letter from A.C. Pigou to DHR dated 1913. 
(4) Letter from A.C. Pigou to DHR 1913. Pigou indicated that he may 
be biased in putting forward this advice because it reflected 
his mm theoretical approach. 
(5) T:S. Ashton, 'Industrial ,Fluctuation' - Review,Economica, Vol. IB, 
No. 71, August 1951, pp.29B-302. 
(6) See A. Hansen, Business Cycles and National Income, Norton 1951, 
pp.211-217. 
'(7) See especially C. Juglar, Des Crises Commerciales et de leur 
retour periodique en France. en Angleterre, et aux Etats-Uns., 
Paris, 1859. For this view see J. Schumpe~er. History of 
Economic Analysis, Allen & Unwin. London, 1954, p.1124. 
(B) W. Phil1ips, Manual of Political Economy, IB2B. 
(9) J. Wade, History and PoH tical Philosophy of the Middle and Working 
Classes, Edinburgh Chambers, 1833. Schumpeter regards this us 
a fairly comprehensive theory of the commercial cycle (op cit. 
p. 743n) • 
(10) Lord Overstone, then Samuel Jones Loyd. 'Reflections Suggested 
by a Perusal of Mr. J. Horsley Palmer's Pamphlet on the Causes 
and Consequences of Pressure on the Money Market', London, 1837. 
(11) A. Spiethoff, Krisen, Handworterbuch der Staatswissen - schaften, 
1923,29 and 1930 Lieferung. (Bog 1-10 des VI Bandes). 
(12) See T. Tooke, A History of Prices and of the State of Circulation 
from 1792 to 1856, published in six volumes from 1838 to 1857. 
(13) W. Mitchell, Business Cycles, Franklin, New York, 1927, p.3. 
(14) See DHR, SIF, Introduction (1948 edition). 
(15) W. Mitchell, op cit., p.46B. 
(16) See l'art 1, Ch. "1 and Part II, Ch. 6. 
I 
(17) J; Schumpeter, op cit., p.742. 
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(18) N.D. Kondratieff, 'Die Langen Wellen der Konjuctur', Archiv fur 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozial politik, December 1926,. (see also 
abridged translation, Review of Economics and Statistics, 
November 1935). The Long Cycle was also recognised by J.A. 
Schumpeter, Business Cycle, McGraw-Hill, 1939, and by W. Mitchell, 
op cit., 1927, amongst others. 
(19) This is the opinion of J.A. Schumpeter, op cit., p.1123. 
(20) A. Hansen, 
the work 
had been 
·see J.A. 
op cit.,p.225, concludes: 
of Juglar ••••• the work on 
peripheral and tangential'. 
Schumpeter, op cit., p.1123. 
'By 1890 ••••• apart from 
depressions and cycles 
For a similar conclusion 
(21) M, Friedman, 'The Counter Revolution in Monetary Theory', Wincott 
Foundation Lecture, published by the Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 1970, p.10. 
(22) 'See J.B. Say, Traite d'economie politique, Paris, 1803: 'All 
sellers are buyers, double the supply of commodities and you 
double the purchasing power'. 
(23) See DHR, SIF, p.L 
(24) W. Persons, 'Theories of Business Fluctuations', Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, VoL 41, November 1926, pp.94-128. 
(25) Ibid, p. 99. 
(26) e .• g. the theories of J .A. Hobson, and A. Spiethoff. 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
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e.g. the agricultural theories of W.S. Jevons, H.S. Jevons, and 
. H.L. Moore. 
G. Cassel, Theory of Social Economy, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 
revised edition, 1932. 
Ibid, the brackets are mine. 
W. Mitchell, op cit., p.25. 
J.R •. -Hicks, A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1950. 
For exampl.e the 'propagation' and 'impulse' cycles recognised by 
R. Frisch', in Economic Essays in Honour of G. Cassel, Allen & 
Unwin, 1933. 
M. Tugan-Baranowski, Les Crises Industrielles en Angleterre, 
Paris, 1913. 
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(35) F.A. von· Hayek, Prices and Production, Routledge & Son, r.ondon, 
1931 and Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, Cape, London, 
1933. 
(36) K. Marx, Das Capital, C. Karr & Co. ,1907, originally published 
in 1867. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Nature of the Industrial Fluctuation and 
the Robertsonian Methodological Approach 
As a further prerequisite to the study of Robertsonian theory, it 
is essential to enquire more deeply. into tile nature of the industrial 
fluctuation which Robertson sought to explain, and to examine the 
manner in which he set about explaining it. 
The nature of industrial fluctuation 
From the beginnin~Robertson was fully occupied with explaining 
the causes of industrial fluctuation;· Such fluctuatfon, he accepted, 
exhibited a cyclical nature, with the trade cycle in European countries 
lasting on average between 7 to 10 years; the American counterpart he 
observed may last as little as 2 to 3 years. (1) He did not devote any 
consideration at all to Kondratieff's long cycle, and declared: 'we 
had better wait a few centuries, until tl1ere are more of these objects 
under the microscope, before making up our minds whetl1er there is 
anytl1ing >'cyclical" about them'. (2) His Study is an attempt therefore to 
explain both the dOlmturn and upturn of the business cycle, and as such 
constitutes a complete theory of fluctuation. 
The trade cycle was more than a cycle in prices or credit in 
Robertsonian literature. Indeed it is the fluctuation in output and 
employment which is stressed above all else in the early works. (3) The 
clearest description of fluctuation that one finds in published 
, 
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material is contained in his BPPL. 'rhe cycle is: 'a quasi-rhythmical 
movement in the level of prices, in the level of money profits, and 
tl)e level of employment'. (4) He continues by arguing that such movements. 
imply the existence of corresponding movements in the volume of produc-
tion and consumption. Although all capitalist countries were subjected 
to this trade cycle, the phases of the cycle were not synchronised 
f·ram country to country, nor did each country suffer the same degree of 
(5) fluctuation in each phase of the cycle. 
Robertson was critical of work which did not place sufficient 
emphasis upon output and employment. In his review of Tugan-Baranowski (6) 
he complained of its preoccupation with the circulation of credit, and 
its neglect of fluctuations in output and consumption. Later, in 1926, 
he accused Sir Ernest Benn of failing to take account of the problem 
of general unemployment. (7) The general over-concentration on price 
fluctuations Robertson thought was excusable to Some extent, since 
price indices were much more reliable, and available, than indices of 
(8) 
employment. The major concern of his Study in 1915, however, was 
with fluctuations in real national income; but, as he pointed out in 
1948, (9) alti10ugh he considered this to be.a main innovation, he 
. (10) 
claimed no great originality for it, citing the work of A.C. Pl.gou. . 
Not only did Robertson regard the trade cycle as being different 
between countries, he also observed that the characteristics of the trade 
cycle witi1in each country would vary from one cycle to the next. Hence later 
he agreed with Rostow that! 'the combinations of forces within the 
moving economy are, like those in political life, in an important sense 
/ 
, 
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always net. and fresh. No year is quite like another year'. (11) He 
felt that not all depressions would be characterised by a decline in 
. (12) . 
r~eal l.ncomei nor, for example, that \-lages need necessarily always 
lag behind prices in a period of prosperity. (13) The trade cycle was 
impossible to define precisely, hence it was not surprising that by 
1915 a 'consistent and comprehensive explanation' of it had not been 
given. (14) 
All of the major works of Robertson on fluctuation also recognised 
. (15) that cycles may differ between kinds of productLon. More pronounced 
cycles will take place in construction good industries .,i th consumer 
good industries being less affected; Robertson suggested in his early 
writings that consumer good production may not declinp. in a depression. (16) 
It is the fluctuation in capital good production which is significant 
in the derivation of Robertsonian theory; it is from this that the 
(17) inevitability of the cycle, portrayed by Robertson, stems. 
Finally, with this view of the natlrre of fluctuation, one needs to 
enquire as to the reaSOn why Robertson placed so much emphasis on the 
study of variations in real income. The answer is to be found in his 
approach to the study of economics. (18) He believed that the ultimate 
subject matter of economics is economic welfare. The best indicator 
that exists of economic welfare is the level of aggregate real income. 
·Therefore, the study of economics can be mainly directed to an examina-
tion of the determination of real income; consequently it is extremely 
important to isolate th" causes of the fluctuations in real income. 
Robertson was aware that he needed to explain both turning points of 
the cycle, but he did not regard boom and depression as equal and opposite 
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evils. Although the boom contained: 'a not negligible amount of 
overl~ork and overstrain, an intensification of industrial strife, a 
burgeoning of cupic! ty and fraud' and 'the increase in real 
enjoyable income is less than it seems to be, and to many individuals 
a negative quantity', (i9) such l;'eatures >lere not as detrimental to 
total welfare as the state of depression. 
Methodology 
In ~ Robertson writes of the tools of inductive and deductive 
reasoning >lhich are available to the economist. (20) The inductive 
method, that of collecting and observing facts, of deriving . theories 
on the basis of these facts, and of testing these theories, was the 
method religiously followed by himself 40 years earlier in his Stud~: 
It is apparent that in his preparation of the Cobden Essay (which 
later became the Study) he did not carry the inductive method far enough. 
In 1913 he was deeply engrossed in a large mass of statistics relating 
in particular to the construction, transport and agricultural sectors 
of the economy. (21) His intention at this stage was to cOlrJnent upon 
existing theory in the light of the facts he had accumulated. This 
approach had been stimulated by his critical view of those theories 
which had not at that time appealed to the facts; in particular this 
criticism was directed at the work of R.G. Hawtrey for neglecting 
statistics completely, at Tugan-Barano>lski for looking only at monetary 
statistics, and at G. Hull for not looking comprehensively at the 
statistics he was supposed to be examining. (22) It >las Pigou >lho 
encouraged Robertson tc gO,beyond this negative npproach, to the second 
/ 
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stage of the inductive process and to formalise his own theory of 
fluctuation. (23)· Robertson remained faithful to the use of statistical 
enquiry in economics throughout his writings. His review in 1929 of 
the work undertaken by wedglwood on the distribution of wealth clearly 
shO\<s his great respect for thorough statistical enquiry. (24) Although 
he had less respect for the questionnaire approach as a means of 
appealing to the facts in economics. (25,-
The first edition of the Study brought with it the final Robertsonian 
step into inductive reasoning, such that it was not only a 
synthesis of existing theories of fluctuation, but a positive contribu-
.(26) t~on to trade cycle theory. It was also indicative of a very 
important Robertsonian belief which will recur over and over ag·ain in 
the following chapters. All theories have some validity; different 
the6ries may be relevant at different times. Not all trade cycles are 
identical, not all trade cycles are therefore to be explained in an 
identical fashion. (27) The danger with most theories is that they tend 
. (28) to over-estimate their own ~mportance. The economist cannot be'mas-
queradfug as a man of science in a universe not of cells and atoms but 
of passions and volitions'. (29) Economics is a study of human responses. 
/ 
Responses might differ over time, such that the explanation of economic 
events will vary. Looking back in 1948 on his Study, Robertson felt 
that he had allowed his own enthusiasm to overcome him, such that he 
had resolved to force every statistic 'to tell a story'. (30) A story 
on occasions which was incorrect, or, if correct, did not remain so 
indefinitely. 
/ 
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This belief goes a long way to explaining his distrust of the 
mathematical approach to theorising, of which he never made significant 
UE\e. (31) Although the economist should utilise statistics, (32) he should 
exercise care in his use of mathematics. In particular Robertson 
directed this warning against the use of mathematical models of the 
trade cycle, a usage which grew stronger over the years. Such models, 
although probably useful, over-simplified the explanation of the trade 
cycle and tended to create a neglect of those forces acting upon the 
cycle which were either exogenous to that particular model or were 
difficult to fit into the model in a mathematical form. Consequently 
the forces endogenous to that particular model received an emphasis 
in the explanation of the cycle. The degree "to which cycles are self-
generating became over-estimated. In this respect the role of innova-
tion in the trade cycle, and the lumpiness and discontinuity of the 
investment process, which Robertson chose to emphasise in explaining 
the cycle, had been excluded from the popular models of the cycle. (33) 
The use of such limited mathematical models tended in turn to over 
simplify the remedies available for economic ills. (34) In addition 
Robertson remained sceptical that econometric methods could be used to 
complement the mathematical model; this scepticism stemmed from a 
doubting of the continued stability of the parameters of mathematical 
models over time, and was sufficient for Robertson to conclude that 
there is a probability that 'more truth will ••••• be wrung from the 
interpretive studies of the crude data' as in his Study. (35) 
! 
/ 
, 
/ Two other features of Robcrtsonian theorisi.ng must be emphasised 
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at the outset. Firstly, from the 1915 Study onwards,Robertson always 
felt that he could examine the micro-economy and gain from elis analysis 
explanations of the cycle in aggregate economic activity. He adopted 
what could'be called a 'structural approach' to the cycle, arguing 
through the effects of various sectors of the economy upon the aggre-
t 
(36) ga e. In this ma.nner he avoided the criticism which he had raised 
against R.G. Hawtrey, that it grossly underestimated: 'The effects of 
a dislocation in one trade upon the volume of production in other 
trades'. (37) Secondly, and no less important, he always used in 
theorising a dynamic and not static approach; this is most evident in 
the period analysis of BPPL(38) and in his criticism ,of Keynes' General 
Theory. (39) 
/ 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Robertsonian Theory of Industrial Fluctuation - An Outline 
Introduction 
In this chapter the skeleton of the Robertsonian theory of 
fluctuation is examined, Subsequent chapters will concentrate more 
fully upcn important aspects of this theory; and trace the origins and 
influences upon it, putting the flesh upon the bones. 
The direction which the views of Robertson on industrial fluctuation 
were to take is evident from his early work undertaken in the course of 
his preparations for the Study. In a paper read to the Royal Statistical 
Society, he chose to examine evidence relating to the gestation period 
of investment, and the length of life of investment. (l) He did not at 
this stage formalise his theory. .' (2) A review of Good and Bad Trade 
again gives some indication of his early views. He accused ne\. work 
on commercial crises of having a: 'determination to burrow below mere 
monetary phenomena follcwed by the same relapse into monetary terms at 
(3) 
all critical stages of the argument'. Hawtrey's work was, in his 
view, no exception to this generalisation. 
Robertson by contrast was already committed to emphasising the 
importance of over-investment in the cycle. He complained of: 'that 
recurrent tendency of the business community to an over-investment of 
its resources in fixed capital which ••••• common observation suggests 
is'the dominant characteristic of modern fluctuations'. (4) The same 
I 
/ 
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comment was repeated word for word in a review of the work of M. Tugan-
Baranowski and A. Aftalion; (5). Tugan-Baranowski l1as regarded as 
placing too much emphasis on monetary factors; but Robertson l1as much 
less critical of the l10rk of Aftalion, and interesting comparisons can 
be made of their theories, (6) particularly in relation to the role of 
inve~tment. It is not surprising therefore that, when his first book 
appeared, strengthened by Pigou's encouragement to 'dig down to real 
fa~ts,,(7) Robertson was to emphasise real as opposed to monetary causes 
of the cycle, and to present a 'real' theory of fluctuation dominated 
by the inherent features of a capitalist economy with a heavy dependence 
upon the investment process. As ~uch it was the first theory of its 
kind in British literature. 
The movement from depression to recovery 
The theory of industrial fluctuation builds upon a micro-economic 
analysis of the causes of fluctuation in output in particular industries. (a) 
This is not meant to imply that the fluctuation of a particular indust~y 
~Iill necessarily cause a significant movement in aggregate output; but 
Robertson did acknowledge the interdependence of industries believing 
that fluctuation could be transmitted .from one sector of the economy to 
the next, in particular from the agricultural to the industrial sector. (9) 
An expansion of aggregate industrial output out of the depression 
will occur when either the supply of p::oductive effort offered by the 
labour force is increased, or the average productivity of each unit of 
effort is increased. Significant changes in either are invariably to 
, 
be'found'where the cause of an expansion in a particular industry can 
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be more generally applied to other industries at the same time. The 
cause most emphasised in Robertsonian literature is the occurrence of 
an invention which raises the average productivity gained from each 
unit of effort supplied. In 1915 Robertson also stressed the influence 
of an increase in agricultural production, caused by changing weather 
conditions, I<hich brings a fall in the exchange value of agricultural 
relative to industrial produce. This change in relative prices would 
create an increase in the amount of aggregate effort supplied by the 
labour force, and hence increase industrial production. (10) This is 
indicative of' how changes in one sector 'of the economy are regarded as 
potentially exerting a significant influence upon aggregate production. 
Robertson also argued that agricultural abundance may raise business 
confidence, increasing the expected returns from investment, and boosting 
the production of capital goods. (11) 
In addition, the expectation of an increased productivity of con-
struction goods(12) may be sufficient to generate a general recovery. 
Here the increased attractiveness of IDvestment is anticipated by a 
revision in the marginal utility of capital goods relative to that of 
consumer goods. This revision is normally undertaken as a result of any 
one of three events, either because of L~e wearing out of a large, pro-
portion of the existing stock of capital goods, or the discovery of nel" 
territories and consequently nel< areas for the application of capital 
goods, or the occurrence of a legal or physical invention. 
The, above causes of the upturn of the cycle demonstrate four 
/ 
important general features of Robertsonian theory: 
/ 
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1) the real nature of the causes of the upturn. Monetary 
forces, in particular the extensi.on of credit, are 
not the cause of the upturn. Banks may respond to an 
increased demand for credit during expansion, but this is 
a symptom of the cycle and not a force instigating the 
cycle. 
2) the emphasiS placed upon the fluctuations that occur in 
capital good production through the cycle. It is the 
marginal utility of capital goods which varies; the 
marginal utility of consumer goods is relatively stable. 
Hence the cycle is primarily one in the demand for I'apital 
goods and in turn the production of such goods. ll3J 
Later Robertson did acknowledge that a variation in(r~r 
demand for consumer goods may set, off the recovery. 
3) the fluctuations in output are in response to movements in 
" prices. Each of the potential causes of expansion acts 
firstly upon the level of prices of some goods relative 
to those of others, especially the prices of capital goods 
relative to those of consumer goods; it is this change in 
prices, bringing in'turn a change in the margin between 
price and cost, which leads to the response of 
industry to expand output. The change in prices is not 
however the cause of fluctuation but the means of trans-
mitting the original cause to the volume of production. 
In other \;ords producers react to price signals which 
reflect the underlying cause of fluctuation. 
4) The ability of changes within particular sectors of the 
economy to have substantial repercussions upon the 
aggregate level of economic activity, sufficient in 
fact to cause the existence of a trade cycle exhibiting 
large swings in employment, prices and production. 
The causes of the do~~turn 
The theory of fluctuation put forward by Robertson is normally 
classified as a non-monetary, over-investment theory. (15) This section 
suggests that this is a justifiable classification on the grounds that 
the crisis is seen to be caused by over-investment, and th" factors 
generating this are non-monetary in nature, and associated with inherent 
characteristics of the capitalist system of production. 
/ 
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In the same I'ay that the upturn is stimulated by all increase in 
the marginal utility of capital goods relative to that of consumer 
gqods, so the dOl'nturn is brought about by a dOlffil'ards revision in the 
marginal utility of capital goods, bringing a contraction in the prod-
uction of capital goods. 'rIds do=ward revision is an effect of the 
over-l.nvestment occurring during the expansion. The characteristl.cs of 
the upturn therefore guarant.ee the inevitability of the do.mturn. 
The increased marginal utility of capital goods at the trough of the 
depression.stimulates invcstr.Jent and brings recovery; but this invest-
ment I'ill be excessive for a number of reasons. 
An increase in the price of a commodity during a period of recovery 
provides an inducement to investment. The length of time necessary-for 
investment to be realised, that is its gestation period, (16) maintains 
high prices by delaying the additional supply of consumer goods that 
I'ill be forthcoming. As a consequence all produ.cers are tempted to 
react to the high prices. The general ignorance as to the amount of 
investment other producers are undertaking leads to over-investment; 
but eventually producers must realise that.an excessive increase in 
the production'of consumer goods must result from the over-investment. 
Prices fall and recession must follow: 'the longer therefore this 
period of gestation, the longerl'ill the period of high prices continue, the 
greater >fill bB. the Dver-invBstmentand the more severe the subsequent 
depression'. (17) But recession can occur before the increased production 
of consumer goods caused by investment reaches the market. The 
realisation that the close of the gestation period I'ill yield an 
excessive additional supply of conS1.L",er goods leads t.o a collapse in 
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the demand for capital goods before this additional supply is forth-
coming. Producers expect that further investment will involve a sacri-
. 
fice of present enjoyment disproportionate to the enjoyment which will 
be afforded by the new consumer goods which it is proposed to create. (18) 
Over-investment is no more theln a failure of the economy to maintain the 
ideal distribution of production between consumer and capital goods. (19) 
During the boom the average productivity of a unit of effort will 
decline. There will be a growth of real costs of production as pro-
ducers resort to less efficient methods of production and organisa-
, (20) (21) t10n, and to employing 'incompetent and over-tired' labour 
and more expensive', Semrces of supply of raw materials. Profit margins 
diminish and output contracts. 
Depressions are seen to be aggravated by what Robertson calls the 
'imperfect divisibility and intractability of the instrument'. (22) 
The scale of production and the large size of the unit of investment 
act so as to tempt the producer to enlarge his capacity toa greater 
extent than would be required to meet demand. Similarly the intracta-
bility of investment, by which is meant the inability to withdraw pre-
vious investment (because of the period of time required to close 
down and then reopen, and the consequent cos,,<s inVOlved) would aggravate 
the depression. The proposition that, the length of the life of an 
instrument of production might affect the duration of the cycle also 
cOmr.landed some support from Robertson. Investment might exhibit lumpi-
ness caused by its life-span and the need for replacement. An initial 
b~st of investment would lead to periodic lumps of replacement invest-
/ment determined by the life-span of the capital good. 
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Although agricultural abundance is seen as a possible cause of 
the upturn, agricultural shortage, and the consequent alteration of re 1a-
tive prices of agricultural and industrial production, does not merit the 
same role in explaining the downturn of the cycle. Small agricultural 
crops will be damaging to the boom, but are only of secondary importance 
as the cauSe of collapse to ~ those forces causing over-investment. (23) 
In later writings, even less emphasis is placed upon the possible impact 
of agricultural change upon the. cycle; this is possibly a reflection 
of the diminishing contribution of agricultural production. to aggregate 
output in most western economies. 
The major cause of collapse therefore is the diminishing attrac-
tiveness of investment during the boom; but in 1915 Robertson had some 
sympathy with the thesis that investment might be excessive in relation 
to the amount of saving available. (24) The stock of consumer goods 
during the boom might not be sufficient to allow the investment inten-
tions of producers to materialise. This stock represents the real 
saving available for investment, the finance ~lhich c.11ows the invest-
ment to be undertaken until a further expansion in consumer good out-
put results at the end of the gestation period. If the availability of 
consumer goods is inadequate for the cormnunity to live upon whilst a 
greater proportion of resources ~ devoted to capital good production, 
investment has to be postponed or abandoned and capital good industries 
are plunged into depression. Robertson had. no sympathy in 1915 with 
those over-investment theories which lay the blame of the downturn 
upon the failure of the commercial banks to supply the loanable funds needed 
, 
to match the investment, that is upon the failure of monetary saving to 
/. (25) / meet l.nvestment demand. A shortage of ~l saving is a possible 
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cause of the crisis, but the crisis will occur anyway \1hether or not 
such a shortage exists when the marginal utility of capital goods is 
devalued relative to that of consumer goods. 
The inevitability of the cycle and the role of monetary and psychological 
factors 
Under a capitalist system there is bound to be an inevitable dis-
continuity in achieving economic progress. ,A steady rate of economic 
progress requires continuity in the rate of growth of capital equipment, 
but this continuity is made difficult by the indivisibility and durability 
of fixed capital. The final comment of Robertson in his Study is to this 
effect: 'out of the welter of industrial dislocation the great permanent 
riches of the future are generated'. (26) This vie" is also emphasised ir. 
later publications. (27) Looking back on BPPL in 1949, Robertson comments 
that he was anxious at that time to differ from the orthodox view which 
he saw as wanting stabilit.y in output, achieved through price stability, 
which in turn could be brought about through banking policy. Output and 
price stabilit~' are not always compatible and fluctuation in output is 
sometimes desirable: 'under certain conditions an exceptionally 
rapid expansion of output, and under others a contraction of output -
the former associated with a rise and the latter with 'a fall in the 
general price-level - must be regarded, on a balance of considerations, 
. • (28) 
as economlcally deslrable'. He acknowledged that this later 
. (29) 
emphasis had been prompted bY,~he work cf both Wlcksell and Cassel. 
In evidence to t~e Macmillan Cow~ittec he is similarly disposed to 
argue that: 'a feature of modern industrial progress, partly aggrava,ted 
by,'avoidable causes but partly inevitable, is thnt it proceeds dis-
( 30) 
/continuously - in lumps and by jumps'. The remedy for such 
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fluctuations may be more damaging than the disease. If a capitalist 
system is to be maintained cyclical movements in economic activity are 
a~ unavoidable consequence of the features of tile investment process and 
(31) 
are in fact desirable if the economy is to progress. Fluctuation 
can therefore be regarded as appropriate or inappropriate. 
It is in relation to the generation of inappropriate fluctuations 
l,n output that one encounters monetary and psychological forces acting 
in Robertsonian theory. He was aware in 1915, and 'more so in his later 
publications (especially in the 19205), that two theories of fluctuation 
were gaining most support from British economists; these "ere the so-
called monetary and psychological theories.(32) Robertson was not con-
vinced by either theory. The role of both monetary and psychological 
factors was to exaggerate cyclical movements set in motion by the real 
forces acting upon economic activity. Monetary expansion or contrac-
tion could neither send recovery on its way, nor end the boom; similarly 
the absence of errors of optimism or pessimism on the part of business-
men would not eliminate the trade cycle. However Robertson felt that 
monetary expansion could take the price level beyond the point required 
to bring about appropriate changes in aggregate output, and hence 
facilitate unwarranted expansion which inevitably resulted in depression. 
Conversely monetary restriction might depress the price level belo'" its 
(33) 
appropriate level in the dOl-mturn. 
I 
Psychological factors could 
equally enlarge the boom, or the depression; optimism generates further 
over-investment in the boom, pessimism damages investment in the 
depression. These forces therefore were additional to those creating 
over-investment in the previous section, leading to inappropriate 
• (34) 
fluctuations in output. 
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Some Preliminary Conclusions 
Several important, features of the Robertsonian theory of fluctua-
tion emerge from the last two,chapters and will be stressed in the 
analysis of the following chapters: 
; , 
i 
/ 
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a) Robertson, is the first British economist to stress the role 
of real' factors and not monetary factors in the trade 
cycle. 
b) Even before the publication 'of the General Theory, he is 
very much concerned with the problem of unemployment, 
and with fluctuations in output and investment. He is not 
solely concerned with the price/credit cycle in his early 
publica tions. 
c) He favours an empirical approach to the study of industrial 
fluctuation. He believes that the activity of individual 
sectors has "repercussions throughout the economy. These 
repercussions are transmitted through price movements. 
d) He distrusts the model, building approach to cycle theory, 
believing that such mcdels oversimplify the true situa-
tion. 
e) The causes of recovery are more important in Robertsonian 
theory than the explanation of t,he downturn, since the 
boom is believed to breed its own destructicn. Recovery 
is caused by the increased attractiveness of investment. 
This is the result of one of the following: 
f) 
i) exceptionally good crops in the agricultural 
sector, 
ii) an increase in the'need to replace instruments 
of production in some important trade or groups 
of trades, 
and above all else, 
iii) the occurrence of an invention in some important 
trade or group of trades. 
Recovery does not require an initial increase in the demand 
for consumer goods. The marginal utility of consumer 
goods remains relatively constant. Robertson observed 
that/in general, consumption fell during a revival. He 
did not lay much stress on the accelerator in 1915, but 
in later writings he did acknowle~1i.le 'tha't recovery can 
begin in the consmnption trades.(3J) 
, 
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g) The downturn of the cycle results from over-investment. 
Robertson put forward a non-monetary, over-investment 
theory of the cycle. The temptation to over-invest 
results mainly from the repercussions on the volume of 
investment of its gestation period. 
h) Depressions are aggravated by the 'imperfect divisibility 
and intractability of the instrument' and the longevity 
of the instrument. But these features of investment 
also mean that fluctuation in output and employment is 
to some extent desirable or appropriate. 
i) Monetary and psychological factors might be responsible 
for undesirable changes in output. They cannot instigate 
the trade cycle on their own, but need the prior impact 
of real forces to set the cycle on its way. 
j) Over-investment leads to over-production relative to 
particular demands. This brings depression. The' teln-
porary gluttability of large groups of particular human 
wants' (36) is seen as a leading cause of the depression. 
The decline in the marginal utility of capital goods 
causes the downturn, bringing a decline in the demand 
for capital goods. It was in this respect that invest-
ment may be excessive. It may not be excessive in 
relation to the availability of real or monetary saving 
during the boom, as other theories held. 
In the following chapters a more detailed examinaticn is given of 
these crucial aspects of Robertsonian theory. In Chapter 4 the role of 
the price mechanism in the cycle will be observed and the links between 
micro and macro economic activity explored in a more rigorous analysis 
of the causes of expansion. Chapter 5 will delve more deeply into the 
theory of the crisis. Chapter 6 will look at the implications of fluc-
tuation in agricultural production for the industrial cycle; Chapter 7 
will examine the role of psychological and monetary forces in the cycle 
and extend the analysis to consider Robertson's views on the accelera-
tion principle, on the under-consl~ption theories, and give a preliminary 
indication of the links between Robertsonian and 11arshallian theories. 
The operation of saving in the cycle became the focus of discussion in 
,. 
,the economic analysis of the inter-liar period. This will be the subject 
! of Part II of this thesis. 
I 
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48 
,(33) DHR, BPPL, p.39, also see later DHR, LEP, pp.4l2-4. 
(34) DHR, SIF, pp.239-40. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Causes of the upturn 
Robertson began his study of industrial fluctuation in 1915 by 
considering the forces which instigate variability in output within 
particular ind'lstries. This was proceeded by an investigation as to 
whether fluctuation in one industry could be transmitted to other 
industries such that q cycle in aggregate output. is exhibited. The 
negative answer he found to this question prompted him to enquire as to 
whether the cause of fluctuation in a particular industry may be simul-
taneously causing fluctuation in other industries in the economy. 
Bearing this approach in mind, this chapter begins by examining the 
Rob<!rtsonian explanation of fluctuation in particular industries and 
, 
shows the role of price movements in linking the initial cause to the 
change in output it creates. It then outlines the causes of fluctuaticn 
which are regarded as potentially having a significant impact upon 
several industries at anyone time. A closer examination is also under-
taken of the theoretical framework utilised by Robertson. (1) 
The causes of fluctuation within particular industries 
There are two possible causes of changes. in output within a par-
ticular industry, the first and less important here, is a fluctuation 
in supply attributed . largely to the nature of fixed capital within 
that industry. This will be discussed in rel<'ltion to the causes of the 
downturn of the cycle. (2) However it is relevant here to enquire as 
I 
I 
, 
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to the influence of cost changes upon the volwne of production.. The 
second is a fluctuation in the demand for the product of that industry' 
. 
which brings a variation in its price; either fluctuation, whether it 
be supply or demand, by changing costs or prices, will be responsible 
for yielding a change in the profit margin. This, in turn, will act 
(3) 
as an incentive to either expand or contract output. There is 
nothing especially original about this approach in 1915; it is very 
much within the Narshallian tradition. (4) 
Fluctuations in costs 
In the Study the relationship between costs and desired output 
within an industry is treated as an empirical question. Changes in 
cost, and corresponding changes in output, are examined in both consu-
mer and construction good industrie~. (5) The theoretical relation 
which was expected to be found, and which is postulated more clearly 
in BPPL, (6) is that an increase in costs will tend to diminish output 
by shrinking profit margins; a fall in costs will raise profit margins 
and provide an incentive to produce more. Concentrating upon the 
period 1890-1910, Robertson finds that for the cotton, jute and woollen 
industries, that is three industries depending upon an annual harvest 
of the raw material, prosperity and depression fluctuate in accordance 
with the cost of the raw material. (7) Similarly, in the construction 
good industries, which include coal, shipbuilding and iron and steel 
. (8) 
production, it is found that increasing cost brings depression (and 
vice versa); but Robertson is not convinced by the t.hesis put forward 
by G. Hull and J. Lescure (9) that fluctuations in cost.S are invariably 
• I 
. 
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responsible for cyclical movements in the construction good industries. 
Empirically this is disputed because little correlation is obtained 
between falling raw material costs and the level of investment under-
tak h ' h d "k' 1 (10) en; 19 costs 0 not appear to prevent 1nvestment ta 1ng pace. 
The conclusion is reached that cost fluctuations on the majority of 
occasions in construction good industries do not have a profound influence 
upon the output cycle in these industries but merely create 'tentative 
oscillations and false starts'; (ll) only in.one respect are cost 
fluctuations significant. (12) This is where, in the case of the upturn, 
the lowering of costs has been caused by the occurrence of invention. 
The application of invention to the production process in an industry 
may not immediately stimulate prosperity, but on most occasions 
Robertson believed that it did act so as to raise the receipts of the 
industry and boost investment. ' 
In invention therefore >le have the primary cause of a fluctuation 
/ 
in costs in the construction good industries, which yields variability 
in 'investment and output within these industries, this is our first 
clue as to the cause of the upturn in macroeconomic activity in 
Robertsonian theory. 
Fluctua tiors in demand " 
Robertson gave two further reasons why an industry mi,ght be 
encouraged to alter its scale of operation-because of forces ori the 
d d th th th 'd (13) ema.n ra er - an e supply S1. e. Firstly, if an industry revises 
its demand for the products which it can receive in exchange for its 
I 
own production, then this will lead to an alteration in its own level 
I 
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of output. Again the emphasis is upon the importance of this within 
the capital good and durable conSumer good industries. The desire for 
stlch goods is likely to vary depending upon the existing stock of goods 
in the hands of consumers or producers; a war or an earthquake, or 
some extreme happening which destroys this stock, will stimulate an 
increased desire for these goods; (14) but more especially, demand, as 
well as supply, will be influenced by the occurrence of invention(15) 
which raises the desire for capital goods. Robertson cites the impact 
in this respect of inventions relating to railways, electrical power, 
diesel power, and iron and steel manufacture. (16) 
Secondly, the output of an industry may increase in response to 
a rise in the exchange value of its product, that is a rise in its 
real demand price, (l{) the number of units of other products that can 
be gained in exchange for one unit of its own production. (18) In this 
respect fluctuations in agricultural production which are 'due to a 
variation in -the bounty of nature' are very important. (19) Whether the 
output of an industrial group is expanded as a result of a good harvest 
depends upon the demand elasticity of that industrial group for agricul-
(20) tural produce; but agricultural change is not the only possible 
cause of an alteration in the exchange va.lue of an industrial product. 
A reduction in the operating costs of other industries may increase 
the real demand price; here again the forces of invention and innova-
tion may be at work; (21) in addition the change in taste for the product 
of an industrial group may impose some change in the exchange value of 
that product. 
/ 
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It is apparent from this discussion that it will be essential to 
explore in more detail the connect5.on between a change in· exchange value 
(relative prices) and its effect upon output. but first we need to 
extend this micro-analysis to a consideration of the possible causes of 
an expansion in aggregate output. 
From depression to recovery 
The foregoing microeconomic analysis provided Robertson with the 
means to explain the upturn in aggregate economic activity. The stimu;' 
1ation of output in one industry cannot bring a general revival in 
output. but the forces creating an expansion in one industry may be 
acting simultaneously in a like fashion upon other industries. This is 
particularly true of two such forces, the occurrence of invention and 
the advent of a bountiful harvest. The latter is reflected in an 
increase in the exchange value of all industrial groups, and generally 
results, according to Robertson, in an extension of industrial cutput. (22) 
The former merits more attention at this point. 
The role of invention 
An invention which is widely applicable to industry will not only 
lower the real operating costs of production, bringing a 'general rise 
in the productivity of effortT , (23) but also increase the demand for 
capital goods, (24) and alter the relative prices of products; this 
causes industrial output to change. Invention may lead to an extension 
of transport facilities, as the product stimulated by it may require 
/ 
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mobility from the location of production to its markets. It may also require 
the assistance of the iron and steel trades in its application to 
industry and therefore boost output in that important sector of the 
economy. During the final stages of depression there is usually a 
decline in production costs as the productivity of labour 
increases and production techniques are improved. (25) The possibility 
of applying an invention during the depression acts so as to increase 
the marginal utility of capital goods relative to that of conswner 
goods. The invention stimulates an increase in the expected produc-
tivity of capital goods and boosts the demand for such gOOds. The 
consequence is asignificant change in the output of the capital good 
industries, with no necessary change at the beginning of recovery tn 
consumer good output. But this is only a temporary rise in the 
marginal utility of capital goods. Once the invention has been fully 
exploited, given the durability of capital equipment, then the demand 
for capital goods must fall. Hence the offspring of the boom is a 
depression. The most relevant feature of· the cycle therefore is the 
volatility of the output of the capital good industries relative to that 
of the consumer good industries. (26) The conviction of the Study is 
that fluctuations in the marginal utility of construction goods 'furnish 
, 
the key to the most important aspects of modern industri.al fluctuations'. (27) 
This theoretical view of the upturn has strong .support in the 
statistical enquiry in the Study. This is found in the booms which 
occur as a result of inventions in the electrical industry (1902-7), 
raih<ays (1872), and in the steel industry (1882). Later, in 1926, 
i ~obertson is able to add the innovations relating to oil power which 
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are seen as being responsible for recovery in 1912. (28) 
However, not all inventions will bring recovery. It is important 
to 'distinguish between two possible implications of invention. 
FirstlY,invention may be such tilat it can be applied in a group of 
industries simultaneously, or within the majority of firms witilin a 
large industry. This would be the case, for example, where a new 
source of power can be applied throughout industry, or a new means of 
transport utilised. Secondly, innovation in one industry may have 
repercussions upon otiler industries where that innovation cannot also 
be applied. For example, it may increase demands placed upon tile 
transport sector, or upon raw material suppliers. It was Robertson's 
belief tilat,for an invention to successfully generate a recovery, it 
must be such that it could be introduced in a large group of trades; 
it would be unlikely for the repercussions of an invention within one 
industry to be sufficient to create a general revival. (29) 
Emphasis must also be placed upon tile point that invention in ~ 
particular sector of the economy can bring a general revival. The 
stimulation of output in one sector is not necessarily at the expense 
of a diminution of output in otiler sectors; most industries can, and 
do, prosper at the same time, yielding a net expansion of output rather 
tilan a redistribution of the total product between industries. (30) 
/ 
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This belief i.n tile importance of the role of invention and 
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innovation in the cycle continues right through to LEP in the 1950s. 
The application of a ne" invention, or the new-found application 
o~ an old invention, is still regarded as the cause of most 
upturns in the 19th century. (31) The only notable shift in the 
Robertsonian argument first' appeared in the late 1930s. (32) This 
is indicated by a greater support for the argument that'the 
accelerator is operative in most cycles, and that expansion need 
not necessarily start in the capital good industries but may 
originate in the consumer good industries (as the marginal utility 
of consumer goods increases relative to that of capital goods). 
This new-found faith in the accelerator persists again into the 
1950s, and in his Cambridge Lectures. (33) 
The role of invention - the influences upon Robertsonian analysis 
It is apparent from the publications and correspondence of 
Robertson that there were no positive influences from other econo-
mists upon him in his emphasis upon invention in promoting economic 
revival. His Cambridge contemporaries had not in 1915 acknowledged 
the importance 'of real factors in the cycle. Pigou was in fact 
criticised by Robertson for underestimating the importance of 
inventions in his Wealth and Welfare. (34) Later Pigou complimented 
Robertson on his discovery of the importance of invention; comment-
ing on the StudY_,he wrote to Robertson: 'the part played by 
/ 
/ 
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inventions are very good and important; this strikes me - the 
stress laid on that and its working out - as the most important 
original contribution in this book'. (35) Despite this, Pigou 
did not himself stress inventions in his later work, suggesting, 
in 1929, that real causes of the cycle could be disregarded, 
. . . (36) 
except where 'large inventions' and harvest variations occurred. 
Hawtrey had provided a negative influence in that Robertson was 
critical of what he regards as his over-emphasis upon monetary 
factors within the cycle. (37) Keynes' first venture into trade 
cycle theory was prompted by an early draft of the Study, and 
therefore was not Significant in influencing the working out 
of the Robertsonian thesis. (38) 
Equa~ly the continental literature, which closely resembled 
the content of the Study, had not penetrated Cambridge before 
1915. In retrospect Robertson wrote: 'I think that in 
1914, blissfully ignorant of a great mass of continental litera-
ture, I felt quite brave in awarding the prize apple for 
trouble making to the twin goddesses of investment - invention 
and innovation, or at any rate splitting it between them and 
the god of weather'. (39) lbis is also indicative of how far 
Robertson felt he was being contrary to British and American 
/ 
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literature on the trade cycle at that time. 
But he was not totally ignorant of continental literature. 
As noted previously he had reviewed the works of both Tugan-
Baranowski and A. Aftalion before writing the Study. (40) Both had 
put forward over-investment theories of the trade cycle, but 
Robertson had offered the same criticism of ·the work of Tugan-
Baranowski as that which he raised against R.G. Hawtrey. Tug an-
Baranowski sought to explain the volatility of expenditure on 
. (41) 
capital goods in terms of the relationship between free and 
real capital. In a depression the accumulation of free 'capital 
eventually brings, through a lowering of its price, an increased 
demand for real capital (for funds to be invested in capital 
(42) goods). This causes the upturn. Aftalion had similarly 
put the blame of the cycle upon the capitalist system of produc-
ti (43) on. Fluctuations in the output of fixed capital were 
responsible for cyclical movements. These fluctuations were to 
be explained by changes in the level of consumer demand, small 
changes bringing relatively large changes in thc demand for 
capital goods. But here it is the marginal utility of constmer 
goods 'tlhich initially increases, and which is responsible for the 
movement out of depression, a thesis not supported in 1915 by 
Robertson. So neither Tugan-Baranowski, nor Aftalion, stressed 
the role of invention in the cycle; nevertheless the work 
of bo~~ authors must have given Robertson some encourag~ent 
I 
to' support an over-investment theory 9'f fluctuation, and to 
/delve more deeply into the causes of fluctuation in the capital 
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good industries. 
The only major inspiration of the Robertsonian approach appears 
therefore to be found in the wealth of statistics which he accumulated 
for his Study and which he managed to decipher sufficiently to offer 
invention and innovation the worship he thought they deserved. 
Similarities with continental literature 
The work of three continental economists in particular has also 
laid stress upon invention, innovation or both in causing the trade 
cycle. . (44) (45)' (46) These are A. Sp~ethoff, G. Cassel and J. Schumpeter. 
Although Robertson was aware in 1914 that Spiethoff was also working 
on business cycles he had no knowledge of his views other than that he pro-
posed a shortage of real saving theory of crisis. (47) The work of 
Cassel exerted a strong influence upon Robertson during the preparation 
of BPPL, (48) but not before. Schumpeterian theory contains the closest 
resemblance to the role of innovation found in the Study, but this was 
not known to Robertson until 1927. (49) , 
Spiethoff regards a cycle as an ',unavoidable feature of capitalism.(50) 
As with Robe~tsonian theory, it is the fluctuation in investment which 
is held as the prime mover in industrial fluctuations. The change in 
investment creates a response in consumption through its effects upon 
income and output. Spiethoff was not convinced by the thesis supported 
by TUgan-Baranowski(5l) that the accumulation of loanable funds during 
the depression phase would be sufficient, in time to stimulate the 
I 
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outburst of investment that is characteristic of the outset of pros-
perity. The main factor creating this outburst is, not the pressure 
from the supply of loanable funds, but the advent of new profitable 
investment opportunities and outlets. These are a consequence of 
either new inventions or the opening up of new territories. Prosperity 
once under way becomes self-sustaining. Investment increases income, 
output and purchasing power bringing increased demand for consurner goods 
(the multiplier process) • Prices rise stimulating further investl!1ent; 
so the process continues in a cumulative fashion. Eventually the 
supply of loanable funds is diminished, blocking further expansion; 
alternatively or simultaneously, the investment outlets are exhausted 
and investment falls due to a need merely to replace worn out capital 
equipment rather than to make net additions to it, the outcome being 
recession. If new inventions and new territorial discoveries occur in 
a regular, evenly distributed manner, the resulting invest~ent outlets 
would not be concentrated at the bottom of the depression. The assump-
tion of this theory therefore is that such inventions and discoveries 
are unevenly distributed over time, since without this the cycle would 
not be generated. (52) 
The same basic ideas contained in the work of both Tugan-Baranowski 
. and Spiethoff on the cycle are repeated in the early work of G. Cassel. (53) 
In later life, however, his theory moved more towards being a monetary 
. (54) 
theory of the cycle, along the same l~nes as that of R.G. Hawtrey. 
The most interesting original contribution of his \'IOrk rests with his 
interpretation of the influence of the rate of interest on the cycle; 
be.cause of thi:> his theory differs slightly from that of Spiethoff. 
i 
61 
During the prosperity phase the rateof interest rises as a result of 
the shortage of loan capital which develops through over-investment. 
The rise in the rate of interest dampens the level of investment since 
(55) it reduces the value of capital goods. The analysis then runs 
parallel to that of J.M. Keynes and G. Wicksell, investment being taken 
/ 
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to be sensitive to interest rate changes. The fall in the rate of 
interest during the depression increases the 'value of capital goods' 
and stimulates the recovery of investment •. The importance of the rate 
of interest is thus in its effect on the profitability of invest-
ment, and therefore the volume of investment that takes place in any 
(56) given period. 
Finally, but of most importance, is the work of Joseph Schumpeter. 
To him the business cycle is a normal feature of the process of economic 
(57) development. . The underlying assumption that inventions and dis-
coveries are unevenly distributed over time, which the theory of 
Spiethoff rested upon, received much attention in the work of 
Schumpeter. He emphasises the role of innovation in the cycle. This 
takes the form of either changes in production or transportation methods, 
changes in the organisation of industry, the opening up of new markets, 
(58) 
or new sources of raw materials, or the introduction of a new product. 
It therefore involves invest.'Ilent. The boom consists of a burst of 
innovation; the downturn is characterised by an absence of innovation. 
Although invention may proceed at a steady rate over time, its applica-
tion to industry, that is innovation, is likely to be lumpy. Thus, 
during depressj.on, invention may occur but there is a failure to apply 
Inr.ovation requires a positive decision to invest by entrepreneurs 
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which will not be forthcoming during depression. The movement into 
prosperity is facilitated when a few entrepreneurs decide to innovate. 
Their success acts as an ex~~ple to other entrepreneurs and produces 
a 'herd like' movement of innovation, and the required burst of invest-
ment for prosperity. (59) A pre-condition for innovation is a ready 
supply of bank credit. Given this,a cumulative expansion takes place. 
The upper turning point must follow as 'depression is nothing more 
than the economic systems reaction to the boom or the adaptation to 
the situation into which the boom brings the system'. (60) Prosperity 
must come to il.n end when the new investment brought about by innovation 
has passed through its gestation period, and ultimately swells the flbw 
of consumer goods. Consumer good prices must fall, reducing profitability, 
and leading the marginal firms into liquidation. Secondly, as prosperity 
proceeds, the opportunities for further investment decline, particularly 
as the increased flow of consumer goods comes on to the market. Both 
these reasons are active in providing the downturn of the cycle. 
Robertsonian theory is most similar to this Schumpeterian analysis. 
Both make a sharp distinction between invention and innovation. It is 
not the occurrence of invention which is of significance in the timing 
of the cycle, but its application to production techniques. Innovation 
takes place on a relatively grand scale at the end of the depression, 
even though invention may be distributed evenly over the cycle. 
Robertson also, though not >lith the strong emphasis contained in 
Schumpeter's work, portrays businessmen as sheep, who will follow the 
(61) initial investment undertaken by the braver entrepreneurs. Thus 
the· trickle of innovation at the end of depression may soon be turned 
/ 
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into a torrent bringing the volume of investment required for recovery. 
This kind of business behaviour is not totally irrational. Firstly, 
since some entrepreneurs are prepared to innovate, this is taken as 
indicative of improved business conditions. Secondly, it may be that 
the sheep amongst the entrepreneurs feel that unless they also invest 
quickly, the initial burst of investment demand may bring increased 
costs in the capital good industries and make delayed investment 
unprofitable. (62) 
The theoretical fra~ework - the elasticity of demand for income in 
terms of effort 
/ 
Each of the potential causes of the upturn of the cycle isolated 
in toe last section have their initial impact upon either the agricul-
tural or capital good industries. The essential theoretical analysis 
required is to explain how the change brought about in one sector of 
the economy can be transmitted to aggregate production. Robertson has 
to show that an expansion in output in one sector would not necessarily 
be at the expense of output in other sectors, that is t.hat the potential 
causes of the upturn did not merely redistribute existing resources 
between sectors rather than enlarge total output. Unfortunately his 
exposition is confined to footnotes, and the resultant brevity does not 
aid a total clarification of his arguments. (63) 
It is convenient to divide the economy into three sectors, A, B 
and C, their products being ~, band £, to assume that there is an 
absence of money, and that production in each indushy is performed by 
(64) 
a /group of equal co-partners'. This represents a simple barter 
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economy. What will happen given either increased .agricultural produc-
tion, or the occurrence of innovation within a particular sector or 
a~ least in a number of industries within a sector? (Both changes are 
the most important sources of revival). 
Let us first consider agricultural abundance. In a barter economy, 
if sector A is e,e agricultural sector, the rate of exchange between A, 
Band C will alter. More units of agricultural produce will be obtain-
able for each unit of the products of Band C. The crucial question is 
whether or· not this situation gives rise to more or less output in B 
and C. This depends upon the elasticity of demand for income in terms 
of effort in both Band C, that is the responsiveness of. income to 
changes in the effort price of acquiring that income. (65) Concentrating 
upon the relationship between sectors A and B, a diminution in the price 
of ~ in terms of £ yields a decline in units of effort which need to be 
expended by sector B in order to acquire a uni t of income (measured in 
terms of ~). If the demand for income in.terms of effort is elastic, 
then the fall in the price of ~ in terms of b will lead to an increase 
in the aggregate effort expended on production in sector B. If it is 
inelastic then e,e decline in effort price will result in a decline in 
aggregate effort in sector B. This is shown diagrammatically below. 
Let the price of a unit of income of ~ (the effort resources 
necessary to achieve a unit of ~) fall to El' >lith an elastic demand 
for income in terms of effort curve (dldl ), the aggregate effort 
expended by sector B to undertake purchases from Sector A is given by 
the area OY1TE1 , which exceeds OY XE. If the demand for income curve ---- 0 0 
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o Quantity of Income 
Figure 1. Demand for income in Sector B in terms of effort price 
is inelastic over the relevant range (dZdZ)' the change in effort price 
results in a decline in the aggregate effort in sector B going on pur-
chases froru A (OY ZZE1 ). In a similar fashion ~le could explore the 
impact of the agricultural abundance upon the aggregate effort devoted 
to acquiring a in sector C. 
It still remains to determine the change in the aggregate effort 
which sector B will devote to the purchase of the products of sector C 
(and vice versa). This is shown in the diagram below which is a modi-
fication of the Robertsonian analysis in the Study: (66) 
, 
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o B 
Figure 2. Sector B 
z 
MU 
c 
MOL 
b 
Effort used in pro-
ducing ~ 
This diagram relates to the amount of effort expended in sector B as a 
result of agricultural abundance. The vertical axis measures the mar-
ginal utility of effort in terms of b or £(~i, (~ \ , and the hori-
. b , \ c-; 
zontal axis measures the aggregate effort used in producing b. 
o MUb shows the marginal utility of effort gained from producing ~; MU c 
shows the marginal utility of effort to be gained from producing £ at 
each level of effort expended in sector B. Hence the greater the aggre-
gate effort expended in sector B, the less effort there is available to 
expend in sector C, (this does not preclude the possibility that aggregate 
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effort in all sectors can increase as a result of the agricultural 
abundance), and the higher is MU. If B's effort demand for income is 
c 
efastic then the amount oj effort expended on ~, as a result of a fall 
in its effort price, may move from OA to OA1 • This leads to MU~ being 
displaced to MU~. Equilibrium will now be reached at E2 ~Ihere the mar-
1 ginal utilities are equated (MU
c 
~ MUb) 1 before,equilibrium existed at 
El. The amount of aggregate effort now utilised by B to purchase from 
sector C has fallen from AB to A1Bl or by B1Z. Nevertheless, the aggre-
gate effort expended by sector B has increased from OB to OB1 , as a 
result of the agricultural abundance. 
o 
The steeper is MU , and the 
c 
flatter is MUb , the smaller ,.;ill be the chenge in aggregate effort in 
sector B, given the initial assumption of an elastic effort demand for 
income in that sector. 
The ultimate conclusion is that,given an elastic effort demand for 
income, agric'lltural abundance must stimulte aggregate effort in the 
economy, and consequently aggregate output, bringing a general revival. 
But the extent of this revival depends upon: 1) the elasticity of the 
effort demand for income in each sector, 2) the proportion of total 
effort devoted to purchasing from sector A; if the agricultural sector 
is small then OA and AAl will be relatively small and BBl will be dimin-
ished, 3) the rate of increase/decrease in the marginal utility of 
effort in the various sectors. 
The impact of the other main cause of a general revival, innovation, 
can be examined in a like manner. Innovation within one sector of the 
f!conomy, or a group of industries within one sector, may yield a reduc-
. . 
/tion in real costs in those industries which, in turn, may result in a 
. 
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diminut.ipn of barter prices and therefore a reduction in effort. prices 
for other sectors. W11ether or not this stimulates output in other sec-
tOrs again depends upon the elasticity of the effort demand for income. 
The fact that innovation has taken place itself reflects a change in the 
intensity of desire for capital goods in the innovating. industries, and 
a revision in their demand for income ·(in terms of e~fort) curves. (67) 
'I'his represent.s a fall in the effort price faced by capital good indus-
tries and may (again depending upon demand elasticity) result in,an 
extension of aggregate effort and hence output on their part. 
By virtue of this kind of analysis Robertson concludes: 'increased 
prosperity arising from this cause (invention, innovation) in any single 
group of trades is not necessarily secured at the expense of any other 
group, and so may legitimately, if the field over which it extends be 
sufficiently wide, be regarded as an explanation of a constructional 
. (6B) 
and a. general revl. val l • 
'rhe argument of this section can be construed in terms of price 
elasticities of demand. We have a situation where the elasticity of 
demand for agricultural produce is greater t..'1an unity. Hence a fall 
in price will bring an increase in total expenditure upon agricultural 
produce. linat Robertson is suggesting is that the increase in total 
spending on agricultural produce is not undertaken at the expense of 
expenditure in other directions. The desire to spend more on agricul:'" 
tural produce is met by an extension in productive effort, and con-
sequently a net expansion in output and income. If the price elas-
ticity of demand f,!ir agricultural produce is less than unity, a fall 
. 
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in price will reduce expenditure in this direction and lead to a 
diminution in the supply <!if effort forthcoming. 
The above analysis of industrial fluctuation does appear to be 
confined to the work of Robertson. The use of effort elasticities of 
demand for income was hOHever also utilised by Dalton to discover the 
impact of taxat.ion upon aggregate effort. (69) It was later employed 
by A.C. Pigou in his working out of the repercussions of changes ill 
(70) 
one industry· upon others during the course of the cycle. This 
represented a sophistication of his earlier work which had reached the 
same conclusion as that of Robertson on the repercussions of agricul-
tural change upon other industries. (71) 
The major criticism of this theoretical framework(72) is Keynesian 
in nature and arises where the barter economy is replaced by a monetary 
economy. Unless there is an increase in total monetary demand there 
will be no change in aggregate output; for example, an increase in 
mon",tary expenditure on agricultural produce must be at the expense of 
expenditure on otl1.er produce. Whether this criticism is valid depends 
upon the constancy of total monetary demand in t.he above circumstances. 
Clearly Robertson would argue that the change in relative prices sig-
nallillg the revival must result in an extension of the aggregate effort 
supplied by the labour force in a money economy_ The extra produce 
yielded by this additional effort will constitute an addition to total 
monetary demand. In the face of a static money supply, the price level 
will adjust to accommodate Ule increased volume ef purchases taking 
, (73) p,lace. 
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neo-classi aLanswer t the Keyn ian critic· ID 
ound some Robertso. If the r duc-
price~ 
In this section the upturn has been vim.ed in terms of an 
increase in the marginal utility of effort. It must be borne in mind 
in the following chapter, on the causes of the downturn, that the 
downturn also can be analysed by employing this framework and in terms 
of a diminished marginal utility of effort. (74) 
\ 
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Chapter 4 - Footnotes 
(1) For Robertson's comments upon the transmission of fluctuation in 
one industry to others see chapter 7,see also SIF, New Introduction 
(1948), p.xii. 
(2) See pp. 77-85. 
(3) e.g. DHR, SIF, p.4G. 
(4) See pp.lll-S.See also J.N. Wolfe, 'Marshall and the Trade Cycle', 
Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 8, Feb. 19SG, pp.90-l0l, and 
M. Friedman, ~ssays in Positive Economics, Chicago Univ. Press, 
Chicago 1953, pp.GS-G8. 
(5) DHR,.SIF, Part 1, Ch. Ill. 
(G) DHR,~, p.8ff. For example, p.9 DHR writes: 'A lowering of 
its real operating costs will increase the output which it is 
worth the while of the group to produce'. 
(7) DHR also observed that where two industries were competing for a 
common raw material (composite demand), when one industry pros-
pered, the other was in a depressed state. He gave the boot 
trade depression (1913) as an example of this, caused by pros-
perity in the leather goods trade (SIF, pp.Sl-2). 
t8) DHR, SIF, pp.S3-4. 
(9) ~,p.SSff. 
(10) Ibid, pp.SG-GO, see also DHR, EF, p.12l. 
(11) DHR, SIP, p.G4. 
(12) ~, p.GGff. 
(13) \\'here' industry is in the hands of a group of equal co-partners ,. 
(see BPPL, p. 7, and SIF p.12G). This analysis l1as applied to a 
barter economy, but DHR also thought it valid fora monetary economy. 
(14) DHR mentions also the effects of change in tariffs and taxes upon 
demand. See SIF, p.72. 
(15) DHP., BPPL, p.ll. 
(lG) DHR, SIF, p.70, BPPL, pp.lO-l!. 
(17) DHR, SIF, p.126, BPPL, p.8ff. 
(18) Provided the elasticity of demand for the commodities offered in 
exchange is greater than unity. (See PP.63-7Qbelow). 
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(19) DlIR, BPPL,. p.14. 
(20) See pp.63··70. 
(21) DHR, BPPL, p.16-17. 
(22) This depends upon the effort 
produce (see PP.63-70). 
agricultural forces in the 
(23) DHR, SIF, p.239. 
elasticity of demand for agricultural 
More will be said about the role of 
cycle in Chapter 6. 
(24) DHR uses the e~~ressicn 'instruments' of production. See~, 
p.12. 
(25) DlIR,~, p.9. 
(26) See DHR, ~, pp.183-4. 
(27) Ibid, p.157. 
(28) Ibid, pp.183-7 and BPPL, p.ll. 
(29) DHR, SIF, p.157. 
(30) Ibid, p.127. See also pp.63-70. 
(31) DHR, LEP, pp.410ff; DHR does not commit himself fully on their 
relevance for fluctuation in the 20th century. 
(32) See especially DHR, EMT, p.134. 
(33) See DHR, LEP, p.416. See also pp89-103. 
(34) A.C. Pigou, Wealth and Welfare Macmillan, London, 1912, p.447. 
Pigou writes: 'specific inventions are like enduring booms 
in Nature's bounty, and are not, therefore, of first-rate 
importance for the study of fluctuations'. (SIF, New Introd. 
p. ix) • 
(35) Letter from A.C. Pigou to DHR, 1916. 
(36) A.C. Pigou, Industrial Fluctuations, Macmillan, London, 1927, 
(second ed. 1929), p.56. 
(37) DHR, review of Good and Bad Trade by R.G. Hawtrey, Cambridge 
Review, Nov. 27th, 191~. 
'(38) Paper presented at the Hotel Cecil in 1913. See JMK, CW, Vol. XIII, 
pp.2-14. 
(31) DHR, EC, p.89. , 
, 
(40) See pp. 35-6. 
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(41) He was adamantly opposed to agricultural explanations of the 
trade cycle. 
(42) See pp. 261-80. 
(43) See, for example, A. Afta1ion, 'Le Rhythme de la Vie economique', 
Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 1921, p.278. 
(44) For A. Spiethoff's early ideas see: 'Vorbemerkungen zu einer 
Theorie der Uberprodktion', Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung 
und Volkswirtschaft 1902 
(45) G; Casse1, Theory of Social Economy, Harcourt, Brace & Co., Ne" 
York, (revised. ed.) 1932, (originally published in 1918). 
(46) J.A. Schumpeter, 'Die Wel1enbewegung des Wirtschaftslebeus', 
Archiv.fur Sozia wissenschaft und Socialpolitik, Vol. 39, 1914, 
pp.1-32, and Business Cycles, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1939, 
Vols. 1 & 11. 
(47) DHR, by 1914, had read W. Mitche1l's Business Cycles (1913) which 
included a very brief summary of Spiethoff's 'shortage of saving' 
theory (pp.8-9). Mitchell did not cover the work of Schumpeter 
. in this book. 
(48) DHR, BPPL, Introduction. 
(49) The first reference to the work of Schumpeter is contained in the 
second edition of Money (1928) p.156. Sch~~peter had published 
an article on 'The Explanation of Business Cycles' in Econo~ica, 
Dec. 1927. 
(50) See A. Spiethoff, Krisen, (op cit.) ·p.82, 'the "nonna1" is 
expansion nor depression, nar,.needless to say, crisis. 
normal of the free, money using capitalist market is the 
of fluctuations'. 
(51) M. Tugan-Baranowski, op cit. 
(52) See A. Hansen, op cit., p.300. 
(53) Particularly the first edition of Theory of Social Economy. 
published in 1918, but ready for print in 191~. 
(54) Ibid, (later editions). 
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'I'he 
cycle 
(55) Value in Casse1's analysis appears to relate to the nate.of return 
on capital goods. ' 
(56) See pp.304-18. 
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(57) J. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, p.1. 'This wave movement is 
in itself not abnormal but an essential part of economio pro-
gress, indeed I may add, the special expression of a quite 
general form of social development'. 
(58) See J.Schumpeter, ibid, pp.87-8B: 'we will simply define 
innovation as the setting up of a new production function'. 
(59) Schuropeter in fact saw this, not as a move out of depression, but 
as a move towards equilibrium, which lies between the lower 
(GO) 
and upper turning points. His analysis takes the form of 
explaining movements towards/from equilibrium. See G. Haberler, 
Prosperity and Depression, AlIen & Unwin, 4th ed., 1958, pp.8l-
82n. 
J. Schumpeter, Theory of Economic 
Cambridge, Mass., 1934, p.224. 
lished in 1911.). 
Development, Harvard Univ. Press, 
(first edition in German pub-
(61) DHR, SIF, p.39. DHRwrites: 'if a business man sees other business 
men making extensive purchases for rene>lals, it is likely to aronse 
in him a not wholly rational feeling of optimism, which will 
tempt him to engage in new enterprises of a similar character. 
(62) ~,p.39, see also Part I, Ch. Ill. 
(63) DHR, BPPL, pp.12-3, ~, pp.204-5, pp.132-3. 
(64) DHR, BPPL, p.7. This assumption avoids the complications imposed 
by making a distinction between employers and employees, between 
the interests of capitalists and wage-earners. 
(65) For a clarification of this term see L. Robbins, 'On the Elasticity 
of Demand for Income in terms of Effort', Economica, June 1930, 
pp.123-9. 
(66) Robertson.' s analysis is as follO\.,s: 
/ 
Again the procedure adopted is to look at the position of 
sector B. OU measures u~its of utility, and OX the amount 
of productive effort undertaken in sector B. UoUO is the 
curve showing the marginal utility of effort of sector 
B gained from consuming ~ or what Robertson calls the 
'marginal productivity of effort in terms of satisfaction der-
ived from consuming c'. (See DHR, SIF, p.132, p.205. 
The 'extra' utili ty derived from consuming .£ purchased by 
the proceeds in terms of b of one more unit of effort). 
If B's effort demand for income is ela1ltic then the amount 
of effort expended on a, as a result of the fall in its 
price, may move from CA to OAl • As a consequence UOUo is displaced to UlUi' where the horizontal distance 
between the curves is equal to AAl • UD measures the mar-ginal disuUlity of providing effort. Sector B is in 
equilibri~ when the marginal utility derived from effort 
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u 
o A B x 
Sector B 
is equated with the marginal disutility of supplying 
effort. Before agricultural abundance, this is at Ei' 
aft.er at E2 . The amount of aggregate effort now 
utilised by B to purchase from sector C has fallen 
from AB to AlBl , or by B1Z. Nevertheless, the aggre-gate effort expended by sector B has increased 
fronl OB to OBl as a result of the agricultural change. The steeper the marginal disutility curve, and the 
flatter the marginal utility curve, the smaller will 
be the change in aggregate effort in sector B, given 
the initial assumption of an elastic effort demand for 
income in that sector. (If the marginal disutility 
curve is vert.ical then the additional effort expended 
on buying from A will be totally offset by a diminution 
of effort used to purchase from Cl. Similarly w~ could 
trace through the effects in sector C. 
// The major deficiency in this analysis,' remedied in the 
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text/is the attempt to measure the marginal disutility 
of supplying effort in POSITIVE units. It is only pos-
sible to conceive of thi;-being positive if one inter-
prets UDUD as measuring the positive. marginal utility 
of c. Hence the greater the effort devoted to B, 
the less effort there is available for sector C produc-
tion and the higher is the marginal utility of c. This 
is the approach of the text. 
There is a further· alternative approach which the modern 
economist would perhaps take for a barter economy, but 
this bears even less similarity with Robertson's original 
. analysis. This is to assume a two sector economy, and 
to visualise the production possibility frontier moving away from 
the origin as a result of the agricultural change (sector 
A). Where the economy moves to in terms of production in 
both A and B depends upon the social indifference curve. 
(67) Consider the innovating industries: 
2 
units of income 
(68) DHR, SIF, p.127. 
A revision of d l to d, means that ~ 
more tmits of effort 
are offered for each 
unit of income (in 
terms of capital 
goods) gained. 
(69) H. Dalton, PrinCiples of Public Finance, Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Ltd., London, second ed., pp.100-8. 
(70) A.C. Pigou,. Industrial Fluctuations, pp.4l-42, and especially 
Ch. V. 
(71) A.C. Pigou, Economics of Welfare, Macmillan, London, 1920, p.8l8. 
(72) See G. Haberler, op cit., pp.157-8. 
(73) DHR, BPPL, Ch. 3. 
(74) Especially in the construction good industries. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Theory of Crisis - From Boom to Recession 
There were three types of over-investment theories of crisis known 
to Robertson during the course of his preparation of the Study. Tugan-
Baranowski(l) argued that the investment during the boom became 
excessive in relation to the supply of credit available to finance it, 
and consequently the-capital good industries suffered. Labordere and 
SpieL~off(2) proposed tilat over-investment occurred relative to the 
available stock of consumer goods required to accorrnnodate this 
investment. (This stock represented a stock of real as opposed to 
monetary saving). Aftalion-(3) believed that over-investment resulted, 
not because of a shortage of saving to finance it, but because the 
demand for capital {instrumental) goods fell below the available 
supply. (4) This was a consequence of a decline in the marginal utility 
to be gained from capital goods relative to that of consumer goods. 
This latter thesis of the three commanded most support from 
Robertson, (5) although he did have some sympathy for the real saving 
thesis. (6) In this chapter the reasons for over-invesLment taking place 
are explored in more detail. (7) It is not necessary to date Robertsonian 
theory in this context since he remained faithful to the views expressed 
/ 
here throughout his later writings. 
The gestation-period of investment 
Even before the ~tud~ Robertson had provided several hints at 
what he thought was most responsible for over-investment. These hints 
appeared as comment on, and development of, the work of Aftalion. (8) 
7B 
In his review of Aftalion's work(9) he supports the manifest importance 
of the gestation period of investment, which yields too much invest-. 
t 
(10) 
men . In his paper to the-Royal Statistical Society(ll) he 
chooses to extend the statistical enquiry of Aft,alion' s work on the 
gestation period to several English industries and considers their 
implications" for the industrial cycle. 
In his Study, the fact that investment does not instantaneously 
materialise in the form of fixed capital equipment means that· the 
boom must inevitably give rise to its own destruction. The gestation 
period brings this' about in the following manner. An' increase in the 
prices of commodities. during a period of recovery provides an induce-
ment to investment. The length of time necessary for invest.'llent to 
be realised maintains high prices because of the lag in the supply of 
additional commodity output. As a consequence all producers are 
tempted to react to the high prices. The general ignorance as to the 
amount of investment other producers are undertaking leads to producers 
over-investing, such that eventually a large increase in the production 
of commodities will result. Prices fall and recession follows. What 
is more 'the longer therefore this. period of gestation, the longer 
will the period of high prices continue, the greater will be the over-
investment and the more severe the subsequent depression'. (12) This 
particular thesis appeared in the Study despite the objection of Keynes 
\'Iho failed to appreciate that more investment could occur than was 
profitable, (13) and is supported by empirical evidence relating to the 
production of coal, pig-iron, ships, cotton and coffee. (14) This 
evidence yields the. conclusion that the period of gestation is import-
/ 
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ant in. detenilining the intensity and duration of the phases of several 
past fluctuations in output. In relation to shipbuilding Robertson 
concludes 'it should be observed that owing to the length of the 
period.of gestation the impact of several successive independent 
ripples of demand frequently exercises an effect upon the output of 
new ships which resembles that of a continuous and concentrated 
breaker'. (15) The period of gestation varies from one product to the 
next and over the course of the cycle for each product. Particular 
attention is focused in the Study on the role of the transport sector. 
Robertson appreciates the influence of the transport system on· the 
gestation period, that is the need for transport to bring capital 
.equipment to its place of usage. This often prolongs the period of 
installation of equipment. 
The gestation period however is not only responsibl.e for too much 
investment in the above cont.ext. It also aggravates t.he running down 
of stocks of consumer. goods "hich are needed to meet consumer demand 
"hilst resources are being diverted to cater for investment. The 
longer the period of gestation, the heavier the demands upon the stocks 
of existing consumer goods. (16) 
It is relevant at this stage to indicate the infl.uence that 
Aftalion had upon Robertson' s work. This influence ,/as undoubtedly 
significant since, whilst working on the Study, Robertson had written 
that Aftalion's work "as the most constructive contribution to the 
trade cycle theory ever made, >lith the possible exception of Jevons' 
/ (17) 
work.. In relation to the downturn Aftalion argued that 'the chief 
; 
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responsibility for cyclical fluctuation should be assigned to one of 
the characteristics of modern industrial technique, namely the long 
period required for the production of fixed capital'. (18). The length 
of the time period in the production of fixed capital disguises the 
amount of investment that is taking place as a result of the increase 
in consumer wants. The businessman is unaware of the extent of invest-
ment being undertaken by his fellow businessmen, and is therefore 
unable· to adjust his volume of investment according to this. The 
danger which can arise occurs when businessmen over-react to an 
increase i~ consumer demand by over-investing in capital goods. (19) 
The occurrence of over-investment during the period of prosperity and 
the increase in output of consumer goods that it eventually yields, 
culminates in a saturation of consumer· demand. The natural reaction 
to this saturation is for businessmen to curtail any further expendi-
ture on capital goods, demands upon capital good industries fall and 
recession sets in. 
From this it can be seen that there is much in Aftalion' s thesis 
which Robertson utilised in his Study. In the next section it will be 
demonstrated that Robertson was also convinced by Aftalion's emphasis upon 
the influence of the durability or longevity of capital equipment in 
prolonging the depression. However, he was not convinced in 1915 by 
his explanation of the upturn of the cycle in terms of the acceleration 
principle. (20) 
:!,he durability, imperfect di visibili ty and intractal>ili ty of capital 
equipment 
, 
" Karl Harx (21) appears to have provided the main inspiration for 
81 
Robertson to enquire.intb the relation between the length of life of 
capital and the trade cycle. Marx had argued that the occurrence of 
c;ises at ten yearly intervals could be explained by the fact that the 
average life of capital was ten years. As a consequence it was 
suggested that investment will proceed in a discontinuous fashion, with 
periodic bursts of investment every ten years followed by years of in-
activity. 
This thesis commanded some support from Robertson. His early 
statistical enquiry confirmed an average life of capital of ten years 
in ratlways and cotton spinning though not in the case of shipbuild5.ng 
or other industries!22) He observed that investment was not distributed 
evenly over time but was clustered/and that such periodic outbursts 
of investment must give rise to periodic lumps of replacement invest-
ment determined by the lifespan of the capital equipment. But/if the 
average life of capital varied from industry to industry/there could be 
no inevitability in the. cycle as a consequence of the Marxian theory 
that a burst of replacement investment would occur in all industries 
simultaneously. Nevertheless, Robertson sought to enquire whether past 
peaks in investment activity had been characterised by replacement or 
net invest.ment. He found that the evidence did tend to support Marx; 
in the case of railways, cotton, wo01 and shipbuilding investment 
activity appeared to coinci.de with the lifespan of the machi.nery 
employed. The length of life of capital was therefore another possible 
cause of the wide fluctuations in activity in the capital gocd indus-
tries which were a feature of the trade cycle. 
; 
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The imperfect divisibility of capital equipment and its intracta-
bility were also forces tending to aggravate the depression, and to 
add to the over-investment taking place during the upswing. (23) Capital 
equipment is not often employable in small units hence the investment 
decision necessitates a choice between buying an excessively large-
sized unit of investment or none at all. As a consequence, if invest-
ment takes place, the additional output which it may eventually 
generate could exceed the·additional demand·for which it was undertaken. 
This type of occurrence·was regarded as most severe in the public 
utility services. (24) Such .industries, the notable examples being the 
railway and electricity industries, require heavy expenditure on 
capital equipment in order to create a large continuous network of 
such equipment. (25) 
The reverse argument also holds true. Because ·of its indivisi-
bility, investment is intractable. It is impossible· in some industries 
to close down, or lie idle, capital.equipnient as a result of a shortfall 
in demand. Robertson gives a comparison of the coal and pig iron 
industries. Intractability is more extensive in the coal industry 
where the lying.idle of capital equipment would be unwise in two res-
pects. The closing·down of colleries is costly, particularly if pro-
vision has to be made also for their possible re-use, and it may repre-
sent a danger to the work force. The closing down of a blast· furnace 
is a decision which, although still costly and perhaps inconvenient, 
can more lightly be undertaken; even so, this is also a good example 
. of the indivisibility of capit.al equipment. The failure to keep in 
i 
use one furnace may herald a significant drop in the total output of 
83 
the iron producer. (26) 
C0nclusion 
In this chapter the strength of the real forces responsible for 
the crisis has been witnessed. These real forces are represented 
primarily by the gestation period of investment, but also by its dura-
bility, its imperfect divisibility, and allied with this, its intrac-
tability. Working together during the upswing, these features of 
investment lead to an excessive outlay upon capital e(luipment which 
ultimately depresses the marginal utility of these goods relative to 
that of consumer goods. The inevitable result is a·downturn in the 
capital good industries and the onset of depression. 
/ 
/ 
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Chapter 5 - Footnotes 
M. Tugan-Baranowski, op cit. 
M. Labord~re op cit., A Spiethoff, op cit. 
A. Aftalion, op cit. 
DIiR, SIF, p.240. There is a stage reached during the boom when 
further investment would: 'involve a sacrifice of present 
enjoyment disproportionate to the enjoyment which will be 
afforded by the r.ew consumable goods which it is proposed to 
create'. Also BPPL, p.95n 'the primary reason for construc-
tional depression is a perfectly sensible downward revalua-
tion, on the part of individuals and corporations, of the 
advantage of possessing instruments'. 
DHR, Evidence to the Macmillan Committee, Section 11, p.323. 
See PP.157-65. 
See pp.38-42. 
A. Aftalion, op cit. 
DHR, Review of A. Aftalion, op cit.,Economic Journal, March 1914, pp.SI-9. 
Ibid, p.851 but without further elucidation he contends that 
this is 'an aspect of that doctrine of quasi-rent long familiar 
to English readers'. 
DIiR, 'Some Material for the Study of Trade Fluctuations', 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, January 1914. 
DHR, ~, p.15. 
See JMK, CW, Vol. XIII, p.4ff. 
DHR, SIP, pp.I5-l8; 
DHR, EF, p.113. He suggests that the gestation period may be 
exaggerated by government interference in relation to ship-
building. (See~, p.82, also JRSS (1914) p.162). 
DHR, SIF, p.178. 
DHR, Review of A. Aftalion, op cit., Economic Journal, Harch 1914, p.S8. 
A. Aftalion, 'The theory of Economic Cycles based on the 
Capi talistic Technique of Production' • Review of Economic 
Statistics, October, 1927. Similar emphasis was made 
in his earlier work uith which DHR "as familiar. 
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(19) Afta1ion illustrates this point by using the following analogy: 
If one rekindles the 'fire in the hearth in order to warm 
up a room, one has to wait a while before one has the 
desired temperature. As the cold continues, and the 
thermometer continues to record it, one might be led, 
if one had not the lessons of experience, to throw 
more coal on the fire. One would continue to throw 
coal, even though the quantity already in the grate 
is such as will give off an intolerable heat, when 
once it is all alight. To allow oneself to be guided 
by the present sense of cold and the indications of 
the thermometer to that effect is fatally to overheat 
the room! 
Taken from G. Haber1er, op cit., p.136. This was not a metaphor 
appreciated by DHR (see his review of A. Afta1ion) op cit. 
(20) See pp.99-103. 
(21) K. Marx, Das Capital, vol. ii, part ii, ch.9. 
A11en & Unwin, 1938, London, vi, p.211 see 
for the Study of Trade Functions', Journal 
Statistical Society, January 1914, p.165. 
(22) DHR,~, p.165ff. 
(23) DHR, SIF, Part I, Ch.2. 
(24) Ibid, p.31. 
English version 
DHR, 'Some Materi.a1 
of the Royal . 
(25) In other words, it is of no use building a railway part of the 
way from A to B, if passengers wish to be carried all the way 
to B. 
(26) DHR, SIF, pp.32-36. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Agricultural Forces in the Trade Cycle 
Many of the continental over-investment theories had developed as 
a critical response to agricultural theories of the cycle. (1) In con-
trast to this, in this section, we find Robertson extending considerable 
importance to agricultural forces, particularly in generating a recovery. 
Approximately one third of his Study is devoted to an examination of the 
relation between crop production and industrial activity. This, despite 
the position held by economists in 1914, that: 'to exhibit any leaning 
towards celestial or crop theories was indeed, to invite the suggestion 
that one ought to go to see a doctor'. (2) 
Two branches of agricultural theories 
Two variants of agricultural theories were already well established 
prior to 1915. Robertson was well aware of both of these. (3) The firs·t, 
and more extreme, gained only limited support in SIF. This was associated 
with W.S. and H.S. Jevons in the U.K., and with H. Moore in the United 
States. (4) It hypothesised a connection between climatic conditions and 
a cycle in agricultural production, the agricultural cycle in turn causing 
the industrial cycle. 
On the basis of statistical observation, W.S. and H.S. Jevons pro-
posed that the cycle in spots on the sun created cyclical weather condi-
tions, bringing a cycle in crop production. W.S. Jevons' theory was a 
result of a comprehensive study of the records of English trade from 
I 
1721 to 1878; in this he estimated that the average time lapse bet>leen 
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commercial crises was 10.44 years. Evidence on the 9ccurrence of sun 
spots gave the sun spot interval to be 10.45 years. From this he pro-
po~ed that: 'it seems probable that commercial crises are connected 
with a periodic variation of weather affecting all parts of the earth, 
\ 
and probably arising from increased waves of heat received from the sun, 
and concluded: 'judging this close coincidence of results, according to 
the theory of probabilities, it becomes highly probable that two periodic 
phenomena, varying so nearly in the sa'lle mean·period, are connected as 
(5) 
cause and effect'. This precise theory was to perish not on the mis-
use of statistical methods, in that correlation does not necessarily 
imply causation, but upon the revision of the observed length of the 
sunspot cycle. 
This revision of the sunspot cycle stimulated H.S. Jevons to revise 
his father's theory in 1909, (6) still maintaining the causal link between 
crop cycles and business cycles. Using meteorological evidence which 
put the period of solar radiation at 3~ years, H.S. Jevons attempted to 
show empirically the existence of a 3~ year periodicity in crop yields. 
As·the trade cycle is of 7 to lO~ years average duration, he concluded: 
'the impulse from the harvest comes every 3~ years, so that trade fluctua-
tions must fit into the nearest multiple of 3~ years', (7) that is, it 
takes more than one period of good crops to initiate a boom period. 
~'hus a single trade cycle 'ias no longer seen to be revolving on the basis 
of a single crop cycle. 
The theory of H. Moore was based upon substantial statistical 
evidence, and benefited from the availability of newfound statistical 
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techniques (correlation and regression analysis). The evidence presented 
related to rainfall data in the crop-producing areas of Ohio and Illinois. 
Moore found that: 'the weather conditions represented by the rainfall 
in the central part of the United States, and probably in other contin-
ental areas, passed through cycles of approximately 33 and 8 years 
duration, causing like cycles in the yield per acre of the crops'. (8) 
Thisestablish~d the duration of the crop cycle somewhere b~tween that 
of W.S. Jevons and that of H.S. Jevons. This he later confirmed by 
investigating crop cycles in England and France. (9) A high correlation was 
shown to exist between crop yields and certain business activity 
indicators such as the price level of pig iron production. As ~Iith 
W.S. Jevons, he took correlation to imply causation: 'these cycles of 
crops constitute the national material current which drags upon its sur-
face the lagging, rhythmically changing values and prices with which the 
economist is more i~~ediately concerned'. (10) . However, in later· work 
he was ready to accept that this natural cause of the cycle may be 
partially or totally offset by the effects of other causes, natural or 
social, regular or fortuitous. (11) 
All of the theories outlined here not only have in common the idea 
that the crop cycle causes the business cycle but each regards an increase 
in crop yields as having a beneficial effect on business activity, and 
a decrease in crop yield as having a depressing effect on industrial 
output. 
The second variant of agricul!'ural theories is typified by the ,.ork 
of Piatt Andrew before 1915. (12) It is important here since Robertson 
/ 
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explores in his Study some of the links suggested by Piatt Andrew 
beb/een agricultural and business activity. This approach seeks only to 
establish that changes in agricultural output can exert an influence 
upon industrial production. There is no disposition to argue that.an 
agricultural cycle exists at all. Piatt Andr~w concentrated his empiri-
cal investigations into five important channels through ~/hich a change 
in agricultural production may be able to influence business activity. 
These were to establish the impact of such a change upon the consumption 
of non-agricultural produce, upon the incomes of farmers and the related 
trades, upon the balance of trade and bank reserves, upon the demand 
for transport services, and upon those manufacturing trades which use an 
agricultural product as a raw material. He was led to the conclusion 
that all the expansions in America between 1872 and 1905 were initiated 
by agricultural abundance, and most of the downturns preceded by agri-
cultural depression. 
It is against this background and these·conclusions that Robertson 
set about his own statistical enquiry into the role of agriculture in 
promoting industrial fluctuation. 
Agricultural influences upon industrial fluctuation - the Robertsonian 
theory 
The Robertsonian approach to analysing the effects of changing crop 
volume and value upon economic activity has both a micro and macro 
aspect. The first line of enquiry is to ascertain the influences of 
agricultural variation upon particular industries, an approach not dis-
similar from that of Piatt Andrew. From this there are clues as to the 
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role to be dispensed by Robertson to agriculture in bringing aggregate 
industrial fluctuations. 
The most significant argument investigated is that changes in crop 
volumes will alter incomes in the agricultural sector.which, in turn, 
will have repercussions upon the demand for capital equipment. (13) The 
initial argument is self-evident. The ~ncome of farmers depends upon 
the annual crop volume. If this volume increases, farm incomes will 
rise, if the demand for the crop(s) is elastic. Less straightforwa.rd 
are the consequences of increased farm incomes for the demand for capital 
equipment. There is strong support for the proposition that the increased 
purchasing power of farmers must'raise the demand for capital equipment, 
either directly, if farmers buy more agricultural machinery and improve 
production techniques, or indirectly in that, even if increased farm 
incomes are used to payoff mortgages, or to extend cultivated land 
acreage, those receiving additional farm expenditures will themselves 
. d i l' (14) have more 1ncome to spen on cap ta equ1pment. But there may be 
exceptions to this general rule. Clearly the capital-intensive farmer 
(e.g. the wheat producer) will have greater scope for expenditure on new 
machinery; the labour-intensive producer (e.g. rice farmer), with a lack 
of substitutability of factors, cannot enlarge his purchases of 
capital equipment despite increased receipts. In addition, looking 
beyond the agricultural sector, the net effect upon the demand for capital 
goods must depend upon the type of redistribution of income that has 
taken place. If aggregate income is fixed, a wealthier farming community 
impl.i.es a decline in the real income in other sect.ors. This in turn 
may signal a decline in the demand for consumer goods "hich may have a 
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. depressing effect upon the demand for capital goods: In a monetary 
economy one might also find credit being concentrated in the prosperous 
agricultural sector at the expense of the other sectors. Robertson sought 
to resolve these opposing arguments by considering the experiences of 
both the United States and Britain. Invariably he found that the evidence 
connected increased farm incomes with an upsurge in the demand for capital 
goods, the only major exception being the building industry in Britain 
which in the period examined (1869 to 1913) was depressed during periods 
of agricultural prosperity. 
Howeve~) the enlargement of tIle demand for capital goods is not 
solely dependent upon the increase in crop values. Following again the 
analysis of Piatt Andrew, Robertson also investigated the effects of 
increased crop volume upon the demand for transport services, both land 
and sea transport. Increased crop volume puts pressure on transport 
facilities such that more rolling stock, engines, railways, and shipping 
has to be provided to cope with demand. 'l'his increase in demand will 
heighten, in turn,the demand for the products of the iron and steel 
industry. (15) 
The effect of increased crop values upon the 'consumer good industries 
is more complex. A redistribution of income in favour of agricultural 
producers must increase the demand for certain types of consumer goods, 
but the overall effect on the consumption trades is uncertain. The for-
tunes of the consumption trades in th" period 1880 to 1913 are seen to 
have been dictated by the condition of the purchasing power of the population 
in ,India, and by the income of th" Brit.ish working classes. The former 
, . 
,varied with the state of the rice harvest in India. A low price of rice 
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gave the Indian population more purchasing power to ·buy British exports, 
particularly cotton goods. This export trade was so significant(16) that 
it·dictated the course of consumer good output. (17) In this case there-
fore, agricultural change in another country is seen to have an impact 
upon British output through. its effect upon the demand for exports. The 
change in the purchasing power of the working class in Britain,through 
agricultural abundance, can be either positive or negative. If the abun-
danoe is a result primarily of a heavy wheat. crop, consumption may expand 
due to an inelastic demand for wheat which lowers total expenditure on 
wheat and raises the purchasing power of the working class, lowering 
(18) that of wheat producers. 
The impact upon aggregate output of agricultural fluctuation 
The opposition to agricultural explanations of the cycle was already 
well established by 1915. The validity of the sunspot theory had been 
questioned on scientific grounds; the sunspot cycle could not be firmly 
established and as a consequence neither could the cycle in agricultural 
. (19) production. But this did not condenm. agricultural fluotuation to a 
passive role in the cycle. Robertson believed that agricultural change, 
not necessarily regular in nature, may be one of the main forces causing 
the upturn; it is an exogenous force "ith the same possible consequences 
as invention and innovation; as such it need not be the determining force 
behind every industrial cycle. 
There are two main criticisms of this thesis I<hich Robertson had to 
overcome. Many argued that agricultural change merely redistributed a 
fixed aggregate income between, in particular, the Rgricultural sector 
; 
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and the working classes. There would be no increase in the .aggregate 
purchasing power within the community, (20) and therefore no stimulation 
. 
afforded to aggregate output by increasing crop volumes. It is in 
answering this criticism where the concept of effort elasticity of 
demand becomes relevant. (21) A change in the rate of exchange between 
agricultural and industrial products can bring a net increase in aggre-
gate output. Whether it does or not del(ene.s upon whether the effort 
. elasticity of demand for agricultural produce is greater or less than 
unity. If it is greater than unity, agricultural abundance Idll lead to 
an expansion of effort by industrial producers and consequently to an 
increase in industrial output bartered in exchange for agricultural 
produce. If effort elasticity falls below unity then industrial output 
will decline. Nevertheless the change in the rate of exchange imposed 
by agricultural variation can, not only redistribute income, but also 
raise or diminish the aggregate level of income. (22). Hence Robertson 
concludes: 'in certain circumstances the total volume of industrial 
activity may be diminished by an increase in the volume of crops, but 
that it is not likely in any case to be diminished much, and is more 
likely on the whole to be increased'. (23) 
The second major criticism is that agricultural fluctuation is so 
small that it cannot be responsible for the more extensive changes in 
industrial output in the cycle. (24) In most Western economies by 1915 
the agricultural sector contributed a much smaller proportion of national 
product than it did 60 years earlier. ·This fac·t weighed heavily 
against the agricultural theories;" but this did not automatically 
preclude the fluctuations in crop volume and value remaining from 
,having a substantial repercussion on indust.rial output. The important 
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statistical exercise undertaken by Robertson was therefore to ascertain 
the extent of agricultural fluctuation. 
• 
Inter-temporal compensation, 
.. ~ 
the storing of crops in years of glut and their release in years df 
dearth, did iron out some of the alteration in the ratio of exchange 
(25) 
which would have otherwise taken.place. But nevertheless con-
siderable alteration in the ratio of exchange still occurred. Inter-
local compensation(~6) did not gain sta~istical support. A diminution 
in the supply of a crop from one source was not offset by an increase 
in supply from other sources. Indeed Robertson took the commonality of 
weather conditions experienced by most suppliers as indicative of some 
(27) justification for the sunspot theory. Neither .. as it found t!'1at 
variation in crop yields was minimised by the increased diversity of 
crops planted by farmers. Again, the dearth of one crop was not counter-
acted by the glut in another. The overriding conclusion was that agri-
cultural fluctuation was not negligible, and could still influence indus-
trial fluctuation in 1915. 
Therefore in his Study it is apparent that considerable weight is 
given to the possibility of changing weather conditions bringing industrial 
revival; the emphasis upon it bringing a collapse is not as great. In 
general, agricultural abundance will stimulate production overall, and 
agricultural shortages would have a depressive effect. (28) In later 
work, however, the role of agriculture did not gain the same attention. In 
. BPPL Robertson concludes t.hat agricultural periods: 'do not furnish a com-
plete explanation of the periodicity of industrial output', but that 
movements .in the volume of agricultural output strongly influence both 
, 
the t.imes at which various stages of the cycle occur, and the magnitude 
,.hich cycles attain.(29) Even in his Cambridge lectures he remains 
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faithful to the influences of the soil upon a revival. But in LEP he 
excludes any reference to the effort demand analysis of his Study and 
co~centrates instead upon applying the microeconomic argument of early 
writings (particularly the influence of changing, farm incomes upon 
investment) at the macro level, (30) an approach which Keynes had utilised 
in the General Theoryo (31) 
It is not surprising therefore, with this kind of emphasis upon the 
role of agricultural fluctuation in the cycle, that Robertson took excep-
tion to thecomrnent by W. Beveridge that primary producers,and consumers 
(32' 
of their products, had been a neglected aspect of trade cycle theory. J 
/ 
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Chapter 6 - Footnotes 
(1) The work of both A. Aftalion and M. Tugan-Baranowski is a good 
example of this. 
(2) T.S. Ashton, 'Industrial Fluctuation', Economica, Vol. 18, No. 71, 
August 1951, pp.298-302. 
(3) He had read the work of the Jevons and also that of Piatt Andrew. 
Each is referred to in SIF. 
(4) W.S. Jevons, Investigations in Currency and Finru1ce, Macmi11an, 
London, 1884. 
H.S. Jevons, 'The Sun's Heat and Trade Activity', Contemporary 
Review, August 1909. 
H.L. Moore, Economic Cycles: their law and causes, Macmillan, 
New York, 1914. 
Each of these authors also suggested other causes of the cycle., 
(5) W.S. Jevons, ibid, p.215, 
(6) H.S. Jevons, op cit., p.8. 
(7) Ibid, p.8. 
(B) H.L.Moore, op cit., p.149. See the review of this book by R.A. 
Lehfeldt, Economic Journal, September 1915, pp.409-11. 
(9) H.L. Moore, Generating Economic Cycles, Macmillan, New York, 1923. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) See especially A. Piatt Andrew, 'The Influence of the Crops upon 
business· in America', QuarterlY Journal of Economics, Vol. XX, 
1906, pp.322-5S. 
(13) DHR, SIF, Part 1, Ch.S. It is interesting to note that this is 
.an argument utilised by JMK (see GT, pp. 330-1) • 
(14) DHR,~, pp.89-90. Here DHR is arguing against G. Hull, op ci~., 
p.46. 
(15) DHR, ibid, p.75. Robertson also argues that increased farm 
incomes may exer.t a psychological influence, increasing t.he 
level of investment (pp.9l-2). 
/ ; (16) Accounting for 40 per cent of British exports in this pericd. 
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(17) See the statistical evidence, SIF, pp.106-l20. 
(18) DHR,~, pp. 110-20. 
(19) DHR does go to considerable length nevertheless to defend the 
sunspot theo~y, SIF, pp.12l4-8 • 
. (20) DHR cites J. Hobson and G. Hull. A later version of this 
argument appears in G. Haberler, op cit., p.153ff. 
(21) See pp.63-70. 
(22) DHR himself was critical of writers who supported an active role 
of agricultural change in the industrial cycle without recog-
nising that more than a redistribution of income might take 
place. See his treatment of A.C. Pigou, SIP, p.137. 
(23) DHR, SIr, p.D7. 
(24) Again G. Hull was regarded by DHR as one of the main proponents 
of this. 
(25) Ibid, pp.14l-3. 
(26)- Where, because of the existence of several sources of supply, 
fluctuations in supply from one source may be offset by 
opposite fluctuations in other sources. 
(27) DHR, SIF, p.145. 
(28) The-exceptions being the slumps. of 1921-4 and 1929-32. The latter 
SllliDP he viewed, in his preface to the 1948 edition of his 
Study (p;xi), as partly the result of a glut of agricultural 
products, but at the same time this depressive influence was 
counteracted by a stimulus to house-building brought about by 
low food prices. House-building was affected largely by the 
level of wheat prices; although the causation is obscure 
Robertson (Study pp.118-l20) concluded, on the basis of statis-
tical evidence, that lower "heat prices meant lower expenditure 
on wheat, and increased spending by families on shelter. -
House-building as a consequence was stimulated. 
(29) DHR, BPPL, pp.14ff. 
/ 
(30) 'It (revival) may occur-to meet a demand arising out of abundant 
harvests, either directly, through the farmers' purchases of 
equipment and the like, or indirectly via the pressure on rail-
way and shipping capacity, or more indirectly still, through 
the optimism generated as t_o the prospects of the producing 
areas'. (LEP, p.409). 
(31) JMK, GT, Ch. 22. 
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(32) A comment made by l'l. Beveridge in Full Employment in A Free Society, 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1944, p.305. It i5 indeed a surprising 
comment since Beveridge himself had researched on this topic in 
the 1920s.· (See his 'Weather and Harvest Cycles', Economic 
Journal, Vol. 31, December 1921, pp.429-~52). See also DHR, SIF, 
(1948), p.x. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Robertsonand the Alternative Theories of Industrial Fluctuation 
, 
As a final aid to achieving a clearer perspective of the Robertsonian 
theory of fluctuation, it is worthwhile to survey its relation with alter-
native theories; in particular to survey here the Robertsonian standpoint 
on the operation of the accelerator in ~he cycle, to examine the role of 
psychological and monetary forces in the cycle, to >litness the reaction 
cif Robertson to the, under-consumption school, 'and to clarify the extent 
to ,.,hich Marshallian economics influenced the theory of fluctuation. (1) 
The acceleration principle and the cycle 
Aftalion's work is the source of Robertson's knowledge of the accelera-
tion principle in 1915. (2) He had argued that-a small change in consumer 
demand during the depression would be sufficient to create a much greater 
change in the demand for capital goods. The level of investment in any 
(3) period is determined by the rate of change in consumer demand. Modern 
macroeconomic textbooks are now littered with numerical examples of this 
principle which show the initial magnification of capital good production 
as a result of a small change in constuner demand; this is followed, 
because of the durability of capital equipment, by a sharp diminution in 
the demand for these goods. (4) All go to prove the point which Aftalion 
was anxious to make, namely that the volatility in the cycle is to be 
found principally in the capital good industries and not in the consumption 
trades. Hence Aftalion asserts that the existence of the capitalist 
system of production:' 'has caused the appearance and repetition of 
economic 'cycles'. (5) 
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Robertson, in the Study, does acknowledge that there is a possible 
link between changes in 'the demand for consumer goods and the amount of 
investment subsequently taking place. At the micro level an increase in 
demand will raise prices, and hence the margin between prices and costs; 
this margin in turn will help determine the producer's investment 
decision. (6) T11e essential point here is that the transmission mechanism 
from the change in consumer demand to investment is through price changes; 
this contrasts with the usual statement of the accelerator "Ihere prices 
are constant. The general impression gained from the Study is of its 
scepticism of the importance of the acceleration principle in causing 
miicro-industrial revival. (7) This is borne out of the contention that 
the marginal utility of consumer goods remains fairly stable over the 
cycle. (8) (Although it would not necessarily follow that this stability 
creates a stable demand for consumer goods ovel:" the cycle. If, for 
example, ,income is changing through the cycle so too might be consumer 
demand even if the marginal utility of consumer goods' is constant) .(9) 
It is the marginal utility of capital (construction) good~ which fluc-
tuates, and which is responsible for the cycle. This fluctuation is 
primarily brought about by other sources than that of changing consumer 
demand, principally from invention and innovation affecting costs of 
production. This is supported by empirical observation which suggests 
that the period of revival in construction good industries is frequently 
. d b f 11 . . t . (10) character~se y a a ~n consumpt~on, no an expans~on. 
The scepticism over the importance of the accelerator disappears 
from Robertsonian literature by the end of the 1930s. It becomes one 
/ 
of"the main weapons which Robertson uses against Keynesian multiplier' 
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analysis. (11) In 1937 Robertson agrees with the importance which Harrod 
attaches to the accelerator in the upswing, (12) arguing that 'the 
. 
principle of acceleration deserves pride of place in any analysis of the 
trade cycle'; (13) but at the same time he recognises other determinants 
of investment, and highlights the interference to the smooth working of 
the accelerator imposed by invention. The same year, in a radio broad-
cast, (14) Robertson built a theory of f~uctuation around the accelerator 
declaring it to be 'at the root of the whole.trouble'. He did however 
point out the limitations of the principle. If idle capacity exists 
then an increase in consumer demand need not lead to an expansion in the 
demand for capital goods, merely to the reutilisation of idle capacity. 
The rate of interest, and invention, and 'all sorts of things' would also 
influence the level of investment again disturbing the precision of the 
acceleration principle. This :'-llgtcrOir continues in the post-war 
period, particularly in LEP, (15) but Robertson consistently emphasises 
that the accelerator alone is not responsible for determining investment. 
Indeed he finds some consolation in the Hicksian role for autonomous 
investment in the cycle,. preferring this role,hol<ever,to be slightly 
deflated, (16) but not totally nullified. He declares in LEP, contrary 
to his opinion in the Study, that the accelerator has all<ays for him 
taken pride of place in the cycle, (17) even though it has its limitations. (18) 
In the Study recovery begins in the 'instrumental trades' (19) and 
is eventually passed on to the consumer good industries. LEP is less 
definite than this; the expansion can begin in either capital or ccnsumer 
good industries; wherever it begins it will be transmitted from one to 
the other.(20) This ultimate faith in the acceleration principle marks 
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perhaps the most significant shift in Robertson's vie>ls on the cycle 
over his lifetime. 
The under-consumption school - Robertsonian comment 
As >lith the over-investment school of industrial fluctuation, the 
under-consumption school comprises multifarious theories. All theories, 
from the early >lork bf Malthus and Sismondi (21) to the more developed 
(22) " 
under-consumptionist stance of J. Hobson and W.F. Foster and W. 
. (23)" Catchings are not complete theories of the cycle. Each concentrates 
upon explaining the dOlmturn >lithout reference to the revival. 
The >lorks of Hobson and Foster and Catchings dre>l most attention 
from Robertson. (24) In conunon with other theories the blame for the 
crisis is placed upon an inadequacy of consumer spending. This under-
consumption in turn reflects over-saving by the community. But in what 
senSe is there over-saving? There is an increase in saving at the end 
of recovery, parallel with" a diminution in the level of consumer spend-
ing, because income saved cannot also be spent. This increased saving 
>lill flow into the capital good industries; that is, there will be an 
increase in investment financed by the additional saving. '111is invest-
ment will ult~lately bring an increase in the output of consumer goods 
at a time when consumer demand is deficient (because of the over-saving 
taking place). This leads to the Hobsonian proposition that there will 
be an optimum ra"te of saving (25) which will prevent the inadequacy in 
consumer demand arising during" the recovery. The major cause of under-
consumption is the maldistribution of income. During the upswing too 
, 
great a proportion of total income is in the hands of the higher income 
groups, those with a high propensity to save. The remedy therefore is 
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seen to be the raising of wage levels and consequently a greater equali-
sation of incomes between the various income recipients, such that those 
who desire to consume also have t.he purchasing power to do so. 
Part 2 of this thesis will provide a more complete picture of 
the Robertsonian comment upon the under-consumption theory. The follow-
(26) ing brief observations will be sufficient at this stage: 
1) In contrast to the under-consumption school, Robertson emphasises 
the importance of investment, not consumption, as the leading force in 
I 
the crisis. It is not the gap between consumer demand and output which 
.brings the downturn, but the deficiency of demand for capital goods in 
relation to capital good production (caused by a downward revision in the 
marginal utility of these goods relative to consumption goods) .. Again it 
must be emphasised that in the Study Robertson -regarded the volatility 
of the consumption trades as relatively negligible during the upswing. 
The crisis is characterised by an over-production in the capital good 
industries, not in the consumption trades, nor in both together. 
Robertson found that capital good production tended to decline towards 
the end of the upturn before consumer good production. This also sup~ 
ported his thesis and worked against the under-consumption schooL (27) 
There are passages in the Study which do suggest, as Robertson 
admits, (28) that his theory is 'quasi-Hobsonian' in character. (29) He 
believes his theory merits this description because the downturn in the 
instrumental trades must eventually have repercussions upon the consump-
tion trades. 
/ 
2) 'rhe alternative theory of crisis which gains limited support 
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• (30) from Robertson ~n the Study bears an even greater dissimilarity 
with the under-consumptionist view. The cause of the crisis, which may 
operate before the more conventional Robertsonian over-investment 
mechanism begins to function, is the shortage of saving needed to accom-
modate the investment intentions of producers. Under-saving, not over-
saving, is the cauSe of the crisis. Saving here is defined as the stock 
of consumer goods, accumulated during the depression, which the com-
munity can live upon during the recovery, whilst a greater proportion of 
resources flow into the capital good indu~tries away from consumer good 
production.· If this stock of ~ saving is inadequate to meet the 
investment demand, investment intentions have to be abandoned, and 
capital projects left unfinished. The inevitable consequence is a 
depression beginning in the capital good industries. The under-consump-
tionist adopts a totally contrasting approach. During recovery, invest-
ment takes place whilst the supply of consumer goods is deficient. 
Eventually the capital equipment generated by investment must be com-
pleted, and will·result in an expansion in.the supply of consumer goods; 
at this stage the demand for consumer goods becomes deficient in 
relation to its supply. There is no anchor put on the advance of invest-
ment. by a shortage of saving. 
3) Less important a feature of the later work of the under-consump-
tionist, in that it is not essential to the explanation of the crisis, 
is the proposition that all saving need not necessarily flow into invest-
ment. 
. (31) This is more in keeping with the Robertsonian theory of ~nterest. 
Robertson too upholds this proposition, arguing that saving can be 
ho~rded, or used to buy titles which do not necessarily generate new 
investments. It does not however merit any special consideration in the 
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crisis, since the upturn must be characterised by an excess of investment 
over saving and not vice-versa. 
4) Finally, the means of preventing the crisis through a redistri-
bution of incomes, advocated by the under-consumptionist, did not find 
favour with Robertson. It would not be in the interests of economic pro-
gress to instigate such a redistributio~. If the capitalist system of 
production was to be retained, because of the features of investment, 
economic progress vlOuld not be steady. Cyclical fluctuation is inevitable 
and to some extent a justifiable feature of a capitalist system seeking 
to enlarge its productive capacity •. In the short-run, the wage earner 
. might suffer due to the ups-and-downs of industry, but in the long run 
. (32) he must benefit from the increase in the standard of living promoted 
by cyclical variations. 
The role of psychological and monetary forces in the cycle 
The grouping together of psychological and monetary forces is justi-
fied principally by the common role which Robertson attaches to each in 
the cycle. 'rhis is a passive role in which, although not guilty of 
causing the underlying economic instability in the cycle, monetary a.nd 
psychological forceD are regarded as potential villains exacerbating this 
instability. This grouping is also justifiable in the sense that the 
psychological and monetary theories of fluctuation were together the most 
popular theories during the most productive years of the working out of 
the Robertsonian thesis (1913-1930). 
I 
;' 
Most modern economists are familiar with the psychological theory 
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(33) . 
of the cycle put forward by A.C. Pigou. In this· errors of optimism 
and pessimism on the part of businessmen are responsible for the cycle. (34) 
Similarly, Keynes too was to lay some stress upon uncertainty and expec-
tations and their repercussions upon business activity, particularly 
investment. (35) 
By 1915 several economists .had already emphasised psychological 
factors in the cycle. Many of the previous theories mentioned also 
acknowledged a role for psychological factors in the cycle, without 
accepting this role as being the cause of the cycle. Aftal.ion recognised 
that the gestation period of investment, because of the uncertainty it 
created in relation to the investment decision, may lead to errors in 
business operations. Schumpeter also felt that the herd-like movement 
of businessmen during prosperity may be exaggerated by errors of optimism. 
However, three economists above all others in this period(36) had very 
definite views that psychol.ogical factors were of utmost relevance in 
any discussion of the cause of the cycle. These were: John Stuart Mill, 
John Mills and n.H. Beveridge. 
In 1848 John Stuart Mill wrote of prosperity being established on 
a wave of speculation and overconfidence, bringing price rises and over-
. (37) 
commltment by merchants. The bubble bursts with speculative selling, 
prices fall, and the ensuing panic leads to depression. Thus the cause 
of the crisis is the excessive speculation which cannot be maintained, 
inevitably leading to collapse. 
John Mills was of the cpinion that a cyclical movement in the minds 
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of businessmen created the cycle in trade. (38) Out of a period of 
increasing trade is bred a feeling of optimism. Optimism in turn breeds 
recklessness and over-excited trade, culminating in stagnation. Recovery 
can only take place when businessmen become optimistic once more. Hence: 
'the malady of commercial crises is not, in essence, a matter of the 
purse but of the mind'. (39) 
The tendency for businessmen to over-react is also the cause of the 
cycle in W.!!. Beveridge's theory. (40) The economic system is itself to 
blame for this, because of its lack of perfection. Lack of knowledge, 
and the resulting uncertainty during prosperity, make businessmen mis-
judge the market. Each tries to obtain for himself as much of any 
increase in demand as he possibly can. The aggregation of this reaction 
brings over-production, falling prices and depression. Business pessimism 
grows and this exaggerates the contraction. 
In response to this psychological theory, Robertson firmly upheld 
that both optimism and pessimism must be induced by specific occurrences. (41) 
It was in discovering what these occurrences were that the true sources 
of the cycle l~y. Optimism and pessimism alone could not bring industrial 
fluctuation. The underlying causes of both the cycle, and the over- or 
under-reaction of businessmen, rested with the real forces already dis-
cussed. Increased crop volume and value is seen to breed an 'infectious 
spirit of confidence'. (42) The gestation peridd of investment dis-
guises the ~~ount of investment taking place, heightening the uncertainty of the 
business.environment,. and:consequelitly ,the 'probability " of'errors of 'judgement by 
, (43) 
entrepreneurs. At the heart of every error by businessmen there is 
, 
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an underlying real cause. In a world of imperfect knowledge, errors 
will occur and may exaggerate·the economic instability present through-
out. the cycle. Robertson did not seek to deny this. Indeed he Was 
critical of models of fluctuation which did not afford this psychological 
interference. Of Harrod's model he states: 'we are conducted through 
a severely rational and frictionless world in which nobody ever loses 
his head or makes mistakes or finds himself in a bottleneck'. (44) 
Although otherwise largely sympathetic to Harrod's real theory, 
Rohertson is critical of its neglect of psychological factors. There 
is thus a kind of halfway house for psychological forces, not totally 
. innocent of damaging steady progress, but certainly not the first 
offenders. (45) However, whereas the capitalist system of .production 
renders the economic cycle a permanent and justifiable feature in the 
interes.ts of long-run economic progress, additional fluctuation at the 
hands of psychological forces is not, according to Robertson, justifiable 
and should be eliminated through government economic policies. (46) 
All business cycle theories express views on the operation of 
monetary factors during prosperity and depression. Output, employment 
and economic activity in general are facilitated by the monetary system. 
Investment requires finance, consumption requires money income, the 
value of production is measured in money terms, and the whole process of 
exchange is undertaken using money. Since the cycle is concerned with 
these economic variables, a neglect of the role of money is a sad omis-
sion from any theory. So far the theories outlined have accepted the 
role of money as being a passive factor in the cycle, not actively 
causing prosperity or depression, but merely allowing or aiding the 
, . 
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cycle to occur. ~lonetary theories give a much stronger active role to 
money. (47) Dominant amongst these theories is that of R.G. Hawtrey, 
whLch first appeared in 1913 and had a significant early influence upon 
Robertson 's work. (48) 
Consumers' outlay, which in Hawtrey's analysis means expenditure on 
both consumer and ,capital goods, is determined by the quantity of 
money. As the quantity of money varies, or more specifically as expan-
sions and contractions of bank credit take place, so consumers' outlay 
, (49) is affected and the cycle ~s generated. The onset of prosperity is 
brought about by an expansion of bank credit and will persist as long 
as the expansion of credit continues. (50) A cycle in bank credit is a 
consequence of: 'an inherent tendency towards fluctuations in the banking 
institutions' (51) through: 'the too ready acceptance of reserve pro-
, 'd d't l' ,(52) port~ons as a gu~ e to cre ~ po ~cy • The theory rests upon the 
sensitivity of merchants to changes in the rate of interest. Thus, When 
the banks find.', that they are able to extend bank credit, they lower the 
cost of borrowing, and this stimulates the merchants to utilise credit. 
Merchants use the credit to increase their demands upon producers 
(increased orders). Stocks are rtm down, and producers respond by 
increasing output to match demand, and to replenish stock levels. To 
do this involves increased utilisation of the credit facilities offered 
" 
by the banks, A general rise in employment acts in promoting wage 
increases which, in turn, lead to increased consumers' outlay. Finally 
the banks feel they are no longer able to offer cheap money, the rate 
of interest rises and this chokes off the expansion. (53) 
, 
, 
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The discussion of saving, investment and the rate of interest in 
Part 2 of this thesis will make a more detailed enquiry into the 
behaviour of monetary forces in Robertsoniall theory. It has been stressed 
that one dominant objective of the Study was to pull back the monetary 
veil and to observe the real forces causing the cycle; later work, 
particularly BPPL, was to fit monetary factors into the cycle, but money 
remained of secondary importance. (54) An expansion of credit could not 
on its own initiate the cycle, but it could, ·in going beyond the expansion 
needed to finance justifiable investment, lead the cycle to higher peaks, 
and to even worse depressions. The manner in which this aggravation of 
the cycle occurred was not dissimilar from arguments found within the 
monetary theories. (55) In the Study, for example, an expansion of credit, 
or an increase in the volume of money, will raise the general level of 
prices and encourage additional investment. This inducement may come 
about in several ways, (56) by raising the confidence of the business 
community, by lowering the real burden of the debt of· the businessmen, 
and more specifically the real cost of the'utilisation of bank credit, 
. (57) 
and by lowering the real'costs of product~on. An excessive expan-
sion of credit may also keep the money rate of interest at a relatively 
low level in comparison with the rate of return offered on new invest-
ment opportunities; (58) equally a contraction of credit, and an 
increase in its cost, could not of its own bring the down-turn. It 
could, however, take it beyond that level dictated by real forces 
tlrrough a fall in prices and a diminution in profit ~,rgins and also 
through an increase in the money rate of interest rendering marginal 
investments unprofitable. (59) 'rhe cycle in credit therefore aided and 
/ 
abetted psychological forces; the excessive follies of businessmen in 
; 
, 
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the UpSWil1g may be facilitated by a ready supply of bank loans at low 
cost; their undue pessimism in the downturn is encouraged by a lack of 
finance available to undertake further investments, and by immoderate 
rates of interest on new loans. The principle deficiency of monetary 
theories was in not appreciating that the true limitation upon expansion 
was not the restricted ability of the banking system to create credit, 
but the real stock of consumer goods which the economy could draw upon 
whilst the structure of production was biased towards capital goods. (60) 
Robertson and the Marshallian tradition: some preliminary observations 
J\ 1>"'-
Naturakfacit saltum (61) had been the motto of Alfred Harshall, and 
indeed could equally have been that of Robertson. As Harshall sought to 
develop the early economic" of D. Ricardo and J. Mill, so too did 
Robertson strive to present his theory as a continuation of Marshallian 
economics. Thus, one would not expect Robertsonian theory to be markedly 
different from that of Marshall.; the differences in fact are mainly 
differences of emphasis rather than sharp contrasts; but these differences 
are concentrated in the theory of fluctuation and are less pronounced in 
relation to the important Marshallian micro-economic topics of supply and 
demand analy"is and producer/consumer surplus. 
Whereas Robertson devoted most of his research to studying industrial 
fluctuation and economic dynamics, Marshall had been preoccupied with 
comparative statics and I<ith micro-economics in his earlier writings. 
. (62) 
'l'he Econom~cs of Industry had offered two chapters on crises and 
(63) depression, but it was not until his final work, Money Credit and Commerce, 
, 
that Marshall chose specifically to study industrLil fluctuation. This 
makes the task of interpreting the Marshallian theory of fluctuation 
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more difficult, since it has to be assembled from isolated references 
to the trade cycle. 
This tendency to neglect the trade cycle, in contrast to Robertson, 
may in some >lays reflect the classical disposition towards theories of 
fluctuation. Such theories grew out of an attack upon Say's Law which 
argued that there was no possibility of over-production~ The classical 
economists in general had sought to uphold Say's Law, but at the same 
time did acknowledge that maladjusted production could exist (where, for 
example, investment took place in unprofitable outlets). Marshallian 
economics was also to take this approach; Marshall declared that: 
. (64) 
'though men have the power to purchase they may not choose to use 1t'; 
but this was not sufficient evidence against Say's Law to encourage 
Marshall to devote more of his energies to a study of industrial fluc-
tuation. (65) Nevertheless Robertson felt that his 0I1n treatment of the 
law of markets grew out of a less than exaggerated respect for it from 
(66) his teachers. Clearly he was prepared-to go further in his disres-
pect for Say's Law than Marshall. The over-investment theory was indica-
tive of the belief that an economy can produce more of particular ],inds 
of commodities than it desires; there can be over-production in relation 
to individual types of goods. More significantly Robertson agreed l1ith 
Aftalion that over-investment can in turn bring about a general over-
production. (67) 
Strictly in accordance with the Marshallian tradition and contrary 
to Keynesian analysis, the Robertsonian causes of the cycle influence the 
levels of output and employment by changin] prices and hence profit mar-
gins; in Keynesian economics prices remain stable at less than full 
113 
employment; the movement from depression, through recovery to boom, is 
not characterised by increasing prices until unemployed resources have 
been fully utilised. (68) That price movements occur in response to' the 
! 
underlying causes of fluctuation is a fairly widespread feature of trade 
cycle theories in 1915 and did not belong exclusively to Cambridge 
economists. Robertson had read of the role of fluctuating prices and 
profit margins in the works of, not only Marshall, but also G. Hull and 
w. Mitchell (69) in preparing his Study. Hull in fact regards the varia-
bility in the price of construction goods as the cause of the cycle; 
when this price falls entrepreneurs are willing to undertake 'optional 
construction,(70) and this creates the ups>1ing. Mitchell highlights the 
role of profits in the business cycle; (71) the economic system functions 
on the quest for profits. In the depression, factor costs, and the cost 
of bank credi~ fall; profit margins therefore increase. This sets recovery 
in motion as businessmen react to the high profit margins by increasing 
production. A cumUlative expansion occurs and prices rise. Businessmen 
anticipate even higher prices in the future, and economic activity 
(72) 
accelerates. The downturn comes when stresses occur in the pros-
perity phase. (73) At the peak of the cycle the rate of increase in 
costs exceeds the rate of increase in prices; bank credit becomes more 
expensive and less abundant; profit margins fall, and recession takes 
place. Although Robertson may therefore have inherited directly from 
Marshall the inclination to use prices as a vehicle for transmitting 
fluctuation to aggregate output and employment, he was certainly not 
distracted from this course by much of the alternative literature 
available to him in 1915. (74) 
, 
, 
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The main ingr8dients of Robertsonian theory are in fact the same as 
those found in Marshall's work, it is in the proportions in which they 
are mixed where the two differ considerably. Marshall too had recognised 
that fluctuation tended to be concentrated in the capital good indus-
tries, (75) and that fluctuations may be caused by: 'wars and rumours of 
wars, by good and bad harvest, and by the alternate opening out of promis-
. ., (76) th th 1 f d' 1ng new enterpr1ses ..... I ese are e rea causes oun 1n 
Robertsonian theory. But more important than the real causes are the 
psychological forces operating in the cycle, and here we do witness a 
'clear division between Robertson and Marshall. Here the Marshallian 
view follows very closely that of John Stuart Mill and John Mills. (77) 
The chief cause of fluctuation is the cycle in business confidence. The 
downturn is the result of a lack of confidence, and the revival occurs: 
'through the gradual and often simultaneous growth of confidence among 
the many and various trades'. (78) This emphasis is not that of Robertson 
in 1915 or even in later work except that is until" !-.EP, where his argument 
bears a high degree of similarity with that of Marshall. Robertson 
writes: 'more often recovery seems to start with a gradual regrowth of 
confidence among the consumption trades, the construction trades coming 
along later'. (79) He is so convinced by Marshall that he quotes, at 
length, passages in the Principles relating to business confidence in 
the cycle. (80) But this support for Marshall in this respec~ it must 
be stresse~is more of an exception than a general rule if one surveys 
the tot~lity of Robertsonian literature. 
Finall~ in this exercise of comparison, it is essential to realise 
th<;"contrasting role of credit expansion "and contraction in the respec-
tive theories. Robertson found himself crl.tical of Marshall's contention 
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that credit expansion could stimulate investment. (81) Additional credit 
may be· provided for the revival, but it is a different matter getting 
budinessmen to utilise that credit. Marshall implies that the act of 
credit creation itself can manipulate business confidence, and boost 
investment. Credit creation can also provide the fuel for revival by 
expanding in response to business confidence during the upswing. (82) 
This latter proposition would not be denied by Robertson in that he did 
. (83) 
acknowledge that monetary forces could exaggerate the cycle. 
This is as far as we need progress in this part of the thesis. The 
following part will cast more light upon the degree to which Robertson 
. developed the !~arshallian approach, and will explore the links between 
Robertsonian theory and alternative explanations of the cycle. 
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Chapter 7 - Footnotes 
(1) The discussion of the role of monetary forces in the cycle is 
somewhat limi ted at this stage, it will be covered in more 
detail in Part II. 
(2) Although not mentioned in SIF, Bickerdike had also written on the 
Acceleratien Principle in 1914 (see Economic Journal, September 
1914, pp.427-29). See DHRs review of A. Aftalion (op cit.}. 
The Principle became associated later with the werk of J.M. 
Clark. 
(3) Nothing is said here of the time lags which may be present in 
this relation. 
(4) For one .of the most proficient discussiens of ·this, see G. Haberler, 
ep cit., p.S5ff. 
(5) A. Aftalion, 'Le Rbythme de la Vie Economique', Revue de 
Metaphysique et de Morale, 1921, p.278. 
(6) DHR, SIF, p. 92. 
(7). Ibid, pp.122-5; here the conventienal accelerator is referred te 
(without price changes). 
(8) ~,p.l56. 
(9) Ibid, p.157. 
(10) Ibid, p.125. DHR uses the argument·that the prosperity of one 
of the consumption trades, heralded by an increase in the exchange 
value of its product, will merely be at the expense .of others 
where exchange values have fallen. There will be little net 
extension of aggregate effort by producers. 
(11). See pp. 282-303. 
(12) DHR, EC, p.71. 
(13) DHR, EHT, p.179. 
(14') Reprinted in The Listener as 'Is Another Slump Coming', 28th July, 
1937, pp.174-5. 
(15) DHR, LEP, p.426. 
(16) DHR, EC, pp. 72-4. 
(17) DHR, LEP, p.425. 
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(18) ~, p.427. In LEP DHR adds that the accelerator Nill not 
operate symetrically dONnwards. 
(19) DHRS alternative title for the construction trades. 
(20) DHR,~, p.41O. 
(21) For an excellent discussion of this see G. Haberler, op cit., 
Ch. 5. 
(22) See Appendix 2. 
(23) W.T. Foster and W •. Catchings, Money, Boston 1923 and Profits, 
Boston, 1925. 
(24) DHR, 'The Monetary Doctrines of Messrs. Foster and Catchings', 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 43, pp.473-99, 1929, 
reprinted in EEA, pp.139-l62. 
(25) See.DHR, SIF, pp.235-7, also Appendix 2 • 
. (26) On the connection between over-investment and under-consumption 
theories see also H. Ellis (ed) A Survey of Contemporary 
Economic~, American Economic Association, Blakiston 1948, 
Ch.2, (written by W. Fellner). 
I 
(27) Modern macro-textbooks tend to associate a deficiency in spenjinq 
as the cause of unemployment with J~OC. What must be appreciated 
'is that JMK belonged neither to the under-consumption nor over-
investment school~. He emphaslsed that unemployment is caused 
by a deficiency in both consumer spending and investment; the 
remedy is a general stimulation of demand. (GT, p.325). 
(28) DHR,~, (1948), preface p.xiv. 
(29) Ibid, pp. 205,241. 
(30) See pp.157-l65. 
(31) See later pp.226-252. 
(32) 'Out of the welter of industrial dislocation the great permanent 
riches of the future are generated', (SIF, p.254). 
(33) A.C. Pigou, Industrial Fluctuations, Macmillan 1927. 
(34) In 1924 Pigou wrote: 'we have found as a dominating cause of 
trade cycles, wave-like" swings in the minds of the business 
world between errors of optimism and errors of pessimism'. 
(From: Is Unemployment Inevitable? London, 1924). 
(35~ JMK, 2:£., pp. 321-2. 
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(36) The pre-19l5 period. 
(37) J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Longman, Green & Co., 
1848. 
(38) J. Mills, 'Credit Cycles and the Origin of Commercial Panics", 
Transactions of the Manchester Society, 1867. 
(39) Ibid. 
(40) W.H.Beveridge, Unemployment, Longman, Green & Co., London 1909 
and 1930. 
(41) See DHR, SIF, pp.8-9, pp.38-9. 
(42) Ibid, 1'P.92-3 
(43), , See DHR, Money, (1928), pp.159, 170. 
(44) DHR, EMT, p.176. 
(45) DHR, 'Is Another Slump Coming', The Listener, 28th July, 1937, 
p.174. Boom breeds depression BUT: 'This isn't only or 
chiefly because if recovery isprdonged people begin to behave 
recklessly and greedily, though that has often happened in the 
past! 
(46) See pp.400-39. 
(47) R.G. Hawtrey, Good and Bad Trade, London, 1913. 
(48) DHR in fact saw two types of monetary theory. (BPPL, p.2). 
Hawtrey's theory was the most extreme type where: 'the trade 
cycle is a purely monetary phenomenum'. The less extreme 
theory DF~ associated with JMK (Tract on Monetary Reform) 
where monetary forces do not cause the cycle, but monetary 
policy can prevent the cycle occurring. 
(49) R.G. Hawtrey, ~cit., p.272. He states: 'A depression of trade 
is in essence a general slackening of the monetary demand for 
commodities and an expansion of trade is a general augmentation 
of the money demand for commodities'. 
(50) Ibid, p. 98. 
(51) Ibid, p.199. 
(52) Ibid. 
(53) See pp. 261-281. 
(54) A comment by DHR in the preface (p.xii) of the 1948 edition of 
, / 'Money. 
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(55) Cf.R.G. Hawtrey's theory. DHR in the SIF chose, in particular, 
to comment upon the thesis of Bilgram and Levy, The Courses of 
Business Depressions (see SIF, p.211). 
(56) See DUR, SIF; p.213ff. 
(57) The implication here is that money wages will lag behind prices 
during the recovery. 
(58) An argument which DHR used extensively in later writings see pp. 
(59) See pp.261-81. (See also SIF,pp.219-21). 
(60) This was DHR's view of monetary theories in 1915. Later he had 
reason to qualify this view as a result of the analysis relating 
to 'lacking' found in ~_ Ch. 5, see pp.16G-195. 
(61) 'Nature does not leap'. Found in the title page of A. Marshall, 
Principles of Economics, Macmillan, 1890. 
(62) A. Marshall, Economics of Industry, Hacmillan, London, (see 1925 
edition) • 
(63) A. Marshall, Money, Credit and Commerce, Macmillan, London, 1923. 
(64) DHR, SIF, ,preface (1948) p.xii. 
(65) A. Harshall (Economics of Industry, p.154) writes: 'And it is 
thought that this state of things is one of general over-produc-
tion. We shall however find that it really is not,hing but a 
state of commercial disorganisation; and that the remedy for 
it is a revival of confidence'. 
(66) DHR, SIF, preface (1948) p.xii. 
(67) ~,pp.2oo-5. 
(68) For a discussion of this point see J.N. 
Trade Cycle', Oxford Economic Papers. 
pp. 90-101. 
Wolfe, 'Marshall and the 
No. 1, February 1956, 
'(69) W. Mitchell', Business Cycles, Burt Franklin, 1913. 
G. Hull, Industrial Depressions, New York, 1911. 
(70) Defined as construction over and above necessary construction 
which consists principally of replacement investment. 
" 
(71) W. Mitchell, Business Cycles, 1927, p.107. 
(72) In his 1913 book Mitchell did not mention the acceleration 
principle. In later work he did utilise the principle in 
/' explaining the cycle. 
/ 
/ 
.I 
120 
(73) 'A slow accumulation of stresses "ithi.n the balanced system of 
business-stresses which ultimately tmdermine the conditions 
upon which prosperity rests', taken frcm Readings in Business 
Cycle Theory, p.50, (written by W. Mitchell). 
(74) K. Wicksell was perhaps the best example of an economist 
emphasised price movements in his theory of the cycle, 
his work was not read by Dim in preparing the Study. 
(75) A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, pp.163, 710-11. 
(76) Taken from E. Eshag, op cit., p.6. 
(77) See pp.l06-7. 
who 
but 
(7B) A. Marshall, Economics of Industry, p: 154. 'rhis quote continues: 
'it begins as soon as traders think that prices will not con-
tinue to fall: and· with a revival of industry prices rise'. 
(79) DER, LEP, p.416. 
(SO) Quoting from A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, pp.7l0-11. 
(Bl) DER, SIF, p.235. 
(B2) See, for example, A. Marshall, op cit., pp.710-12, and Money, 
Credit and Commerce, p.249ff. 
I~'J - i \ 
(B3) See pp.l07-1l1. 
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CHAPTER 1 
'Introduction 
The discussion of the trade cycle, and the economic problems it 
created, entered a different phase during the interwar period. 
Economists began to examine fluctuation in terms of the relationship 
between saving and investment, this is perhaps best illustrated by 
the contents of Robertson's BPPL and Keynes' Treatise. 
Much of the debate on the behaviour of saving and investment in 
the cycle took place between Robertson and Keynes. Thus it is import-
ant to gain a clear understanding of their working relationship in 
this period. This is the subject matter of Chapter 2. 
We need to go back to the Study to discover the. initial Robertsonian 
approach to saving in the cycle. In Chapter 3 the degree of sympathy 
which Robertson showed to the 'shortage of real saving' doctrine in 1915 
is discussed in detail. In the 1920s more attention was paid, par-
ticularly by Robertson, Keynes and Hawtrey in the U.K., to the concept 
of saving. In Chapter 4 we examine the Robertsonian concepts of 
, lacking' • This is essential, for the forced saving doctrine is at 
the centre of Robertson's thoughts on,not only the cycle, but also the 
behavi.our of int.erest rates and the price level. The proceeding 
i 
; 
chapters (5, 6) dwell upon the influences on the working out of the 
Robertsonian concepts of lacking, on the question of the originality 
of"automatic' and 'induced' lacking, and also compare the r:>le of 
, 
, 
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saving in Robertsonian theory with its role in the work of A.C. Pigou 
and F. von Hayek • 
• 
This brings the thesis to a consideration of the Robertsonian 
theory of interest (Chapter 7). The loanable funds theory seeks to 
establish the connection between saving, investment and the interest 
rate, and the interference to the determination of the interest rate, 
brought. about by changes in hoarding habits,and newly-created 
money. Again we will explore the origins of Robertsonian theory, in 
particular its similarities with the Marshallian theory of interest 
(Chapter 8). This leads into a discussion of the role of interest 
rates in either causing or allowing cyclical movements in output, 
employment and prices to take place (Chapter 9). Continental economists, 
notably K. Wicksell and F. von Hayek/consider~d industrial fluctuation 
in terms· of the relationship between the 'natural' and the 'market' 
rate of interest. This was also an approach developed by Keynes in 
<->\. .. 
the Treatise. It is therefore important to determine Robertson's reac-
tion to this aspect of trade cycle theory. 
The General Theory provided, for many economists, a revolution in 
economic thought. Again it was particularly concerned with the relation 
between saving and investment, and the influence of this relation 
upon the level of employment. In many ways it appeared to be contrary 
to much of what Robertson had to say before 1936. It was intended as 
an attack upon the 'forced saving' theSis, and upon the loanable funds 
theory of interest. The consumption function, relating consumption to 
income, gave rise to the multiplier process and· replaced the strong 
,/ 
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link in classical economics between saving, consumption and the rate 
of interest. In Chapters 10, 11, 12 and 13 we will examine in detail 
Robertson's response to the General Theory. Chapter 10 explores the 
implications of the multiplier for forced saving; Chapter 11 examines 
the liquidity preference G~eory and begins to assess Robertson's views 
upon it; Chapter 12 considers the liquidity preference versus loanable 
funds debate which proceeded the General Theory; Chapter 13 assesses 
the revolutionary nature of the General Theory in relation to the 
contents of Robertsonian economics before 1936. 
The General Theory assumed that prices would be constant at less 
than full employment. There was no discussion of price determination. 
Chapter 14 therefore concentrates upon Robertson's explanation of how 
the.price level is determined, and gives some indication of the behaviour 
of prices over the trade cycle. 
It has been necessary to omit a number of topics from this part of 
the thesis; in particular there is little detailed coverage of the 
debate concerning the definitions of saving and investment which followed 
Keynes' Treatise, neither is there a detailed discussion of the simi~ 
larities between Robertson's loanable funds theory and that of the 
Swedish School. Interested readers will find these topics already 
adequately covered in Conard's Theory of Interest. 
/ 
/ 
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CHAPTER 2 
Background to the Robertson-KeynesDebate 
'In the early 19l0s and again in the 1920s I did do a bit of 
scrambling' towards the frontier (of economic thought), firmly roped to 
the man of genius who has perished there. Sometimes I venture to think, 
I was even a.little bit in front of him; but in the end he went on 
beyond me, and it is my belief - an unpopular one, I know, but I cannot 
help it - that he got a bit off the track and set the flag in places 
where it is not destined to rest'. (1) 
Much of what follows is not only a comment upon the work of 
Robertson, but an examination of the work of Keynes in the inter-war 
period, and the Keynesian Revolution which followed the General Theory; 
for this reason it is essential that, before embarking on these excur-
sions, a general overview of the working relationship between Robertson 
and Keynes be presented, and an indication of the parallel development 
of their theories given. 
Robertson turned to the economics tripos at Trinity Ccllege, 
Cambridge in 1910. Immediately he came into contact with Keynes, who, 
in the same year, had become Director of Studi.es for 
undergraduates reading economics at Trinity College. Keynes was 
Robertson's elder by seven years. lIe had graduated from Cambridge in 
1905 with a first in mathematics, and, after spending two years in the 
Indian' Office, gained, in 1908, a Lectureship in Economics at Cambridge 
University, and, in 1909, a Fellowship at Kings College, Cambridge. 
;' 
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Both remained in Cambridge, Robertson as a Fellow of Trinity College 
from 1914 onwards, Keynes as a Fellow and Tutor in Economics, and from 
1924 as the Bursar of Kings College, until 1939 when Robertson took 
the Chair in Banking at the London School of Economics. Keynes often 
combined his duties in Cambridge with work elsewhere, such that he 
remained in Cambridge for, at most, four days each week. (2) The only 
interruption to their close proximity in this period came during the 
first world war when Robertson served in the army and Keynes worked as 
a Civil Servant in the Treasury. (3) 
In the early years Robertson undoubtedly still thought of himself 
as a student of Keynes. In 1920 he described Keynes as his master. (4) 
Later, although this great respect for Keynes remained, it is evident 
that Robertson became much closer to Keynes, regarding hinself more as 
a colleague and friend. Not even 'the most forthright of students would 
dare to challenge his master's voice in the way Robertson did that of 
Keynes from 1928 onwards. Robertson and Keynes had similar views on a 
n~~ber of issues, not always connected with economics in this inter-war 
period. As an example one can cite their views on German reparations 
after the first world war. In a review of Keynes' Economic 
Consequences of the Peace (5) Robertson supports Keynes in a flatter-
ing manner and agrees with him that the financial burden put upon 
Germany was too excessive and that this excessiveness \;,,-s caused partly 
by 'the other clauses of the Treaty; but he disagreed that these other 
clauses were umlise and suicidal. (6) Robertson and Keynes also felt 
similarly about the return to the Gold Standard in 1925.(7) Their 
political outlooks were also very compatible. Keynes took an active 
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part in Liberal Party policy proposals in the 1920s and later; (8) 
Robertson, who had been president of the Liberal Society in Cambridge 
as an undergraduate, was less actively engaged, but did contribute to 
the Liberal Party Summer Schoo1s(9) and to policy documents. (10) Keynes 
has been called an 'opportunist and an operator', who applied his 
theory when it aided a 'proposal that might win current political 
acceptance, and dropped along with the proposal when the immediate pur-
pose had been served or had failed'. (11) RQbertson could not be branded 
• so, he was not the same political animal as Keynes. 
The .:,xchange of views on economic theory - early agreement, later conflict 
How fruitful their collaboration and friendship became can now be 
satisfactorily judged by reading the correspondence between them con-
tained in the Collected writings of John Maynard Keynes. (12) The only 
major interruption in correspondence between 1913 and 1937 came during 
the first world war, and in the period of six years following it. The 
letters are on matters of substance, oft<m extending to several thousands 
of words. Much of the debate between them in the period however did not 
take place on paper. Harrod remarks: 'They had many a long talk, 
chasing the truth'. (13) Unfortunately the spoken word is lost to us 
for ever. All that ·can be said is that the printed word, formidable as 
it is, is possibly only the tip of the iceberg of the interchange 
between them. 
The earliest dialogue relates to Robertson's dissertation, which 
won for him the Cobden Prize in 1913, a Trinity Fellowship in the 
I 
; 
fol10wi~g year, and in 1915 appeared as the Study. Keynes was extremely 
/ 
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flattering about Robertson's thesis, despite having not been able to 
recommend it, above all else, as evidence of Robertson's worthiness 
of a Fellowship in 1913. (14) His opinion of the published th~sis was 
equally as high. (15) In a paper, (16) which was stimulated by the 
reading of Robertson's thesis, Keynes was critical of over-investment 
theories of fluctuation of the Robertsonian type; he accused them of two 
incorrect arguments, that more capital can be invested than is physically 
available, and that investment will proceed.beyond the point of profit-
abi.lity. Yet he. proceeds to put forward his OI,n over-investment 
theory, with much more emphasis upon banking operations and the creation 
of credit in yielding over-investment, and comes close to a theory of 
forced-saving, (17) which Robertson was later to elucidate in BPPL under 
Keynes' influence. 
The war interrupted any further development of ideas, and it was 
not until the 1920s that a renewal of the collaboration between them 
occured. Throughout the 1920s they worked very closel.y together on the 
integration of interest rate and savings/investment analysis into 
trade cycle theory, although there was primary concern with one phase 
of the cycle, both were anxious to understand the causes of unemployment. 
In turn this led to an examination of the role of banking policy in 
regulating the cycle. The two worked very closelY together on four 
(18) books, Tract on Monetary Reform, Money, BPPL, and the Treatise on 
Money, (19) although none of the books were publi.shed under joint 
authorship. There was considerable, but not total, agreement between 
them in this period, Kcynes' Tract on Monetary Reform was viewed by 
Rob'ertson as placing too much weight on the abili ty of monelary pol icy 
• 
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to get rid of fluctuation. (20) Keynes upheld the Cambridge orthodoxy 
much more than Robertson was to do in the 1920s. Writing in 1948, 
R6bertson admitted to having no great respect for Say's Law of Markets 
in his early writings. (21) However, led by Robertson in the 1920s, 
neither were to respect the traditional boundary between monetary 
theory, dealing with the demand for output as a whole, and 
price level, ·or value theory.(22) There were differences· of opinion over 
: (23) the drafts of BPPL and especially over the Treat1se. OVer BPPL the 
differences between them were largely differences of emphasis and 
methOd,· not of substance, and were reconciled before publication; 
but the differences concerning the Treatise persisted and widened. 
However,· as we move through this period, their !espective views on the 
behaviour of saving and investment in the cycle, and .on banking 
operations, and their implications for economic policy, grew wider 
and wider apart, such that by the time the Treatise was published there 
were already signs of the irrepairable breach which was finally to 
appear with the General Theory in 1936. In the 1928 edition of Mcney, 
Robertson still saw fit to write: 'my debt to Mr. J.M. Keynes ••••• 
has reached a sum which is no longer capable. of expression· in words' • (24) 
He goes on to argue that much of it should not have been published 
without Keynes' name alongside his own taking a share of the credit, (25) 
particularly chapter VIII which related to banking policy in the cycle 
and which, in a simplified fashion, introduced the forced saving 
thesis of BPPL. By 1926, the two had a.ppeared ·to reach coml!lon ground 
t 1 t 
(26) 
a as. By the time BPPL was published Robertson was obliged to 
write: 'I have had so many discussions with Mr. J.M. Keynes on the 
s~bject~matter of chapters V and VI, and have re-written them so 
;" 
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drastically at his suggestion, that I think neither of us now knows how 
much of the ideas therein contained is his and how much is mine'. (27) 
Thls agreement was crucial to the development of the ·theories 6f both Robert-
son and Keynes. These two chapters outlined the Robertsonian defini-
tions of various types of saving, discussed the role of saving in the 
cycle, developed the theory of forced saving and laid down the guide-
lines for an effective banking policy to counteract the cycle. 
That their agreement at this stage was almost total is supported 
by Keynes' declaration: 'I like this latest version, though God knows 
it is concise'. (28) And later: 'I think that your revised chapter V 
is splendid, - most new and important. I think it is substantially 
right and at last I have no material criticism. It is the kernel and 
real essence of the book'. (29) But he felt that very few economists 
would have the capacity to understand what Robertson was saying. 
Hm<ever, whilst Robertson was to remain faithful to the theory of forced 
saving developed in chapter V, Keynes was to depart from it very rapidly, 
and to be extremely critical of such a theory as it was to be found in 
Hayek's Prices and Production. (30) Forced saving was very roughly 
handled in the General 'rheory, (31) its demise in the eyes of Keynesians 
being brought about by the development of multiplier analysis after 
1936. (32) 
The Treatise on Money 
The gestation period of Keynes' Treatise on Money was ·to last for 
six years. (33) In September 1924 Keynes invited Robertson to discuss 
with him theories of the credit cycle which: 
,/ 
( 34) 
'go half-wa:,' to meet you'. 
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The" debate which was to follow was detailed and complex. In the early 
drafts of Chapter 23, which later disappeared from the final version 
of the Treatise, Keynes followed the analysis of BPPL(35) and maintained 
compatibility with the forced saving doctrine. This was in 1928. But 
by 1930, in the published work, forced saving played no part in Keynes' 
thesis. This change 6f mind by Keynes brought with it differences in 
the definitions of saving and investment, differences in their relation-
ship through the cycle, and ultimately, a divergence of vie>ls on the 
objectives and nature of banking policy in the cycle. Although, before 
. publication, Robertson partially disguised hiG inability to accept the 
Treatise, (36) he could not resist >lriting: 'I am disappointed to find 
myself still full of resistances on certain parts, - not, I think on 
the main structure'. Even after its publication Robertson still offered 
it a certain amount of flattery, - describing it as: 'marvellously 
full of ne>l meat ••••• I think the >lhole of Book VII, most of which is 
ne>l to me, splendid', (37) but he did not go so far a~ to say that he 
agreed wit.h its thesis. In May 1931 Robertson wrote: 'I should like 
to have been able to subscribe to the fundamental analysis of your 
Treatise, but the more I've studied it, the more obstacles I find in 
" (38) the >lay of doing so'. 
The substance of this disagreement will be seen in detail at 
various points throughout the follo>ling po"ges; it is sufficient 
at this stage to isolate the main areas of disagreement. These 
stem from the departures of the Treatise from the analysis of 
BPPL. Clearly the key to the disagreement was to be found in Keynes' 
neglect of the forced saving doctrine which they had put fort1ard 
/ 
togeth"r in 1926. This was felt deeply by Robertson; looking back in 
/1949 he remarked how disappointed he was that his own approach had , 
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never: , d h' ( ) k' , (39) , got un er 1.S Keynes s 1.n • He was perhaps thinking 
in particular of Keynes failure to develop the period analysis, the 
step by step approach, of BPPL. This led to differences of definition 
and terminology. Keynes' analysis used aggregate concepts of saving 
and investment, while Robertson preferred to divide saving into its 
voluntary and forced components, and investment into that relating to 
, (40) fixed capital and that relating to circulating or working cap1.tal. 
Both argued that saving and investment need,not be equal, but whilst at 
the time of >n:iting ~ they agreed as to why such inequality might 
result~ in'the Treatise Keynes found new explanations for their diver-
gence. Robertson saw Keynes ' ~tise as being much nearer to the 
classical tradition. He objected to Keynes' contention that money 
(41) 
receipts would always be spent. Looking back on this period again 
in 1949, Robertson wrote that Keynes played down the: 'gravity of the 
objections which I thought I had discovered to the policy of monetary 
stabilisation', (42) and defended the orthodox view c~lling for price 
stabilization as an objective of monetary ,policy. This showed a funda-
mental conflict with BPPL. Robertson argued there, and continued to 
argue, that it was the role of the banks to create credit to finance 
the working and fixed capital needed for appropriate fluctuations in 
output during the cycle. This credit creation might bring about 
instability in the price level. (43) Even so, it would be justifiable 
to argue that Robertson and Keynes >lere closer together on t.heoretical 
and policy issues than either 'lOre to the classical tradition at this 
time. Saving and investment need not necessarily be equal. In fact 
Keynes went so far as to argue that disparity between saving and 
invest'11cnt \ .... as the most important influence on fluctuations,. claiming 
i 
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odginality for this argument. (44) But the origin of the recognition 
, 
that saving and invesbnent need not be equal can be traced back to 
BPPL, although Robertson never advocated that the excess of saving over 
investment was the cause of a trade depression. It was merely·a symptom 
of a depression brought about by movements in the productivity of 
invesbnent. (45) 
The debate in the learned journals (46) . which followed the Treatise 
proved an arduous task for even the participants to follow. To 
Robertson and Keynes was added a third major contributor F.A. von Hayek, 
who reviewed the Treatise in 1931. (47) The complexities of the debate 
arose from differences concerning the definitions of ~aving and 
investment. (48) The debate had the outward appearance of a difference 
. (49) in terminology, but in fact it was much deeper than that. Keynes 
clearly represented the issues in the following words: '\\'hen you were 
writing your Banking Policy and the Price Level and we were discussing 
it, we both believed that inequalities between saving and investment -
using those terms with the degree of vagueness with which we used them 
at that date - only arose as a result of what olle might call an act of 
inflation or deflation on the part of the banking system. I worked on 
this basis for quite a tir,:e, but in the end I came to the conclusion 
that it would not do. As a result of getting what were, in my opinion 
more clear definitions of saving and investment, I found that the 
salient phenomena could come about without any overt act on the part of 
the banking system. Ny theory as I have ultimately expressed it is a 
result of this change of view, and I am sure that the differences 
between me and you are due to the fact that you in substance still hold 
.I 
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the old view. But I only reached'my new view as a result of an attempt 
to handle the old view with complete thoroughness'. (50) This had a 
considerable bearing on specific issues. Robertson's initial post-
publication reaction was to view the crux of the dispute as being con-
nected with the: '''price level of investment', the functioning of the 
rate of interest, and the synthesis of the new equations with those 
which bring in quantity and ve1ocity",.t 51) 
The debate is encountered in several parts of the discussion which 
follows, in the examination of definitions of saving and investment, 
(and their possible, inequality) ,the behaviour of saving in the cycle, 
the crucial question of forced saving, and also the determina-
tion of the price level and banking policy. 
Towards the General Theory 
Whilst the debate over the Treatise was still taking place in the 
learned journals, Keynes was already preparing his next and most import-
, (52) 
ant work - the General Theory. Despite their inability to come to 
terms over the Treatise, Robertson and Keynes continued to work together,. 
However, Keynes J main source of comment on .. the drafts of his new ""'ork, were 
not, as for his earlier works, to co~e from Robertson" but from the 
young generation of aspiring Cambridge economists, members of the so-
(53) 
called Cambridge 'circus'. Robertson was the first person to see 
proofs of the General Theory outside of the 'circus'. He provided 
(54) 
copious, but unsympathetic, comment upon it in February 1935. 
. (55) Keynes was anxious to avoid the terminological debate of the Treatl~. 
/ 
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Before its publication Robertson found the General Theory. difficult to 
comprehend,(56) and complained: 'a large part of your theoretical 
structure is still to me almost complete mumbo~jumbo:' (57) Not sur-
prising1y Keynes was offended by this last remark, and retorted: 'This 
book is a purely theoretical ~,ork, ~ a collection of wise-cracks. 
Everything turns on the mumbo-jumbo and so long as that is still obscure 
to you our minds have not really met'. (58) In March 1935, apart from 
minor correspondence, discussion between them ceased until after the 
General Theory. 
One of the burdens which Robertson took upon himself in his 
critical comments on the General Theory, before and after its publication, 
was to act as defender of the Marshallian tradition against Keynes' 
criticisms. He himself had not fully accepted the neo-c1assical views 
in the 1920's, in fact one could go so far as to argue that he was per-
haps its most consistent critic in that period. He did not accept the 
validity of Say's Law, he disputed the existence of any automatic mechanism 
generating full employment in advocating his over-investment theory of 
the cycle with its emphasis on real causes, and he disputed the existence 
of equality between saving and investment;. but at the same time 
he never departed from a faith in the Cambridge equation, and the real 
cash balance approach, nor from the loanable funds tileory of 
. (59) J.nterest. Nevertheless, he felt it his duty to support Cambridge 
orthodoxy against Keynes and the ensuing Keynesian Revolution. He 
regarded his own theoretical innovations an developments out of the 
Cambridge orthodoxy, and was anxious to convince Keynes that much of 
what was contained in the General Theor~ had its origins in Marshall's 
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Principles of Economics (60) or in Pigou's Industrial Fluctuations. (61) 
His defence did not arise from any personal loyalty to Marshall and 
Pigou, he "as much closer to Keynes than to either of them. Indeed, 
it "as Robertson who had taught Keynes to stray from the neo-classical 
path in the 1920s, for Keynes described Robertson as his: 'parent in 
the path of errancy'. (62) Rather he believed Keynes to be mistaken on 
a purely intellectual level. For his contacts with Harshall and Pigou 
were not close .. 
Marshall had retired from the Chair in Cambridge in 1908, and had 
been succeeded by Pigou, before Robertson became a student of Economics. 
Therefore, he had not been taught by Marshall. He saw Harshall on one 
occasion only, although Marshall remained in Cambridge until his 
death in 1924. (63) He regarded himself as on~ of the many spiritual 
grandsons of Marshall. (64) Although Robertson never corresponded with 
Marshall, Marshall did write to Robertson twice, to inform Robertson 
that he often used his Study in his preparation of Money, Credit 
and Commerce, (65) and to compliment Robertson on Money. (66) Robertson 
continued to be impressed throughout by Marshall's work above that of 
everyone else. It is indicative that for his lectures in Cambridge, 
from 1946 onwards, he recommended students to read Marshall's Principles, 
Pigou's Economics of Welfare, (67) as well as Keynes'General Theory. He 
k . . 1 'b h d' l' . t' (68) remar ed about t.he Prlnclp es: no ody as succee ed In rep aClng 1 • 
Robertson had more contact with Pigou; the influence of Pigou on 
Robertson's thesis has already been indicated, (69) and out of their 
Iwrk of the 1920s came very similar views on certain issues. (70) Even 
I 
so; it is doubtful that Robertson was closer to Pigou th",n to Keynes, 
/ 
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even in the post-General Theory period. (71) 
• 
His reaction to the General Theory was no more than a desire to see 
justice done, an attempt to make Keynes give credit where credit was 
due. He was always anxious to show to his readers the source of his 
arguments. In the original edition of his ·Study he failed to 
k 1 d b . 1 . b ' (72) ac now edge a e t to an art~c e wr~tten y Marcel Labordere. He 
felt such self-reproach over this that in the 1948 reprint of his book 
he reproduced the complete article as an appendix, writing himself a 
. brief biography of Labordere as an introduction to the article. (73) He 
, 
, 
thought that correctness in economics \'las often Cl question of degree, 
that all theories '.ere to some extent true. Therefore it· was wrong to 
completely condemn theories,in the manner in which Keynes had condemned 
parts of the Cambridge theories in the General Theory. Remember how 
Robertson had begun his first major work: 'In the deathless words of 
Dodo, everybody has won and all must have prizes'. He could never for-
give what he saw as Keynes disrespect to Marshall; for he, a.s much as 
Pigou, was a firm believer in the view that if one looks closely 
enough, , it is all in I~arshall'. 
Robertson's pre-publication comment on Keynes' handling of the 
Cambridge orthodoxy were mild in corr.parison to what followed. (74) 
Keynes accused him of not sloughthing his 'neo-classical skin' as his 
theory developed; Robertson retorted that Keynes had sloughthed his 
'nea-classical skin', but at the same time put on a pair of blinkers 
so that he was unable to take account of neo-classica.l doctrine in 
/ (75) his General Theory. Keynes believed that one of his intentions in 
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writing the book had been to lay open the main differences of opinion 
between himself and his teachers and former pupils. 
This form of attack upon the General Theory never mellOl.ed. 
Shortly after publication Robertson claimed that the General Theory 
merely rearranged existing theory and did not put: 'some new piece on 
the beard'. (76) It was criticised for exaggerating differences with 
existing orthodoxy, and for representing theory as a new addition to 
knowledge, not a development of what had gone before. Such an approach 
\ Robertson felt: 'doesn't breed a scientific spirit but the reverse -
a blind scramble to acquire the new orthodoxes for fear of being out of 
fashion'. (77) This criticism had not diminished even in LEP in the 
1950s. (78) 
Keynes accused F.V. Hayek of not giving him the .. 'measure of good-
willrthat an author deserves from a reader in his reviews of the 
. (79) 
'l'reatl.se. One cannot help but feel that Keynes was guilty, as far 
as Robertson was concerned, of the saDle offence. The Keynes of the 
General Theory chose to oVer-emphasise his departure from the doctrines 
of Marshall, Pigou and others and not to extend to them sufficient 
credit for the development of his thought. This was the offensive aspect 
of the General Theory to Robertson. The following passage admirably 
summarises how Robertson felt: 'You say I have found it difficult to 
appreciate the revolution in thought. which followed the publication of 
the G.T • ••••• No I haven't! I have disliked and mildly ridiculed the 
phrase "The Keynesian Revolution", because I think it suggests that the 
i:>novations in the G.T. constituted a bigger advance in thought on what 
/ 
13S 
had gone before than in fact they did. But that "in the end it was 
his rhetoric and his new mystique which carried the day" is indisputable! 
The truth is that they spread error as well as truth. In other words, 
not only did Keynes fail to acknowledge what had gone before, but many 
aspects of his work which had not gone before represented errOneous 
(SO) 
argument rather than the economic truth'. 
The defence of the Marshallian tradition can be seen primarily in 
his attack upon Keynes' liquidity preference theory of interest. Keynes' 
money theory of interest neglected the real forces acting upon the rate 
of interest; the neo-classical forces of productivity and thrift. Much 
of the post-General Theory debate was centred upon this particular 
issue. In addition Robertson sought to convince Keynes and others 
that Marshall and Pigou had been as much concerned with effective 
demand as Keynes had been in 1936, and that Marshall had recognised the 
multiplier process. 
A preview of critical comment on the General Theory 
Robertson has been accused by Hicks, amongst others, of examining 
the General Theory like: 'a man examining a Seurat with a microscope, 
and denouncing the ugly shapes of the individual dots'. (SI) One of the objec-
t.ives of the remainder of this part of the thesis is to determine how 
far this was true. Here Robertson's criticisms fundamental? Should 
Keynes have paid more attention to the individual dots rather than 
'flinging a pot of paint in the public's face' as Professor Wilson 
accused him of doing? (S2) 
/ 
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Mo.ggridge(83) believes that the 'General Theo.ry rests upo.n fo.ur 
building blo.cks. The first is the co.nsumptio.n functio.n,the seco.nd,the 
multiplier, the third,the theo.ry o.f investment and the fo.urth, the 
liquidity preference theo.ry o.f interest. Few eco.no.mists wo.uld dispute 
that these fo.ur blo.cks are the fundamental features o.f the General 
Theo.ry. Fo.r the mo.ment at least it is co.nvenient to. discuss Ro.bertson's 
criticisms in relation to these building blocks. It is upan these 
blocks that the strength af the General Theory depends. If Rabertsan 
showed severe cracks in these,his criticisms cauld be regarded as funda-
mental. 
It is nat surprising from the exchanges on theo.ret,ical matters in 
the earlier inter-war period that a major part of this post-l936 co.n-
tro.versy between Keynes and Ro.bertson sho.uld 'be co.ncerned with the 
relatio.n between saving and investment. Keynes attached co.nside~'able 
importance in his General Theory to the consumption function; from it 
was develo.ped the multiplier, the pro.pasitio.n that investment determines 
output and saving, and th'at the change in output will be a multiple of 
the change in investment, that multiple depending on the propensity to 
spend. This was regarded by Keynes as an attack on the classical view 
that saving and investment wo.uld be brought to equality via the rate of 
interest. Keynes, stoo.d this theory on its head. Investment determines 
saving not vice-versa, the co.nnecting variable being real incame and not 
the rate of interest. Robertsan had a number of criticisms relating to. 
this theoretical appro.ach - each of which will be dealt with in detail 
in due course. Suffice it now to say that these criticisms related 
primarily to. Keynes' definitions of saving and investment, and to the 
, 
~nfluences upon spending and saving. 
;' 
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'1'he interpreters of the General Theory derived two approaches to 
saving/investment analysis. One is to be found in multiplier analysis, 
. 
where saving and investment are instantaneously equated (because of the 
use of comparative statics). The finance required for investment to 
take place is instantaneously provided by voluntary saving, so there 
is no need either for the banks to create credit to finance the invest-
ment or for forced saving to be imposed on the public. Indeed, in 
Keynes' thesis there is no such thing as forced saving. Even if credit 
is created by the banks, prices need not rise so long as unemployed 
resources exist. In the forced saving doctrine prices rise even at 
less than full employment. Given the mllltiplier, and a static approach, 
the equality of saving and investment is guaranteed. Robertson did not 
.dispute that consumption and saving were partly determined by real income, 
as well as by the rate of interest; this had been part of his own 
theory for at least ten years before the publication of the General 
Theory. But although he accepted this, in his own dynamic approach to 
the question, there was a one period lag in this relationship. 
Robertson's main criticism fell on .. the static nature of Keynes' 
analysis, the instantaneous equality, with its implication that positions 
of equilibria are more worthy of discussion than disequilibria, and on the 
i 
/ 
fact that Keynes gave no role to the rate of interest in determining the 
equality of saving and investment. To Robertson the propensity to con-
sume/save was not stable, it was influenced by changes in the rate of 
interest, and by banking policy and the creation of credit affecting the 
desire to hoard (changing 'K' in the Cam)ridge equation). The multiplier 
could not be regarded as being precise. To this one can add criticism 
of'e,e third building block - the theory of investment. Keynes failed 
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to allow the accelerator to work alongside his multiplier. (84T. 
The second approach to the saving/investment question is to be 
found in the 'ex-post' analysis of the General Theory. In this saving 
and investment are always equal by definition. This represents a 
total reversal of the argtunent of the Trea.tise that the 
inequality of saving and investment are responsible for industrial 
fluctuation. Again much of the controversy which surrounded the 
General Theory related to the definitions of saving and invesanent. 
Robertson believed that definitions which '<lade them irredeemably equal: 
'takes us all back to pre-Ivithers, pre-IVicksell days, and obscures 
instead of clarifying what happens when an act of investment takes 
place'. (85) 
To Robertson therefore, the multiplier was no ~ore than a 
'potentially useful little brick,,<86) not the cornerstone of some great 
monument. Keynes had used his savings/investment analysis as a sub-
stitute for the cash balance approaches of the classical and neo-
classical economists. (87) One of the intentions of Robertson's work 
throughout his life had been to develop definitions of saving and 
investment, and their subsequent analysis, which ~'ere cOlr.patible with 
(88) the 'money' and 'real' cash balance approaches. 
Having upheld a connection between saving and investment via the 
level of income, and not through the rate of interest, Keynes was forced 
into the posi tion where he could not support the loanable funds theory 
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of interest; that is, unless he advocated a theory where the rate of 
int.erest continually changed due to the influence of income changes 
upon the demand for, and supply of,loanab1e funds. This latter a1terna-
tive would have only weakened his multiplier analysis by causing 
instability in the propensity to spen.d. His fourth building block 
therefore was his liquidity preference theory of interest. In the pre-
publication correspondence Robertson saw nothing at all to criticise in 
this new theory. The reason for this was undoubtedly because Robertson 
had failed to grasp what Keynes was getting at. Initially he saw no 
difference between Keynes' theory and that of Marshal1. Robertson read 
more into Keynes' theory than was intended. It was the very purpose of 
Keynes' theory to deny that productivity and thrift had any role whatso-
ever in the determination of interest rates. (89) This was a central 
proposi tion in Marshal1ian theory, as it was ,in Hobertson' sown loanab1e 
. (90) funds theory of ~nterest. To Keynes the rate of interest was 
determined by the demand for, and supply of, money, by stocks rather than 
by flows. This was a purely monetary theory of interest. Robertson's 
loanable funds theory emphasised that the rate of interest >las deter-
mined by flows of 10anabJ.e funds; these flows were influenced by Eeal 
as well as monetary factors. It was a dynamic not a static theory; 
the supply of, and demand for, 10anable funds both change over time in 
accordance with changes in banking policy, in productivity (and hence 
income), and in thrift. (91) The controversy ranged over several issues, 
including, most importantly perhaps, the effects of changes in prod-
uctivity, thrift, and the money supply on the rate of interest; but it 
also covered the relationship between short- and long-term rates of 
/ 
, 
interest, the determinants of the demand for money, and the meaning of 
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liquidity preference • 
• 
This section began with a quotation from Hicks, decrying Robertson's 
criticisms of the General Theory. Yet it is interesting to note that 
later on in that review he states: 'the effect on Mr. Kaldor's mind, 
as well as on my own, of the General Theory has been profound; but we 
have each of us been led, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, 
through Keynes to Robertson'. (92) One can take the view that some of 
,the most important developments of the General Theory really take us 
back to the pre-General Theory' writings of Robertson. The use of 
dynamic analysis can be seen in most of Robertson's earlier work;, the 
reconciliation of the liquidity preference and loanable funds theories 
of Robertson and Keynes, take us back nearer to Robertson than at 
least the Keynes of the General Theory would have wished; the pitfalls 
of the multiplier were there to be seen in Robertson's work - in the 
influence of the accelerator, in the lagged relationship between con-
sumption and income, and in the other influences upon saving and invest-
ment. On policy issues Robertson had been recommending public works 
programmes to cure depression as early as 1915, and stressing that dep-
ression resulted from a lack of effective demand. 
The following pages will discuss in more detail the issues tenta-
tively raised here. It may very well be at the end that the conclusion 
reached is that reached by Robertson on the General Theory - that Keynes was: 
(93) 
'sharpening the wrong axes and runni.ng along the wrong streets'; 
that the corroct and more worthwhile development of theory may have been 
along the Robertsonian path; the steps may have been more difficult 
; 
.' 
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to follow, <,BPPL was a less digestib1e book than the General 
Theory) but the path shorter. In so far~as theory can 
be· judged by its ability to fit the facts, and tlle success of the economid 
policies which it recommends, our conclusion on the latter must wait 
until the final pages of this thesis. 
That there was a lack of common ground between Robertson and 
Keynes over important parts of the ~total the"ry is beyond dispute, but 
it would be wrong to leave this discussion with this~conc1usion alone. 
If one takes an overall picture of the General Theory it is not so dis-
similar from Robertson' s theoretical and policy beliefs as t.he 1itera-
ture would lead us to suppose, particularly on the question of effective 
demand and fiscal policy. This view has also been taken by such eminent 
. (94) 
economists as T. W~lson and A. Hansen. Robertson had always main-
tained, and continued to maintain, that effective demand was tlle main 
determinant of the level of employment. He warned Pigou in 1'945 that 
the implication of his latest book(95) was· that it was in favour of 
attacking unemployment by manipulating wages: 'rather than manipulating 
demand', (96) a proposal with which he disagreed. This emphasis on 
aggregate demand wa.s also the most important message of the General 
Theory. 
The correspondence also reflects this agreement on a general 
policy and theoretical level. On 13th December 1936 Keynes wrote: 
'after reading your two American papers, I do feel that there is not a 
great deal that is fundamental which divides us - even less perhaps than 
i y,?u think. For I agree with a greater proportion of what. you say than 
145 
you give me credit for. As regards your Harvard paper and practical 
applications, you will find that two articles which I am writing for 
t~e Times early next year go a considerable way along this same route'. (97) 
Robertson replied in a like manner: 'I've been glad too to feel lately 
that the chances of practical disagr~ement are less than I had feared'. 
On liquidity preference, Keynes acknowledged the debt he owed to 
Robertson in the development of his ideas in the inter-war period, but 
(98) 
at the same time doubted the debt he m.ed to Marshall and Pigou. 
Nevertheless Robertson "!as not· prepared to stay in Cambridge in the 
heat of the Keynesian Revolution. In 1939 he left to take the Chair in 
Banking at the London School of Economics. This must have been a wrench 
for him for he loved Cambridge dearly; it is perhaps indicative of the 
strength of the animosity he felt for some of the leading members of 
the Keynesian Revolution. E.A.G. Robinson has recently reflected on 
Robertson's departure from Ca.mbridge: 'Dennls, an immaculate scholar t 
had been for years in a sense the keeper of his (Keynes) conscience. 
If he could convince Dennis, he felt that he was right. I find it harder 
to look at this through Dennis Robertson's eyes. In retrospect I 
think Robertson felt more acutely than any of us ima.gined at the time. 
the constant strain of being used as Keynes' conscience. Inevitably 
Keynes was arguing vigorously in defence of his ideas. And Robertson, 
who was curiously diffident for one of his great ability, was unsure 
whether h,e was yielding to good argument or to pressure of friendship, 
and unsure whether Keynes' attempt to restate really met the legitimate 
points that he made. One recalls what he had written to Keynes ten 
years earlier, when they were both arguing about his Banking Policy and 
" 
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the Price Level: "I am afraid of being swayed into publishing by the 
desire to avoid disappointment and loss: but I am also afraid of being 
swayed against publishing by my tendency to believe you are always 
right! Sometimes when I have stood out against this weakness I have 
been justified! ••••• I am so unconfident that I should always like to 
put at the top of everything that I write 'nobody must believe a word 
of what follows.. Is that a hopeless frame of mind?'" I believe, that 
is to say, that when Robertson decided to take a chair in London in 
; 1939 he was anxious to be released from the still continuing respon-
(99) £ibilities of being the keeper of the conscience, the touchstone'. 
One cannot doubt the truth of this, but one may suspect that the last 
straw for Robertson in making his decision to depart was the bitter 
. , (100) 
conflict he had with some of the Keynesians, not Keynes hlmself. 
After the General Theory 
Robertson took the Chair in' Banking ~t the London School of 
Economics in 1939 and remained in that Chair for only one year before 
he departed for .wartime duty. Hence. the I'Jar brought the debate over 
the General Theory between Keynes and Robertson to an end, at least for 
the time being. 
Robertson became a civil servant in the Treasury, whilst Keynes 
was appointed advisor to the Chancellor of the Exchequer; the two 
therefore came into contact within the Treasury. Robertson acted as 
economic advisor to Sir Frederick Phillips who was the Third Secretary 
in ,the Treasury, responsible for the Balance of Payments. This task 
, 
, 
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included the management of the country's gold and foreign currency 
reserves. The American Alliance and Lend-Lease brought Robertson into 
contact with the Americans. In 1943 he went to Washington to discuss 
Lend-Lease arrangements, 'and later on he was to work on the preparations 
for the Bretton Woods negotiations. \'lhen the Conference began he found 
himself a meIP.ber of the British delegation. 
It was at the Bretton Woods Conference 'that Robertson was again to 
\ work with Keynes. 'There followed a reconciliation between the two, but 
, 
not over matters relating to the General Theory. The Conference was to 
establish a new international monetary system, and the International 
Monetary Fund to aid its operation. Keynes and Robertson had never been 
at loggerheads over matters of this kind; Keynes was to write to his 
mother: 'Dennis Robertson is perhaps the most useful of all 
absolutely first class brains do help!' Others also regarded Robertson's 
contribution as important: thus according to Sir Richard Hopkins: 'if 
anyone is picked out, I think it would have to be Dennis, whose help 
has been absolutely indispensible'. (101) Indeed Robert,sonand his 
American counterpart, Bernstein, had been responsible for drafting an 
agreeable text from the multitude of decisions which had descended from 
the committee meetings. 
But there was not sufficient time available to Keynes and 
Robertson to allow them to discuss 'the General TheorY,and time in 
future was to prove short.. Robertson, after the war, found himself 
back in Cambridge, in Pigou's chair. He was back in the heat of the 
I , 
KeyneGian Revolution, but in a Cambridge without Keynes. Keynes died 
/ 
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on April, 21st, 1946. Robertson introduced his lecture to Cambridge 
undergraduates on the 25th April, 1946 in the following words: 'I am 
thankful that it waS my privilege in the last years of the war to 
work under him (Keynes), in London and Washington and at Bretton 
Woods, in the old .re1ation of admiring, though not uncritical disciple-
ship, in furtherance of purposes which we both had much at heart. I 
had hoped that in quieter years ahead we might slip back into leisurely 
discussion of those matters of theory and of pedagogies over which we 
had failed to see eye to eye and which there has been no time to re-
open in these crowded years'. (102) Nevertheless Robertson continued 
to be critical of the General Theory, as he promised in his early 
Cambridge lectures; he was: 'Scattering sparks of fire' against a 
theory which: 'quickly showed signs of crystalising into an orthodoxy 
no less rigid than that against which it was, or conceived itself to 
be a revolt'. (103) 
Conclusion 
It is against thi~ background that the remainder of Part II of 
this thesis must be read. This chapter has ·highlighted the strong 
personal and working relationship bebleen Robertson and Keynes, the 
early close development of their respective vie>ls on saving and invest-
ment, and the trade cycle; this was followed by increasing academic 
disagreement from the Treatise om1ards; there was never a total recon-
ciliation of the disagreement relating to the General Theory, although 
their personal relationship always remained close. 'rhey both had a 
gre"" iespect for each other. Despite their academic disagreements, 
it is doubtful that their theories would have reached the sophistication 
149 
that they did reach without the penetrating advice given by each other. 
I , 
I 
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CHAPTER 3 
-Saving in the Cycle: The Robertsonian Approach in the Study 
After our discussion of the relationship between Keynes and 
Robertson, we now turn to a detailed analysis of Robertson's work on 
saving and investment, and their role in the trade cycle. This will 
eventually enable this part of the thesis to elucidate the differences 
and similarities between the t>lO men; the content of this and the next , 
seven chapters however will not allow us to lose sight of the major 
objective of this thesis - to present a thorough examination of the 
theory of industrial fluctuation. We begin in this chapter with a dis-
cussion of the Robertsonian analysis of saving in 1915. 
The study paid less attention to the behaviour of saving in the 
cycle than Robertson' s work was to do from 1920 onwards. Nevertheless 
one can gain a clear interpretation of the movement of saving through 
crisis and depression; the message one gets differs substantially from 
the standpoint adopted by Robertson in the 1920s, particularly in 
Money and BPPL. (1) 
The real saving theory 
/ 
In the period 1912-15 Robertson was anxious to get behind the 
monetary exterior to the real forces operating, and causing, industrial 
fluctuation. (2) Although the ~~y-was not concerned with presenting 
a thorough elaboration of the definition of saving, as later work was to, 
/ 
it is evident that Robertson equated the amount of saving available 
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for investment with the accumulated stocks of consumer goods. (3) 
Savings are not to be found in the amount of loanable funds available, 
• but in the real stock of goods available to support the community whilst 
a greater proportion of resources are diverted to the production of 
capital goods. 
The inspiration for this view on saving at this time undoubtedly 
came from three sources, from an article written by a French 'eccentric', 
Mnrael Labordere, which had sought to determine the cause of the 
American crisis in 1907, (4) an outline of the work of Spiethoff in 
Mitchell~s Business Cycles, (5) and the paper delivered by Keynes on 
the theory of fluctuation in 1913. (6) This 'real saving' theory was 
(7) to be developed later by Cassel and by Spiethoff amongst others, and 
was to be commented on again by Robertson in 1926. (8) 
The theory can best be illustrated by assuming a Robinson Crusoe 
island, the major implications of which are an absence of money, with 
(9) both total production and consumption being undertaken by Crusoe. 
Crusoe has a limited amount of time, he has to decide on hm/ to divide 
this time between taking leisure, producing consumer goods and producing 
capital goods. If he devotes all his time to the manufacture of a 
fishing rod without first building up a store of consumer goods on 
which to live, he will starve. Therefore, before investment can be 
undertaken, a stock of consumer goods needs to be accumulated. This 
stock has to be sufficient to support subsistence through the gestation 
period ·of investment, and is hence the real capital needed to finance 
, 
the investment. Even in a monetary economY,without this stock nO 
/amount of paper money could finance investment and at the same t';me 
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allow the community, big or small, to survive. The store of food 
which Crusoe needs to enable him to devote the winter months to making 
his fishing rod is real saving •. In 1915 Robertson applied this t~esis 
straightway to a monetary economy wiL~out discussing the influence of 
banking policy on saving. He did not enquire as to the ability of the 
banks to force people to refrain from current consumption and in so 
doing to divert resources into capital good industries. This latter 
inquiry first appeared in Mone~ in 1922. (10) 
The origins of the Real Saving doctrine 
Robertson could not claim any originality for the real saving doc-
trine. Labordere and Spietboff had argued likewise before the Study 
appeared, and indeed took the doctrine a good deal further by suggest-
ing that the shortage of real saving was the ·cause of the crisis. 
Both defined over-investment in relation to the available supply of 
/ 
real saving, not as a deficiency in the demand for capital goods 
relative to their supply as in the Robertsonian theory of crisis. (11) 
spiethoff(12) argued that the over-production of machines and also 
durable consUll!er goods in the crisis was the result of an inability of 
prospective purchasers to raise sufficient capital to buy them at a 
profitable price. The lack of capital in the money markets disguised 
the real difficulty. There was a deficiency of labour and consumer 
goods needed to utilise the resources, materials and equipment, ear-
marked for the production of more capital equipment and durable consumer: 
goods. Therefore, a shortage of ca.pital is not a deficiency of monetary 
fundS, but a symptom of an imbalance in the production of capital and 
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consumer goods; capital and durable consumer goods (e.g. dwellings) 
are overproduced; consumer gotlds are underproduced. The solution to 
this shortage of capital is not to print more money, that is unless it 
can be transformed into the goods required to utilis'e the over-produc-
t " (13) l.on. 
Labordere held similar views to those of Spiethoff, but being a 
~ 
·non-professional economist, and not having read widely on the subject 
.of fluctuation, (14) it is doubtful that he was influenced at all by 
/ 
Spiet~off. Undoubtedly, the Labordere article had much more impact on 
Robertson than any other at this time, as the original works of 
Spiethoff were not available to him. Robertson was particularly impressed 
by Labordere's description of a one-man crisis, which developed the 
(15) Robinson Crusoe argument above. In the following passage, drawn 
from the English translation, (16) the thesis 'is lucidly laid out; 
'Towards the end of summer, he noticed that his supplies, his reserves 
of corn, wine and all the products, the abundance of which were his 
pride and joy, or in other '-lords that his spare capital in kind, was 
running out. What was he to do? Should he stop L~e construction of a 
dam, half completed and risk the spring floods destroying work that, 
too weak yet by itself, would not fail to give way under the strain? 
With the winter snow what would become of the houses without roofs 
intended for the new inhabitants of his lands? A thing half finished 
dies and carries away with it all traces of the human labour that it 
(17) 
represents' • Crusoe has over-invested, he has put too much of a 
strain on the stocks of conSt~er goods that exist to finance the 
investment; the result must be a collapse, a crisis. Investment 
/ 
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projects have to be abandoned never to be completed (the resources put 
into such projects being totally wasted). Surprisingly however 
Robertson did not refer to Labordere's work in his Study in 1915, despite· 
its obvious simi.larity and influence upon his "ork at that time. 
The third source of inspiration of Robertson's view of saving in 
the cycle came from Keynes; but Keynes' thesis did not have the same 
clarity as that of Labordere, and, more importantly, it did not appear 
until after . (18) the early drafts of the Study had been wr1tten. 
Nevertheless, Robertson acknowledged an obligation to Keynes for the 
provision of an insight into the possibility that crises may be caused 
by a too rapid utilisation of the existing.stock of consumer goods in 
the investment process; but Robertson criticised Keynes for the over-
certainty of this thesis. Robertson did not believe that the collapse 
of investment was always caused by the inability of the stock of con-
sumer goods to maintain it at its current level, this \las the implica-
tion of Keynes' thesis. (19) 
Reaction to the 'money' saving thesis 
These were the positive sources of influence upon Robertsonian 
theory; but theories are made, in addition, from negative reactions 
to the theories of others. The shortage of real saving thesis came from 
a desire to isolate the .rcal causes of the cycle, and to counter what 
Robertson believed to be the over-emphasis upon the monetary forces 
. (20) 
acting upon fluctuation, present in the >lork of Tugan-Baran0>lsk1, 
. (21) (22) 
and more so 1n the work of R. G. HaI,trey. 
/ 
, 
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Hawtrey's theory is criticised elsewhere, (23) hence attention can 
be focused here on the theory of Tugan-BaranowskL lie believed that 
• 
there was a natural tendency in capitalist economies to accumulate 
savings (24) even during depression. This accumulation does not auto-
matically lead to an equal accumulation of capital goods; (25) that is 
saving does not automatically flow into investment. This accumulation 
of saving takes place in the banks, and results, during a depression, 
'in a lowering of the market rate of interest. As more and more savings 
are accumulated throught the depression, so the greater becomes the 
pressure to find investment opportunities for them. Eventually t~is 
pressure reaches such a level that industries can no longer refrain 
from employing the available funds. There is a burst of expenditure 
on capital goods leading to prosperity. Prosperity continues through 
the expansion of investment which uses up mor~ and more of the 'money' 
saving; over-investment occurs as the rate of increase in investm8nt 
outstrips the rate of accumulation of saving. The rate of intercst 
rises, a financial crisis ensues, investment falls, and recession 
occurs. 
The fundamental criticism by Robertsan of this thesis was that it 
placed too much emphasis on money savings,' and made no reference to the 
real nature of the limit to investment, - the ~.!:. consumer goods 
required to finance investment whilst investment is taking place. 'rherc 
is thus a significant difference bc'tween 'shortage of capital' theories 
which concentrate upon fluctuation in money savings, and those which 
recognise saving in the form of stocks of real consumer goods. 
; 
/ 
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The latter was the Robertsonian approach to the problem of 
financing investment in 1915; he did not remain faithful to this view 
of saving and was later critical of the way in which he had confused 
saving with the stock of consumer goods. (26) From 1920 onwards he was 
much more concerned with the ability of the commercial banks to extract 
saving from the public by increasing the creation of credit, hence 
raising the price level, and forcing the public to refrain from con-
sumption, in turn diverting resources into the capital good industries. 
Saving could be manufactured through banking policy and was not 
entirely to be found in the existing accumUlation of consumer goods. 
Attention is now focused on this in the following chapter •. 
, 
/ 
/ 
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Chapter 3 - Footnotes 
(1) See pp.166-94: 
(2) See pp.13ff. 
(3) DHR, SIF, preface p.xv to 1948 edition. 
(4) M. -Labordere, op cit., see Appendix-l. 
(5) W. Mitchell, Business Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting, 
Burt Franklin, New York, 1st edn. 1913. 
(6) See JMK, CW, Vol. XIII, pp.2-l4. 
\(7) G. cassel, op cit., A. Spl.ethoff, op cit., see especially also 
} the work of E. Von Boehm-Bawerk, e.g. Capital and Interest, 
Macmillan, London, 1922. 
(8) DHR, BPPL, Chs. VI and VII._ 
(9) A similar example was used by DHR in LEP pp.34-35. although he 
pointed out that he did not believe in the 1950s that the 'real 
saving' thesis was totally valid for a monetary economy. 
(10) DHR, Money, Ch. V, 1922. 
(11) Although Robertson accepted that the shortage of real saving was 
a possible cause of the American crisi.s in 1907, he did not see 
it as an alternative to the over-investment theory outlined 
earlier. Crises could occur even where the stock of consumable 
goods >las high: 'It must not, hO>lever, be supposed that a 
check to industrial revival ••••• can only be caused by an 
actual depletion of the stocks of consumable goods. In the 
first place it is possible that in certain periods of expansion 
(as perhaps in England in those culminating in 1882 and 1890) 
the growth of general productivity is so considerable that no 
such depletion actually occurs; secondly, in normal cases the 
close of the period of gestation will bring replenishment. 
Nevertheless, neither in the first case is the constructional 
relapse avoided, nor in the second case is constructional 
activity immediately restored'. DHR, SIF, p.180. 
(12) 
(13) 
i 
/ , 
See W. Hitchell, op cit.! pp.10-ll. 
Insofar as Robertson >lent some >lay to support this thesis, one 
can recognise some of his discontent with the under-consumption 
theory of the cycle. for in the 'shortage of real saving' 
thesis there is an implication of under-saving during the 
expansion phase of the ~Jcle. not over-saving; there is over-
. consumption, not under-consumption. The respective theories are 
complete opposites in this respect. See pp .166-9 4. 
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(14) See Robertson's comment in the 1948 edition of SIF, 'He did not 
appear to have any acquaintance with the works of those econo-
mists "hose approach has most affinity with his mm'. See 
Appendix 1. 
(15) See Appendix I, p.440-85. 
(16) ~, 
(17) Ibid, p.450. 
(18) JMK, CW, Vol. XIII, p.l. 
. (19) DliR, ~, p.l71n • 
(20) M. Tugan-Baranowski Les Crises Industrie11es Angleterre, French 
edition, Paris: Giard & Briere, 1913. 
(21) R.G. Hawtrey, Good and Bad Trade, l1acmillan, r,ondon, 1913. 
(2~) See PHR, review of Good and Bad Trade, op cit., and review of 
Les Crises Industrielles Angleterre, op cit. 
(23) See pp.lOS-ll. 
(24) Aggregate money savings (by all individuals and businessmen) -
is termed 'free capital'. 
(25) . Capital goods, machinery, buildings etc. are called 'real capital' 
in Tugan-Baranowski's analysis. 
(26) See especially DHR, BPPL, Ch. 5. 
" 
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CHAPTER 4 
Robertson on Saving (1918-1940) 
Introduction 
The development of trade cycle theory in terms of an examination 
of the relationship between saving and investment had proceeded in the 
J:9th century without precision being given to the definition of these 
terms. As a result differences in theory often arose from different 
impiicit meanings ·of saving and investment. The assumption that the 
theory could take for granted the definitions of saving and investment was 
challenged in the 1920s. In Britain it was Robertson who· was respon-
sible more than anyone else for this challenge. 
In this chapter the Robertsonian approach to saving in the writings 
of the inter-war period is outlined and commented upon. This enables 
an examination of the role 01' saving in the cycle to be undertaken. The 
result of a redefinition of terms provides Robertson with a significantly 
different view of the behaviour of money in the cycle to that found in 
the Study - but not significantly different to the point where !".':Petary 
forces >';.n over real forces in determining cyclical fluctuations. 
'l'he distinction between voluntary Saving and gross Lacking 
Crucial to an understanding of Robertsonian analysis is the classi-
fication of the possible divcrgence of what most textbooks now refer to 
a.s ;' 'Keynesia..."'l' saving, and what Robertson calls 'lacking'. (1) The 
tIVO may be identical, but if money flows are changing, and consequently 
, 
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prices are variable, they will be unequal. It is also important to 
realise at the outset that this possible inequality is detennined 
largely by the dynamic nature of Rob'ertsonian analysis compared with 
the static analysis of Keynesian economics. The time lags in the 
adjustment of output to monetary expenditure flo~s, and the lag of 
some money increases behind price changes, are responsible for saving 
being not only spontaneous and voluntary, but also forced. 
spontaneous saving or lacking is no more than simply the money 
saving out of income received which is voluntary and not imposed upon 
the public by banking operations. It is determined entirely by the 
level of income received and the desire to save, >Thich is itself 
determined principally by the rate of interest. This type of saving 
therefore is identical to the conventional meaning of saving. But 
total saving may not be entirely comprised of spontaneous saving or 
lacking. The difference may be attributed to forced saving, or what 
Robertson calls in BPPL 'automatic lacking', and to 'induced lacking'. (2) 
The elementary approach to spontaneous lacking was first developed by 
Robertson in Money. The analysis of BPPL and later(3) became much 
more sophisticated as a result of the introduction of period analysis. 
The relation between income and spontaneous saving is based upon periods 
of a 'day', which is defined as a period when the income received on 
(4) that 'day' cannot be spent on that 'day'. Thus the amount of lack-
ing on 'day' 2 is determined by the amount of disposable income received 
on 'day' 1 in relation to consumption on 'day' 2: more specifically: 
/ 
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Hence from this we gain a clearer definition of what constitutes 
lacking. Robertson writes: 'a man is said to lack, or to do lacking, 
. 
if his consumption on any day falls short of the value, at the time of 
its receipt, of the income which he has at his disposal on that day'. (6) 
If a man has EX of disposable income and he spends EY then he is lacking 
to the extent of E(X-Y). The major difference between this view of 
lacking, and that contained in the spontaneous saving of 110ney is that 
lacking on any 'day' is defined according to the individual's level of 
disposable income on that 'day', which is the income received on the 
previous ' day' . 
What is more important is the fact that spontaneous saving and 
total saving or lacking need NOT be equal. ·The difference ~s attribu-
table to the existence of automatic lacking or d~slacking. (7) 
Voluntary saving can occur without automatic lacking; automatic lack-
ing can occur without vOluntary saving. (8) If our individual receives 
£X and spends EY, then, ceteris paribus, voluntary saving and total 
lacking are both equal to E (X-Y). However, if other individuals 
expand their consumption, and this results in higher prices, our 
individual can get less consumer goods for his EY of expenditure than 
previously; in this case he is saving E (X-Y), but in addi·tion he is 
forced to save, to the extent of the consumer goods he loses through 
the rise in the price level. This is lacking beyond that which is 
voluntary. Hence total lacking is in excess of voluntary saving. If 
he increases his spending to EX, then clearly he is not saving in the 
conventional sense; but lacking may be imposed upon him if other 
individuals are increasing their expenditure and are forcing up the 
/ 
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. price level, since then he can buy less consumer goods than previously 
with EX. The short fall in consumer goods represents the extent of 
a~tomatic lacking. Gross lacking is positive whilst voluntary saving 
is zero. Alternatively, if other individuals reduce the flow of money 
they are putting on to the market, prices will fall and our individual 
can buy more goods for EY than he could previously; here voluntary 
saving will now exceed gross lacking. Dislacking is in fact taking 
place. 
There will be a need to delve more deeply into the distinctions 
touched upon here, in particular to enquire as to the meaning of auto-
matic lacking which complicates the Robertsonian conceptions of saving 
or lacking. Before we do this, however, an essential prerequisite is 
to discuss the meaning of capital in Robertsonian literature. 
The meaning of capital and its determination 
In BPPL Robertson made a. sharp distinction between the decision 
to save and the decision to invest. The two acts were not synonymous. 
~I'his represented a marked difference to the early classical approach, 
but it varied little from the continental approach "ith which D.H. 
Robertson was familiar at that time. Nevertheless, it "as something 
of a breakthrough in economic analysis in this country, and was later 
to be developed not only by Robertson but also principally by Keynes in 
the Treatise a.nn the General Theory. 
Three types of capital are distinguished in BPPL - fixed, circu-
/ 
l';'ting ann imaginary capital. The function of lacking is to provide 
I 
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this capital. The fixed capital possessed by society is its stock of 
'man-made material wealth', (9) which can be used to produce goods and 
services in the future. This includes: 'instruments of all kinds, 
including buildings, and improvements to land such as drainage 110rks 
or harbours'. (10) The lacking which is used up in the provision of 
.' (11) 
such fixed capital is termed 'long lackLng'. 
The meaning of circulating (or working)' capital (12) is not so 
straight fOrl1ard. Robertson was influenced by lIenderson (13) who had 
rebelled against the orthodox view of circulating capital, this held 
that circulating capital is to be found in the stock of consumer goods 
;1hich the entrepreneurs and their employees have to consUme whilst 
undertaking production. (14) The longer is the average period of produc-
tion the greater \'lill be the required stock of consumer goods. 
Alternatively, the greater is the stock of consumer goods the longer can 
be the production period and/or the volume of production. This is a 
thesis which is not inconsistent with Robertson's view in 1915. In ~~e 
classical economic system this 'real capital' doctrine yields the 
equality of saving and investment; saving, the stock of consumer 
. (15) goods, determines the volume of investment possible, not VLce versa. 
It is by utilising the unspent income of one period, represented by 
the stock of conSUlner goods accumulated, that the output of the 
next period is generated. Henderson did 'not see the necessity for such 
a stock of consumer goods, it was sufficient that the community had 
the power to produce the required consumer goods as the need arose. 
/ 
, Robertson adopted a middle course. He believed that circulating 
/ 
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capital did consist of a stock of consumer goods, but that this stock 
need only be a small proportion of the total circulating capital. In 
• 
the Robertsonian definition it included also· what statisticians might 
today call 'work in progress', and the ra" materials used up in the 
(16) production process. For a Robinson Crusoe Island, circulating 
capital is shown almost totally in the stock of consumer goods avail-
able to finance the production process, but for a complex capitalist 
economy the major portion of such capital exists in the unfinished 
produce in whate\rer stage of production. 
How much ci~·culating capital is necessary for production to take 
place depends firstly upon whether the level of production represents 
a growth, contraction or stability of output compared with the previous 
level of production. Assuming a stable level of output it would depend 
upon the average production period and the character of the produ.ction 
period. (17) The production period of a commodity is· the time lag 
between the commencement of manufacture and the final arrival of the 
commodity in the hands of the consumer. Given that the value added at 
each stage of production is evenly distributed over the production 
period, the amount of circu.lating capital required will be equal to 
. (18) 
one half of the value of production for each production perlod: 
W = '>D.R 
Robertson chooses throughout his writings to maintain this dis-
tinction between fixed Ilnd circulating capital; thus one has a dis-
aggregation of investment rather than an economic analysis based upon 
, 
a' concept of gross investment. (19) The justification for this distinc-
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tion is to be found in the Robertsonian theory of banking policy. (20) 
Commercial banks in the earlier part of this century provided advances 
for the finance of circulating capital only; very little was given to 
finance expenditure on capital equipment, which was usually financ'O!d 
out of past profits, or by share issue. In exploring the repercussions 
of bank credit creation, Robertson felt it essential to separate the 
two forms of capital, since fixed capital played little part in the 
process. Each type of capital may thus react differently to changes 
. ,\ ~n, for example, the rate of interest. Lacking which is converted by 
the commercial banks into circulating capital is termed 'short. lacking'. 
But why is short lacking necessary? Simply, it is necessary because 
production cannot be instantaneously expanded. If there.is a desire 
to expand output, entrepreneurs need first to enlarge their require-
ments of circulating capital; the provision of additional circulating 
capital can only be accomplished by the utilisation of existing resources, 
in particular by employing labour. The labour so employed has to be 
paid a wage, and so has purchasing power; but because of the time lag 
in the extension of production as a result of the increased desire for 
production there has not, as yet, been an expansion in the output of 
consumer goods. Remember that this addition to the employment of 
labour produces only more circulating capital NOT more consumer goods. 
Hence we have a situation in which more employment creates, in the 
period needed for consumer good output to respond, greater competition 
; 
I 
for the existing volume of consumer good production. With a given 
volume of consumer goods this must involve some consumers doing without 
goods, or at least making do with less than they consumed previously 
before this increased competition for goods. It cannot be stressed 
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too strongly that this lacking is generated because of the inability of 
production levels to respond illD1lediately to.changing circumstances; 
t~e average period of production is greater than zero. As most indus-
tries have unequal values of circulating capital at different times, 
this gives rise to variability in short lacking requirements throughou·t 
the trade cycle and is at the heart of the-Robertsonian decision con-
cerning the appropriate use of banking policy in the cycle. The differ-
ing nature of capital, as well as the differing means of financing the 
purchases of the two forms of capital, led Robertson to take a critical 
view of Keynes' general treatment of investment in the Treatise and 
also in the General Theory; Keynes in this respect did fling a pot of 
paint rather than sketch the intricate details of the provision of 
capital. 
The third type of capital, and the least important in terms of its 
role in Robertsonian theory, is imaginary capital; this is represen'ced 
by the stock of paper securities which are not backed by physical 
assets. These are largely in the form of transfers of spending power 
from the public to the government. Lacking which goes into this 
channel is termed 'unproductive' as distinct from the 'productive 
lacking' associated with fixed and circulating capital. (21) 
In what follows the Robertsonian concepts of capital must be 
borne in mind. Capital is not to be used interchangably ,dth loanable 
or investible funds; this latter definition of capital was employed 
. . (22) by, amongst others, Tugan-naranowsk~. Likewise the Robertsonian 
cOl1cept of 'capital' is not that which most individuals conceive as 
; 
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capital, that is their stock of assets of all kinds. (23) 
Tlie forced saving doctrine - automatic lacking and induced lacking 
Much of what Robertson has to say during and after the inter-war 
period on the question of economic policy and the control of industrial 
fluctuation, and on the theoretical controversies of the period, is 
derived from one central, and extremely important, theory. This is 
the 'forced saving' theory. An understanding of this therefore is an 
!"ssential prerequisite to a clear interpretation of what follows in 
this thesis. The remainder of this chapter will concentrate upon an 
explanation of this aspect of Robertson's work, but the full importance 
of this forced saving thesis will not be appreciated by the reader 
until the final chapter has been read. 
Forced saving is the link between the Robertsonian theory of 
prices and the theory of interest. If banks create credit, prices in 
general rise and at the same time the supply of loanable funds is 
increased, keeping down the market rate of interest. Should the prod-
uctivity of investment increase, creating an increase in demand for 
loanable funds, the advent of forced saving 'in the wake of more credit, 
creation will prevent the market rate of-interest moving towards the 
natural rate of interest. Forced saving can be blamed for the divergence 
between the two rates of interest. Forced saving is doubly important 
because it represents an original and substantial contribution to the 
debate on saving and investment in the 1920s; Robertson ';as the first 
British economist to thoroughly develop the: conce:pt of forced savi.ng 
although he was quickly followed by Pigou. (24) Later the doctrine was 
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rediscovered in early classical writings although, even so, the 
Robertsonian concept of induced lacking represented a substantial 
r~finement of this doctrine. (25) Interest is also stimulated in this 
topic by the fact that the working out of the theory was undertaken 
with the invaluable assistance,of J.H. Keynes. Remember that Keynes 
had put his stamp of approval on the forced saving doctrine in 1926 
and had been responsible for the introduction of induced lacking into 
.(2(;) . 
BPPL. ~owever, 1t was Keynes who later became its keenest critic. 
The Forced "Saving thesis in ~loney (1922) 
The forced saving thesis was introduced in the first edition of 
(27) . Monez, 1t was not part of the Study. The contribution of loanable 
funds to support capital, working and fixed, was not to be found 
entirely in the difference between current disposable income and 
current spending, nor in the accumulated stock of conSU!eer goods at the 
beginning of the period in question.as Robertson had argued in 1915; loanable , 
funds for investment were available in addition through "the forced 
saving provided by banking operations. Given excess liquidity, commer-
cial banks will make net additions to loans as a result of continuous 
pressure on them to do so from optimistic businessmen: this increase 
in loans may be several times as large as the original expansion in 
deposits. Addi"tional loans wi).l create an increase in the flow of 
money onto the goods market in competition with the flow of money 
already coming from the public. This increase in demand will force 
up prices, and the general public will be 'forced' to share the avail-
able real output of consumer goods with those financing expenditure 
/ 
via the commercial banks. The general public are forced to abstain 
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from consumption thGY would ot.herwise havG undertaken had prices 
remained static. The validity of this forced saving process partially 
depends upon the acceptance of Robertsonian pGriod analysis. The time 
lags present in the process are essential if forced saving is to occur. 
Firstly, the increase in bank loans will initially raise prices; only 
after a lag will the level of output be affected.~2B) Secondly, as a 
result of the increase in prices brought about by the additional bank 
loans, the real income of some households will decline; that is, for 
a proportion of the population, there is a lag of money income changes 
b!ehind the increase in the pricG level. It is this section of the 
community which provides the forced saving for investment. (29) Forced 
saving therefore is not to be found in a stock of loanable funds held 
by the individual which can be used for future consumption, as with 
EEontaneous saving. Real resources have been transferred from one 
group of individuals to another. OnG may view this as a shift of 
resources from creditors to debtors, since those borrowing from the 
banks have net gains in terms of the real resources which they consume. 
Alternatively, it may be viewed as a shift 6f resources away from 
fixed income groups to entrepreneurs. (30) Robertson saw the process 
as being VGry precise in Money; an X% rise in the volume of bank 
loans would yield an X% increase in the general price level; that is 
h 1 1 f 1 · b (31) t e rea va ue o· money would dec lne y X%. The scheme in the 
diagram below summarises the forced saving thesis expressed here, and 
highlights the step by step approach, the period analysis more 
thoroughly developed in BPPL and beyond. 
I , 
/ 
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• STEP 1 
STEP 2 
STEP 3 
STEP 4 
STEP 5 
STEP 6 
STEP 7 
STEP 8 
STEP 9 
/ 
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The Forced Saving Process 
Increase in the demand for loanable flmds (e. g. as a result 
of an increase in the marginal productivity of capital) • 
Demand for loanable funds exceeds supply. 
Inadequate VOLUNTARY saving to support desired investment 
at existing rate of interest. 
BANKS respond to provide finance for the additional invest-
ment. 
LOMJS are utilised to finance the production of CAPITAL 
goods - not consumer goods .. The volume of consumer 
good production is FIXED at this stage. 
The I'JAGEBILL in the CAPITAL GOOD INDUSTRIES "ill increase. 
There is increased COMPETITION for the available output of 
consumer goods. 
The PRICE LEVEL Wil~ rise. I 
SOME INDIVIDUALS are FORCED to save i. e. to consume less 
than they \"ould have done before prices rose (;::; the 
lIUTOBATIC LlICKING of BPPT.) • 
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The Recognition of Induced Lacking - and tile development of the concept 
of Automatic Lacking - BPPL (1926) 
The forced saving doctrine put forward in 1926 by Robertson '!as 
much more refined. It is found in the Robertsonian concepts of 
to ' d' d d 1 k' (32) au mat~c an ~n uce ac 1ng. 
Automatic lacking is difficult to define although it represents 
no more than a refinement of the previous forced saving process. It 
requires an understanding of >That Robertson meant by 'automatic 
stinting'. Thts arises wher.e individuals are prevented from consuming 
goods as a result of an increase in the aggregate stream of money onto 
t.'le consumer good market. Again its existence depends upon the time 
lags operative in the consumer good market. Prices respond to an 
expansion of bank loans, output follows after a lag. The increase in 
the stream of money is caused by either net dishoarding, where some 
individuals are spending more than the value of their current output on 
consumer goods, using past hoards to finance their expenditure, or by 
an increase in the money supply via the commercial banks. Automatic 
lacking occurs if this automatic stinting reduces t.'le consumption of 
some individuals below tbeir .intended level of consumption and below 
the value of their current output. (33) It is the equivalent of the 
forced saving introduced in Money, except insofar as Robertson made 
explicit the view that a change in hoarding habits could generate 
forced saving as well as the creation of credit. 
,Induced lacking represents an innovation in Robert.sonian theory. 
/ 
AS' a result of an increase in the flow of money onto the goods may·ket, 
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prices will rise and forced saving will occur; but additional saving 
may be induced t.hrough the rise in prices. The real value of the 
• 
individual's money stock declines as prices rise and as a consequence 
individuals may refrain from consuming to the full value of their 
current output in order to restore this real value. Alternatively, 
the individual may be encouraged for several reasons to achieve a new 
real value for his money stock. (34) The lacking which results has been 
induced by the change in prices; it is voluntary and designed unlike 
automatic lacking, but it is the result of a change in the money stream 
, as is automatic lacking. 'rhe general public therefore supply the lack-
ing required to finance Robertsonian capital, not the owners of the 
deposit in the banks, from whence the additional loans ate created. (35) 
There are two further, and extremely important, characteristics 
of this process of forced saving. Firstly, it involves a change in 
the structure of production with resources being divertcd from consumer 
good industries to capital good industries. The expansion in bank 
loans provides entrepreneurs with the funds to buy capital goods and 
labour. There will be an increase in the demand for capital goods 
relative to the demand for consumer goods and hence the price of 
capital goods will rise at a faster rate tilan that of consumer goods. 
Resources will be encouraged to move from consumer into capital good 
industries. (36) This has repercussion on the nature of the cycle. (37) 
/ 
Secondly, Robcrtson is not assuming t.hat full employment exists 
in the economy and tilat output cannot be expanded. What he proposes 
/ is' that, utilising period analysis, the expansion of output can only 
, 
180 
follow a rise in the price level not precede it. The argument runs as 
follows. If output is to be expanded then this can only come about 
tllrough an increase in the availability of circulating capital.. 
Circulating capital cannot be made available unless the activity of 
lacking is similarly increased. Spontaneous saving or lacking may not 
be sufficient to meet the demand for circulating capital, hence it is 
left to the banks to increase the amount of credit creation; but an 
increase in the amount of credit will enlarge the flow of money com-
,peting for the existing available output which cannot change in the 
current time period, bringing an increase in the general price level, 
but particularly in the price of capital goods. This imposes lacking 
on the public, through the change in prices. The extended volume of 
lacking must always preceed an expansion of output. This could be 
viewed as a sustained rise in the price level, since an increase in 
prices will necessitate an increase in the value of circulating capital 
required to finance an expansion of output. This, in turn, will call 
for a further expansion of bank credit and a further rise in the price 
level. The problem which then arises is that of controlling the rise 
in the price level.. (38) 
/ 
Four questions are worthy of being answered. The first is to 
enquire as to the sources of Robertson's forced saving thesis. The 
second is somewhat of a digression at this point, but it becomes 
extremely relevant in later discussion. What role did Keynes play in 
the development of Robertson's views on forced saving? The third 
question asked in the next chapter is: Ho," valid is the forced saving 
thesis? and the fourth, how much of the Robertsonian forced saving 
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thesis is to be found in the work of earlier economists, and in the 
work of contemporaries, particularly Pigou and lIayek? These will be 
taken in order. 
Influences upon the Robertsonian Forced Saving Thesis 
The inspiTation for the forced saving doctrine in Robertsonian 
theory is not entirely evident. There is no indication in any of the 
published works, or correspondence of Robertson, that he was familiar 
with the forced saving thesis which had been put forward by various 
. (39) 
early classical economLsts. This is also a rare occasion on which 
it can be said that this aspect of Robertson's work was not to be found 
'in Marshall'. (40) There is no evidence of any recognition by Marshall 
of forced saving in any of his publications, but one would suspect that 
his analysis of the effects of changing prices on income distribution 
had some influence upon Robertson. (41) Schumpeter had employed the 
forced saving doctrine in 1911 but this work was not available to 
Robertson in English until 1934. (42) 11. lIenderson had introduced a 
concept of involuntary saving which went some way towards the forced 
saving doctrine, and Robertson was familiar with this when writing 
Money. (43) The example given by Henderson was of a municipality, 
embarking on an investment project, which horrows from its public -
they are compulsorily forced to save as a result of higher rates 
charged; but this specific case does not involve credit creation, nor 
a general rise in the price level of consumer goods; both of which 
are features of the Robertsonian forced saving doctrine. The work of 
Aftalion, reviewed by Robertson in 1914 had suggested a quasi-forced 
, 144) . 
saving process. Aftalion had argued that the entrepreneur ,"as able 
,/ 
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to impose saving by keeping stocks of consu~er goods off the market, 
forcing up the price level and hence reducing the real income of the 
consumers. This, in turn, led to a transference of purchasing power 
from consumer to producer and to a diminution in consumption; but 
again t~is argument omitted the credit creation process and a general 
movement in the prices of consumer goods. 
One is left wondering whether or not it was Keynes ~lho aided 
Robertson in the working out of the role of forced saving. No corres-
pondence remains between them over the drafts of ~ney, although the 
debt which Robertson owed to Keynes has already been indicated. (45) 
The clue lies in Keynes' paper on fluctuation in 1913, (46) which 
Robertson had used in the preparation of his Study. In this Keynes 
distinguished between deliberate and undeliberate saving. Investment 
can be financed from either source. Deliberate saving is the amount 
set aside by individuals for the purpose of investment; that portion 
of their resources which is put aside by individuals, into commercial 
bank deposits, is undeliberate saving. There is no intention on the 
part of the individual for it to be used for investment. If this is 
fed by the banks into investment projects via bank advances the amount 
of saving used for investment might exceed the amount deliberately 
saved for this purpose. This is as far as the Keynes' thesis goes; 
however, the next logical question is to ask what effect bank advances 
might have upon prices, a.lld the division of resources between capital 
and consumer goods industries. We have already seen how Robertson took 
this step. 
; 
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The Keynes/Robertson Debate on Forced Saving 
Keynes, in the General Theory, took a very critical view of the 
• 
forced saving doctrine. He regarded what he called the neo-classical 
attempt to link saving with investment through the forced saving doc-
trine as one of: 'the worst muddles of all' within the theory of 
. (47) 1nterest. He could see no clear meaning of the concept of forced 
saving unless it was measured against a specified rate of saving. 
This might be the rate of saving consistent with full employment; the 
forced saving would be measured by the excess of actual saving over 
that consistent with full employment (in the long run). Although this 
• . (48) definition was consistent with· that of Bentham's forced frugal1ty, 
it was inconsistent with Robertson's view that forced saving could 
arise at less than full employment. Keynes' definition would yield a 
forced short-fall in actual saving not a positive contribution to 
total lacking at less than full employment. He saw little possibility 
of successfully applying a forced saving doctrine in conditions of less 
than ful.l. employment and did not believe that contemporary economists 
had actually attempted to apply the forced saving thesis assuming con-
ditions of less than full employment. Clearly Keynes memory was short; 
this was precisely what Robertson had been trying to do in ~! with 
Keynes' assistance. (49) The real Keynesian attack on forced saving came 
with the development of multiplier analysis. (50) The fundamental 
problem which the forced saving doctrine attempts to solve is to 
explain how funos are provided to meet the demandS for fixed and working 
capital during the boom. The simple answer given by the multiplier 
process is that additional savings are automatically yielded by tl1e 
I 
, 
initial change in investment; the changG in investmGnt instantaneously 
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(in static analysis) yields an equal increase in saving which is 
voluntary, and is generated by the increase in income/output and 
employment created by the addition to investment. Prices need not 
rise to finance investment, additional bank credit need not materialise. (51) 
There is no need for forced saving. This was Keynes' ultimate stand-
point on forced saving, but it disguises an earlier flirtation he had 
during the 1920s with Robertson's similar concept of imposed lacking. 
This we will now consider. 
Mention has already been made of Keynes' paper on industrial 
fluctuation in 1913 in which he distinguished between deliberate, or 
what might be'more conventionally called volUntary saving, and undelib-
erate saving. It would be incorrect to suggest that this undeliberate 
saving matched the later concept of automatic lacking, but there are a 
number of similarities. Keynes believed at this time that saving and 
investment need not be equal; during a boom inve,stment would exceed 
voluntary saving, during a depression investment would fall short of 
such saving. The discrepancy between the two was made possible by 
banking operations. It is within the scope of the banks to transmit 
the 'community's reserve of free resources' towards those responsible 
for capital expenditure. In other words the banks could put funds 
deposited with themselves to productive use. Clearly this is a long 
way from a forced saving thesis; there is no necessity for prices to 
rise to impose saving on the public via credit creation; but Keynes 
had accepted that saving and investment need not be equal and this was 
a step forward from orthodox thinking in 1913; he had recognised 
that banks could play a role in supplying the funds needed to finance 
/ 
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the expenditure. 
The forced saving doctrine was not supported in any of Keynes' 
publications in the years t.hat were to follow, but there is con" 
siderable evidence in Keynes' correspondence to uphold the view that the 
Robertsonian approach to saving was acceptable to Keynes right up to 
the publication of the Treatise en Money. Robertson gave Keynes a 
major acknowledgement for help received in the preparation of Money, 
but no correspondence survives to determine whether or not Keynes agreed 
'with the section within· its pages on the impositi.on of forced saving. 
'I'he most illuminating correspondence however is to be found in relation 
to Keynes' comments on the drafts of BPPL. In the earliest surviving 
chapter draft of the Treatise Keynes had already moved nearer to the 
forced saving thesis by accepting that banks may create additional 
money in excess of the purchasing power entrusted to them and as a 
consequence prices would rise in the boom. The reverse would hold true 
of the depression, but he did not relate this to its effects on saving. (52) 
This preceeded Keynes' comments on the drafts of BPPL!53) Not only did 
Keynes accept the Robertsonian view of lacking in the cycle, but he 
was responsible for introducing induced lacking into Robertson's thesis and 
partly responsible for working out the i.mplications of hoarding and 
automatic lacking. 
I 
I 
In the early drafts of BPPL Robertson had tried to make a distinc-
tion betNeen the act of . hoarding and what he called 'forced effective 
short lacking'. A change in hoarding arose where an individual altered 
his stock of money holdings. An increasre in hoarding was a source of 
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additional saving which could be tra.nsmitted to investment through the 
banks. Robertson initially believed that forced short lacking would 
n~t involve a change in the stock of money held by individuals, hence 
it could be distinguished from the lacking available through a change 
in hoards. Keynes convinced him otherwise. (54) tVithout admitting to 
this increased hoarding brought about by an expansion of bank loans, 
Keynes could not accept that resources would be released from the con-
sumer good industries to capital good industries, since without it 
there would be no diminut.ion of aggregate spending power as inflation 
proceeded. ( 55) Robertson was to accept this, but he maintained the 
distinction between the types of hoarding which were undertaken. In 
general a change in hoarding is voluntary; that which arises from an 
expansion of currency is not voluntary, but imposed on the public; it 
is instantaneous and inevitable. 
Keynes and induced lacking 
More important than this was Keynes' contribution of induced 
lacking, which is the most significant difference bebleen Robertsonian 
theory and that of others advocating a forced saving doctrine. 
Robertson had begun by assuming that 'K', the proportion of the indi-
vidual's holdings of money to his level of real income, would remain 
constant over time. Keynes felt that this assumption led Robertson to 
neglect an important source of additional saving which was reflected in 
changes in 'K'. As a by-product of automatic lacking, there would be 
a certain amount of induced lacking. The increased flow of money, and 
increased prices charact.eristic of the process of automatic lacking, 
might induce SOme individuals to alter 'K'; that is to increase or 
.I 
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decrease their real hoardings; this in turn might divert more or less 
funds to investment. Robertson would not initially relax his assump-
tion, believing that even if he did allow 'K' to vary, it would only 
strengthen his argument; (56) l.ater he was convinced by Keynes. (57) 
Keynes gave three reasons why ne" hoardings would take place as 
prices rise: (58) 
(i) The real value of bank deposits may fall below the 
minimum required by depositors and therefore they 
may desire to restore this real value rather than 
maintain their consumption levels. 
(ii) Inflat.ion may bring a redis·tribution of income in favour 
of individuals whose propensity to hoard is greater. 
(iii) If infl~tion is accompanied by a higher bank rate, 
this may provide additional incentive to hoard by 
raising the reward for abstinence. 
However, working against these forces, Keynes recognised that infla-
tion may breed expectations of higher prices. This would accelerate 
spendi.ng and reduce the incentive to hoard and also lead to the impov-
erishment of certain sectors of the public causing a fall in their 
capacity to hoard. 
Undoubtedly this exhaustive list of t.he effects of inflation on 
hoarding was more than sufficient to persuade Robertson that 'K' might 
change. In fact Robertson goes so far as to employ the redistributive, 
the real balance, and the expectations arguments in the final version 
of BPPL. (59) The implication of induced lacking is that t.he naive 
version of forced saving found in Money required amending: no longer 
is.it possible to argue that an X% rise in the money supply will bring 
, 
. 
'. 
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a similar change. in the price level. As prices rise so hoarding habits 
may change producing a change in 'K'. An increase in 'K' would dampen 
d~wn the change in the price level, a reduction in 'K' would accelerate 
inflation. (60) The debt Robertson owed to Keynes therefore was very 
substantial. (61) 
Keynes was not overpowered by his discovery of induced lacking, 
remaining doubtful as to the degree of its importance. (62) By the 
time BPPL was ready for publication Robertson and Keynes were in total 
agreement on the forced saving doctrine. (63) After BPPL Keynes was to 
lose faith in the forced saving doctrine, and in particular with the 
reco~~endations derived from it for the appropriate use of banking 
policy during boom and depression. (64) Robertson had concluded that 
in order to finance justifiable investment during the boom forced as 
well as voluntary saving would be required. This could only come about 
if prices were allowed to rise (as banks expanded loans to meet the 
increased demand for circulating capital). Keynes, in the Treatise, 
believed that the 'orthodox' objective of price stability should not 
be sacrificed entirely in the interest of the demand for circulating 
capital during the boom. 
Although t.he final draft of the Treatise omitted any comprehcm-
sive discussion of the forced saving doctrine, it is evident that as 
late as August 1929 Keynes was contemplating including a chapter which 
displayed support for it. (65)' During the boom the banks would be 
called upon to finance an increased demand for working capital. Unless 
vc;luntary saving was forthcoming the expansion of bank credit would 
/ 
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. (66) 
result in a rise in prJ.ces. Keynes listed five possible solutions 
which could be employed to bring equality of saving and investment. 
If voluntary saving could not be adjusted to meet the demand for 
investment, if resources could not be gathered from abroad, if invest-
ment could not be manipulated or saving and investment brought into 
equilibrium, then the only remaining solution was for the banks to 
bring about a 'forced transfer of purchasing power'. In outlining the 
solution Keynes follows the Robertsonian path completely. Automatic 
lacking is explained, as well as induced lacking. (67) 
The real break with the forced saving doctrine was to come in the 
debate following the publication of the Treatise; it is most visible 
in Keynes'attack upon lIayek's Prices and Production, (68) in which 
Hayek had put forward a similar theory of forced saving to that found 
in BPPL. (69) 
What has been gained from this discussion? Two conclusions 
stand out. Keynes supported Robertson's forced saving thesis right 
up to the publication of the Treatise in 1931 and indeed was respon-
sible for a good deal of its sophistication in ~ compared with its 
statement in !:lon<:X,. In particular one can :credit Keynes with the 
working out of the Concept of induced lacking and its implications for 
price movements in the cycle and appropriate banking policy. Secondly, 
the hostili~y which Keynes later directed to the doctrine was really 
an attack upon his own previously held views in the mid, and late,1920s 
and not simply 2.n assault on the views of Robertson, Pigou and Hayek 
amongst others • 
. 
• 
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Chapter 4 - Footnotes 
(1) This was Robertson's term for saving. He had great difficulty 
in finding an appropriate word for his view of saving. In 1926 
he rejected 'waiting', he thought 'abstinence' implied some 
moral judgement, and 'going without' was too clumsy. Hence he 
settled for 'lacking'. I,ater on, in the 1930s debate on 
Saving/Investment he was forced to return to the use of the 
term saving. In his LEP, he did not use 'lacking', but 
'waiting'. (See LEP, pp.2l4-6) • 
. (2) DHR, BPPL, Ch. V, 'spontaneous lacking corresponds pretty 
well to what is ordinarily thought of as saving, and scarcely 
requires further definition', (p.47). 
,(3) DHR, 'Saving and Hoarding', in EMI, pp.46-64. A similar defini-
\ tion is given much later in his LEP, p.2l5. 'A person saves 
when he refrains from exercising a command over consumable 
goods and services which has come to him as part of his current 
income' . 
(4) DHR, EMI, p.47. 
(5) St = voluntary saving on day (t) , 
Yt - l = income received on day (t-l) , 
C
t = 
consumer spending on day (t) • 
(6) See DHR, ~, Chs. 6 and 7. 
(7) And also induced lacking, see pp.178-89. 
(8) DHR, EMI, p.46-64. 
(9) DHR, LEP, p.l02. 
(10) Ibid, p.102. 
(11) DHR, BPPL, p.4l. 
(12) DHR, LEP, p.l02, '~lorking' capital is preferred in LEP. 
(13) H. Henderson, Supply and Demand, Cambridge Economic Handbooks, 
1921, p.124, and also by G. Cassel, Theory of Social Economy, 
Unwin, 1923. 
(14) DHR described this Vie\1 as that 'countenanced by Adam Smith arid 
Jevons', ~PPL, p. 42. 
i 
/ 
/ 
/ , 
191 
(15) Assuming that no hoarding occurs; . for a fuller discussion of 
this sce B. Corry, Money, Saving·and Investment in English 
Economics, 1800-1850, Macmillan, 1962, pp.18-l9. 
(16) See DHR, BPPL, p.42, Cf. DHR, Money, 1928, p.l03. 
(17) DHR, Money, Ch.V, and·BPPL, Ch.5. 
(18) Where W = circulating or working capital required each pzriod, 
D = the production period, 
R = real output. 
If the value-added is greater during the earlier ·stages of produc-
tion then the circulating capital required will be somewhat 
greater than one half of the value of production in that produc-
tion period. 
(19) The best example of which is found in JMK's GT. 
(20) See pp.207-25. 
(21) DHR, BPPL, p.45. 
not exhaustive. 
The categories of la·cking so far outlined are 
Of less importance is the distinction between 
direct and indirect lacking, the former occurring where lacking 
flOl~s directly into investment, where, for example, an 
individual buys a capital good with his own spontaneous saving 
rather than financing the purchase by using the lacking of 
another individual (through the banks). 
(22) DHR also interprets Marshall's use of the term 'capital' in this 
manner, although there is convincing evidence that Marshall 
used. it to depict the·real resources which were free to be used 
for investment projects (see E. Eshag, From Marshall to Keynes, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1963, p.46ff).-
(23) For a further discussion see DIm, LEP, pp.102-3. 
/ 
(24) .A.C. Pigou, Industrial Fluctuation, Macmillan, London, 1927. 
(25) See later pp. 200-6. 
(26) See Part II, Ch.2. 
(27) DHR, Mcne:(., pp.90-93. 
(28) Ibi~, p.89. 'For in real life the additional bank loan, to be 
/ 
of any use to the borrower, must be created before his additional 
goods are ready for sale ••••• The man who wants to borrow 
from a bank ••••• is a man whose products a.re not ready for 
innnediate sale'. 
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(29) Ibid, p.90, 'any saving that is done is done during the currency 
of the loan, as it were impromptu and at the eleventh hour, by 
the members of the general public, who find the value of their 
money diminished, and are forced to abstain from the consumption 
which they would otherwise have enjoyed ••••• The community is 
in effect compelled, by the extra purchasing power put into 
the hands of the borrower, to share with him its current 
income of real things, and such hoards of real things as it 
may possess' • 
(30) Robertson saw this mechanism as redistributing income away from 
the rentier and salaried classes. 
(31) See especially chapter 14. 
(32) Some may find it surprising that DHR chose not to alter the 1928 
edition of Money in.the light of his discovery of induced lackina 
in BPPL •. The explanation is to be fOUlld in correspondence ' 
between DHR and D. Patinkin (letter from DHR to Patinkin 7.8.1956). 
Mon~ was regarded by DHR as a general textbook, not requiring 
the detailed analysis of BPPL which was directed tmqards fellOlq 
academics; BPP1 was the book from which DHR wanted his contri-
bution to the inter-war debate to be judged. 
(33) The opposite of Automatic Stinting was called Automatic Splashing. 
This could be caused by net hoarding, or by a reduction in the 
money supply. 
(34) DHR,~, pp. 74-71. See also pp.377-99. 
(35) DHR cites Cannan as holding this view. See E. Cannan, Economica, 
Vol. 1,' January 1921, pp.28-36. 
(36) See DHR, ~, pp.71-72, 88-89. 
(37) See pp.261-81. 
(38) See pp.427-39. 
(39) See 1'1'.200-6 •. 
(40) E. Eshag, op cit ... pp. 59-60. 
(41) See, for example, A. Marshall, Economics of Industry, Macmillan. 
London, 1892, p.165ff. A. llarshall, Money Credit and Commerce, 
was first published aft.er Money, in 1923, therefore the dis-
cussion of income distribution and prices in tbis book could 
not have been an influence upon Robertson. 
(42) J. Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development, 1911, (German 
edition) • 
,. 
.I 
H. Henderson, op cit., Ch. 9. 
of Money. 
See the preface of the 1949 edition 
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(44) DHR, Review of A. Aftalion, (op cit.), Economic Journal, March 1914. 
(45) See Part II, Ch.2. 
(46) J.M. Keynes' paper delivered to the Political Economy Club, 3rd 
December, 1913, Hotel Cecil, London. Reproduced inJMK, CW, 
Vol. XIII, pp.2-14. 
(47) J.M. Keynes, GT, p.183. 
(48) Ibid, pp.183ff. 
(49) Letter from JMK to DHR, 28th May, 1925. JMK, CW, Vol. XIII, p. 35. 
That Keynes was aware of this is supported by this correspon-
dence. Keynes wrote on Robertson's.draft in 1925 of his forced 
saving thesis: 'the fact that at present there are unused 
resources,· and you are unconsciously regarding as an argument 
..,. in your favour the admitted power of inflation in some conditions 
to bring unused resources into use'. 
/ 
(50) See pp.282-303. 
(51) JNK introduced a concept of 'finance' in the post-GT debate. 
See pp. 339--'':3. 
(52) See JMK, CW, Vol. XIII, p.21. 
(53) lihich followed in the period May-November 1925 and covered 
Chs. 5 and 6 of the final book, that is those chapters which 
defined 'lacking' and the nature of lacking over the cycle. 
(54) Letter from JMK to DHR, 28thMay, 1925. JMK, CW, Vol. XIII, p.34. 
(55) Letter from DHR to JMK dated June 1925. Ibid, p.39. 
(56) Ibid, p.32. 
(57) Letter from DHR to JMK June 1925, ibid, p.39. 
(58) Letter from JMK to DHR, May 31st 1925, ibid, p.36. 
(59) DHR, BPPL, pp.75-6. Note the similarity of this argument with 
what is later called the Pigou, or Real Cash Balance Effect. 
Here increased prices can increase the desire to hoard and 
lead to less spending. Pigou argued that lower prices would 
increase the real value of cash balances and reduce the 
desire to hoard and hence increase spending. 
(GO) See later chapter 14. 
(61) In a letter to T. Wi1son (31.10.53) DB~ writes: 'It was Keynes 
who made me introduce t1 Induced Lacking" I • 
(62) Letter from JMK to DHR, 31st May, 1925. JMK, CW, Vol. XIII, p.38. 
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(63) Letter from JMK to DHR 10th November, J.925, ~, p.40. 
(64) See Part II, Ch.2. 
(65) This was a draft of chapter 23. Reproduced in JMK, ~, Vol. XIII, 
p.83ff. 
(66) It is interesting to note that Keynes had argued in this context 
that wherever investment and voluntary saving are equal prices 
must change, exactly the same theory as that of Robertson. 
(67) See JI-lK, cw, Vol. XIII, pp.104-8. 
(68) F.A. von Hayek, Prices and Production, op cit. 
(69) See J.M. Keynas 'The Pure Theory df Money - A Reply to Dr. Hayek', 
Economica, November 1931. Reproduced in JMK, cw, Vol. XIII, 
pp.243-56. 
., 
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CHAPTER 5 
Critical Comment on the Forced Saving Thesis and the 
Originality of Robertsonian Theory 
It is not the objective of this chapter to question whether or 
not a government should allm. a period of 'forced saving to develop. 
This question has 'been more than adequately discussed elsewhere. (1) 
Here we are primarily concerned with the validity of the thesis itself. 
\ Can forced saving actually arise in a'period of expansion? 
The various criticisms of the thesis are directed at the dJ.fferent 
stages of the process. One ancient criticism which has been adequately 
covered in the literature(2) is to question the means by which bank 
loans are created. Do new deposits create loans or vice-versa? Robertson, 
in 1926, was ar'guing against Taussig' s proposition: 'So far as deposits 
are created by the banks ••••• money means are created, and the command 
of capital is supplied, without cost or sacrifice on the part of any 
( 3) 
saver'. If one accepts that new deposits create loans how do these 
deposits arise? The assumption which Robertson had to make was that 
they emanated from government policy, from, for example, the buying of 
securities from the piililic. It is the attack upon the second link in 
the chain of reasoning which ,is perhaps more substantial, the link 
between an expansion of bank loans and the rise in prices generated. 
There are three major criticisms of this link, two are related 
and might be described as Keynesian in nature, though one at least was 
recognised long before t,he Keynesian period in the work of the early 
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classical writers. The non-Keynesian attack is best illustrated in 
(4) the work of R.G. Hawtrey. This was directed at Hayek's version of 
forced saving, which was almost identical to that of Robertson with 
the exception that induced lacking was not introduced into his analysis. (5) 
Hawtrey disputed the existence of forced saving. If businessmen increase 
their borrowing from banks then they will purchase additional resources 
before the rise in price takes place. The additional demand created 
will not automatically result in a rise in the price level and the 
imposition of forced saving. This additional demand will fall upon 
,the ~tocks of consumer goods which have been accumulated out of past 
saving (prices remain constant even though the money supply rr,ay be 
expanding). Even if loans are spent on new production, the income so 
created may be spent on goods which can be drawn from existing stocks 
of consumer goods. (6) If stocks are depleted far enough prices will 
ultimately rise; but Hawtrey argues that it is impossible to link the 
losses which occur to some sections of the public with the loans given 
to businessmen for the purchase of additional resources and what is 
called forced saving. Stock levels are replenished as prices rise, 
but this is carried out by utilising excess profits created by such 
price rises (from voluntary not forced saving) • (7) 
Robertson had taken account of the availability of stocks in his 
original formulat.ion of forced saving. (8) In many ways he agreed with 
this latter Hawtrey criticism, but he did not believe that it invalidated 
his agrument. Increased demand may initially reduce stocks rather than 
raise prices, but event1!ally prices would need to rise to ration out 
goods between competing demands. If prices rise, forced saving must 
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come about; some individuals would suffer a decline in real income and 
have lacking imposed upon them through the price rise. Insofar as 
Hawtrey admits that excess profits through higher prices are at the 
(9) 
expense of consumers he has a weak case against the forced saving 
doctrine. 
The second, and what has the appearance of a Keynesian criticism, 
is to question whether prices will rise as additional credit is 
created in the presence of unused resources. Thus it is found in the 
modern day exposition of demand pull inflation. Prices will only rise 
where a position of full employment has been reached and not before. (10) 
Robertson made no reference to the state of employment in· Money but 
there is an implicit assumption in BPPL, and in later work, that 
unemployed resources could exist where forced saving was taking place; 
that is, prices could and would rise at less than full employment. 
Forced saving would take place in the movement from depression to boom, 
where some resources are assumed to be. idle. 
The answer to this criticism is to be found in the sequence of 
events in the Robertsonian theory. A rise in prices must precede a 
rise in employment. If businessmen wish to expand output and to 
increase employment, this can only come about by utilising more working 
and circulating capital, which is required in the production process. 
Voluntary saving is insufficient to finance this increased demand for 
circulating capital and therefore businessmen have to borrow from the 
banks. Loans are expanded and this swells the flow of money competing 
for ·the ·existing. level of output. There has not yet been a change in 
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output, because circulating capital is needed to bring this about. 
(Again the time lags are all important). If the flow of money 
• increases, prices must rise. Output will only expand after a time lag, 
in response to this movement in prices. -Keynes, in the debate surround-
ing the General Theory, was to argue that the supply of output would 
be elastic at less than full employment, and therefore the prices of 
consumer goods would not rise as demand and output rose in both the 
capital and consumer good industries. The forced saving thesis rested 
upon the belief that the supply of consumer goods is less than perfectly 
elastic, and that price rises are inevitable with an increase in 
(11) demand. 
The final major criticism came directly from the General Theory 
and the so-called revolution which followed it. A thorough discussion 
of this will follow a later outline of Robertson's views on the multi-
. (12) plJ.er process. Keynes' neglect of forced saving "as justified by 
his use of static analysts. If businessmen sought to increase expendi-
ture on capital goods (of whatever kind), the extra saving required to 
finance this increment in investment will be brought about by that 
investment itself. As Joan Robinson was to argue, more clearly than 
Keynes, (13) extra investment will instantaneously create an equivalent 
amount of additional saving through its effect on the level of income. 
If the real world was static Robertson ,;auld not dispute this; but, 
as Robertson had maintained throughout his writings, there are time 
lags to be taken into account in the real world. Such time lags 
severely limit the validity of the Keynesian attack. It takes time for 
th~.additional saving to be generated to finance the increment of 
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investment; the question remains: how is investment financed in the 
meantime? This is a question to be answered after a later discussion 
ox the multiplier. (14) One would suspect that Keynesians crest too 
easy in their beds in accepting the multiplier and dismissing the 
forced saving doctrine, but let the suspicions remain for a few pages 
more. 
Further questioning of the validity of. forced saving arose from 
the work of Professor Strigl. (15) He disputed that a transfer of pur-
chasing power would yield an increase in the production of capital 
goods. The fall in consumption of those whose real income is reduced 
by inflation "ould be offset by the increase in consumption of those 
"hose real income is improved, leaving no additional resources for 
capital formation. The Robertsonian answer to this would be that 
forced saving ~Iil.l bring a transfer of purchasing power, but it will. be 
a transfer to those in the community who are seeking to undertake 
relatively more expenditure on capital goods, not upon consumer goods. 
Resources will be diverted from consumer to capital good industries. 
Theoretically there still is support for a forced saving doctrine, 
in that the various criticisms outlined above can be countered by a 
detailed examination of the Robertsonian process of forced saving. 
The argument against Robertson's theory, if there is one, is surely to 
be sought not in the above criticisms, but in the view that output 
cannot expand without an initial increase in the provision of circu-
lating capital. This is the·proposition "hich leads Robertson to 
believe that price changes, and forced saving, mURt precede variability 
/ 
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in output and employment. 
The originality of nobertson's forced saving doctrine 
Although there is no evidence to suggest that Robertson was aware 
of the fact during the preparation of either Money or BPPL, the forced 
saving doctrine had already seen the light of the day in the ,.ork of 
. (16) 
numerous wr~ters. 
It is· now generally accepted(17) that the forced saving doctrine 
had its origin in the work of the pre-classical ,.riters Potters and 
Law, and possibly also in the work of one of the physiocrats, St. 
Peravy. (18) By the early 19th century it was clearly expounded in the 
work of Bentham and Thornton. Bentham introduced the concept of 
'forced frugality' which went some ,.ay towards Robertson's automatic 
lacking. (19) Similarly Thornton recognised that an increase in the 
money supply, by raising prices, may force labour to reduce its con-
. (20) 
sumptJ.on. This doctrine was developed in the first half of the 
19th century in the classical literature alongside Say's Law, even 
though it was inconsistent Hith it. (It was inconsistent in the sense 
that saving and investment, as a consequence of forced saving, need 
not be brought into equality by movements in the rate of interest. 
Hence supply may not create its 01111 demandi. It was a much less mechan-
istic explanation of the link between changes in the money supply and 
prices than the Quantity Theory and the Cambridge Equation which 
was to be developed later in· the Hork of Ilarshall, Wicksell and Pigou 
(21) 
~ongst others; the simple versions of these approaches argued that 
a change in the money supply 'lOuld bring an equi-proportionate change 
; 
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in prices. The forced saving doctrine argued that the change in prices 
which transpired would depend upon whose holdings of money the change 
in money supply affected. This is most explicit in the work of Thornton 
and Mill. (22) An exhaustive coverage of the treatment of forced saving 
in classical literature would be too time-consuming and would be subject 
to the law of diminishing returns in relation to its relevance to the 
development of Robertsonian thought, particularly as it has been surveyed 
in other literature. The point has been adequately made that automatic 
lacking had-been recognised by classical >lrite:cs in the period 1800-
., 1850, by Malthus, Ricardo, Dugdale Stewart, Torrens .. and Laudcrdale, in 
. (23) 
addition to those already c1ted. 
However, the work of T. Joplin merits a special mention because 
of its relevance, not only to the pre-Robertsonian expression of forced 
saving, but for its attempt to relate forced saving to L~e theory of 
interest >lhich was also a feature of Robertson's work. (24) Joplin 
distinguished between the natural rate and the market rate of 
interest attributing the cause of the difference to forced saving. 
The consequence of this '<ould be an inequality of saving and invest-
ment and a fluctuation in prices not interest rates. (25) Joplin 
proved to be a voice in the ,<ilderness; the doctrine of forced saving 
and its association >lith the difference between natural and market 
rates of interest was not a feature of classical and neo-classical 
literature until the advent of Robertsonian theory in the 1920s. 
This period of inactivity in the development of the forced saving 
doctrine hm.-Jever, did not stretch to the continental economists. Lean 
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Walras developed a theory of forced saving in 1879 and this in turn was 
to stimulate Knut Wicksel1 to extend e1e analysis along(26) ~e line 
• 
of enquiry introduced by Joplin; but ~ere is no~ing to indicat.e 
that Wicksell was familiar with Joplin's work. The significant 
feature of Wicksellian work was that it not only propounded a forced 
saving doctrine, and made forced saving responsible for the divergence 
between natural and market rates of interest, but it went on to state 
that ~e divergence of natural and market rates of interest was res-
ponsib1e for the credit cycle. If the imposition of forced saving 
meant that the market rate of interest was less than the natural rate, 
then monetary demand for factors of production would increase. The 
ensuing competition for labour would increase wage rates, consumer 
demand would increase, as would ~e demand for credit coming from 
producers, and a cumulative expansion would result. (27) This "as the 
inspiration for later work by Von Mises, Schumpeter and Hayek. (28) 
Forced saving, therefore, played a much more important role in 
Wicksellian and indeed in Hayekian theory as the cause of the cycle 
than it did in Robertson's ~eory of fluctuation. (29) It represented 
an attack on the classical literature from which ~e forced saving 
doctrine had matured; the classical literature had failed to recog-
nise that the forced saving thesis was not in harmony with the classical 
theory of interest. 
In conclusion ~erefore, what is missing from the pre-Robertsonian 
treatment of forced saving is the concept of induced lacking, ~e 
additional saving which may result from the rise in prices because of 
a,change in hoarding habits ('K' in ~e Cambridge Equation). This was 
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in fact the main point made by Robertson in his comments upon Hayek's 
article on the development of the forced saving doctrine. (30) 
RObertson did not have access to that continental literature which 
recognised forced saving and i.ts influence upon the cycle until the 
1920s; but the classical writings were available to him. However it 
is not surprising that he failed to find the origins of automatic 
lacking in this literature; forced saving was not a central thesis of 
classical economics; it was buried in footnotes and very infrequent 
page references in the major classical writings. It was not a topic 
covered in its own right, but an occurrence occasionally referred to 
. in the discussion of current economic problems. 
i ,. 
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Chapter S - Footnotes . 
(1) In· the early classical literature see J. Bentham, Economic 
WriEings, (edited by W. Stark), Allen and Unwin for the Royal 
Economic Society, London 1952, (see especially Vol. 1, p.237). 
See also for an excellent discussion B. Corry, op cit. pp.SS-61 
and D. ·O'Brien, The Classical Economists, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1975, pp.162-S. 
(2) See, for example, F. Lavington, The English Capital Markets, 
p.130ff. 
(3) F.W. Taussig, Principles of Economics, Macmillan, New York, 1911, 
Vol. I, (p.357 in 1939 edition). See also DHR, ~PPL, p.S2. 
(4) See especially R.G. Hawtrey, Capital and Employment, Longmans, 
1937, Ch. VIII. 
(S) Although the debate between Keynes, Robertson and Hawtrey does 
cover this to some extent. See various issues of thR Economic 
Journal 1932-4. Letters from R.G. Hawtrey to DHR are also 
critical of the forced saving thesis in this period. 
(6) R.G. Hawtrey, ~apital and Employment, p.252: 'If there is any 
net addition to wealth, it is because the recipients of this 
money do not spend the whole of it. But that is voluntary not 
forced saving'. 
(7) The following quotation from a draft of R.G. Hawtrey's corunents 
upon Robertson's forced saving thesis is typical of this 
criticism: 'If the creation of new money continues for a 
considerable period the diminution of stocks of goods will 
become perceptible. Prices will begin to rise. Alongside the 
rise of prices due to the increase in the amount of money in 
circulation, a temporary rise is further called for to enable 
traders to reconstitute their stocks. Prices must be high 
enough to restrict sales to something less than output. It is 
through this temporary rise of prices above replacement value 
that the additional working oapital is paid for. The holders 
of the depleted stocks of commodities are enabled, as it were, 
to levy a tax upon the consumer to make good the deficiency. 
'Here again Mr. Robertson's analysis is vitiated in its applica-
tion to the real world by the assumption that the retail price 
level is always instantaneously adjusted to any variation in 
demand 1 • 
(8) DHR, Money, Ch.V. 
(9) R.G. Hawtrey, Capital and Employment, p.253. 
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(10) However, some of the early expositors of forced saving were aware 
of this. Bentham wrote, for example: 'If the application of 
the new influx of money were confined altogether to the buying 
into employment the quantity of capacity for labour as yet 
unemployed, it would contribute nothing to the rise 6f prices: 
an influx of fresh goods (the produce of labour) would be 
produced by the money ••••• Value of money as compared with 
goods, would remain unchanged'. (Op ci t. p. 330). I,ater he 
qualified this by arguing that it is inconceivable that an 
expansion in the money supply, whatever the state of employment, 
will not raise prices. (For an exhaustive treatment of this 
see B. Corry, op cit., pp.55-7). 
(11) See, for example, JMK, CW, Vol. XIV, p.70. 
(12) See pp.282-303. 
(13), J. Robinson, An Introduction to the Theory of Employment, 
~!acmillan, London, 1937, Ch. Ill. 
(14) See pp.282-303. 
(15) S. Strigl, Kapital Und Produktion, Vienna, 1934, p.195. 
(16) By the time he wrote 'Saving and Hoarding' (EHI) in 1933 his atten-
tion" had been brought to this by Hayek. See F.A. von Hayek, 
'A note on the development of the doctrine of Forced Saving', 
Quarterly Journa16f Economics, Vol. 47, 1932-33, pp.123-33. 
(17) See D. O'Brien, op cit., pp.162-65, and T. Wilson, Fluctuations 
in Income and Employment, Pitman, 1942, Ch.l. 
(18) See J. Viner, Studies in International Trade, " Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1955, pp.187-8. 
(19) J. Bentham, Collected Works, Edinburgh, published 1843, but 
written as early as 1804. (Published as Manual of Political 
Economy, (edited by Bowring)~ Ibid, p.44: 'By raising money 
••••• government has it in its power to accelerate ••••• the 
augmentation of the mass of real wealth. By a proportionate 
sacrifice of present comfort, it may make any addition than 
it pleases to the mass of future wealth ••••• But tho it has 
in its power to do this, it follows not" that it ought to 
exercise this power to compel the community to make the sacri-
fice I. 
(20) Thornton argued: 'It must be admitted that provided we assume 
an excessive issue of paper to lift ••••• the cost of goods 
though not the price of labour, some augmentation of stock 
will be the consequence, for the labourer •••.• may be forced 
by his necessity to consume fewer articles, though he may 
exercise the same industry'. Taken from L. Robbins, op cit., 
p.146. 
I 
(21) See chapter 14. 
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(22) See A. Marget, Theory of Prices, Vol. 1, pp.307ff. 
(23) Adequate reference can be found to each of' these writers in t.. .. e 
. works already mentioned by Hayek, O'Brien, and Corry. 
(24) See pp. 226-52. 
(25) Joplin wrote: 'The natural rate of interest can never be knmm 
with our system of currency. It depends, as we have stated, 
upon the quantity of income saved, proportioned to the demand 
for capital. But with the power possessed by our banks of 
cancelling money ,.hich has been saved, or manufacturing it 
when it has not, this supply and demand can never be certain. 
Consequently the banks have an arbitrary charge, some of 4% 
but most of 5% from which they do not vary; but which being 
neither the natural war-rate nor the peace rate, is as little 
likely to be the true rate as any other between these two 
extremes they could have pitched upon'. 'But it may be easily 
perceived that if the banks were t.o regulate its issues by no 
other rate than the demand it had for money at. 4%, or' 
any particular rate of interest, then its issues would always 
be above or below what they ought to be ••••• prices would 
fluctuate instead of the rate of interest'. (Taken from 
T. Wilson, Fluctuations in Income and Employment, Pitman & 
Sons, London, 1942, pp.11-12.) 
(26) See L. Walras, Theorie Mathematique du Billet de Banque, 1879, 
reprinted in ~tudes d'Economie Politique Applique, Lausanne 
and Paris 1898; for further comment see pp.26l-81. 
(27) See pp.26l-81. 
(28) L. Von Mises, Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel_, MgnchE;n, 
1912. J. Schumpeter, Thcorie der wirtschafflichen Entwicklunq, 
Leipzig, 1912. For extensive reference to Hayek's work see pp.265-.9. 
(29) See pp.265-8l. 
(30) DHR,~, pp.8l-2. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Saving in the Cycle 
Robertson continued to defend his belief in the forced saving 
doctrine throughout the Keynesian Revolution and into his Cambridge 
Lectures in the late 1940s and 1950s. In Lectures on Economic 
Princi~les he dropped the terminology of lacking and reverted to the 
l1arshallian term '\laiting' but still employed the argument "of imposed 
lacking. (1) It is now possible therefore to visualise the Robertsonian 
approach to saving in the cycle which he held from the time of BPPL 
onwards. It will be instructive, in addition, to compare his approach 
with that of PigOll and Hayek; these were the t,,!O eminent Robertsonian 
contemporaries, pre-General Theory writers, who utilised the forced 
saving doctrine in their theories of fluctuation. (2) Again it cannot 
be emphasised too greatly that Robertson always examined saving in a 
dynamic setting as part of cycle theory and this goes some way towards 
explaining why he was later critical of Keynes' attempt to 'deal with 
the savings-investment complex in terms of a theory of static and 
stable equilibrium'. (3) 
In BPPL Robertson conceded that some, but not '.all, crises were 
caused by a shortage of saving even in the presence of the forced 
saving mechanism. Thus he was partially able to agree with the con-
clusion of both Cassel and Spiethoff who wrote that crises were caused 
by the over-?roduction of cap;..tal "quipment in relation to the volume 
of savings. (4) 
, 
, 
, 
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To Robertson it was not the deficiency of the acctmulated stock 
of consumer goods which caused the crisis, an argument he had recognised 
but not accepted in 1915, nor a deficiency in loanable funds available 
for investment, it was a deficiency in the provision of lacking needed 
to finance circulating and fixed capital. (5) Such a deficiency he 
believed was responsible for the crisis in 1919-20 and perhaps this is 
why he accorded it some importance in 1926 compared with his dismissal 
of the theory in 1915, (6) but even so, in BPPL he remained faithful to 
.the causes of fluctuation suggested in the Study. (7) 
If one examines his later·work on fluctuation, particularly his 
(8) 
comments upon the Austrian School, he again emphasises the theory 
contained in the Study and omits the concession that a deficiency of 
capital may be responsible for crises. Crises are caused by over-
investment, by a decline in the desire to purchase the f1011 of capital 
goods coming on to the market. This will arise nO matter I1hat level 
of activity of lacking is forthcoming. The enquiries lihich Robertson 
failed to follow through in BPPL were firstly to ask what forces were 
responsible for the initial increase in demand for circulating and 
fixed capital at the end of depression, (which set off the process of 
forced saving) and secondly, '''hat forces were responsible. for the down-
turn in demand for circulating and fixed capital. Such enquiries would 
have led him straight back to the Study, to the forces of agricultural 
change and invention \rlorki.ng Ort the investment decision, and to the 
causes of over-investment; but one must remember that BPPL was not 
intended as a comprehensive study of t.he cycle, but as an exa.mination 
I 
of:the monetary forces operating in the cycle; it specifically intended 
, 
I 
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to investigate the justifiable behaviour of banks and the appropriate 
movements of the price level through the cycle. That Robertson 
remained faithful to his view of the cause of the crisis in the Study 
comes out most forcibly in his review of Ropke's Crises and Cycles in 
1936. (9) In this he argues that even if spontaneous saving were provided 
in sufficient quantity to support investment: 'over-investment would 
be over-investment none the less! (10) An expansion of credit and 
additional forced saving >;ould merely postpone an inevitable downturn. 
In examining the dynamic behaviour of saving over the cycle, as 
Robertson expressed it in 1926, it is essential to recognise the time 
lags present in the relationship between variables which .give the 
process its dynamism. The differences in the time lags acknowledged 
in competing theories are often the major expression of differences 
. (11) betvleen theor~es; the main concern here is with the behaviour of 
forced and spontaneous saving over the cycle. Beginning in depression, 
the first time lag is to be fotmd in the response of output to an 
increase in the demand for circulating capital. This increased demand 
will be reflected in an increase in the price of the goods which consti-
tute circulating capital and will be a signal to producers to extend 
production. Neither the spontaneous saving available, nor the degree 
of dishoarding in the economy, may be sufficient to cope \<ith the 
demand for finance; businessmen must therefore turn to the banks for 
assistance, and the consequent expansion of credit will bring the forced 
saving required. Automatic lacking arises because circulating capital 
requires labour to be em9loyed in its production. This labour is paid 
a \~agc, but .it is not producing consumer goods. HO\-lever, because it 
I 
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has the purchasing power to buy consumer goods, it will compete for the 
available stock of consumer goods with that labour which is actively 
engaged in producing consumer goods. At this stage consumer good 
output has NOT expanded, the prices of consumer goods must rise; but 
Robertson implicitly assumes that the rate of increase in consumer 
good prices is not as high as that of capital good prices. The newly 
created credit falls into the hands of entrepreneurs who are seeking 
to expand their circulating capital. Thus there is an increase in the 
demand for capital bringing an increase in the price of capital goods; 
but to gain more circulating capital involves employing more labour, 
this swells the wage bill and in turn leads to an expansion in the 
demand for consumer goods. Prices of both capital and consumer goods 
will rise in a forced saving process, but the former will outstrip the 
latter. This early phase of the recovery process is swmnarised in the 
diagram below. 
, 
Forced saving will take place as some will have to forego consump-
tion they would previously have undertaken before the change in the 
price level. It is here where the most crucial time lag is found in the 
Robertsonian process. Forced saving can only arise insofar as the " real 
income of some individuals in the economy declines, that is the change 
in their money income lags behind the rise in the price level. (12) 
The classical writers had regarded wage earners as the class of income 
receivers whose income adjusted to prices only after a lag. Robertson 
believed the classes of income receivers who had lacking imposed upon 
them were the rentier class," and the salaried part of the labour force. (13) 
It/may not be the wage earner who suffers in the Robertsonian forced 
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saving process. Part of the expansion of credit would he used to 
employ more labour with the result that the total consumer demand may 
not decline as previous >lriters had suggested; a greater proportion 
of consumption may in fact find its way to the wage earning sector of 
the economy. 
The amount of forced saving required is enlarged by several fac-
tors. As prices rise, those entrepreneurs, who ",ere not initially 
seeking a rise in their real circulating capital, will need to increase 
their money expenditures on capital in order to maintain that capital 
at its existing level. Again there may be a call upon the banks t.o 
finance this, creating further increases in the price level and forced 
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saving. As loans are repaid to the banks new loans will be made, but 
there is no guarantee that the former is equated with the latter. The 
process of expansion of output will bring with it a lengthening in the 
production process for two reasons; firstly, if prices are expected 
to go on rising, merchants will hold stocks for longer periods; 
(14) 
secondly, as output rises, so 'physical obstacles and delay' will 
occur in the production process. In addition, as prices rise, so 
dishoarding can be expected to take place. Price rises breed expecta-
tions of further rises and expenditure >lill accelerate thus reduci.ng 
, the available savings. Those fixed income groups that suffer from 
imposed lacking may try to adjust their real hoarding in the face of 
price rises in order to maintain consumption; this again brings a 
fall in saving; but more important than this is the behaviour of 
entrepreneurs. If they anticipate that prices will continue to rise 
they will be encouraged to dishoard by keeping stocks of goods rather 
than cash balances. This again stems the flow of forced saving in the 
expansion and necessitates, alongside the other arguments expressed 
here, the imposition of further forced saving and further price rises 
if the expansion is to continue. 
How is expansion brought to an end? An e~~ansion of this kind, 
involving an initial increase in the demand for circulating capital 
and hence increased demand for short lacking, will reach a crisis when 
·the supply of short lacking, forced and spontaneous, fails to meet the 
demand for it. Thus this is a 'shortage of saving' theory of fluctua-
tion. 
/ 
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Robertson did not wholeheartedly back this theory in 1926. Host 
cycles were to be explained by an examination of variations in the 
demand for,and supply o~long lacking, that is in the saving which 
goes towards the financing of fixed capital as opposed to circulating 
capital. This did not involve the process of forced saving initially 
since long lacking was provided, not by the banks (to any degree), but 
by voluntary decisions on the part of individuals and corporatior.s. 
Most periods of expansion are preceded by an expansion in the demand 
for long lacking. This may, for example, come about through invention 
, which raises the p~'oductivity of investment. Past profits earned by 
entrepreneurs, private or public companies, and the purchase of new 
securities by individuals, are the main sources of this supply of 
lacking. This supply is voluntary, but as the expansion develops it 
may be insufficient to match the demand for long lacking. At this 
stage the banks may be called on to bridge the gap between demand and 
supply, exhorting lacking from the public by an expansion of credit 
which raisffi pricesl again this leads to automatic lacking as with 
the provision of short lacking. 
In putting forward the view that voluntary saving might not be 
sufficiently forthcoming in the boom, Robertson was influenced by the 
reasoning of Cassel. (15) Following Cassel, Robertson believed that 
expansion brought ''Iith it riSing input costs which diminished profit 
margir.s and the available lacking from this source. In addition the 
voluntary supply of lacking may be curtailed by the substitution of 
hoarding for the productive use of profits in financing investment as 
entrepreneurs recognise that bad times are to follow, and that a pool 
of funds must be accumulated to pay future dividends. (16) 
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If the banks fail to respond to the demand for long lacking a p~ema-
ture downturn of the cycle may occur. Thus Robertson suggests a 
'deficiency of capital' theory of the crisis in the same mould as that 
. (17) 
of SpLethoff and Cassel. But such a crisis is the exception rather 
than the rule in Robertsonian theory. Some crises may be caused by a 
shortage of capital, but this merely disguises an inevitable downturn 
which would have occurred later irrespective of the state of the supply 
of long lacking. Eventually during the boom the point would be reached 
where the: 'revaluation of the advantage of acquiring instruments 
. (18) 
would in any case have soon arrL ved' . . At this stage the marginal 
utility of acquiring capital goods declines, and the demanQ. for lacking 
diminishes. This is the true cause of the crisis in Robertsonian theory. 
The correct banking policy may be one of restricting the demand for 
(19) lacking rather than procuring the funds needed to match demand. 
The cause of the downturn therefore is to be found on the demand side 
for long lacking, not on the supply side: having led his readers some-
way along the path of the Spiethoff and Cassel theory of crisis, 
Robertson ends by performing a somersault which leaves his theory 
fa.cing in the opposite direction. A somersault, however, which was to 
be expected if the consistency with the Study was to be upheld regard-
ing the causes of crises. 
A comparison of views on forced saving - Robertscn, Pigou and Hayek 
Two other notable economists were to use the forced saving doctrine 
in their theses on the causes of industrial fluctuation; these were 
. (20) 
A.C. Pigou and F.A. von Hayek. Their work on forced saving came 
after that of Pobertson, and both were apparently aware of, and influenced 
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by, Robertson's work on forced saving, Pigou more so than Hayek. 
A:C. Pigoll on forced saving_ 
The major work of Pigou on industrial fluctuation was published 
in 1927. (21) His discussion of forced saving was very close to that 
of Robertson and indeed was partly represented as a comment upon BPPL. (22) 
Pigou had been convinced by the forced saving argument in BPPL; but 
he was not seeking to answer the same question as Robertson, or Hayek 
for that matter, as to the impact of a shortage of saving on the boom. (23) 
His main concern was to provide a correct measure of the amount of 
forced saving, or real levies, over the cycle. (24) He did however, 
frame his view of appropriate banking policy in the cycle in the light 
of forced saving; his conclusions and proposals on banking policy again 
tl : fl d b b" (25) h d"d were grea y 1n uence y Ro ertson1an argument. But e 1 not 
admit to the possibility that ~ crises may be attributed to a 
shortage of saving, forced or otherwise, as Robertson had done. 
To Pigou industrial fluctuation was mainly the result of non-
(26) 
monetary causes. Banking operations might interfere so as to extend 
the alllplitude of the cycle. (27) Forced saving was associated >lith 
rising prices; which in turn exaggerated the cycle by, amongst 
other things, affecting businessmen's expectations, This created 
optimism or pessimism and brought unjustified investmen"t decisions. 
This led Pigou to conclude that monetary disturbances of this kind 
could be eliminated if forced saving was prevented. This elimination 
could be achieved by keeping the price level stable. (28) 
/ 
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The Pigovian. view of forced saving in the cycle was therefore not 
so divorced from that of Robertson. Pigou had accepted Robertson's 
p{ocess of forced saving, but he had not accepted that some cycles 
might be caused by a shortage of saving) however this had been the 
exception in Robertson's theory rather ~han the general rule. The 
downturn would follow inevitably even with a glut of saving. His own 
work had led him to the Robertsonian conclusion that monetary forces 
could only exaggerate the cycle not cause it. Hayek's theory of fluc-
tuation was in marked contrast to this ~obertsonian approach, forced 
saving was.recognised, "nd it was given prime importance in Hayek's 
explanation of the causes of industrial fluctuation. 
Hayek on forced saving 
Hayek was the person chiefly responsible for bringing the earlier 
. (29) 
work on forced saving to the attention of contemporary econom~sts. 
Despite his obvious thorough grounding in the historical development 
of the doctrine, he was unable to mould this into a clear statement 
of what he meant by forced saving. 
There are sever31 inconsistencies in his references to forced 
saving. He appears to have a totally different concept to that' 
employed by Robertson and Pigou at one stage where he proposes that 
forced saving will occur wh2never the volume of money is increased, 
and this does not necessarily involve a decrease in the value of 
money. (30) Robertson believed that a decrease in the value of money 
was responsible for forced saving. This Hayekian approach was to imply 
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that saving would be forced whenever additional credits, the only dis-
cernable characteristic of the process, were offered by cOIT@ercial 
banks - irrespective of the effect on prices. There was no indication 
that anyone would suffer from declining real income and declining 
consumption. 
This contrasts with a second statement of his theory in Prices and 
Production.C.311ere he shows a more traditional approach to forced saving, 
.... 
identical with the automatic lacking of BPPL in that prices are seen to 
rise as credit creation expands, some incomes lag behind prices, and 
hence some individuals have to. go without consumption. This interpreta-
tion of the Hayekian theory(32) is visible in the work of Hawtrey and 
Haberler, but is one upon which Hicks has more recently failed to cast 
his eye. (33) Hicks' survey of the Hayekian theory is indeed very 
interesting in that it attempt.s to highlight Hayek's failure to provide 
a time lag which would yield a dynamic process. Most of Hayek's work 
is consistent with Hicks' interpretation that Hayek had in mind a lag 
of consumption behind wage rises, rather than a lag of wages behind 
prices. (34) Prices and Production is the exception to this. 
The possible lag of consumption behind wage rises i.s a lag which 
is evident also in Robertson's theory and one which now bears 
Robertson I S name in most modern macroeconomic ·textbooks; but it was not 
a lag which had any great rOle to play in the dynami.c process associated 
with forced saving in BPPL. This lag in lIayekian theory brought about 
the relative movement in prices be'tween consumer and capital goods which 
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stimulated the changing structure of .production found in the theory 
of fluctuation, if consumption demand lags behind wages, consumer 
good prices will not rise to the same extent as capital good prices 
during the early stages of the expansion, thus resources will be 
diverted to capital good industries. 
Therefore, it is impossible to come to any firm conclusion on a 
comparison of tha two theories of forced saying - those of Hayek and 
Robertson, because of the a.mbiguities ift the writings of the former. 
One interpretation would suggest that they are identical, the other 
would leave them very different. Both interpretations must be borne 
in mind in what follows. 
Forced saving and industrial fluctuation 
The second line of inquiry which is of interest at this point. is 
to compare the role of forced saving in generating fluctuations in 
the theories of both Robertson and Hayek. (35) Later it will be shown 
that Hayek I s theory is best explained in terms of the divergence 
. (36) between the natural and market rates of ~nterest, but here the 
position has not yet been reached where it is opportune to undertake 
this explanation. 
Haberler classifies the Hayekian approach as a monetary over-
(37) investment theory of the cycle. This is indeed a classification 
which Hayek would favour, (38) but the purist might not readily agree 
Wiel this. The expansion comes when there is an increase in the 
,I 
provision of credit by commercial banks. (39) Now what is the cause of 
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the expansion - the provision of additional credit (and the subsequent 
forced saving) or the factors creating the increased demand for credit 
in the first place? Hayek would conclude the former, Robertson would 
argue it is the latter. The fundamental difference between them is 
that Hayek believed that it is not the initial disturbance which is 
important in the explanation of the cycle but the way in which the 
economic system reacts to this disturbance; it is upon this that his 
theory must be classified. Robertson saw the cause of the cycle as 
the cause of the initial instability in the economic system. One 
finds in the Hayekian theory a list of causes of the increased demand 
for credit not dissimilar from that which Robertson had put forward in 
his Study. (40) However, Robertson held that such causes were the real 
causes of the cycle; crises would occur whatever happened in the 
monetary system; monetary forces could only exaggerate the amplitude 
of the cycle. Hayek believed that a crisis would not follow an 
expansion brought about by real forces unless additional credit came 
from the banks during the upturn (causing excessive investment activity) • 
The determining cause of the cycle can be found in the elasticity of 
the volume of credit which causes a divergence between natural and 
market rates of interest. Forced saving is to blame for crises. (41) 
Therefore, much more importance is attached to forced saving as the 
villain of the peace in this theory compared with that of Robertaon. 
It is possible to detect a substantial change in the Hayekian 
thesis over the years. In particular, his work published in a 1939(42) 
shows marked contrasts with his earlier work on forced saving. In this 
he ,took two steps towards the Robertsonian theory. Firstly, he dropped 
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the assumption of full employment which he had used in his two earlier 
books on fluctuation; this was an assumption which Robertson had never 
made. Secondly, and perhaps more fundamentally, he argued that the 
downturn in the cycle came, not from a shoruage of forced saving and a 
subsequent increase in the rate of interest, but from a fall in the 
inducement to invest. This fall in inducement was not the result of a 
rise in the rate of interest, nor of an increase in factor prices, but 
came about because of a rise in the rate of.return in consumer good 
industries relative to capital good industries. In other words, as in 
Robertsonian theory, it represented a revision of the marginal utility 
of acquiring capital goods by ,entrepreneurs. 
However, this is where the similarity ends between the respective 
theories. Hayek, in his 1939 explanation of the cycle, waS to utilise 
the 'Ricardo effect' (43) whereby a rise in real wages leadS to a sub-
stitution of machinery for labour (and vice versa). Towards the end 
of tile boom consumer good prices rise, real wages fall and labour is 
substituted for capital. Consumer good industries become more profit-
able relative to capital good industries. The economy moves to less 
capitalistic methods of production. The cause of the downturn therefore 
is the fall in de~ for forced saving not the failure of supply to 
match demand - exactly Robertson' s argulllent; but Robertson did not 
~mploy tile 'Ricardo effect' in his explanation. 
Whatever differences there might have been over the causes of 
fluctuation, Robertson and Hayek both had similar views on the nature 
of:the cycle. Hayek saw the cycle as a continuing process of change 
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in the structure of production and as a shortening and lengthening of 
the period of production. A depression has the main characteristic of 
a'shrinkage in the structure of production, a movement away from 
capital good to consumer good production and a shortening of the produc-
tion period. An expansion has the opposite characteristic. 
This is more clearly spelt out in Hayek's writings than in those 
of Robertson. Changes in the structure are.the consequences of changes 
in the relative prices of capital and consumer goods. During expansion, 
capital good prices rise relative to those of consumer goods. At the 
end of prosperity, consumer good prices rise relative to those of capit-al 
goods. Resources move to reflect this change. In Prices a.nd Production 
Hayek tried to show that forced saving lengthened the productive process 
by creating an increase in investment; the structure of production 
changed in favour of capital goods. Robertson would have attributed 
this change in structure to the non-monetary factors increas~g the 
marginal utility of acquiring capital goods. This lengthening of the 
production process could not last if the money supply failed to con-
tinue increasing. The failure to continue to provide forced saving 
shortened the production period. It is this latter argument which Hayek 
replaced in 1939 by the 'Ricardo effect'. During the expansion, 
invesbnent rises, but. the money spent on invest.ment brings with it an 
increase in consumers' incomes; consequently the demand for consumer 
goods increases. Prices of consumer goods will rise, real wages will 
fall and it becomes relatively more profitable for entrepreneurs to 
divert resources to conSl00er good industries. (44) 
, 
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In this chapter the importance of the forced saving process in 
the Robertsonion theory of fluctuation has been established. Forced 
• 
saving is the means offtnancing the burst of investment during recovery, 
not the cause of the upturn itself. But Robertson did concede that a 
shortage of saving may, on occasion, bring the downturn in advance 
of an inevitable downturn which would result from a devaluation of the 
marginal utility of acquiring capital goods. We have also seen the 
high degree of similarity between the theories of Robertson and Hayek 
on the role of forced saving in the cycle. Now we must turn to the 
theory of interest. 
, 
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F. von Hayek, Honetary Theory of the Trade Cycle and Prices 
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F. von Hayek, Monetary Theory of the Trade Cycle, 1932 ed .. 
pp.218-20. One possible explanation of this is that he is 
assuming that productivity is increasing. If prices are 
stable, those members of the workforce on fixed money incomes 
are unable to share in the increased production by increasing 
their consumption; they are thus forced to save. 
F. von Hayek, Prices and Production, p.57. 
See R. lIawtrey, Capital and Employment, p.235 and G. Haberler, 
Prosperity and Depression, p.44. 
J.R. Hicks, critical Essays in Honetary Theory, Oxford, Clarendon 
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I owe a debt for this section of the thesis to the comments and 
work of Hiss S. Shenoy of the Cranfield School of Management. 
Sce pp.265-9. 
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credit theory of the trade cycle'. 
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~e following quotation: 'new inventions or discoveries, the 
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~Schumpeter}, a fall in wage rates due to heavy immigration, and 
the destruction of great blocks of capital by a national catas-
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these reasons is in itself sufficient to a.ccount for an 
excessive increase of investing activity, which necessarily 
engenders a subsequent crisis; but tha·t they can lead to 
this result only through the increase in the means of credit 
which they inaugurate'. 
(41) Ibid, p.226. 
(42) F. von Hayek, Profit, Interest and Investment, Collection of 
Essays published in London 1939 by Routledge & Sons, see 
especially pp.3-71. 
(43) See G. Haberler, op £!:!., Ch. 13, also R.G. Hawtrey, Capital and 
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(44) See especially G.N. Halm, f.1onetary Theory, Blakiston Co., 'i'Ol:onto, 
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within the scope of this thesis to examine the validity of the 
'Ricardo effect', but in general economists have been unimpressed 
by its application to cycle theory. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Robertsonian Theory of Interest 
Introduction 
The logical extension of the analysis of the preceding section is 
to explore the relationship which exists in Robertsonian theory between 
saving and investment. In this one encounters the theory of the rate 
... 
of interest since the Robertsonian approach argues that changes in saving 
act "pon investment via the rate of interest. First thoughts on this 
subject might lead one to believe that interest theory is straightforward 
- there seems little controversial in the proposition that savings will 
act on investment through changes in the rate of interest; but the 
1930s saw the elevation of interest theory to a position of extreme 
importance in the theoretical debates surrounding especially Keynes' 
Treatise and the General Theory and the work of" the Austrian and Swedish 
schools on industrial fluctuation. (I) 
In the pre-1930 period Robertson had given little importance to 
the rate of interest, except insofar as his work on saving and hoarding 
was relevant to its determination. Indeed there is no formal statement 
of his theory of interest in any of his books until the publication of 
LEP. The first task of this section therefore is to clarify the 
Robertsonian theory of interes"t. Most of his writi.ngs in the 1930s, 
and later for that matter, were comments upon the role and determination 
of interest rates in competing theories, rather than clear statements 
I 
of" his mm views; "but from this it .is possible to assemble what is 
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known as the loanable funds theory of interest - this is associated per-
haps more with Robertson than with any other economist, principally 
because of Robertson's staunch defence of this theory against the Keynesian 
Revolution. (2) 
It cannot be overstressed that in his work on interest rates 
Robertson was attempting to develop a theory which was consistent with 
.his theory of money. It was an attempt to integrate the theories of 
interest and money. "-Later, the proposition that changes in the money 
supply will cause a change in the general price level will be explored 
in detail. (3) In the. theory of interest a change in the money supply, 
or a change in the propensity to hoard,will be shown to have repercussions 
on the rate of interest through their effects on the supply of loanable 
funds. Robertson was at pains to uphold the compatibility of these 
effects by explaining the consistency of the changes in the rate of 
interest and the price level that would result. 
The debate in the 1930s surrounding the theory of interest >las 
detailed and complex. In what follows the more important aspects of 
the debate are selected for discussion. Having examined the 
Robertsonian theory of interest, and hinted at its resemblance or oe,er-
wise to Marshallian theory, it is ccmpared with contemporary theories. 
The major concern of this thesis is, hovlever, with industrial fluctua-
tion and for this reason attention is particularly paid to the explana-
tion of the cycle in terms of a divergence between natural and market 
rates of interest, (charac'teristic of the Austrian school of thought in 
the earlier part of this century),and Robertson's comments upon it. 
I , 
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Post-Keynesian criticisms of the 10anab1e funds theory have often been 
developed on the assumption that it is a static theory, yielding an 
equilibrium rate of interest. This is not true of Robertsonian theory. 
To Robertson the loanable funds theory was a dynamic theory, with the 
schedules of supply and demand for 10anab1e funds continually changing 
such that equilibrium was never attainable. 
A further extremely important question worthy of discussion is 
that of the possible inequality of saving and investment andOthe impli-
cations of this for cyclical fluctuations. This ultimately brings the 
thesis to a consideration °of the General Theory and to the Robertsonian 
criticism of the multiplier and the liquidity preference theory of 
interest; each of which "ere major assaults on the validity of the 
loanable funds theory of interest. 
As in relation to most other subjects, the Robertsonian theory of 
interest is entirely consistent throughout his publications; the chap-
ters on interest in his LEP have a content totally compatible ~7ith per-
haps his earliest, and most illuminating, article on the rate of interest 
in 1934. (4) .His views on interest "ere not to be changed by the General 
Theory or by the Keynesian attack on his theory. He remained unconvinced 
by the liquidity preference theory, and indeed was responsible for a 
good deal of the pressure which led Keynesians to rethink the theory and 
to support the reconciliation of loanable funds and liquidity preference 
theories in the form of the Hicks - Hansen, IS-Ut curves. It will be 
argued later that this reconciliation led Keynes' theory back tmvards 
the .neo-classical theory of interest - nearer to it than the Keynes of 
, 
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the General Theory would have intended. That Robertson was prepared 
and determined to uphold the loanable funds theory in the face of the 
shlirp Keynesian criticism shows the strength of his conviction to it. 
This is not to argue that Robertson did not develop his theory over the 
years; he was convinced by certain innovations in interest rate theory; 
and this was particularly so in relation to the work of A. Lerner on 
the demand side of the money markets. (5) But he continued to regard 
his theory as being in line with accepted economic doctrines before 
1936 and as a branch of the general theory of pricing. 
r..rhe meaning of interest 
The first problem encountered in a survey of interest theory is in 
establishing a definition of the rate of interest. This is problemati~" 
cal for a number of reaSOns.' In reality there exists a wide range of 
interest rates not a single rate. There is a short~t,erm and long-term 
money market where the short-term rate tends to be less stable than the 
long-term. There is a market for gilt-edged securities and one for non 
gilt-edged securities. Some money markets ar'e more competitive than 
others. Theory has to proceed by assuming that there is a single repre-
sentative rate. The justification for this is partially based upon the 
empirical fact that the variety of interest rates which do exist tend 
to move in the same direction as each other, even though they may not 
be identical. One particular controversy in which Robertson became 
involved was in the detennination of the relationship between short-
term and long-term,interest rates; does the long rate determine the 
short rate or vice versa? (6) Of great relevance to the theory of indus-
I 
trial fll1ctuation is the distinction which some economists have attempted 
.I 
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to make between a natural and a market rate of interest, and the rela-
. (7) 
tionship between the two • 
• 
Therefore, to argue that Robertson believed the rate of interest to 
be the price of loanable funds, and like other prices to be determined 
by supply and demand is somewhat of an oversimplification of Robertson's 
thesiS; but Robertson did state this on several occasions. In 1931 he 
wrote that the rate of interest is the: 'market price of the hire of 
something which Marshall called "free or 'floating capital" ••••• and 
.which recent writers seemed to have settled down into calling "loanable" 
or investible funds'. (8)In LEP he was similarly disposed to argue: 'it 
is the price of the use of investible funds, arrived at in the market, 
like other prices as the result of the interaction of schedules of 
. (9) demand and supply'. However, the actual market rate of interest need 
not necessarily coincide with the natural rate of interest. The two 
will coincide if the demand for, and the supply of, loanable funds are 
equated; although even so, this would be a very unstable position, 
both rates quickly changing. Robertson 'vas keen to point out that 
banking operati$bg could bring an inequality of natural and market rates 
of interest (e.g. through the forced saving process). (10) 
This thesis of necessity must determine the meaning of the natural 
as opposed to the market rate of interest; it will be necessary to 
explore the Robertsonian belief that this natural rate itself is not a 
stable rate of interest, but is continually moving; finally it will be 
essential to explore the relationship between natural and market rates 
of interest; does the market rate have a tendency to move to"lards the 
/ 
i 
, . 
231 
natural rate or vice versa in the long run? These complexities arise 
because Robertson believed that his theory of interest was a 
dynamic theory and that the rate of interest would be continually 
changing; as a consequence he needed to examine the reasons for the 
continual movements in the supply of,anddemand for, loanable funds 
which would be taking place. The loanable funds theory is not a 
static theory yielding an equilibrium rate of interest. It will be 
necessary to treat it as such in the survey of Robertsonian theory 
which follows in order to isolate the scurces of supply and demand for 
loanable funds, that is, one must make an assumption of ceteris paribus 
which Robertson was loathe to make. 
Finally it must be stressed that the loanable funds theory examines 
the flows of loanable funds in specific time periods. Robertson is 
seeking to establish the sources of the supply of, and demand for, loan-
able funds in a defined time period, and the factors determining their 
magnitude, he is not concerned with a stock of loanable funds existing 
at some po in t in time. This stock approach was the form in which 
Keynes developed his theory of interest in the General Theory. 
The supply of and demand for loanable funds 
The Robertsonian theory of interest emphasises the role of both 
monetary and non-monetary factors in -the determination of the rate of 
interest. In this way it can be di.stinguished from the real theory of 
interest fOlli~d in the work of, for example, Boehm-Bawerk(ll) and from 
.'. (12) 
the monetary theory of ~nterest found ~n Keynes' ~eneral Theory. 
The monetary factors dominate ih the determination of the supply of 
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loanable funds. The real factors, in particular the forces of invention 
and agricultural change, act principally upon the demand side by changing 
the marginal productivity of capital and in turn changing the demand for 
.loanable funds. Together demand and supply, hence monetary and non-
monetary factors, act upon the rate of interest. 
The supply side 
Although Robertson did not specifically refer to the term loanable 
... 
funds in the first edition of Money, his discussion of the operation of 
the banks and saving habits leads one to believe that the supply of 
loanable funds came from three·sources, from voluntary saving by indi-
viduals or companies, from net dishoarding on the part of the public 
and from newly created money by the commercial banks (thus giving rise 
to forqed saving). Exactly the same proposition is contained in several 
of the ensuing publications, (l3) and finds its final expression in 
LEP. (14) However, in later writings, beginning in 1938, Robertson also 
stressed a fourth source of supply, what he called 'disentanglings'. He 
defined these as savings which had been undertaken in the past which 
were currently being disembodied from fixed capital or from working 
capital, and were being freed for further use on the money markets. 
Disposable income and the supply of loanable funds 
The amount of voluntary saving forthcoming will not be entirely 
determined by the reward for saving, that ·i8 by the rate of interest 
offered. In 1926 Robertson put forward the view that the individual 
undertakes voluntary saving whon he does not spend all of the income 
/ 
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received in the preceding period on consumer goods in the current period. 
Thus it is determined in part by the individual's previous level of 
received income; this gives a lagged relationship between saving and 
. (15) income (Robertsom.an lag). The amount df voluntary saving depends 
upon the: 'margin of income over necessary, or at all events customary 
expenditure'. (16) Similarly the amount saved by business enterprises is 
dependent upon the amount of gross profits less the necessary payments 
in the form of dividends. Such saving may be directly invested back in 
.... 
the business without being offered on the money market; hence part of 
the saving is directly offset by the demand for loanable funds, although 
it is possible that some businesses will offer their savings to the money 
market, at least temporarily. Hence for each rate of interest the amount 
of voluntary saving forthcoming will vary according to the aggregate 
level of disposable income in the economy in that time period. 
If a constant level of aggregate disposable income is assumed, not 
all of the difference between this level of disposable income and current 
expenditure will manifest itself in the flow of loanable funds on to the 
money market. Some individuals or businesses may prefer to keep part 
of their saving in the form of hoards; they may express a preference 
for liquidity, keeping part of their money income by them rather than 
offering it to the money market. The aggregate supply of loanable 
funds \<ill therefore be affected by the desire to hoard and by changes 
in the factors influencing this desire. New hoarding will diminish the 
flow of loanable funds onto the market. This may be counteracted by 
dishoarding where saving undertaken in previous periods is released 
(17) from hoards onto the money market. The total supply of loanable 
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funds is, as a result, not only dependent upon the income level of the 
preceding period but also upon income levels of all preceding periods • 
• 1I0>1ever, one would suspect that the further one moves from the current 
period the less that level of income will have an influence upon current 
amounts of hoards available for dishoarding. There was a continual 
debate in the inter-war period on the concept of hoarding between 
Robertson and Keynes and others. 'I'his need not occupy our attention 
now, but it will be necessary to return to i·t later when discussing the 
loanable funds versus liquidity preference controversy. (18) 
Excluding the rate of interest and income, four further influences 
on the supply of loanable funds were recognised by Robertson in LEP. 
Firstly, saving will depend upon the opportunities that are available 
for the use of saving. Such uses can vary in the amount of safety, or 
alternatively the degree of risk, attached to them, and in their 
liquidity. (19) The availability of only high risk, low liquidity, 
assets in exchange for loanable funds would be a disincentive to 
supply these funds to the market. Secondly, the nature of the expected 
future needs of the individual, and his dependents, will determine the 
extent to which he is prepared to utilise current disposable income for 
consumption. Most individuals recognise a need to save - this need 
takes many forms - the need to provide for the upkeep of one's family, 
if not increase the standard of living in the household, the need to 
provide for the time when current earning power has diminished and the 
need to be in a financial position where one is able to meet unforeseen 
expenditure on illness, or other misfortunes. Related to this is the 
va~iability in the capacity of individuals to undertake their assessment 
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of future needs; these would stem from differences in the degree of 
certainty relating to future events, and presumably, different educa-
titmal backgrounds. Finally Robertson isolates a number of psychological 
factors influencing the saving decision; these are equivalent to the 
psychological factors propounded by Keynes in 1936. (20) It is important 
to emphasise that these four factors were introduced by Robertson in 
his post-General Theory publications and did not form part of his earlier 
published work on the theory of interest. 
'rhe elasticity of the supply of loan able funds 
Robertson followed in the classical and.neo-classical tradition by 
concentrating much of his discussion of interest rates on the question of 
the elasticity of the supply of loanable funds to changes in the rate of 
interest. His earlier work on this lacked the usual Robertsonian 
thoroughness. In 1931(21) he was led to questl.on the law of supply 
whereby a rise in the rate of interest, by increasing the reward for 
saving, will encourage a greater supply of loanable funds. This was the 
justification for the convcmtional classical argument for a direct 
relationship between the volume of loanable funds supplied to the market 
and the rate of interest. Robertson questioned this direct relationship 
(22)' (23) by introducing an argument employed by Marshall and Cassel 
before him. Some individuals have an inelastic demand for income; 
thus if the rate of interest rises they will save less since less saving 
will now guarantee them the same given future income. Individuals are 
regarded as having a fixed saving objective. If the rate of interest 
falls more saving will take place. Marshall had regarded this argument 
as·'unimportant and as 'such it did not interfere with the direct rela-
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tionship between interest rates and saving; Casse1 had not been so 
convinced. (24) Robertson failed to reach a firm conclusion on the 
importance of this particular argument. The direct relationship was 
maintained in Robertsonian theory by an unconvincing argument;' by the 
argument that higher rates of interest will: swell the source 
in which a large part of the saving that is done in fact originates -
namely, large incomes derived from investments. Ve~' rich people will 
find it hard to think of anything to do with an increase of income except 
save it'. (25) There is implied a relation between the level of interest 
rate and the distribution of income in the economy. Robertson is 
clearly not assuming cetcris p~ibus. Higher rates give more income to 
the top income groups who can do little else but save this income. 
Robertson himself was later unconvinced by this argument for it dis-
appears from his subsequent writings on interest. He continues to 
employ a direct relationship beb,een the supply of 10anab1e funds and 
interest rates, but later is more willing to accept the classical reason-
ing as to why it should be a direct relation. (26) 
Again Robertson's most sophisticated discussion of this relationship 
is ,to be found in his LEP. (27) In this he traces the development of 
the 10anab1e funds theory and comments upon the refinements introduced 
into it. It'is therefore possible to gain some impression 'of his later 
(28) 
views on contemporary loanable funds theories.. On the issue of the 
nensitivity of saving to changes in the rate of interest, Robertson 
accepts the neo-c1assical approach. The individual is regarded as seek-
ing an "qui1ibrium "here he equates the marginal utility of spending a 
unit of money on consumption "ith the marginal utility he would gain by 
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saVing that unit of money. (29) The relation between saving and the rate 
of interest can be' seen as a problem of assessing these respective mar-
• ginal utilities. The solution will be reflected in the amount of 
interest which can be accumulated by saving a unit of money rather than 
spending it, counteracted by the individual's rate of time discount. 
In neo-classical literature this has been treated partly as a 
problem of growth theory; Robertson commended the Ramsey model where 
the theory of saving was used to explain'growth within the economy. (30) 
In the context of the supply of loanable funds forthcoming in a given 
pe.riod, the conclusion reached by Robertson was that if 'R', the rate 
of interest, exceeded 'P', the rate of time discount, then saving 
would be positive; if 'P' exceeded 'R' then saving l10uld be negative. 
Thus if the rate of interest increases, given that the rate of time 
discount is constant, the supply. of loanable funds will increase. An 
inverse relationship \yould only materialise in the case of the 'sargant 
man', (31) which is the exception rather than the general rule. If 
future income is expected to decline by a constant proportion 'G' per 
time period, saving will be positive even if 'P' is greater than 'R', 
since the individual may be encouraged to save to meet future needs in 
the advent of declining income. Mathematically Robertson argued that 
if: 
G > A i-A .P. 
where 'A' is the elasticity of his desire for consumption, the supply 
curve for the individual becomes backward sloping. However, the aggre-
gate supply of loanable funds bears the classical income relationship 
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with the rate of interest in Robertsonian theory. 
Hoarding and the rate of interest 
So far the discussion has proceeded in te1~S of the relationship 
between saving and the rate of interest. The second source of loanable 
fQ~ds, dishoarding, and the negative source, hoarding will also depend 
upon the rate of interest. A rise in the rate of interest increases the 
marginal disutility of hoarding and encourages positive saving; a fall 
.... 
acts in the reverse direction. Robertson's early pronoilllcement on this 
relationship shows the dangers involved in talking in terms of a single 
rate of interest.. It is important in BPPL, for example, to distinguish 
between the rate of interest offered on deposits in commercial banks, ruld the 
rate of interest available in the money markets, (e.g. the bond 
rate). In Robertsonian theory, increased hoarding can take the form of 
increases in the current account deposits at commercial banks; thus, 
if the brulk raises its deposit rate, this: 'diminishes the temptation 
to Dishoard', (32) and reduces the supply of loanable funds. Quite the 
contrary conclusion to that above results if no distinction is dra~n 
between types of interest rates. If the interest rate in the money mar-
kets is raised relative to that in commercial banks, dishoarding will 
take place. Therefore the behaviour of hoarding depends upon which 
interest rates are being moved and what relationship these movements 
have to each other. The confusion is diminished if one accepts the 
conventional approach that the majority of hoards are not held in 
interest bearing accounts. In LEP this confusion disappears since 
there is no reference to interest being earned on money hoarded. 
, 
, 
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Keynes introduced the concept of liquidity preference in his 
General Theor~ to replace the kind of approach to hoarding characterised 
by.Robertson's work. There was considerable disagreement over the 
(33) 
similarity of the two concepts. Robertson did regard the liquidity 
preference approach as being superior in one respect; t.his was in 
relation to the attention it focused on the psychological factors 
influencing the various demands for money. Robertson had never developed 
fully the causes of changes in hoarding in the manner which Keynes had 
done in his examination of the speculative and precautionary demands 
'" 
for money. 
Previous analysis makes further discussion of t~e forces acting 
upon hoarding unnecessary; induced lacking, an element of the 
Robertsonian forced saving doctrine, is represented by changes in 
hoards, and this has been shown to be influenced by price expectations 
a.nd actual price movements in Robertsonian theory. (34) 
Net additions to the supply of money 
Last, but by no means least, additional money created by the 
commercial banks, perhaps on the basis of conscious government policy 
directed via the Bank of England, is a source of loanable funds. In 
many ways this is probably the most important element with regard to 
later discussion. As such it is the only source of supply of loanable 
funds I.hich can be regarded as being independent of a conscious decision 
to save on the part of individuals. For this reason it is not subject 
to the range of i.nfluences upon it which arise in relation to voluntary 
saying and which have dominated this discussion. As a source of supply 
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it has an elevated position in Robertsonian theory for a number of 
reasons; it gives rise to forced saving" generated by price changes, and 
• 
it yields the possibility of an inequality between the actual market 
rate of interest and the natural rate; alternatively it prevents the 
equality of voluntary saving with the amount of investment taking place. 
To summarise, the Robertsonian supply of loanable funds takes three 
forms: ,firstly, the voluntary saving on the part of individuals and 
... , 
companies within the economy, determined largely by the level of a dis-
posable income available to be saved, and the market rate of interest, 
secondly, the amount of net hoarding taking place, determined by the 
range of factors influencing also voluntary saving, and finally, the net 
addition to the money supply created by the commercial banking system. 
The demand side 
Although the supply of loanable funds was discussed thoroughly in 
the early Robertsonian writings, the demand side was not explored in any 
detail until after 1936 in the debate surrounding the interest rate con-
troversy. (35) However, it is clear that in 1931 Robertson regarded the 
demand for loanable funds as coming from businessmen .,ho wished to under-
take investment, and as such was dependent upon the profitability of 
the possible investment opportunities. This ,demand, as with the supply 
of loanable funds, is regarded as a flo., of funds between two points in 
time and not as a stock at any given point in time. The behaviour of 
demand would depend upon the behaviour of the marginal productivity of 
the industrial uses to which the funds could be put. Robertson felt 
that this marginal productivity would decline as investment rose: hence 
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the demand for loanable funds for industrial uses would be inversely 
related to the rate of interest; that is, to be encouraged to demand 
more loanable funds, in the face of a declining marginal productivity 
in the uses to which these funds can be put, businessmen must be enticed 
by lower rates of interest. Although this argument remained central to 
Robertson's later writings on interest theory, the treabnent of the demand 
forloanable funds became appreciably more sophisticated over the years. (36) 
Robertson never claimed any originality for his treatment of the demand 
fer loanable funds; indeed his later statements followed closely the 
work of Ramsey and later that of Lerner,(37) whom he regarded as 'distin-
guished scavengers' tidying up the classical approach to the demand for 
loanable funds. (38) 
The.argument that all loanable funds need not necessarily flew 
into the financing of investment appears for the first time in Robertsonian 
theory in 1938.(39) Robertson distinguishes between four potential uses 
in which funds may be employed. In addition to expenditure on fixed 
and >lOrking capital, they may be spent on the maintenance or replacement 
of capital goods, they may be put into store, er they may be utilised 
by the consumer to finance expenditure in excess of current income. (40) 
Despite this fourfold classification Robertson continued te regard the 
first use as the most significant in the determination of the behavieur 
.of the demand for loanable funds, and this dcminates his discussion of 
this topic. (41) 
Following the early worK of Lerner on the demo.nd side, Rober1.:son 
recognised two curves of marginal productivity "hlch had previously been 
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used by econOlaists in seeking to explain the level of interest rates. (42) 
The first, the marginal productivity of capital, is less important than 
the second, that which Robertson prefers to call the marginal produc-
tivity of investible funds (which Lerner refers to as the marginal 
efficiency of investment). Indeed there is a good deal of confusion as 
to what the marginal productivity of capital means. The more logical 
interpretation is that of Robertson, derived from the early work of 
Lerner. Here it is regarded as a stock concept showing: 'For each 
hypothetical size of stock of machines, ~hat would be the rate of 
return which would be incurred on the replacements which would be 
needed to keep the stock of machines constant at just that size'. (43) 
This approach is converted into a numerical example in LEP, yielding a 
curve showing the marginal productivity of stocks of'fixed capital at 
different sizes.(44) In later work(45) Lerner chose to interpret the 
marginal productivity of capital as showing the rate of change of 
income with respect to capital - an approach which he regarded as 
illogical and therefore discarded it, concentrating instead upon the 
second concept - the marginal efficiency of investment. 
Although Robertson did not discard the marginal productivity of 
capital in his LEP and maintained its original meaning, he clearly saw 
it as being of relatively minimal importance in the determination of 
interest. The second concept, the marginal productivity of investible 
funds, which Robertson saw as equivalent to Keynes' marginal efficiency 
of capital, is that which yields the sensitivity of the demand for 
loanable funds to the rate of interest. The investment decision is 
made in any time period by taking into account the current necessary 
. 
expenditure on investment Clnd the rate of :ceturn on that invest.J11cnt. 
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The marginal productivity of investible funds curve shows for any period 
tne behaviour of the net rate of return derived from employing investible 
. 
funds in expenditure on capital goods. What relationship then will the 
demand for loanable funds have with the rate of interest? Robertson 
believed that the net rate of return from employing investible funds 
would decline as more funds were employed, since the greater the rate of 
output of capital goods, the greater would be the cost of producing one 
" (46) 
more unit of capLtal. This was exactly the reason given by Keynes for 
the negative slope of the marginal efficiency of capital curve. 
"Ho~lever, in addition, Keynes argued that the i11vestment process uses up 
the most profitable outlets first of all and leaves the less profitable 
investment opportunities for later utilisation. Robertson believed that 
this" decline in the profitability of investment, as the stock of capital 
increased, "ould be reflected in a declining marginal productivity of 
capital and would bring a shift in the marginal productivity of invest-
ible funds curve, and hence in "the demand for loanable funds over time. 
Indeed, with a given state of technology and level of population, there 
would be a tendency for the marginal productivity of investible funds 
to decline over time, hence the demand for loanable funds curve "ould 
"" d th"" (47Y shift in each successive t~me perlod nearer an nearer to + e orlg1n. 
It is impossible to come to any firm conclusion as to "hich is the 
correct approach. If the marqinal productivity of capital can be regarded 
as being fairly constant over the range of investment opportunities ~7hich 
are available in the time period assumed by the loanable funds theory, 
then Robertson's approach is aoceptable. If.i.t va:::-ies with each extra 
unit of investment underta'<en, or is expected to vary by businessmen who 
; 
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nayhave a regard for the future as well as the present capital stock, 
then the Keynes' approach has validity. Because of this difference, 
• Robertson was incorrect in arguing that the marginal productivity of 
investible funds and the marginal efficiency of capital were identical 
concepts. 
Despite these minor technical differences between Keynesian analysis 
and his own, Robertson was able to endorse the earlier views on the 
inverse relation between the demand for loanable funds and the rate of 
. (48) Lnterest. But did Robertson really intend to move towards the 
Keynesian stagnation thesis by .arguing that the marginal productivity 
of investible funds would continually decline over time? Surely not,for 
there are in Robertsonian theory several forces in operation which 
have a tendency to displace the demand for loanable funds curve to the 
right rather than to the left, bringing higher levels of investment; 
these forces can be viewed as acting upon the average period of produc-
tion in the economy. The greater is this average period of production, 
the greater is the amount of working and fixed capital needed in the 
production process; consequently the greater will be the demand for 
loanable funds. In LEP there is an emphasis upon the impact of popula-
tion changes and invention and research upon the demand for loanable 
funds. (49) If the population is expanding then capital must be 
widened, as the demand for consumer and capital goods increases along--
side the population change. Similarly if invention and research is 
taking place which reduces production costs or introduces new products, 
. . (50) 
then capital deepening Wl.ll occur. This is not to say that inven-
tio~ and ~esearch need always lead to an increase in th~ demand for 
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loanable funds. Some developments may lead to less capital-intensive 
processes being introduced; however it would be true to argue that this 
ha~ not been the more CDIImlon development. What is fundamental ,"ith 
respect to the rate of interest is that the demand for loanable funds 
emanating from invention and research is responsive to changes in the 
(51) 
rate of interest. 
Demand and supply ,"orking together 
... 
It ~lould be an unforgivable sin in the eyes of Robertson to take the 
curves showing the demand for,and supply of,loanable funds and depict 
.them in a static unchanging manner on a diagram. Nevertheless this sin 
is openly committed with the plea that it ,"ill aid in the clarification 
of Robertson's theory of interest. The analYSis proceeds ,"ith the ,"arn-
ing that Robertson never allowed himself the simplifying assumption of 
ceteris paribus; for Robertson, the rate of interest ,"ould never reach 
an equilibrium level but would be continually changing throughout the 
course of the cycle, as a symptom, and not ·a cause, of the cycle. This 
would be the result of unending shifts in the demand and supply schedules 
over time; in other ''lords, the Robertsonian theory of interest is a 
~namic and not a static theory. 
This sinful approach is represented in the diagram below. 
The supply of loanable funds comprises: 
/ , 
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Where Hd represents net dishoarding, (52) bM is the new creation of money 
by the commercial banks,(53) S is the extent of voluntary saving out of 
v 
current disposable income. 
It is convenient to divide the demand for loanable funds into two 
components - tha-t part going towards the financing of investment projects 
(I) and that to be otherwise utilised (J) hence: 
, 
, 
D I + J. LF :;:: 
247 
Given the assumption of ceteris paribus the demand for, and supply of, 
loanable funds are equated where: 
= I + J. 
From this it can be seen that, even if Robertson had argued that supply 
and demand could be equated and equilibrium achieved, - which he stead-
fastly refused to argue - saving and investment need not be identical 
in the medium-term unless by some coincidence: 
... 
This ,;ould be a coincidence in that there is no argument in Robertsonian 
literature which supports this equality. This would only 'be the case 
in the diagram if Sv and I intersect at a rate of interest RO and riot Rl • 
Movements in the rate of interest will not necessarily act so as to 
equate saving and investment, such that investment always fills the 
gap left bet,.een income and consumption by the desire to save. 
One final point should be made while the luxury of static analysis 
is afforded. Robertson was disposed to accept that there may be a 
minimum belm' which the rate of interest will not fall. The supply of 
. (54) loanable funds may be zero at a positive rate of ~nterest. Thus he 
shared the proposition put forward by Keynes in tha form of the liquidity 
trap region. But this was not of Keynes ' inspiration, but an acceptance 
of arguments put forward by Cassel which Robertson had first acknowledged 
in 1929. (55) At some low rate of interest Robertson believed that 
saving became zero because the desire to reach a fixed saving objective 
is. quash"d by t.he minimal re~lard of saving. It takes twice as long to 
gain a fixed saving target if the rate of interest is 1% than if it is 
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2%. In other words one needs to save twice as much at 1% to reach the 
saving objective in the same time; as a consequence such low rates of 
in~erest act as a disincentive to save, and saving objectives are 
abandoned. If this leads to zero saving at a positive low rate of 
interest as Robertson suggests, then clearly he regards the achievement 
of a saving objective as the key motive for saving. This is an impor-
tant arg~~ent for it demonstrates the pre-General Theory Robertsonian 
belief in the possible existence of a minimum rate of interest. Keynes 
was NOT the first economist therefore to recognise a level below which 
"-
the rate of interest would not sink. (56) 
/ 
i 
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Chapter 7 - Footnotes 
(1) mm; UAT, p.B3. Robertson complains of the over-emphasis upon the 
rate of interest: 'nothing was ever allowed to happen - money 
was not allowed to affect prices, wage rates were not allo.led 
to affect employment, I had almost added, the moon was not allowed 
to affect the tides - except through the rate of interest'. 
(2Y This is most obvious in reading JMK, £!:!.' Vols. XIII and XIV. 
(3) See pp.377-99. 
(4)· See DHR, LEP, Part 11 Chs. IV, V & VI. Cf. DHR, 'Industrial 
Fluctuation and the Natural Rate of Interest', Economic Journal, 
December 1934, pp.650-56. 
(5) See PP.24l-5. 
(6) See pp.348-50. 
(7) F. vOn Hayek, op cit., and DHR,'Industrial Fluctuation and the 
Natural Rate of Interest',op cit. 
(B) DHR,.EMI, p.1Sl. 
(9) DHR,~, p.376. 
(lOY ~lis might arise through an increase in the marginal productivity 
of capital brought about by, for example, a nelO invention; 
this increases the marginal productivity of using loanable funds 
by entrepreneurs; the rate of return on capital increases, and 
hence raises the demand for loanable funds and the natural rate 
of interest. If the banks react by increasing the money supply, 
increasing the supply of funds, and holding the interest rate 
constant, the natural rate will then exceed the actual market 
rate of interest. This argument disguises some of the complexi-
ties which will be discussed later. (See pp.261-8l.) 
(11) E. Boehm-Bawerk, Recent Literature on Interest, Macmillan, London 
and NelO York, 1903. 
(12) JMK, GT. 
(13) See for example, DHR, UAT, p.S3, and 'What has happened to the 
Rate of Interest', Three Banks Review, March 1949, pp.15-3l. 
Also UAT p.97, and 'Some Notes on the Theory of Interest'. EMI, pp.202-2' 
(14) DIlR, LEP, p.23lff; although DHR had made specific reference to 
additional supply being provided by the liberation of deprecia-
tion quotas (p.376). 
/ , 
(15) DHR, BPPL. 
,/ 
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(16) IJHR,~, p.231. 
• (17) In terms of the Cambridge Equation, hoarding could be recognised 
by a change in the value of 'K', the proportion of the indi-
vidual's stock of money holdings to his level of money income. 
If 'K' increased, the supply of loanable funds would be diminished, 
and vice versa. 
(18) See Part II, Ch.ll. 
(19) The ease with which they can be transferred back into cash. 
(20) DHR, LEP, p.231ff; this reference represents tile most sophisticated 
discussion of the influences on the supply of loanable funds in 
Robertsonian literature. 
(21) DHR,~, p.5. 
(22) A. Marshali, Principles of Economics, p.235. 
(23) G. Casse1, Nature and Necessity of Interest, 1903. 
(24) Ibid, pp.147, 155. Casse1 writes: 'in a broad sense it might be 
said that capital is just as willingly supplied at 3% as at 6%! 
(25) DHR,~, p.14. 
(26) See especially 'Industrial Fluctuation and the Natural Rate of 
Interest', Economic Journal, December 1934, pp.650-56, and 
LEP, pp. 231ft. 
(27) DHR, LEP, p.231ff. This represents an enlargement of DHR, Some 
Notes on the Theory of· Interest' reprinted in EMI, pp.202-222. 
(28) ·See also DllR, EMI, p. 202. This is taken from a chapter writ.ten by 
DBR in Money, Trade and Economic Growth, essays in honour of 
Prof. J. Williams, Macmillan, New York, 1951. 
(29) DHR, LEP, p.240. 
(30) F. Ramsey, 'A Matha~atical Theory of Saving', Economic Journal, 
December 1928 pp.543-59; for a fuller discussion of this model 
see Connard, An Introduction to the Theory of Interest, pp.83-9. 
(31) The term used by DHR, see EMI, p.205. 
(32) DHR, BPPL, p.77. 
(33) See, for example, JMK, ~, Vol. XIV. 
(34) See pp.166-94. 
(35) See especially DHR, EHI, pp.150-233. 
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(36) See DllR, UAT, p.102ff, and LEP, p.2l6ff. 
(37) . F. Ramsay, opcit., A Lerner, The Economics of Control, Macmillan, 
New York. 
(38) DHR, UAT, p.l04. 
(39) DHR, ·~~,pp.150-87; Given as a lecture at the London School. of 
Economics, Summer Term, 1939. 
(40) ~, p.152. 
(41) DHR, LEP, p.224ff. 
(42) A. Lemer, op cit., pp.330-8. See DHR, UAT, p.l03. 
(43) Ibid, p.l03. 
(44) DHR, LEP, p. 226ff. 
(45) A. Lerner, 'On the Marginal Productivity of Capital a.nd the 
Marginal Efficiency of ·Investment', Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 61, 1953, pp:1-14. 
(46) DllR, LEP, p.228; 'its expected net quasi-rent represents a smaller 
and smaller rate of return on its cost of construction'. 
(47) Ibid, p.229. 
(48,. Ibid, p.222, 'A substantial fall in the rate of interest could not 
but convert a great many technical possibilities into economic 
advantages, and sooner or later into realities'. (A vim, which 
.he associated especially with G. Cassel). 
(49) 
(50) 
(51) 
, 
/ 
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Ibid, p. 219. 
Ibid, p.220. Widening is defined as 'An increase both in capital 
and in output, and not necessarily, an initial increase in 
capital per unit of time', also: 'It is evident that by and 
large the outstanding scientific achievements of the last 200 
years have created a succession of immense waves of demand for 
waiting, associated wl.th the series of technical revolutions in 
iron and steel production, with the general mechanisation of 
. ~ industry, and with the successive victories of steam, electricity 
and petrol in the generation of power'. 
Ibid, p.22l: 'this factor of the deepening of capital is not 
-wholly dependent on the continual progress of invention and 
research but is also responsive to the price at which investible 
funds can be hired, any appreciable fall in that price stimulating 
the application of methods of deepening which are already in 
principle known but have hitherto been to expensive to apply'. 
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(52) It may be that net hoarding rather than net dishoarding ·"Hl take 
place, but this ·does not alter the conclusion of this section. 
(53) The elasticity of money I<i th respect to the rate of interest I<ill 
depend upon from where the change in money originates. If it 
is created by the monetary authority then it can be expected to 
be insensitive to the rate cif interest. If it arises from the 
excess liquidity position of commercial banks it may well be 
sensitive to changes in the rate of interest. 
(54) In which case the supply curve on the previous diagram must inter-
sect .7ith the positive axis. 
(55) DHR,~, p.247. 
(56) See DHR, EM!, pp.194-5. 
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CHAPTER 8 
• Origins of the Robertsonian Approach to the Theory of Interest 
It is particularly in relation to the theory of interest that one 
can productively investigate the claim that 'its all in Marshall'. Two 
distinct areas of inquiry can be laid open. Firstly, one must explore 
the extent of Robertson's knowledge and understanding of the Narshallian 
theory of interest, and secondly it is important to compare the two 
.... 
theories. There is an element of truth in Keynes' assertion that 
Marshall did not provide any consecutive discussion of the rate of 
interest in any of his published writings. (1) But this does not mean 
that' it is impossible to gain some insight into his theory of interest, 
although the task is made much more difficult, and the insight fringed 
with a certain amount of confusion and interpretive licence! (2) 
Robertson invariably quoted Marshall on the meaning of the rate 
of interest, agreeing that it was the market price for the use of what 
Marshall called 'free or floating' capital, or what Robertson pre-
ferred to call loanable or investible funds. (3) The strict Marnhallian 
, 
definition of the rate of interest was taken by Robertson to be: 'the 
h ' h . d' f l' (4) payment w ~c anyone rece~ve l..n return or a .oan . This definition 
of interest was one of two definitions of the rate of interest used by 
Robertson, corresponding to the market ~ate of interest. (5) But 
Robertson did not fully understand Narshall's meaning of interest. 
This was because he failed t~ recognise that Narshall meant by the 
exp~ession 'free capital', not the supply of, and demand for, loanable 
, 
, 
.' 
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funds, but real capital or resources not yet employed in any particular 
use and therefore available to businessmen for investment. (6) There 
were therefore two rates of interest in Marshallian theory - a real 
rate of interest determined by the demand for/and suppl~ of free 
capital or real resources and a market rate of interest determined by 
the demand fo~and supply o~ floating capital or loanable funds. 
Robertson recognised only the latter in Marshallian theory. 
Had Robertson not misinterpreted Marshall in this manner he wollld 
, undoubtedly have been in even more agreement with Marshall, for Robertson 
was. also to put forward the proposition that there were two rates of 
! 
interest - the market rate of interest and also u quasi-natural rat.e 
of interest which corresponded closely to Marshall's real rate of 
interest. This latter rate was principally influenced by the demand 
for capital goods, which in turn depended upon the productivit~' of 
investment. (7) 
. Despite this failure to come to grips with Harshall's real rate 
of interest, Robertson did not neglect the role of the productivity 
of investment in Marshallian theory. This would act not only upon the 
real rate of interest, through the demand for real capital, but also 
upon the market rate of interest through the demand for loanable funds. 
He was in fact keen to emphasise, in his post-General Theory defence 
of classical theory, the role and importance of real factors in 
interest rate determination (including the productivity of investment). 
Marshall believed that the real and market rates of interest need not 
b<;'identical through time, the real rate being the dominant rate pulling 
. the market rate towards it. This is exactly the relationship which 
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Robertson saw betl<een his. o",n quasi-natural and market rates of 
(8) interest. However, Marshall argued that their equality represented 
• 
an equilibrium position, Robertson believed that the coincidence of 
his t",o rates of interest would not. be a stable position. 
That confusion did arise in Robertson's interpretation of Marshall's 
(9 ) 
theory is understandable for/as Eshag has pointed out, Marshall 
often implicitly assumed that the real and.market rates were equal, and I 
proceeded to use real capital and loanable funds interchangably in his 
explanation of interest rate determination. 
There is some reason to believe that in his treatment of loanable 
funds Marshall "'as referring to the flow of funds within a time period 
and not to the demand fori and supply of/the existing stock of floating 
capital. (10) Robertson himself was critical that Marshall wrongly 
placed flow and stock concepts side by side in his discussion of 
interest rate determination, talking at times of a flow of saving, and 
at other times of a stock of past savings. (11) 
Of the forces acting upon saving on t.he supply side, Robertson 
followed the Marshallian path particularly on the influence of interest 
(12) 
rates. But on the question of the sensitivity of saving to 
changes in the rate of interest this was not treated with the same 
importance in MarshalJ.ian theory as it was by Robertson. 'I'he influence 
of income on saving, which Robertson strongly denied was a Keynesian 
discovery, again was to be f':mnd in l.!arshall's work. (13) What 
Robertson failed to appreciate was that Marshall "'as not concerned 
! with the influence of ·short-ru!l changes in income upon saving, but 
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with long-term secular changes in income. (14) But the influence of 
changes in hoarding habits, and net additions to the money supply (and 
tne resultant forced saving), on the supply of loanable funds is not 
to be found in Marshall; although the latter, unknown to Robertson at 
the time, was to be found in the writings of the earlier classical 
economists. 
In relation to the demand for loanable .funds, Robertson's approach , 
again reflected "hat he saw as a development, or refinement, of the 
" Marshallian position.. He accused Marshall of imprecision, of generally 
arguing that only net investment is important in determining the demand 
for loanable funds, but at other times including the use of finance for 
(15) 
replacement investment purposes within demand. This inconsistency 
in turn led Marshall into confusion between stocks and flows.(16) 
Marshall saw the demand for loanable funds increasing as the rate of 
interest declined within the individual firm because of the diminishing 
marginal productivity of capital; at the aggregate level demand was 
determined by the 'profitableness of business'. This might have been 
more precisely defined as 'anticipated profitability', since Marshall 
was anxious to emphasise the impact of businessmen's expectations on 
the demand for loanable funds. He argued that the rate of interest 
would be high if: 'as a result of expectations, whether well-founded 
or not, the general prosperity is likely to be high ••.•• the rate of 
interest often rises rather high under the influence of hope, in an 
ascending phase of industrial and commercial activity and prosperity/l7) 
Robertson also was to refer to t.he movement. of the rat.e of int.erest 
(18) brought about by hope or by fear, but he paid much less attention 
, . 
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to the influence of expectations on demand than did Marshall (or Keynes 
for that matter in his discussion of the marginal efficiency of 
capital). As to the influence of the marginal productivity of capital 
on the demand for loanable funds, Robertson was to minimise its impor-
tance in later writings, concentrating instead upon what he called the 
marginal productivity of investible funds. 
Therefore, in many ways the Robertsonian theory of interest repre- \ 
sented no more than a logical development of Robertson' s interpretation 
of Marshallian theory, an interpretation which was not strictly correct 
on all counts. But this was clearly the most important source of 
influence on his theory at least in his earlier writings.. In this way 
Robertson merely extended the classical tradition as Marshall had done 
before him. Robertson's most significant contribution to interest 
theory liaS to be found in the examination of the impact of hoarding and 
new money·on the rat" of interest, enlarging upon Marshall's treatment 
of hoards in his discussion of the demand for money. But, as 
Robertson pointed out in 1937,(19) he was not alone in including monetary. 
as well as non-monetary factors in the theory of interest rate deter-
mination; the classical theory of interest could not be adequately 
represented by Fisher's loanable funds theory which excluded the 
monetary influences upon supply, &s Keynes had argued in the General 
Theory. (20) All those economists who had developed a forced saving 
doctrine were to some degree or other emphasising the effects of banking 
operations and credit creation upon the market rate of interest. 
, 
, 
To Robertson the loanable funds·theory of interest was ~ 'common 
sense account of events', a theory which was an attempt to give precision 
;' 
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to the views of neo-classical writers - in particular the work of 
Lavington and Hawt.rey on capital and credit, as well as the general 
. (21) 
writings on capital and credit in 'a thousand newspaper art~cles'. 
.' 
/ 
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Chapter 8 ~ Footnotes 
(1) JMK, GT, p.18G • 
. -
(2) See E. Eshag; From Marshall to Keynes, Oxford, 1963, Ch.3. 
(3) DHR,~, p.15l, and LEP, p.212. 
(4) DHR, !oEP, p.213. 
(5) See p.26lff. 
(6) This failure is most evident in "his criticism of Keynes' treat-
ment of Marshall ill which Keynes uses the Harshallian 'capital' 
to mean capital goods; Robertson believes that the only 
legitimate meaning of this term is investible funds and not real 
capital. See DHR, UAT, p.102n. 
(7) E. Eshag, op cit., pp.4Sff. 
(8) See Part rI, Ch.9. 
(9) E. Eshag, or cit., p.46. 
(10) Ibid, p.47. 
(11) DHR,~, p.102. 
(12) In fact DHR quoted directly from Marshall on the influence of the 
rate of interest: 'Though saving in general is effected by many 
other causes than the rate of interest, and though the saving 
of many people is but little affected by the rate of interest, 
while a few, who have determined to secure an income of a certain 
fixed amount for themselves or their family, will save less l<5.th 
a high rate than with a low rate of interest; yet a strong 
bal~~ce of evidence seems to rest with the opinion that a rise 
in the rate of interest., or demand price for saving, tends to 
increase the volume of saving'. (DIIR, LEP,. p.239). 
(13) A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, p.229 (1920 edition). 'The 
power to save depends on an excess of income over necessary. 
expenditure, and this is greatest among the wealthy'. 
(14) SeeE. Eshag, op cit., p.SO. 
(15) DHR, UAT, p.102. 
(16) A. Marshall, Money Credit and Commerce, London, 1923, p.2S4. 
(17) Taken from DHR, LEP. 
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(18) DHR,~, p.72. 
(19) DHR, Alternative Theories of the Rate of Interest, Economic 
Journal, Vol. 47, 1937, p.428. 
(20) JMK,~, Book IV. 
(21) DHR, Alternative Theories of the Rate of Interest, Economic 
Journal, Vol. 47, 1937, p.428. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
261 
CHAPTER 9 
Natural and Market Rates of Interest and the Trade Cycle 
As has been hinted at on several occasions, an increasing number 
of economists from the early part of the 20th centuryon\lards attempted 
to explain c~'clical fluctuations in terms of a divergence between the 
natural and the market rate of interest. This stimulated Robertson to 
devote an article to an examination of this explanation of the cycle in 
1934. (I) This chapter begins with a brief historical picture of the 
distinction that has been made between natural and market rates of 
interest, it then explores the ·use made of this distinction by the 
Sliedish and Austrian schools in explaining the cycle, and ends with 
Robertson's o~~ vielis on the natural rate of interest and its role in 
the cycle. 
The classical economists and the natural rate of interest 
The idea of a natural rate of interest is to be found in early 
classical writings. Although not explicitly stated, the classical 
definition of a natural rate of interest would be that rate lihich in 
the long-run yields the equality of voluntary saving and investment; (2)· 
this equality would result in an equilibrium level of income. 
In the long-run the quantity of money cannot influence the rate of 
interest. Adam Smith wrote that an increase in the quantity of money 
would increase prices but because it did not affect the rate of profit 
it .could not affect the rate of interest. (3) Similarly John Stuart Mill 
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was disposed to write that the most'common error of the businessman was 
to suppose that 
in ~nterest. (4) 
changes in the quantity of money brought with it changes 
In general most classical writers felt that in the short-
run the market rate of interest could be influenced by monetary forces • 
. Thornton, for example, sought to distinguish between the 'rate of mercan-
tile profit' and the 'rate of interest at the bank'; the former would 
correspond to the natural rate, the latter to the market rate, being 
under the influence of monetary expansion and' contraction. (5) Those 
economists who recognised the forced saving doctrine also generally 
accepted that in. the short-run there could be a difference between the 
natural and market rates of interest, brought about by banking operations; 
although, as Ricardo argued, whatever the volume of loans by.the banks, 
it: 'would not permanently alter the market rate of interest'. (6) ~'he 
regulation of the rate of interest was not to be imposed by variations 
in the rate of lending by the banks, but was determined by the rate of 
profit to be made by employing capital. It is the natural rate of 
. interest which is commonly held as the domihant rate, pulling the market 
rate of interest towards it. The market rate of interest may be under 
the influence of monetary forces in the short-run. Marget refers to the 
sophisticated understanding of economists from Thornton to Marshall of 
the way in which changes in the quantity of money affect prices through 
tne rate of interest; but most felt that the rate of interest could 
not be held for very long by monetary policy at any rate other than the 
natural rate. (7) 
Patinkin has interpreted the classical and neo-classical economists 
in a different fashion. lie suggests that because of the forced saving 
I 
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doctrine, they were qui te prepared to accept the permanent influence of 
monetary changes on the rate of interest. (8) This may be true of the 
neo-classical economists, as the Robertsonian approach will show, but it 
is not typically true of the classical economist. The work of T. Joplin 
is a good example of this. He clearly saw that forced saving would 
interfere with the equality of saving and investment. If changes in 
productivity or thrift occurred, shifting the saving and investment 
schedules, the 'natural rate of interest would change. But if the market 
or actual rate of interest is prevented from moving by changes in credit 
crl2ation, Joplin believed that the likely consequence would be fluctuations 
in economic activity not in the rate of interest. (9) Saving could be 
cancelled or manufactured by the banks, and consequently the actual rate 
may be above or below the natuI',al rate. 
Natural and market rates of interest - Wicksell, Hayek and Keynes 
Robertson >!as not familiar with the classical discussion of 
natural and market rates of interest when he first turned his attention 
to this in 1934. His >!ark then was simply a comment upon the writings 
of three economists in particular - Wicksell, Keynes and Hayek. 
Wicksell was inspired by the work of Thornton, Halthus, Ricardo and 
Joplin. His mm theory was developed fully within the Swedish school, 
in the writings of Ohlin, Lindahl, Myrdal andB. Hansen; it also 
influenced the Austrian school approach to trade cycle theory, particu-
larly the work of Hayek. The .innovation in Ihcksellian theory was the 
application of interest theory to the cumulative processes of expansion 
and contraction. l'1icksell dcscribed fluctuations in terms of the 
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divergence between the natural (or normal) rate and the market (or 
money) rate of interest; any divergence would show itself in fluctuations 
in' prices, not in output and emplo;TIent; but he did not suggest that 
this divergence was a cause of price fluctuations. Indeed he was at 
pains to point out that real causes were responsible for the price cycle, 
(10) 
not the divergence of natural and market rates. 
Wicksell defined the natural rate as that: 'at which the demand 
for loan capital and the supply of savings exactly agree'. (il) This 
would correspond to the definition already assumed above. However, at 
various times it is also referred to as that rate which corresponds 
approximately to the expected yield on the newly created capital, as the 
rate at which commodity prices are stable, or as that rate which would 
. . (12) 
exist if real cap~tal were loaned '~n natura'. Each of these defini-
tions are consistent with one another, except insofar as the first alter-
native fails to take into account the supply of savings acting on the 
natural rate and therefore neglects the effect of thrift, but not produc-
tivity, upon the rate; the final alternative creates problems by 
assuming a barter economy. Hence the natural rate is the normal rate, 
the rate to which the market rate will move, the divergence between the 
two neing caused by banking policy. If the market rate is less than the 
natural rate then prices will rise under the influence of a low desire 
to save as a consequence of a low reward for saving. This leads to a 
growth in consumer demand. The divergence between the two rates brings 
with it increased expectations of profit, which bring a greater demand 
for factors of production; higher factor incomes will result if full 
employment already exists (as Wicksell assumed) and there ,.,ill be further 
. . 
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increases in consumer demand. These reasons are additional to the fact 
that the demand for loanable funds needs to be partly financed via 
forced saving, which itself is inflationary. Clearly in Wicksellian 
theory it is the price level which fluctuates not the level of output 
and employment. 
Tooke, in particular, had been critical of theories which had not , 
matched the empirical observation that rising prices in a period of 
expansion are associated with rising interest rates. (13) The 
" Wlcksellian approach was to avoid this criticism by arguing that it was 
the natural rate of interest which tended to change frequently, whilst 
the market rate remained sluggish in response to·changes in the natural 
rate. Hence an expansionary situation would be characterised by an 
increasing natural rate of interest with the market rate gradually 
follo"ing behind it. Rising prices and rising interest rates were com-
patible in this theory. The boot was. not on the other foot, it was not 
the natural rate which remained unchanged over time and the market rate 
"hich danced around it. The message "as there for all to see, it was 
only "here market and natural rates of interest coincided that money had 
a completely neutral relationship with the price of goods and services; 
any divergence between the two would bring price movements. It was a 
message with which Robertson took issue. He was to argue forcibly(14) 
that the rate of interest which keeps the price level constant is not 
necessarily the natural rate of Wicksellian theory, the rate at which 
the supply of saving and the demand for capital are equated. (15) 
The development of this Wicksellian approach leads once more to 
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that now familiar economist - F. von Hayek. The divergence between 
natural and market rates of interest was lucidly linked by Hayek to the 
variability in forced saving and taken to be the cause of cyclical 
.. (16) fluctuat~on. Hayek's 'additional credit theory' placed the cause of 
the divergence between the natural and market rates upon newly created 
money. This, in the face of increased,anticipated profit from invest-
ment in an expansion,and the subsequent increased demand for loan 
capital, increases the supply of loan capital with little or no increase 
in the market rate of interest. Investment therefore surpasses the 
amount of voluntary saving taking place and a cumulative expansion 
results. Initially the increased investment changes the relative 
prices of capital and consumer goods in favour of the former; the 
structure of production consequently changes in favour of capital goods. 
In the latter stages of expansion factor incomes rise, bringing a rise 
in the demand for consumer goods; this may lead to increased withdrawals 
from bank accounts driving up the market rate of interest and leaving 
some investment projects already begun unprofitable. This will bring a 
turnabout in the structure of production; relative prices now move in 
favour of consumer good industries and against expansion in capital good 
production. Wicksell had assumed full employment in his model; Hayek 
was to do the same in his earlier writings. Later he dropped this 
assumption (17) and examined the Wicksellian cumulative process in terms 
of the fluctuations in output and employment that it might generate over 
the cycle. The conclusion he reached was in contrast to that of Wicksell. 
A stable price level will not provide a total disappearance of cyclical 
fluctuations. (lS) This could only occur if bank deposits could be kept 
/ 
stable, but such a policy "as not justifiable in Hayek's thesis. 
267 
Stability would be at the expense of economic progress; innovation 
would be hindered and the psychological forces working for progress 
would disappear. If economic progress was to be encouraged, banks 
could not ra~ain inactive and credit must be used to supplement volun-
tary saving. (19) Wicksell had given priority to maintaining a stable 
economy, Hayek had seen the need for economic progress. Different 
objectives required different banking policies. (20) 
Amongst the British economists, it was Keynes who sought to develop 
the Wicksellian process in the Treatise on Money published in 1930. (21) 
The Treatise had the same objective as BPPL. It Was a discourse on the 
. causes of industrial fluctuation, with the aim of establishing the con-
ditions necessary for monetary equilibrium in the economy; Robertson 
had similarly, in BPPL, sought to plot the justifiable course of banking 
policy over the cycle. The Treatise saw the cycle as arising from 
fluctuations in the rate of investment relative to the rate of saving, 
that is in the inequality of saving and investment. (22) As such this 
was a descendent of the over-investment theories of Robertson and others; 
in fact Keynes went so far as to agree with the role of innovation in 
the cycle put forward by Schumpeter •. As with Wicksell's cumulative 
process, investment increases when the natural rate of. interest exceeds 
the matket rate and vice-versa; the diverg~nce between the two rates is 
responsible for price movements. If savipg and investment could be can-
tinually equated by maintaining the equality of market and natural 
rates of interest, prices need never move. Entrepreneurs would neither 
be encouraged nor discouraged to expand or contract their scale of opera-
tion~ ~leTreatise was no more therefore than an attempt to spell out 
! 
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the appropriate banking policy which could maintain this. monetary 
equilibrium. Wicksell had chosen not to give his cumulative process 
math~~atical precision. It was Keynes who sought to introduce this 
I 
mathematical precision by manipulating his·' fundamental equations' to 
yield an explanation as to why differences between natural and market 
rates would bring the inequality of saving and investnient,and subsequent 
price movements. 
Keynes' final conclusion was that prices would fluctuate around a 
value E + 0, this fluctuation depending upon the volume of Q (equals I - S), 
which in turn is dependent upon the divergence between natural and mar-
. (23) ket rates. It ,;ould appear that there is little dissimilarity of 
vie,; between Wicksell and the Keynes of the Treatise, other than in the 
degree of mathematical rigour atbached to the analysis. However, this 
is not the case. It is apparent that Keynes was thinking in terms of a 
short-run equilibrium in the Treatise. One must remember that the 
Treatise contained static analysis, no time lag was introduced; the 
discussion as such was no different from the General Theory which was to 
follow, even though it purported to relate to fluctuation. The most 
serious criticism of it was perhaps its attempt to gain conclusions con-
cerning dynamic phenomenon from static equations. In contrast,Wicksell 
was attempting to explain the possibility of some long-term equilibrium 
in the economy. Both failed to take account 'of the state of unemployment 
in'their analysis, equilibrium was defined exclusively in terms of price 
stability irrespective of the level of employment; hence price stability 
would materialise if saving and investment were identical, whether 
employment was low or high. 
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Hicks has interpreted the Treatise differently. He suggests that, 
although Wicksell would not support the possible existence of an equilib-
rium at less than full employment if prices and wages are perfectly flex-
ible" (as they would be in the long-run), Keynes would accept that short-
(24) 
run equilibrium coutd exist at less than full employment. In other 
words the scale of operation of entrepreneurs defined in the equilibrium 
of the Treatise need not necessarily be that consistent with full employ-
ment. This may be so, but it is not explicitly stated in the Treatise. 
Natural and market rates of interest - the Robertsonian view 
This is the background against which Robertson was to put forward 
his own interpretation of the relation between natural and market rates 
of interest. (25) The major problem, and one which was not satisfactorily 
resolved by Robertson, was to define the natural rate of interest. 
The Wicksellian approach had been to define equilibrium and then to 
argue that the natural rate was the rate of interest which would maintain 
this equilibrium. The difficulty for Robertson was to accept a meaning-
ful definition of equilibrium. His own approach to the study of fluctua-
tion led him to adopt dynamic and not stat.ic analysis. It was illogical 
to assume that equilibriwn could be defined as a situation where prices 
were stable and full employment existed. Economies were not stable but 
were continually progressing under the capitalist system of production. 
Economic progress takes place with the symptom of cyclical fluctuation. 
Robertson believed that the natural rate of interest should reflect this 
fact, and therefore he could not accept Wicksell's definition of the 
, 
natural rate. 
, 
/ 
, 
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(26) There is, as Professor Davidson has argued, . not one but two 
natural rates of interest; one keeps the average price level stable and 
• 
the other brings the equality of the demand for, and supply of, savings. 
, 
Full employment and price stability may not be possible within a single 
definition of equilibrium. 
Robertson gave his equilibrium three characteristics; wages and 
profits are at a 'normal level', but he failed to indicate what was meant 
by:normal; secondly, capital will be growing and consequently equilibrium 
is not of a static nature; thirdly, because cyclical fluctuation is 
taking place, full employment will not be a feature of equilibrium; 
unemployment will be at the average level it attains over a full cycle. 
These characteristics are in marked contrast to the meaning of equilibrium 
in earlier Wicksellian theories. Here price :stability is not the chief 
feature; indeed it is more probable that falling prices may be occurring 
at equilibrium. Equally the money supply may not be constant, but will, 
with an increasing population, be increasing at equilibriTh~; in other 
words, money may not be neutral where the natural and market rates of 
interest coincide. The natural rate of interest is the rate which will 
maintain this dynamic equilibrium - an equilibrium which has different 
qualities at different times. Robertson had in mind, not the short-run 
equilibrium of the Treatise, nor Wicksell's long-run equilibrium, but a 
middle period analysis suitable to the study of fluctuation and consistent 
with his earlier introduction of period analysis in BPPL. There is no 
such animal as a static natural rate of interest towards which the market 
rate will be drawn. The natural rate of the Robertsonian thesis js a 
moving equilibrium rate never attainable as there are always endog~ 
, 
.' 
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forces· operating t.o alter it. 
Robertson was to emphasise that equilibrium and the natural rate had 
been studied from the viewpoint that equilibrium existed; analysis then 
proceeded by examining how this equilibrium could be maintained. A more 
realistic, and worthwhile, approach was to assume initially a position of 
disequilibrium and to seek an answer as to how the economy may be restored 
to equilibrium. (27) Keynes was to state in the General Theory: 'there 
is ••••• a different natural rate of interest for each hypothetical level 
of employment'. (28) This was the very message which Robertson was trying 
to get across two years earlier. 
The natural rate, was clearly, as for Wicksell, the dominant rate, 
the one about which the market rate would fluctuate. Similarly Robertson 
was disposed, as Wicksell had done before him, to argue that the natural 
rate was not an immobile rate of interest, but one which would be chiefly 
affected by fluctuations in the marginal productivity of using investible 
funds ~rough, for example, innovation and discovery and changes in thrift 
affecting the supply side). (29) The Blondinians(30) had chosen to high-
light tile monetary forces which created a divergence of natural and mar-
ket rates and had argued in varying degrees as to the powerfulness of 
l ' , , " 'l'b' (31) monetary po ~cy ~n malnta~n~ng equ~ ~ r~um. According to Robertson, 
what the General Theory was to do later to this debate, other than to 
pl~y upon the inter-dependence of investment and saving through the level 
of income, was simply to introduce the possible impact of liquidity pre-
ference upon the market rate;' a force which the Blondinians failed to 
fully examine, but one which Robertson had accounted for, in his discussion 
, 
, 
, 
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of changes in hoarding habits on the rate of interest. (32) 
This is not where the story ends. Robertson was anxious to comment _ 
fully upon the Wicksellian approach. He could only do tilis by utilising 
a diagrammatic scheme which would take him partway back to static analysis. 
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It will be worthwhile to follow the argument of the article 
written by Robertson in 1934 very closely because it brings together 
his views on a number of topics discussed so far in this thesis. These 
are: 
i) the role of forced saving in the trade cycle, 
ii) the importance of the divergence between natural and 
market rates of interest on the course of the cycle, 
iii) the role of investment in the cycle and of the forces 
of invention and discovery in influencing investment, 
iv) the validity of the 'shortage of saving' version of 
the over-investment theory of the cycle. 
It represents a survey of the Robertsonian position up to the pub-
lication of KeyneS'General Theory in 1936, a position which remains sub-
stantially intact in the post-1936 era. (33) In addition it throws some 
light on how the theory of interest is integrated with price theory in 
Robertsonian literature through the forced saving doctrine. 
Let us assume that in the diagram above SI shows, for a given time 
period, the amount of voluntary saving forthcoming at each rate of inter-
est, and Dl the amount of investment during the time period corresponding 
to different levels to the rate of interest (reflecting a declining mar-
ginal productivity of investment). Excluding principally any net hoard-
ing which might take place, and the possibility of any newly created 
money coming from the banks, the rate of interest equating SI and DI is 
representative of the classical natural rate iri a sta·tic economy. 
Robertson would maintain that RI would not be a stable natural rate of 
interest, neither "ould there be any automatic tena.ency to return to 
/ that rate once a disturbance of', the system has arisen. 
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The upswing of the cycle 
• Robertson's dynamic interpretation can be imposed upon this analysis 
by assuming, for example, that an increase in the marginal productivity J 
of utilising saving occurs. (34) As a consequence the demand curve will 
be displaced to the right (D2 ). The impact of this upon the relation-
ship between natural and market rates of interest will depend upon the 
reaction of the clearing banks to the increased demand for loans. It 
would appear that the natural rate of interest has risen to (R4). If 
the banks keep the market rate of interest at RI' they Hill need to 
·create additional money to finance the increased demand for loans for 
investment purposes (S2 - SI)' It will be difficult for the banks to 
sustain this rate of interest; indeed the newly created money will set 
in motion forces which will act upon both the market, and what appears 
to be/the natural rate of interest. These forces result from imposed 
lacking generated by neHly created money. From our earlier discuGsion(3S) 
it was seen that money incomes will rise alongside the money supply, 
prices will rise, and income will be redi.stributed in favour of entrepren 
eurs. If it is assumed that the entrepreneurial class have a higher 
propensity to save than the salaried class, (36) this redistrj.bution will 
lead to a shift in the saving curve to the right (S2)' (37) The natural 
rate of interest now appears to be R3• Robertson concluded that there 
would be a natural tendency for the market rate of interest to move to 
this rate (R3). A number of important conclusions arise from this 
Robertsonian analysis. 
, 
, 
i) saving and investment schedules are not stable, and 
therefore the classical natural rate of interest 
will not be stable. 
• 
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ii) the banks can interfere to create a divergence of 
market and natural rates of interest, 
iii) ,this interference' (through changes in the amount of 
newly created credit) will have some influence upon, 
the classical natural rate of interest. This influence 
manifests itself through the forced saving process. 
In 1934 Robertson chose to emphasise the redistri-
bution effects of income upon induced lacking. 
Earlier, in BPPL, several reasons for induced lacking 
were recognised. These would tend to shift the 
supply curve. What is most significant is that this 
analysis distinguishes Robertson's work from that of 
the early classical writers who saw only a short run 
influence of monetary changes upon the rate of inter-
est. In the long run they believed the ..rate to be 
im'ariant to changes in the money supply, (38) 
iv) the natural rate of interest, ,unstable though it may 
be, will pull the market rate towards it. 
The downturn of the cycle 
But R3 is onl;', what Robertson calls, a quasi-natural rate of 
interest. It is not a stable equilibrium because there are two forces 
operating within the system causing it to change. It is to these 
forces ,le look for an explanation of the downturn of the cycle. The 
first, and less important, force (in Robertson's opinion - although 
emphasised by the Austrain school of economists) is the eventual tendency 
during the boom for wages to catch up with prices and for profit levels 
to fall. The redistribution effect of newly created money is reversed 
and the supply curve will shift to the left (Sl). The natural rate will 
rise relative to the market rate, the demand for loanable funds for 
i~vestment purposes will fall (S3 - S4)' and the recession will occur. 
The Austrian economists(39) blamed the rise in the rate of interest, 
the divergence between natural and market rates that occurred during 
th,e boom, for the dOlmturn. It could be inter'preted as a 'shorta,ge of 
276 
saving' theory of crises, admittedly more sophisticated in argument 
. ~ (40) than that of Sp~ethoff and Labordere, but having the feature of an 
inadequacy of f~~ds to sustain investment at the boom. In classifying 
this theory of crisis however Robertson prefers to go further back in 
the causal chain. The cause of the crisis is not the shortage of saving, 
or even the increase in the natural rate of interest, but the source of 
the original change in thrift. In his 1934 article this was the redis-
tributive effect of differential movements in wages and prices; but 
equally he might have emphasised any of the possible causes of a change 
in lacking expressed in BPPL. 
However much more fundamental to Robertscn as the cause of the 
crisis is the saturation of the economy with capital goods which will 
arise in the vast majority of boom periods. This is brought about by 
the forces discussed in Part I of this thesis, principally by the 
gestation period of investment, and by the indivisibility and longevity 
of investment. On rare occasions this saturation may be absent from 
the boom if a Shortage of saving has occurred first. But invariably, 
according to Robertson, satu:cation appears first and represents the 
only cause of the crisis. On other occasions it works alongside the 
first cause, but invariably dominates it. Even where saturation does 
. not arise, Robertson argues that it would have eventually arisen had 
not the firs·t cause been present. It will result in a decline in the 
~arginal productivity of investment, bringing a shift in the demand 
curve to the left (03), The quasi-natural rate of interest falls to 
RS' with a substantial fallii1g off in the demand for loanable funds 
(S~ - SS) and, in turn, investment. But there is also a secondary 
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effect. Not only will income and output contract, but income wil1 be 
redistributed from entrepreneurs to wage earners. Again this may lead 
to a leftward shift in the supply curve raising the quasi-natural rate 
(R6 ) and dampening investment even further. 
Robertson was anxious to stress that the two causes of crisis were 
not incompatible; (41) they could operate side by side; but the second 
cause was of significantly more importance than 'the first as an explana-
, (42) . 
tion of most cn.ses. In most crises it was not the high rate of 
interest which was the cause of the downtunl in investment, but the 
saturation of the economy with capital goods which brought a situation 
where, relative ·to the boom, very little investment would take place 
whatever the rate of interest might be. (43) 
~lhat conclusions can be added to those above? Although Robertson 
is the first to admit to the oversimplified nature of the above 
. ,(44) . 
analysis, it does demonstrate a number'of Robertsonian be1iefs: 
/ , 
i) not only is the natural rate not stable over the cycle, 
and hence termed the quasi-natural rate by Robertson, 
not only does the natural rate dominate and pull the 
market rate towards it, but it is also never a rate 
at which prices are stable - nor is it a rate at 
which full employment is attained. A quasi-natural 
rate exists in both boom and slump. There exists a 
tendency to move towards it, but no sooner is this 
tendency followed then the quasi-natural rate is 
itself displaced. vie have a moving equilibrium situa-
tion which is never reached because of U,e time lags 
inherent in the system, 
ii) the cycle is not to be explained by monetary forces 
by, for example, a divergence be'tween natural and 
market rates of ' interest. Such a divergence is 
merely a symp~om of the cycle not a cause of it. 
The real cause is to be found, in tenos of interest 
rate theory, in the forces which cause the supply and 
demand curves to shift: - the real forces recognised 
in Part I of this thesis in the over-investment theory 
of the cycle, 
\ 
, 
, 
I 
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iii) the disequilibrium situation, and the processes involved 
in moving from one disequilibrium to the next, whether 
or not the economy is moving nearer to ultimate equil-
ibrium, is more worthy of discussion than a simple com-
parison of static equilibrium; that is, there is a 
reluctance to develop a static approach, 
iv) the forces of productivity and thrift should be emphasised 
as acting'in the long run upon the level of activity; 
in the shorD-run monetary factors (via the clearing 
banks), would interfere with the level of economic 
activity and with the movement in the rate of interest, 
but the underlying forces of productivity and thrift are 
dominant, 
v) there is no automatic tendency over time for voluntary 
saving to be equated \vi th investment through movements 
in the rate of interest. This was a conclusion strongly 
disputed by Keynes in the General Theory who believed 
that saving and i'nvestment ,nust be equated but through 
variations in the level of income, not via the rate of 
interest as in classical theory. This equality was at 
the centre of Keynes' dispute with the loanable funds 
theory, and stemmed from his recognition of multiplier 
analysis. This failure to propose that saving and 
investment would be equated by interest rate movements 
is one of the major distinctions between Robertsonian 
economics and the economics associated in modern macro-
economic textbooks with the classical straw-man. (45) 
\ 
/ 
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Chapter 9 - Footnotes 
(1) OHR,' Industrial Fluctuation and the Natural Rate of Interest', 
Economic Journal, December 1934, pp.650-56. 
(2) See T. Wilson, Fluctuations in Income and Employment, Pitm~', 
London, 1942, p.9n. 
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(7) A. Marget, op cit. 
(8) O. Patinkin, Money, Interest and Prices, Harper and ROH, NeH York, 
(1965 cd.), p.631, Appendix J. 
(9) See earlier PP.201-2. 
(10) K. Wicksell wrote: 
'my view ascribes trade cycles to !.eal causes independent: of 
movements in commodity price, so that the latter become of 
only secondary importance ••••• the principal and sufficient 
cause of cyclical fluctuations should rather be sought in 
the fact that ;'n its very nature technical or commercial 
advance cannot maintain the same even progress as does, in 
our days, the increase in needs ••••• but is sometimes pre-
cipitate, sometimes delayed'. 
Lectures on Political·Economy,Vol .. 2, p.209ff. This is a 
·quote used by DHR, EMT, p.127. 
(11) K. Wicks ell , ibid, vol. 5, p.220. 
(12) See G. Haberler, op cit., p.34ff. 
(13) T. Tooke, Lectures on Political Economy, p.202. 
(14) DHR, ~PPL, p.99. 
(15) This is developed later see pp.269-70. 
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(16) Hayek wrote: 
'the determining cause of the cyclical fluctuation is, 
therefore, the fact that on account of the elasticity 
of the vol.ume of currency media the rate of interest 
demanded by the banks is not necessarily always equal 
to the equilibrium rate, but is, in the short run 
determined by considerations of banking liquidity'. 
Monetary Theory of the Trade Cycle, pp.179-180. 
Wickse11 had similarly made this very point in relation to 
price movements, emphasising that the longer the difference 
between the two rates persisted, this being determined by 
the elasticity of the volume of currency to changes in 
interest, the greater would be the effect upon prices. (K • 
. Wicksel1, Geldzins Und Guterpreise, p.101). 
(17) F. van Hayek, Profit and Interest and Investment, 1939. 
(18) F. von Hayek, Nonetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, p.18S. 
(19) Ibid, Ch. 4. 
(20) Ibid. 
(21) JMK, op cit., 
(22) See L. Klein, The Keynesian Revolution, Macmi11an, London, 1965, 
Papermac, p. 21. 
(23) When E = Income paid out 
0 = Output 
Q = Windfall profits 
I = Investment 
S = Saving. 
See L. Klein, op cit., Ch. 1. 
(24) This is an observation which has been made by J. Hicks, Critical 
Essays in Monetary Theory, Oxford University Press, p.201. 
(25) DHR, 'Industrial Fluctuation and the natural rate of interest' 
was a comment upon the Wickse11ian theory of Hayek Prices and 
Production (1931) and J .M. Keynes 'rreatise on Honey, (1930). 
(26) See B. Thomas, 'The Monetary Doctrines of Professor Davidson', 
Economic Journal, Vol. 45, 1935, p.36ff. 
/ 
(27) DIffi, EMT, p.149: 'explored from the point of view of a traveller 
who desires to keep to the straight path than from that of one 
/l 
/ who has lost it and desires to regain it'. 
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(28) J.M. Keynes, ~, p.242. 
(29) See DHR, EMT, p.148. 
(30) This was Robertson' s tenn for those looking at monetary equili.brium 
by considering natural and market rates. 
(31) See DHR, EMT, p.148ff. 
(32) See Chs. 11 and 12. 
(33) See pp.3l9-76. 
(34) e.g. through invention. Assuming initially that natural and market, 
rates of interest coincide at RI. 
(35) See Part II, Ch.4. 
(36) An assumption which Robertson appears to make (EMI, p.66). 
(37) It is interesting to note the contents of a letter from Robertson 
to T. Wilson dated 31.10.53: 'Later in my own thoughts about 
the trade cycle, I came to'.lay great stress, following Cassel, 
on the changes in saving due to changes in the distribution of 
income during a cycle'. 
(38) See DHR, EMI, p.225, also D. Patinkin, ~oney Interest and Prices, 
note J, pp.630-3. In a letter to D. Patinkin, Robertson 
writes: 'Even when the inflation is over, we may find that the 
curve of voluntary savings has been displaced to the right, 
owing to the distortion of contracts which has occurred'. 
(7th August, 1956). 
(39) Hayek in particular, op cit. 
(40) See pp. 157-66. 
(41) DHR, EMI, p.68. 
(42) The exception being according to Robertson the crisis of 1907. 
(43) DHR, ~MI, p.68: 'the Cunarder suspended on the plea of high 
interest rates remains suspended, with Bank rate at 2 per 
cent, because there are too many ships'. 
(44) 
(45) 
, 
, 
/ 
DHR, ibid, p.71. 
/ 
Robertson did not return in later publications to the distinction 
which he had made between the quasi-natural and the natural 
rates of interest. It must be borne in mind ho\vever, that the 
Hicks-Hansen interpretation of Keynes' GT, which was accepted 
to a large degree by Keynesians, took the GT a good way towards 
the above Wicksellian analysis. As Hicks pointed out (see 
Pp.':\G9--494), the intersection of IS and LM curves can be 
regarded in special circumstances as an "equating of natural 
, 
, 
and market rates of interest. 
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CHAPTER 10 
~ Saving, Investment and the Multiplier (1936 and after) 
The next major step in the saving-investment debate ca~e in 1936 
with the publication of Keynes' General Theory. This section begins by 
surveying the relationship between saving and investment found in this 
great work; from this one can then appreciate why the forced saving 
and multiplier theories were incompatible; "but which had greater 
validity? Robertson was not convinced by Keynes ill1d Keynesian arg~~ent. 
The main objective of this chapter therefore is to examine why Robertson 
remained unpersuaded by multiplier analysis and why he remained faith-
ful to the forced saving thesis. 
~he equality of saving and investment in the General Theory 
Keynes did not accept the Robertsonian proposition that saving 
and investment need not be equal. This proposition was central to the 
forced saving thesis and, in turn, to Robertson's loanable funds theory. 
The inequality of saving and investment was practically guaranteed by 
the interference of changes in the money supply and hoarding habits 
upon the supply of, and demand for, loan able funds. If they were equal 
it was purely coincidental. The General Theory offered its interpreters 
two explanations of why saving and investment should be equal - either 
they were equal by definition or were equated via the multiplier pro-
cess. Thus Keynes was at odds I<ith Robertsonian theory, and, in this 
respect, with his own ~atis!C in which the inequality of saving and 
investment gave rise to cumulative movements in the economy_ 
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The two explanations of saving/investment equality in the Genera~ 
Theory arose from Keynes' failure to distinguish between ex-ante and 
ex-post concepts, between actual saving and attempted saving. The first 
. 
tells us that saving and investment are identical 'by definition. (1) 
Actual saving must always be equal to actual investment. This is a 
truism, an identity. Robertson saw that nothing was to be gained by 
maintaining such an identity for it told nothing of the causal sequence 
betvleen saving and investment. (2), If the equality of saving and 
investment always existed by definition - the result of how the tenns 
were defined - then there Was nothing to be learnt of how independent 
human responses on the part of consumers and businessmen might bring 
about the equality in reality.' This criticism waS also to be voiced 
by Ohlin, (3) and by Lutz(4) who argued that such a definitional approach 
not only was impotent in relation to causal analysis, but that it led 
to a neglect of the role of credit and hoarding in the financing of 
invesunent. This latter point was made by Robertson in his comment 
upon Keynes' multiplier analysis. 
But Keynes avoided this Robertsonian criticism in his second 
approach to equality. (5) In this he attempts to show how saving and 
investment are equal via the multiplier process.(6)An increment in 
investment generates an equal increment in saving. Additional invest-
ment creates additional income, part of which will be spent, part saved; 
this spending will create further income, part of which again will be 
spent, the rest saved; so the process will continue. The additional 
income created by the original increment in investment will depend 
upon the size of the propensity to spend. The greater 1,s the propensi.ty 
i 
to' spend, the greater is the value of the multiplier and the greater is 
• 
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1:he total change in income brought about. Contrast this with the 
classical relation between saving illld investment, where saving influenced 
i~vestment through the rate of interest, and where no reference was 
made to the influence of income changes. 
A simple numerical example demonstrates the multiplier and also 
helps clarify some of the later Robertsonian criticisms. Although such 
a numerical example was not part of Keynes' General Theory, it does 
lucidate the main conclusions reached by Keynes; but at the same time 
it leaves the multiplier open to a dynamic interpretation. This >las not. 
part of Keynes' thesis. 
Round! fir fiy fic !:J.S 
I Em Em Em £m 
1 100 100 ~ (100) ~ (100) 
2 ~ (100) (~) 2 (100) (~)2(100) 
3 (~) 2 (100) (~) 3 (100) (~) 3 (100) 
4 (~) 3 (100) (~) 4 (100) (~) 4 (100) 
5 (~)4(100) (~)5(100) (~) 5 (100) 
6 (~) 5 (100) (~) 6 (100) . (~) 6 (100) 
n (l,t-\lOO) (~) n (100) (~) n (100) 
TOTAL 100 200 100 100 
Here the initial change, and only change, in investment is EIOOm; the 
marginal propensity to consume is .5 and consequently the marginal 
propensity to save is equal to .5 (assuming a simple economy). A 
higher marginal propensity to consume of, for example, .75, would 
yield additional income of E400m. The mul·tiplier in which case would 
be·4 not 2; (7) but the extra saving geqerated, whatever the marginal 
2B5 
propensity to consume might be, would always equal ElOOm; that is, 
starting from a position where saving and investment are equal, the 
change in investment will always create an equivalent increase in saving 
(fiI = fiS). A stable level of income can only exist where saving and 
investment are equal; if the two are not equal then income must still 
be changing - the multiplier process will still be in operation. What 
was crucial about Keynes' treatment of the multiplier was his insis-
tence upon static analysis, the neglect of lags within the multiplier 
process between additional spending and the creation of income, and 
between receiving income and spending it. He was concerned entirely 
with a comparison of static equilibria, without analysing how L~e 
economy moved from one equilibrium to the next. (B) It was this neglect 
which shouldered much of Robertson's criticism. It has already been 
concluded in the last chapter that the equality of saving and investment 
in this manner did not signify stability of output or employment in 
Robertson's.thesis. 
It is important to dwell upon Keynes' multiplier theory, for it is 
the base from which Keynesian policy recommendations follow. The cure 
for unemplo~nent is increased spending; the amount of additional spend-
ing required depends upon the value of the multiplier, which in turn 
depends upon the propensity to consume. A stable marginal propensity 
to consume yields a stable multiplier value. Instability in the pro-
pensity to spend damages the usefulness of the multiplier as a policy 
guide since any change in autonomous expenditure as a result of govern-
ment intervention may not have the desired effect on total demand if 
such instability persists. 
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The multiplier and the forced saving doctrine 
Robertson's reaction to the multiplier can be anticipated if >le 
consider the implications that it has for the validity of the forced 
saving doctrine. The forced saving process results from the impact of 
an increase in the desire to buy capital goods upon the level of 
prices. This increase in demand for capital goods brings forth an 
additional demand for bank loans. If additional credit is created, 
competition results for the available output of goods and services, 
prices rise and some individuals in the economy are forced to save, 
that is they are forced to lack, to consume less than they >IOU Id other-
wise have done in the absence of the additional credit created. Prices 
rise even though the economy may be at less than full employment. The 
finance for additional investment is to be found, not in additional 
credit created by t.he banks, but in the forced saving which additional 
credit creation has brought about, and the induced changes in hoards 
resulting from price changes. 
In Keynes' analysis, at less than full employment, the multiplier 
process provides the additional saving required to finance the incre-
ment in investJlJent without a change in the general price level, and 
without the need for additional bank credit creation. The act of invest-
ment automatically, instantaneously in Keynes' analysis, provides the 
funds to enable the investment to be undertaken. (9) Forced saving is 
not required - voluntary saving responds with just sufficient funds to 
match the invest~ent. Outpu~ responds and not prices. The multiplier 
amounts to a complete condemnation of t.he forced saving doctrine which, 
as we have seen, is central to Robertson's conception of macro-economic 
207 
theory - the role of tbe banks, the operation of the cycle, the move-
ment of prices and so on. Furthermore, it gives the conclusion that 
• 
a stable economy can exist if saving and investment are equal, 
stability conditions which are alien to Robertsonian theory. 
The conflict between the multiplier process and the forced saving 
thesis comes out most clearly in correspondence between Keynes and W. 
Beveridge. (10) Here the conflict is seen in terms of the repercussions 
of a change in investment upon the demand for, and supply of, consumer 
goods. Keynes argues that the act of investment will not raise the 
price level at less than full ,employment because the supply of consumer 
goods is elastic. The Robertsonian forced saving thesis implies that 
the supply of consumer goods is less than perfectly elastic such that 
the additional demand created by employing more labour in capital good 
industries cannot be met by additional supply at the existing price 
level. If the supply of consumer goods fails to respond instantaneously, 
and in a like manner, to changes in demand, prices must change and 
forced saving must ensue - at less than full employment. Robertson 
does not assume the existence of full employment in proposing forced 
saving, although he would not dispute that supply becomes more inelastic 
at full employment. 
In later correspondence Keynes concedes that his theory depends 
upon the supply cf consumer goods being elastic. If it is not then a 
large part of his theory is invalidated(ll) - and the case against 
forced saving is less certain. Keynes admits that if he were to rewrite 
tJ;1~ General Theory he 'lOuld need to re-define full employment, the point 
" 
/ 
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at which much of the substance of the General Theory needs revising. 
Full employment would become that point where the supply of output 
b~comes inelastic. (12) To Robertson this would be an admission that 
full employment can be achieved Witll any amount of tile labour force 
unemployed. (13) This is clearly an untenable position and a major 
limitation to the usefulness of much of the General Tneory. 
Robertson's reaction to multiplier analysis. 
Robertson reacted to Keynes' multiplier analysis in three ways. 
He began by disputing the originality of the multiplier as it appeared 
in tile General Theory. Secondly, he attacked the static nature of 
Keynes' argument, providing his own dynamic interpretation and con-
sequently remoulding the implications of the dynamic multiplier for the 
forced saving thesis. Thirdly, he disputed tile stability of the pro-
pensity to spend and consequently the usefulness of multiplier analysis. 
(i) The origins of multiplier analysis 
Our earlier preview of Robertson's criticisms of ~~e General 
Theory indicated that Robertson felt Keynes claimed too much originality 
for his work. The components of the General Theory were not new, but 
simply rearrangement.'wf existing theory - re arrangements which distorted 
and exaggerated the 'fruitful body of doctrines' (14) inherited by 
economists in the 1930s. The least convincing argument in this respect 
in Robertson's armoury was his assertion that tile multiplier had been 
seen before in Marshall's work, and also in tlle work of J. Lesoure. 
However, Robertson's statement of the so-called 'theory of repercussions' 
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associated with Lescure indicates that it is an acceleratiol1, not a 
multiplier, theory in that it relates to the impact of a change in con-
sumer demand upon the level of investment. No one would now dispute 
that Keynes' multiplier analysis, developed from an article by R. Kahn, (15) 
had appeared before in the work of Johannsen and wulff:(16) Indeed the 
idea that investment stimulates consumption is regarded by Haberler as 
being almost as old as business cycle theory. (17) 
But v/as the multiplier recognisable in Marshallian economics? The 
answer depends upon what constitutes ele multiplier process. Keynes 
believed that in increment of investment had a multiplied effect upon 
income and that the multiplier was determined by a stable propensity 
to spend. As a consequence there existed a precise relation between 
increments of investment and increments of income, output and employment. 
This was certainly not to be seen in Marshall's work. The multiplier 
/ 
/ 
is much more than a proposition that various trades are interdependent. 
If it '<ere not then we need look no further than Marshall' s Principles 
for its discovery. Marshall here states that one effect of the cycle 
was: 'the effect of growing unemployment in one trade reducing sales 
in another so causing unemployment', (18) and that when: 'there is but 
little occupation in any trades which make fixed capital. Those whose 
skill and capital is specialised in these trades are earning little, 
, (19) 
and therefore buying little of the produce of other trades • 
Clearly this is one step towards a multiplier theory, but the ultimately 
important features of Keynes' analysis were its precision, its conse-
quences for the financing of investment, and its implications for 
economic policy. MarRhall's treatment is no more than a general statement 
290 
on the interdependence of trades which is common to many pre-Keynesian 
writers. What cannot be disputed is that Marshall saw a relation 
• 
between consumption and income. But the propensity to spend out of 
income would not be stable since saving, and hence consumption, would 
depend upon the rate 0f interest. (20) As for the consumption-income 
relation, Robertson himself proposed a lagged consumption function in 
BPPL. (2l) 
Even if we acknowledge that Harshall' s theory relating to the 
interdependence of trades is equivalent to the multiplier process, 
there cannot be any doubt that Keynes gave multiplier analysis much 
more emphasis and overwhelming importance than Marshall gave to the 
quasi-multiplier in his view of the operation of the economic system. 
A dynamic interpretation of the multiplier 
The theoretical argument against the multiplier, vis a vis the 
forced saving thesis, was lost so long as static analysis was maintained 
in Keynes' framework. If saving could adjust instantaneously to 
changes in investment via income and output changes, the multiplier 
would provide the finance for investment; there would be no need for 
prices to rise and no need for forced saving to take place; but the 
realisic interpretation of Keynes' multiplier analysis was not, accord-
ing to Robertson, of a static kind. (22) 
A failure by the multiplier to generate, through income changes, 
additional instantaneous voluntary saving, led Robertson straight back 
,to the forced saving doctrine; finance had to come from somewhere. If 
/ 
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voluntary savings were not available, savings had to be exhorted from 
the public through banking policy and price changes. Although Keynes 
regarded his attack on the forced saving doctrine through multiplier 
analysis as decisive in the General Theory, there is still a suspicion 
remaining that Keynes' saw the limitations of his static multiplier 
and that he himself hinted at a forced saving doctrine. (23) 
The popularisers of Keynes' General Theory chose to interpret the 
multiplier in a dynamic manner. The notable example of this is to be 
found in the work of Mrs. Joan Robinson. (24) In this the rounds of the 
multiplier are clearly seen and the infinite series of income adjust-
ments recognised, with each successive change in income becoming pro-
gressively smaller (the rate of progression depends upon the value of 
the marginal propensity to consume). Clearly each round of the multi-
plier cannot take place with infinite speed, and consequently, although 
the volume of saving will be tending towards the value of investment, 
at any point in time the two will be lmequal; saving will be deficient 
in relation to the level of investment, except at the final round of 
the multiplier process. Only where the marginal propensity to save is 
equal to unity will the increase in saving equal the increment in invest-
ment in the same round of the multiplier process. The smaller the 
marginal propensity to consume, the smaller is the deficiency of saving 
to investment at each round of the multiplier process. Given this 
interpretation of the General Theory, even by a strong Keynesian, 
Robertson had grounds on which to launch his attack on the multiplier. 
I 
I 
, 
~ Robertson agreed that without the period of transition from one 
292 
equilibrium to the next: 'We can declare the problem of the finance .\ 
. (25) 
of the process of ~nvestment to be self-solving'. But if he could 
show that time lags exist in the multiplier process and that the period 
of transition cannot be ignored, then Keynes still had to find a source 
of finance for the increment of investment. Robertson's task was not 
difficult for the arguments against the static multiplier already 
existed in his pre-1936 writings. In 1926 Robertson had stressed the 
time lag between receiving income and spending it. Current consumption 
was not related to current income, but to income in the previous time 
period. This "as central to his exposition of the dynamic multiplier. 
What Robertson failed to utilise in his critical comment on the 
static multiplier "as the lag between additional spending and the impact 
of that spending upon the level of output. A lag of this kind ha.d been 
expounded in his Study in the guise of the gestation period of invest-
ment. In this he emphasised the time lag bet"een undertaking the invest-
ment decision and the eventual additional production forthcoming on the 
capital equipment installed. Had Robertson used this lag in the argu-
ment against the multiplier it would have strengthened his case for a 
forced saving process, since a lag in output behind additional spending, 
and the need to finance that spending through the banks, could only 
create price rises (given the failure of output to respond immediately 
as the competition for goods and services increased). This failure by 
Robertson to employ the output lag was partially compensated for by a 
questioning of the operation of the multiplier "here supply was less 
than perfectly elastic. In this situation Robertson argued that prices 
would have to rise in the face of increased spending, and that the 
./ 
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multiplier became a 'somewhat treacherous guide to policy once we leave \ 
conditions of extreme depression'. (26) 
• 
Therefore, the only operational lag in the multiplier process 
not to be found in Robertsonian analysis is that associated 
with Lundberg; this is the lag between additional output and the 
addition to factor incomes created by t~at output. But one lag was 
sufficient to make the fundamental point that instantaneous saving 
would not be created to finance the investment. As a consequence 
Robertson highlighted the impact of a change in investment upon the 
creation of new money in his dynamic interpretation of the multiplier 
process. (27) 
Robertson did not dispute that voluntary saving would eventually 
be yielded by the multiplier process. In the meantime investment needed 
financing; but there was a further problem. Robertson saw no guarantee 
that the saving generated by the multiplier would eventually go towards 
the financing of the original increment in investment. (,28) The multi-
plier process might set in operation forces leading to the creation of 
further investment, which again would need financing. The main source 
of this additional investment was to be found in the additional consumer 
demand brought about by the multiplier; that is, Robertson believed 
that the accelerator would be set in motion. Increased consumer demand 
would create more investment, which would compete for the saving created 
by the original increment in investment. There would be an even greater 
deficiency in voluntary saving. (29) Furthermore he cited Kalecki (30) 
who argued that the induced saving of the multiplier might generate 
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investment of its own. Robertson recognised in this a partial return 
to the classical view that saving determines investment, not vice versa. 
Indeed,. given that voluntary saving was not automatically forthcoming, 
Keynes could no'·.longer claim that the search for finance for investment 
would leave the rate of interest untouched; unless he foresaw a sub-
stantial change in liquidity preference. 
In the post-General Theory debate Keynes introduces the concept 
of 'finance·:'31) whilst still denying that forced saving provides for 
an increase in investment, he adopts a position which is compatible with 
a dynamic version of the multiplier process. The increment in invest-
ment is in need of financing,and instantaneous voluntary saving is not 
forthcoming through the multiplier. Finance is requ:llred to cover the 
period between the planning of investment and its execution: 'well 
in advance of the actual process of investment'. (32) 'I'his finance is 
not supplied fro~ ex-ante saving, but from the entrepreneurs' cash 
reserves or from the money market. This represents a movement by Keynes 
towards Robertson's argument against the static multiplier, but the 
consequences for price movements, and its relation with forced saving, 
are not fully explored in the debate; only its implications for the 
liquidity preference versus loanable funds debate are explored in 
detail. (33) 
In the face of the arguments of this section there seems to be a 
strong case in the post-General Theory debate for a reinstatement of 
the forced saving thesis; that there will always be sufficient ex-post 
investment is not the point at issue. The fundamental question is how 
f 
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investment can be financed in the absence of voluntary saving. 
Robertson's criticism of the static multiplier is indicative of 
this general approach to economic theory. He never supported a dis-
position by economists, notably Keynes, to analyse dynamic problems 
by using comparative statics. He regarded positions of disequilibria 
as being more worthy of attention than positions of equilibria, and as 
a consequence could not accept the neglect of the process of adjust-
ment from one equilibria to another. Disequilibrium is a more normal 
state of affairs, and, although there may be a tendency to move towards 
equilibrium, it may never be reached as parameters change and conse-
quently equilibria change. Such comparative statics therefore cannot 
do justice to the study of economic problems. The static multiplier 
was a good example of this deficiency. It totally excluded any con-
sideration of how investment might be financed, dismissing a bcdy of 
doctrine relating to the question of forced saving, and banking policy, 
which had been handed down and developed from the early nineteenth 
century; it did this simply by proposing an instantaneous adjustment 
mechanism from one equilibrium of the equality of saving and investment 
to the next. 
A dynamic treatment of the multiplier does more than bring into 
question the means by ,.,hich investment is financed; on the policy side 
it highlights the necessity for the careful timing of fiscal changes; 
static analysis simply dismisses the crucial problem. One of the major 
drawbacks in post-war fiscal' policy in the U.K. has been that taxati.on 
or expenditure changes have been applied ei ther too early or too late 
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with the result that such policy has been destabilising rather than 
stabilising. Robertson, perhaps more than any other economist, deserves 
the credit for drawing attention to the dynamic aspects of fiscal 
policy. (34) 
The stability of the propensity to spend 
Central to an explanation of the multiplier process and to its 
useful application to economic policy is the bul.lding block within the 
General Theory that current, real consumption is a Gtabl~ ftmction of 
current, real income. (35) From this one can conclude that, knowing 
the value of the stable propensity to consume, there exists a predic-
table effect of a given change in autonomous expenditure upon the level 
of output and income, and in turn upon the level of employment. Policy 
becomes a fairly straightforward matter of estimating this propensity. 
Again, it is clear that Robertson would find it difficult to accept 
that the propensity to spend out of income was stable. Indeed, although 
at any point in time it may be fairly stable, Robertson was not able to 
accept that it would remain stable over the full course of the multiplier 
• (36) process. He did not deny that there was a strong relationship 
between consumption and income, albeit a lagged relationshi.p; but there 
were additional factors which were important in determining consumption 
out of income. Keynes had recognised that objective factors in excep-
tional circumstances might disturb the propensity to spend; (37) but he 
was not prepared to concede ~o their importance. Robertson emphasised 
the influence which the rate of interest exercised upon saving and con-
I 
sumption. Keynes would not accept the strength of this relationship. 
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In this case to have done so would not only have diminished the usefu1~ 
ness and precision of the multiplier, but it would also have required 
a modifying, if not a complete rebuilding,. of Keynes' theory of 
interest; where the speculative demand for money was seen as the most 
important influence upon the rate of interest. 
Later, in LEP;38) Robertson was able to point to the more complex 
relation that had been fou.''ld between consumption and income in the work 
of Duesenberry. In this it can be observed that the propensity to spend 
out of current income is not constant, but that it varies over the 
cycle. The marginal propensity to consume is low in the dO\1J1swing of 
the cycle and relatively high where income moves about its previous 
peak level. Furthermore Robertson suggested that the operation of the 
multiplier may itself bring a change in the propensity to spend by 
changing the distribution of income between those with low and high 
propensities. If the entrepreneurial class gain real income as invest-
ment increases, so the overall propensity to spend may diminiSh, if 
this class represents the relatively rich, low propensity income group. (39) 
In the 1948 edition of Money Robertson saw the propensity to spend as 
depending upon Wealth: 'especially perhaps on the proportion of capital 
wealth which is ready to hand and easy to spend', (40) a point which was 
reiterated in LEP. (41) 
There is a further argument which Robertson failed to raise against 
the stability of the propensity to spend, but one which is to be found 
in earlier Robertsonian analysis. If investment does increase, and if 
prices rise, induced and automatic lacking must take place. This brings 
about a further change in the propensity to spend. (42) 
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Hence as a result of this instability of spending propensities 
the: 'consumer may take a good deal of whistling back into his neat 
• 
little theoretical cage'. (43) this being the cage built around the 
static multiplier 
Some conclusions on the multiplier 
The foregoing discussion leads to two major critlcisms of the 
multiplier process. Firstly, because it cannot be realistically inter-
preted in a static manner, voluntary savings will not flow from the 
process such that finance is provided for the original increment of 
investment. The saving which does transpire may in any case find its 
way into other investment projects. This means that the question of 
how additional investment may be financed is still very relevant and 
one which the multiplier fails to sclve. In other words the forced 
saving thesis cannot be quickly dismissed because of the recognition 
of the multiplier. The search for finance for investment may still 
yield a ~lassical' link between investment and saving via the rate of 
interest. Secondly, the multiplier process does not yield a precise 
relationship between the increment of investment and the change in 
output generated. The propensity to spend may not be constant whilst 
the multiplier process is working itself out; time lags will interfere 
with its operation, and the fact that: 'Dogs wag tails as well as tails 
dogs,}44) that is that the changes in consumer demand brought about by 
the multiplier may induce further changes of investment - reduces the 
multiplier into a very complex and unpredictable process. So much so 
t~at it is no more than a: 'potentially useful little brick'. (45) 
/certainly not the firm foundation of a General Theory of employment, 
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interest and money. (46) 
• 
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Robertson wrote after the publication of the General Theory: 
'the multiplier only becomes interesting when, in Hicks' 
phrase, it has wings, i.e. is used to analyse a dynamiC 
process' . 
This was a point he made earlier, and more forcibly in his pre-
publication comments upon the General Theory, and one which 
puts Robertson's main objection to the multiplie~ in a nut-
shell: 
'I am afraid I haven't altered my view that equations of the 
type of those on p.63 (relating to the static multiplier) 
are unsuitable for application to heterogeneous slices of 
time within which income is changing, because they obscure 
the time element. (I never liked Kahn's s(hort) p(eriod} 
method in his public works article, but it did at least 
allO'.'1 time (though unspecified in amount), for the "saving", 
corresponding to an act of investment financed (e. g.) by 
new bank money, to be elicited'. 
JMK, GT, p.123. Referring to a situation where an increment of 
investment arose, he said, 
'In this event the efforts of those newly employed in the 
capital goods industries to conSume a proportion of their 
increased incomes will raise the prices of consumption-
goods until a temporary equilibrium between demand and 
supply has been brought about partly by the high prices 
causing a postponement of consumption, partly by a redis-
tribution of income in favour of the saving classes as an 
effect of the increased profits resulting from the higher 
prices, and partly by the higher prices causing a depletion 
of stocks. So far as the bal.ance is restored by a post-
ponement of consumption there is a temporary reduction of 
the marginal propensity to consume, i.e. of the multiplier 
itself, and in so far as there is a depletion of stocks, 
aggregate investment increases for the time being by less 
than the increment of investment in the capital goods 
industries' . 
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,Fellner argues that: 
St = It Equilibrium 
St =; Yt - l - C t Robertsonian lag 
Y
t = Ct + It (equilibrium condition again! ) 
so that: 
= = 
This only holds because St = It has been defined. The model 
should read: 
Yt = Ct + It 
C· = b(Yt _l ) t 
Y
t 
= bY
t
_l + It· 
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The General solution is: 
= + 
Thus: (i) equilibrium exists and is stable if O<b<l. 
(ii) Yt (in the long run) follows the path determined by It. Yt is constant if and only if It and b 
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, . 
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but the other objective factors which might affect it, whllst 
they must not be over-looked, are not likely to be important 
j.n ordinary circumstances'. JNK, GT, pp.95-6. 
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in terms of a dynamic rather than a static multiplier. 
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(45) DHR, Money, p.212. 
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'brick' in his assessment df the multiplier's importance. 
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, 
/ 
304 
CHAPTER 11 
Robertson and the Liquidity Preference Theory of Interest 
The final stage in the saving/investment debate in the inter-war 
period was the introduction by Keynes of the. liquidity preference theory 
of interest. If saving and investment were no longer to act together in 
the determination of the rate of interest, as in the so called 'classical' 
system, but were to marry themselves through changes in the level of 
income, how was Keynes to explain the determination of the rate of interest? 
,If he supported the Robertsonian theory of interest, (1) his precise theory 
of the multiplier would be substantially weakened by the influence of saving 
a.nd investment upon the rate of interest. Of necessity he had to provide 
in the General Theory a new approach to interest rate determination. 
This chapter begins by outlining Keynes' new theory; it then concen-
trates upon a number of major issues which were suhsequently raised by 
Robertson and Keynes in the aftermath of the General TI~. The main 
issues to be discussed in this and the following chapter are: 
(i) the role of productivity and thrift in the determination 
of the interest rate, 
(ii) the valid! ty of the liquidity preference argument in the 
Gen8ral Th80ry and the existence of the tiquidity trap, 
(iii) Keynes' conc8pt of 'finance', and its bearing upon the 
interest rate controversy, 
(iv) the rate of interest in the trade cycle. 
'1'he theme linking these discussions will be t~he ~r:tral issue in the 
debate. This is th8 role of productivity and thrift in affecting the rate 
/ 
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of interest. 
·From this one can gain a clear picture of the extent to which 
Robertson was convinced by Keynes, and of the similarities between the 
Robertsonian and Keynes' theories. Although the approach adopted here 
focuses upon specific issues raised particularly by Robertson in the after-
math of the General Theory, it does provide answers to the fundamental 
questions raised by the liquidity preference versus loanable funds debate. 
The major question is whether the two theories are sUbstantially different. 
The liquidity preference theory looks at the demand for,and supply of, 
money, whilst Robertsonian theory considers the demand for,and supply of, 
loanable funds. The former is a static theory involving stock concepts, 
the latter a dynamic theory concerned with flows of loanable funds. Do 
such differences make the theories radically opposed? An answer to this 
question must depend also upon a n~~er of other considerations. The 
justIfication for util.ising a particular theory is a function of its 
realism, in this case the extent to which it portrays the true operation 
of the 'money' market. The debate over the role of productivity and 
thrift, and the meaningfulness of the speculative motive, is particularly 
relevant in assessing the realism of the liquidity preference theory. 
One also needs to examine the consequences of each theory for economic 
policy. Totally different approaches are capable of reaching the same 
'conclusions when questions of policy action are considered. A discussi.on 
of the connections between changes in the supply of money, prices and the 
rate of interest is particularly relevant here. Finally, but by. no means of 
least importance, one needs to compare the usefulness of each theory as a tool 
of esonomic. analysis, - how far each ft ts into the general body of economic 
/ 
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doctrine. An objective answer to this question unfortunately is diffi-
cult to attain since one has to recognise to ,'hich body one wishes to 
fit the arm of interest theory. Is it that of a typical classical 
'strawman', or the younger trunk of the Keynesian, 'general equilibrium' 
man? 
The liquidity preference theory of interest - a brief outline 
The proliferation of modern macroeconomic textbooks surveying 
·.Keynes' General Theory makes a detailed analysis of the liquidity pre-
ference theory unnecessary. (2) It is sufficient in this section merely 
to bring out the main features of·tbe theory, especially insofar as 
they relate to the loanable funds versus liquidity preference debate. 
The revolutionary nature of Keynes' theory is determined in particular 
by three characteristics: 
I , 
(i) there is no causal influence of the marginal efficiency 
of capital upon the level of interest rates. In 
Robertsonian language this means that the demand for 
loanable funds for investment purposes cannot determine 
the rate of interest. The function of the marginal 
efficiency of capital curve is to portray the amount 
of investment that will take ~lace at an already 
determined rate of interest, ( ) 
(ii) saving is not interest elastic as in classical theory, 
but is determined by the level of income; this 
f0110\<s from Keynes' view that the rate of interest: 
'cannot be a return for saving or waiting' and that 
instead it is 'the reward for parting with liquidity 
for a specified period'. (4) To have argued t.hat the 
rate of interest has some influence upon saving and 
consumption would weaken the impact of the consump-
tion function and multiplier process within the 
General Theory. 
(iii) the third characteristic follows from the first two. 
The rate of interest is the 'price which equilibriates 
the desire to hold wealth in the form of cash with 
the available quantity of cash'. (5) The role of the 
• 
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rate of interest is to determine whether savings 
are to be held in idle cash balances or in non-
liquid securities - not to equate the 'demand for 
resources to invest with the readiness to abstain 
from present consumption'. (6) 
Keynes' theory therefore is reduced to a discussion of the forces 
acting upon the demand for,and supply of, cash, (not of loanable fund8), 
and is thus a purely monetary theory of interest. It is a stock theory, 
examining the demand for,a.nd supply of, cash at a point in time, and 
not, in contrast to Robertson's theory, a flow theory, examining the 
market for loanable funds over a specified time period. (7) It also, 
as such, takes on the appearance of static a.nalysis, consistent with 
the rest of the General Theory, and fails to explore, again in contrast 
to Robertsonian theory, the dynamic nature of the loanable funds market. 
The supply of cash is considered to be relatively straightforward, 
determined by the operations of the central bank and commercial banks. 
The demand for cash is more complex. Keynes first had to investigate 
the motives for holding cash, and then to establish their interest 
rate sensitivity. Two of the motives for liquidity preference, the 
transactionary and precautionary demands, are considered to be reluc-
tant to change with the rate of interest. (8) 'rile third motive for 
holding cash, the speculative motive, guarantees a sensitivity of 
demand to changes in the rate of interest, especially in the liquidity 
trap region where the demand for money becomes perfectly elastic. The 
m~jor implication of this is that there is a mini~ rate of interest. 
Therefore it is this third motive which occupies an elevated position 
in the determination of interest rates. This is the motive which gives 
to money its funct.ion as a store of value, in addition to its function 
I 
(9) 
as a medi um of exchange. 
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• -The speculative demand results from Keynes' assertion that the 
future is uncertain and that this uncertainty breeds varying expecta-
tions as to >lhich way the rate of interest is going to move. This 
uncertainty then makes the speculative demand a logical proposition, for, 
given that wealth holders have only a choice between holding cash and 
buying bonds, the disposition to anticipate an increase in the rate of 
interest l1ill encourage the wealth holder to hold cash in preference to 
buying bonds. If an increase in the rate of interest ensues, the price 
of existing bonds will fall and a capital 10SG will accrue to bond 
holders. On the other hand, if a fall in the rate of interest is 
anticipated, it is more profitable for the wealth holder to buy bonds in 
preference to holding cash. A fall in the rate of interest will 
.i-ncrea.:e bond prices and reward the bond holder with a capital gain. 
This situation works so as to increase the aggregate speculative demand 
for money as the rate of interest falls. The lower is the rate of 
interest the greater is the expectation in the economy that any further 
change in the rate will be in an upwards direction - therefore the 
greater will be the speculative demand for money. In this respect 
Keynes accepts the existence of a safe, future rate of interest{lO) 
which is having a fundamental influence upon the wealth holders specu-
lative demand for money, and therefore upon the actual level of the 
rate of interest. However, Keynes fails to enquire as to the factors 
determining the individual's conception of ths safe future rate of 
interest; this represents q deficiency in his theory, since its deter-
mination is crucial to where the actual rate will stand. 
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There is a second reason why a lower rate of interest will yield 
a greater speculative demand for money in a state of given expectations. 
This waS given less emphasis by Keynes, and has disappeared from much 
of the contemporary interpretation of the General Theory. Keynes 
writes: 'every fall in R reduces the current earnings from illiquidity, 
which are available as a sort of insurance premium to offset the risk 
of loss on capital account,.!ll) This reason is more classical in 
nature in that the marginal utility of holdi·ng cash is seen to increase 
with a fall in the rate of interest - the reward foregone by holding 
cash. It does not rely upon the existence of uncertainty, and expecta-
tions, but is undoubtedly less important since uncertain as to the 
future movement in interest rates is regarded by Keynes as the 'sole 
intelligible explanation' (12) of the speculative market for liquidity. 
This is where the story ends in the General Theory but in the 
ensui.ng debate Keynes was to introduce a second interest-elastic motive 
for holding cash. This is to be found in his concept of 'finance' 
which appeared for the first time in 1937, (13) and which is Keynes' 
answer to Robertson's questioning of the sources of finance for invest-
ment in the absence of voluntary saving. 
Productivity, thrift and the rate of interest 
The differences between the interest theories of Robertson and 
Keynes were much more than the methodological difference of static 
versus dynamic analysis, or s~ock verSus flow theories. Robertson was 
critical of the General Theory for its neglect of the 'classical' forces 
I 
, , (14) 
of productivity and thrift acting upon the rate of lnterest, and for 
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its consequent over-emphasis upon the monetary factors dete-rmining the 
rate of interest - the state of liquidity preference, and the quantity 
• (15) 
of money. Monetary and non-monetary forces work side by side in 
Robertson's theory, productivity and thrift exerting a long-run influence 
upon the rate of interest, through their determination of the quasi-
natural rate which pulls the market rate of interest towards it. 
Monetary factors, newly created money, and changes in hoards, help to 
detennine the market rate of interest, but also affect the long-run 
interest rate by acting upon the quasi-natural rate through their reper-
cuss ions on thrift. Robertson accuses Keynes of two crimes, firstly 
of denying that an increase in the productivity of investment (in the 
Keynesian form represented by a change in the mar~inal efficiency of 
capi tal) can increase the rate of interest", and secondly, of denying 
that an increase in thrift can lower the rate of interest. 
But what is the significance of this possible neglect of produc-
tivity and thrift by Keynes upon the rate'of interest? The answer is 
to be found in our earlier discussion of the savings/investment debate, 
and in the role of productivity and thrift which Keynes recognises; 
for Keynes, changes in thrift and productivity, and hence changes in 
saving and investment, will not move the rate of interest, but will 
act upon the levels of output and employment. An increase in ,the prod-
uctivity of investment will, through the multiplier process, generate 
more income and output, and in turn more consumption (and an equivalent 
increase in saving). There is no need for the rate of interest to 
change. If the propensity to save increases, the rate of interest will 
not decline as in Robertsonian theory, but the level of output and 
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employment will decrease as the value of the multiplier declines. The 
level of saving depends upon the level of real income, not the rate of 
interest. This yields a different supply of savings curve in relation 
to the rate of interest for·every level of income. This is a strong 
argument against classical interest theory; since investment deter-
mines income through the multiplier, the supply of savings and the 
investment demand curve are not independent, and therefore the loanable 
funds theory of interest cannot yield an equilibrium rate of interest. 
This defici"mcY was not recognised by classical writers, but it 
was acknowledged by Robertson in his dynamic theory of interest. (16) 
His theory was adjusted accordingly. The theoretical significance is 
clear; Keynes would dispute the operation of the rate of interest in 
(17) . the cycle as portrayed by Robertson, as well as the ex~stence of 
automatic and induced lacking, and the underlying movements in the 
price level in Robertson's cycle theory. The total significance of the 
J 
neglect of productivity and thrift upon the interest rate, and the 
substitution of its role in determining output and employment is 
heightened, when one contemplates the policy implications of Keynes' 
alternative theory. From the new found relation between investment 
and savings the belief in fiscal policy results. The encouragement of 
thrift is no longer a virtue but a vice in a depressed economy; an 
increase .in the propensity to save out of total income, imposed, for 
example, through an increase in income taxation, reduces the value of 
the multiplier, yielding less output from a given level of investment, 
and more unemployment. It does not bring a lowering of the rate of 
interest and a subsequent encouragement to invest. (18) 
. 
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The importance of the repercussions of. the neglect of productivity 
and thrift on the interest rate justifies a deeper excursion into the 
subject. As a beginning one can enquire as to whether Keynes was com-
pletely neglectful of the forces of productivity and thrift, and, if 
so, was he justifiably neglectful? The strength of Robertson's attack 
upon Keynes in this respect rests upon two pronouncements by Keynes in 
the General Theory. In the first, Keynes declines to offer a shift in 
the marginal efficiency 6f capital any effect upon the rate of interest • 
. An increase merely leads to more investment taking place at a given, 
otherwise determined, rate of interest. (19) In the second, Keynes dis-
credits the view that a decline in the propensity to spend will lower 
the rate 6f interest. (20) Equally, however; one can find statements 
in the General Theory which would support the view that Keynes did 
believe that productivity and thrift, and hence saving and investment, 
would exert pressures upon the rate of interest. For example, in his 
survey of classical economics he argues that: 'we can infer that the 
current rate of interest must lie at the point where the demand curve 
for capital corresponding to different rates of interest cuts the 
curve of the amounts saved out of the given income corresponding to 
different rates of interest'. (21) This statement rests upon the 
assumption that the level of income is constant. 
This conflict in evidence is firmly resolved in favour of 
Robertson's accusation by recourse to supporting arguments in the 
General Theory, and to the correspondence between Keynes and others. 
Although it must be stressed· that it is important to make a definite 
distinction between the view of Keyn8s in the General Theory arid that 
/ 
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. (?2) 
which he held shortly after the General Theory appeared. ~ The 
(23) 
correspondence between Keynes and Robertson, Robinson and Hawtrey 
is very illuminating in this respect. Robertson proposed that any 
rightward movement in the expected marginal productivity of loanable 
funds curve would tend to increase the rate of interest by increasing 
the competition for loanable funds. Keynes replied that within the 
~eneral Theory: (24) 'It is precisely this proposition which I am denying'. 
Similarly, to Hawtrey he wrote: 'When the schedule of the marginal 
efficiency of capital rises the rate of investment is pushed up so as 
to keep the actual marginal efficiency of capital in equilibrium with 
, 
. the conventional rate of interest'. (25) And on the influence on thrift 
.I 
he wrote: 'one of my main points is precisely that changes in the pro-
pensity to spend are in themselves ••••• wholly and of logical necessity 
(26) irrelevant to liquidity preference'. There can be no disputing 
therefore that it was Keynes' intention to totally exclude the forces 
of productivity and thrift from any part in deciding the level of the 
rate of interest. 
But how could Keynes justify his neglect of productivity and 
thrift? His justification appears to come totally from the multiplier 
process. (27) An increase in investment resulting from an increase in 
the marginal efficiency of capital "ill generate its own finance in 
the form of voluntary saving, through the static multiplier. 
Interpreting this in terms of the loanable funds theory, the shift in 
the demand for loanable funds is fully compensated for by an equal 
shift in the supply of loanable funds or vice versa, leaving the rate 
of ' interest untouched by any change in either the productivity of 
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investment or in thrift. 
Whether or not sufficient voluntary caving is generated to maintain' 
the rate of interest at its existing level has already occupied our 
, (28) 
attention in the discussion of the multiplier. If one accepts 
Keynes' static approach then it is instantaneously provided. If one 
seeks a dynamic interpre'tation, as Robertson and others did, t.llen vol-
untary saving may need to be reinforced by an increase in the money 
supply, and a resulting change in the rate of interest. But there is 
a second problem which did not occur to Keynes in writing the General 
Theory. Having given wealth holders a choice between buying securities 
and holding cash, it would be necessary for Keynes to investigate ,.,hat 
wealth holders would do with the additional saving of the multiplier 
process. It may not necessarily all flow into investment willinglY 
without an increase in the rate of interest; that is, to persuade 
savers to part wi'th liquidity, and to take up the increased supply of 
securities resulting from additional investment, an increase in the 
rate of interest may be required. Unless, of course, one can argue 
that the demand for speculative money balances is perfectly elastic 
in relation to the rate of interest, in which'case a reduction in 
speculative balances can transpire without the rate of interest moving. 
It is not sufficient to assume, as Keynes did, tha,t the speculative . 
demand for money will remain constant as a change in productivity of 
thrift occurs; especially when it is clear tilat, with a given money 
supply, speculative demand will respond to a movement in real income 
(29) 
which affects the demand for active money balances. Robertson saw 
th~s difficulty in Keynes' theory and was very critical of i't. It is 
, 
/ 
! 
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worthwhile quoting at length Robertson' s reaction: 'Surely this simple 
formulation (that "the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital 
mAy be said to govern the terms on which loan able funds are demanded 
for the purpose of new investment, while the rate of interest governs 
the terms on which funds are being currently supplied") would only be 
valid on one of two assumptions; a) that the liquidity schedule 
proper is perfectly elastic (the curve representing it a horizontal 
straight line)., or b) that the monetary authority not only possesses 
but is constantly exercising complete power to hold the rate of interest 
down to some assigned figure in face of upward movements of the produc-
(30) . (31) tivity schedule'. It is clear, however, as Robertson po~nts out, 
that outside the liquidity trap region Keynes did not believe specula-
tive demand to be perfectly elastic. The liquidity trap region (32) in 
any case, according to Keynes, is an extreme situation. (33) 
One other lifeline which one could hopefully throvl to Keynes in 
his attempt to escape from the forces of productivity and thrift in 
interest rate determination is to argue that his theory is a short-run 
theory, and in the short-run monetary factors are exclusive determinants 
of the rate of interest. Robertson might have had some sympat.hy with 
this argument, since we have already observed that in his own theory 
newly created money, or changes in hoards, can have some considerable 
say in the determination of the current market rate of interest; 
whereas productivity and thrift will exert. a long-run influence upon 
the rate of interest. Unfortunately this is not the answer, for Keynes' 
liquidity preference t.heory contains a villain of the peace, the safe, 
future rate of interest (which is usually labelled the 'normal' rate 
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of interest). This is the measuring rod against which the actual rate 
of interest is placed when the individual makes his choice between idle 
cash balances and buying securities. It is the villain of the peace, 
for as Robertson correctly argues, (34) it is left undetermined by 
Keynes, yet it is responsible for the level attained by the market 
rate of interest. (35) Had Keynes enquired as to what determines this 
normal rate, he would, according to Robertson, have been led straight 
back to the long-run forces of productivity.and thrift. This is an 
issue to which \1e "ill return in a later exploration of the relation-
ship between short-run and long-run rates of interest. (36) 
But alas this is not where the story ends. Keynes effectively 
changed his view upon the role that productivity and thrift played in 
interest rate determination in the debate which followed the Gen~ 
Th (37) eory. He became less adamant in denying them· any say in interest 
theory, and moved a good distance back towards Robertson's position 
and the classical theory which he was so keen to oppose in the General 
Theory. It is this Keynesian approach, developed in the heat of the 
battle of the Keynesian revolution, and not contained in the General 
Theory itself, which had provided an answer to Robertson's charge 
that the General Theory mistakenly failed to offer non-monetary factors 
any part in interest theory. To this ~lC now turn. 
,I 
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CE1\PTER 12 
Loanable Funds Versus Liquidity Preference -
. The Hicks-Hansen Framework 
Two developments evident from published articles and from corres-
pondence particularly between Keynes and Hicks, (1) indicate that Keynes 
moved a substantial way back to Robertsonian, and classical, interest 
theory after 1936, such that he no longer neglected the influence of 
productivity and thrift upon the interest rate. These were: 
i) Keynes' general acceptance of the IS-LM framework (2) 
put forward by J. Hicks (and later by A. Hansen), 
ii) The introduction of the concept of 'finance' in 
discussing the financial provision for the indre-
ment in investment in the multiplier process. 
In this section we concentrate upon the former by examining the con-
sequences of the Hicks-Hansen framework upon the role of productivity 
and thrift in affecLing output, employment and the rate of interest. 
The concept of finance is a subject of a later section. 
Keynes' attack upon the classical theory of interest was based upon 
its indeterminateness. If saving is dependent upon the level of real 
income, there must be a different savings/rate of interest curve for 
every level of income. The level of income must be determined before 
saving can be ascertained; but, according to Keynes, the level of 
income is determined by the level of investment through the multiplier 
process), and the level of investment Hill be affected by the level of 
interest rates. It appears that the classical them:y had reached an 
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impasse. The rate of interest could not be determined without knowing 
the level of income, nor the level of income without knowing the rate 
of interest. What Keynes failed to appreciate in the General Theory 
was that his alternative theory waS also indeterminate. The transac-
tionary demand for money depends upon the level of income. Thus a total 
demand for money schedule, giving demand at each rate of interest, will 
shift rightward for every increase in the level of income. This indetermin-
. atenesG was resolved by the introduction of the IS/LM framework, (3) 
and, as the following discussion will show, this justified Robertson's 
insistence that tile General Theory inadequately represented.productivity 
and thrift in determining interest rates. Indeed it will be seen that 
Hicksian analysis took Keynesian economics further back to classical 
theory than undoubtedly the Keynes of the General Theo.ry would have 
desired. 
If prices and wages are assumed to be constant, a stable economy 
will exist where both monetary and real market equilibrium are attained at 
a specific level of interest rate and real income. Combinations of the 
rate of interest and level of real income which yield real market 
equilibrium (S = I) are shown in the IS curve, whilst combinations yield-
ing equilibrium in the money market are shown in the LM curve. As each 
curve slopes in the opposing directions, there is only one conillination of 
the rate of interest and the level of real income which satisfies equilib-
rium in both markets. This will be rand Y in the diagram below. The 
o 0 
elasticity of the IS curve is determined by the relation between saving 
and income, that is by the propensity to save, and by the sensitivity of 
the level of investment to changes in the rate of interest, that is by 
the marginal efficiency of capital schedule in Keynes' analysis. Hence 
the position of the IS curve .,ill be changed by either a change in the 
• 
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propensity to spend/save, or by a shift in the marginal efficiency of 
capital schedule. The elasticity of the LM curve depends upon the rela-
tion between transactionary and precautionary demands for money (Ml ) 
and the level of real income, and tIle sensitivity of the speculative 
d~~and for money (M2) to changes in the rate of interest. Hence, 
where the speculative demand curve becomes perfectly elastic (the 
liquidity trap), the corresponding region of the LM curve is also per-
fectly elastic; where specu~ative demand is absent, the LM curve becomes 
totally inelastic; at this point the constant money supply is being 
322 
fully utilised for transactionary and precautionary purposes. A shift 
in the LM curve will result from a shift in any of the individual demand 
for money curves, or from a change in the money supply. 
It is now possible to analyse the impact of changes in both produc-
tivity and thrift upon both the rate of interest and the level of real 
income. If e,e productivity of investment increases, e>e marginal 
efficiency of capital curve will be displaced to the right. More invest-
ment will be undertaken at each rate of interest. Hence at our equilibrium 
rate of interest (r ), more investment will now take place. This 
o 
will create more income through the multiplier process, which, in turn, 
will generate an increase in saving equivalent to the initial increase 
in investment. The IS curve will have been displaced to the right; 
our previous equilibrium rate of interest (r ), if it is to bring about 
o 
the equality of saving and investment (real market equilibrium), must 
now be associated with a higher level of real income. 
But will the equilibrium rate of interest remain at r or will the 
o 
change in productivity bring, indirectly through its effects upon e>e 
level of real income, a change in the rate of interest? The answer 
to this crucial question depends upon e>e point of intersection of the two 
curves (diagram below). If we take a point of intersection in the range BC of 
the LM curve, then the equilibrium rate of interest will change. The trans-
mission mechanism will be as follows: the increase in investment will 
raise the level of real income at less than full employment and saving 
will respond equally to the c;hange in investment; but there will be a 
monetary repercussion of the change in real i.ncome. A higher real 
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income necessitates a greater transactionary demand for money (assuming 
prices are constant). ,This greater transactionary demand can only 
come about if, with a given money supply, cash balances are released 
from the speculative motive for holding money. In this region (BC), 
the release of speculative balances can only be achieved through an 
increase in the rate of interest; this increase in the rate of inter-
est will in turn, diminish the level of investment, dampening the 
change in income that occurs from Y2 to YI •. The 'more inelastic the LM 
curve the more the rate of interest will rise as a result of an increase 
in the productivity of investment, and the less will be the change in 
real income. The extreme situation arises if the IS and LM curves inter-
sect in the region CD. Here the rise in the productivity of investment 
is completely offset in its effects upon real income by an increase in 
the rate of interest. Equilibrium income will remain at Y3 whatever 
the extent of the change in the productivity of investment. 
Keynes' position in the General Theory can clearly be seen if we 
take a perfectly elastic LM curve (LM2). In this case any increase in 
productivity will not result in an increase in the equilibrium rate of 
interest, but in a higher equilibrium level of real income, and hence 
employment. An increase in investment here brings an equal increase in 
saving, the higher level of real income will create a greater trans-
actionary demand for money, but this can be drawn from speculative 
balances without the need to raise the rate of interest. '.rhis is what 
is called the 'liquidity trap' region, where a minimum rate of interest 
is achieved, that is where no holders of cash feel that the rate of 
interest will decline in future. A decrease in speculative balances 
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provides for the necessary increase in transa.ctionary balances, without 
the need for wealth holders to sell bonds.and for the rate of interest 
tb increase. This argument is consistent with Keynes' view in the 
General Theory that changes in productivity and thrift would not 
influence the rate of interest, but at the same time Keynes failed in 
the General Theory to propose conditions which would make the LM curve 
elastic; indeed the LM curve in the above diagram (LM1) is indicative 
of Keynes' views in the General Theory on the elasticity of liquidity 
preference relative to the rate of interest. 
It is unnecessary as a result of the above arguments to dwell for 
too long on the influence of changes in thrift upon the rate of interest 
within the IS/LM framework. An increase in thrift ,dll, through the 
multiplier process, lead to less real income being generated by a given 
level of investment. If the equality of saving and investraent is to be 
maintained the IS curve will need to shift to the left (e.g. IS l to IS) 
indicating that at each rate of interest a lower level of real income 
is required for real market equilibrium. In region BC an increase in 
thrift will therefore lower the rate of interest. I,ess income is 
generated through the multiplier process as a result of the increase in 
thrift; less income requires a lower transactionary demand for money, 
leaving a greater proportion of the fixed money supply available for 
speculative purposes; this will increase speculative demand and lower 
the rate of interest. The fall in the rate of interest will prevent 
income falling to the level it otherwise would have attained (Y4) , by 
offsetting, to some extent., the fal.l in invest.'1lent. Again this reaches 
al)'extrcme situation in the region CD, where the fall in the rate of 
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interest, accompanying the increase in thrift, neutralises the effect 
upon real income of an increase in thrift, by increasing the level of 
• 
investment. The acceptance of this interpretation of the General 
Theory would therefore considerably modify Keynes' earlier pronounce-
ments on productivity, thrift and the rate of interest; in particular, 
it highlights the relevance of the elasticity of the liquidity prefer-
ence curve to deciding whether or not changes in productivity and 
thrift will affect the rate of interest, real income (and employment) 
or both. Consequently, it is very important in a consideration of the 
policy implications of Keynesian analysis. This is an issue to which 
,we will return later. (4) 
Bearing in mind the importance of changes in productivity and thrift 
in classical and Robertsonian theory, and the pains to which Keynes 
went in the General Theory to divorce himself from these forces in his 
theory of interest, his reaction to IS/LM curves was somewhat surprising; 
he was evidently over-awed by Hick's constructive interpreta,tion of his 
theory, incorporating productivity and thrift within a Keynesian frame-, 
work. Keynes offered no fundamental criticism of Hick's important 
article, (5) except that he doubted an increase in the inducement to 
investment would always raise the rate of interest. In terms of the 
above analysis, Keynes argued,that a rightward shift in the IS curve 
could be offset by a rightward movement in the LM'curve, through an 
increase in the mOtley supply; this would keep the rate of interest 
(6) 
constant. This was an argument which Robertson would not dispute, 
but one which Keynes thought'the 'classica1s' might object to. (7) 
Keynes also dec1ilr"d in 1937 (8) t,hat it had be"n his intention in the 
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General Theory to show the propensity to save and the rate·of interest 
as moving in opposite directions. Therefore, it is only in the extreme 
case of the liquidity trap region that changes in productivity and 
thrift do not exert some influence upon the rate of interest. In 
general such changes would bring both a movement in the rate of interest 
and in output and employment in the Keynesian system. 
The Hicksian analysis had demonstrated "that it was possible, as 
Robertson·had argued, to bring the classical forces of productivity 
and thrift: 'under the liquidity hat'. (9) It was an alternative 
approach to that developed in his 1934 article, (10) where monetary 
forces, hoarding and newly created money, were incorporated in a loan-
. (11) 
able funds framework. 
A reconciliation between Keynes and Robertson in interest theory? 
If Keynes now accepted the role of productivity and thrift out-
side of the liquidity trap region, superficially there appears no 
longer to be a fundamental dif"ference between Robertson and Keynes 
over the determination of the interest rate. But such a conclusion 
disgui'les a number of important areas of debate, and possible conflict: 
i 
1) Is there agreement on the transmission mechanism linking 
productivity and thrift to the rate of interest? 
2) h11at is the meaning of liquidity preference, and how 
elastic is the liquidity preference function? 
3) How does the rate of interest behave in the trade 
4) 
cycle? 
Is there any connection between short-run and long-run 
rates of interest? 
328 
A final conclusion is therefore delayed until these issues have been 
resolved • 
• 
1. The transmission mechanism linking productivity, thrift and the 
rate of interest 
In the above· Keynesian analysis an increase in the productivity 
of investment shifts the IS curve to the right, raising the rate of 
interest. The more responsive is the demand for money to changes in 
the rate of interest, that is the more elastic the LM curve, the lower 
is the change in the interest rate. Compare this with Robertsonian 
analysis in which it was also found that an incr~ase in productivity 
would shift the demand for loanable funds curve to the right, raising 
the rate of interest. The extent of the rise in interest rate here 
would depend upon the elasticity of the supply of loanable funds curve; 
the more inelastic is the supply, the greater is the increase in inter-
est rate. If banks respond to a greater demand for loanable funds by 
creating additional credit, the rise in the interest rate may be dfu~pened; 
this is exactly the same conclusion as that of Keynesian analysis where 
an increase in the money supply would shift the LM curve to the right, 
limiting the rise in interest. Similarly with a change in thrift, in 
the Keynesian system an increase in thrift lowers the rate of interest 
(except in the liquidity trap region), by shifting the IS curve to the 
left; whereas in the loanable funds theory, the supply curve is dis-
placed to tlle right, reducing the rate of interest providing the demand 
curve is not perfectly elastic. Although not strictly comparable 
because of the differing methodologies of the two theories, it is 
apparent that <lhether or not Robertsonian and Keynesian theories will 
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bring like movements in the interest rate depends very much upon the 
elasticities of the LM curve and the loanable funds curves. It does 
not follow that when the LM curve is elastic, the supply of or demand 
for loanable funds curves will also be elastic; the factors deter-
mining each are independent. 
However, the transmission mechanism, whereby a change in either 
productivity or thrift culminates in a change in the'interest rate, is 
substantially different in the respective theories. 'Robertson was 
critical of tile Keynesian view that there is an indirect link bet-
ween productivity, thrift and the rate of interest, through their 
effects upon real income, (12) and that.this indirect link will 
fail to operate in the liquidity trap region. To Robertson, a change 
in thrift or productivity will work directly upon the demand for, and 
supply of, securities, directly affecting the rate of interest. If, 
for example, tilrift increases, the demand for securities will increase, 
'and the rate of interest will fall, without there being any change in 
output; but any change in interest rate may induce a change in income 
and output by stimulating a change in 'K', the proportion of income 
which people wish to hold in the form of cash balances. (Le. a change 
in hoarding habits). In our example, if thrift increases, the rate of 
interest falls and 'K' will increase, bringing a decline in income. If 
the rate of interest falls, the volume of hoards will increase: 'so 
that the money put onto the 3ecurities market by the increase in thrift 
does not all find its way out again in the form of increased investments; 
investment is less than saving ilnd income falls as a result'. (13) 
Tnerefore, Robertson chose to emphasise the impact of a change in 
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interest rates upon income, and not vice-versa as in the Keynesian 
(14) 
system. But again, it is important to note the coincidence of 
movements in interest rates and economic activity in the two theories. 
In both theories, lower interest rates (caused by either diminished 
productivity of investment or increased thrift) are associated with a 
lower level of income, and vice versa. 
It is evident from this, and more so f~om earlier discussion, (lS) 
that Robertson did not assume a fully employed economy, such that 
changes in the rate of interest might take place without interfering 
with a constant level of output and employment, as the 'classical' 
economists' aJOe qccused of doing. The level of economic activity can 
fluctuate alongside the rate of interest, but the rate of interest is 
not a cause of this fluctuation, merely a means of transmitting the under-
lying cause responsible for the interest rate movement to output. This 
Underlying cause in most cases is a change in the productivity of investment. 
2. The meaning of liquidity preference and its sensitivity to changes 
in the rate of interest 
One obvious conclusion from the analysis so far is that the simi-
larity between Robertsonian and Keynesian theories on the effects of 
productivity and thrift upon economic activity and the rate of interest 
is strongly dependent upon the elasticity of the LH curve. This 
elasticity is determined by the responsiveness of Keynes' demands for 
money to interest rate changes. Consequently it is not surprisi.ng 
that,Robertson devoted a good deal of his corunent upon the liquidity 
, i 
preference theery to this particular question. But, before this is 
/ 
/ 
, 
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examined, we need to go one step further back in the debate - to 
ascertain Robertson's reaction to Keynes' concept of liquidity preference. 
The three-fold margin 
The difference between the theory of interest in the General Theory 
and that found in Robertsonian literature has its origins in the roles 
attached to the rate of interest in the respective theories. Keynes' 
emphasis upon liquidity preference stems from his view of the rate of 
interest as: 'the reward for parting with liquidity for a specified 
period' , (16) or: 'the re'lard of not hoarding'. (17) Contrast this with 
the classical role of the rate of interest, as the reward for not 
spending; as such it is: 'the price of . "time • I (18) the reward for going 
without current consumption. 
The General Theory neglected the influence of the decision to save 
or spend (out of income) upon the rate of interest, but this is not 
. (19) to say that Keynes was unaware of the classl.ca1 approach. Indeed 
he regarded the accepted theories of interest to 1936 as concentrating 
entirely upon the decision to save or spend out of income, to the neglect 
of the second decision which the saver makes. This was t.he decision 
as to the form in which to save - by holding idle balances or by buying 
bonds. He concluded: 'It is this neglect whi.ch we must endeavour to 
repair'. (20) In doing so he left himself open to the criticism of dis-
/ 
regarding productivity and thrift in the determination of the interest 
rat~ Robertson, for example, felt that Keynes failed to take account of 
the demand side of the market for loanable funds, and of concentrat.ing 
, 
, 
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instead, through the liquidity preference theory, upon the rate of 
interest as the supply price of loanable funds. (21) 
.. 
There was no reason why, as correctly emphasised by Robertson, (22) 
the view of the interest rate as a reward for not spending should be 
inconsistent with the rate being a reward for not hoarding. (23) If 
tncome is to be used to earn interest, not only must that income not be 
spent, it must also not be hoarded in a form where no reward is offered. 
This latter point recognises that hoarding takes place if income is 
deposited in interest bearing accounts (at, for example, commercial 
banks), (24) in which case it is incorrect to argue, as Keynes did, that 
it is the reward for not hoarding. In fact one can argue that the rate 
of interest upon bank deposits is a reward for hoarding, not dishoarding. 
Approached in this manner it is the difference between interest on 
money dishoarded, and that hoarded in interest bearing accounts, which 
is the true reward for dishoarding. 
Robertson believed(25) that saving could be related to the rate of 
inte!"est as well as liquidity preference. There is a threefold, not a 
twofold, margin. In Keynes' theory the marginal convenience of holding 
money is equated with the rate of interest; in classical theory the 
marginal inconvenience of going without consumption is equated with the 
interest rate. Why should not all three be equated in equilibrium? 
. (26) If we reflect on Robertson's theory of lnterest, the prospective 
hoarder and consumer make both decisions - to save, to hoard - with 
reference to the rate of interest. The interest rate c~n perform both 
functions at the same time. As Robcrtson remarked: I such phrases as 
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that interest is not the reward of not-spending but the reward of not-
hoarding seem to indicate a curious inhibition .agai~st visualising more 
than two margins at once. A small boy at school is told that if he 
wins ,a race he may have either an apple or an orange: he wins the race 
and chooses the orange. When his mother asks him how he got it, must 
he reply hr got it for not eating all apple?" May he not say proudly "I 
got it for not losing El race?" ,(27) The fact that saving might be 
related to the rate of interest therefore does not put an end to a pos-
~ible relation between hoarding and the rate· of interest. (28) 
Johnson has interpreted Keynes in a different light. (29) He 
argues that Keynes was aware of the classical relation between saving 
and the interest rate at the micro level; that is each individual will 
decide upon his level of saving out of a given level of income by 
reference to the rate of interest. At the macro level he suggests that 
Keynes regarded this relation as being unimportant, for, at any given 
level of income in the economy, aggregate saving will be insensitive 
to changes in the rate of interest. Thus Keynes was able to concen-
trate fully upon the relation between saving and income without reference 
to the interest rate interfering with the relation between saving and 
investment. One can accept the macro level argument, but there is no 
convincing evidence in the General Theory to support the view that 
Keynes recognised the threefold margin. 
Robertson regarded this as a grave omis~ion from the General 
Theory. He believed that, as a consequence, a positive rate of interest 
could only come about in Keynes' theory if uncertainty as to the future 
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course of interest rates existed. If this uncertainty was absent, and 
the actual rate was taken to be equivalent to the expected future rate, 
Robertson argued that the two rates must be equal to zero in Keynes' 
. (30) 
theory (as the speculative demand for money disappears). If the 
marginal convenience of holding money is zero, the rat.e of interest 
must become zero. Intuition, and empirical fact, tell us that even in 
a perfect world the money rate of interest must be positive. (31) 
Although there is nothing to prevent the real rate from being negative 
as in recent years in Britain. 
In fairness to Keynes the presence of certainty, and the absence 
of the speculative demand, need not prevent the possibility of a 
positive money rate of interest. It may simply mean that the rate of 
interest is indeterminate. Alternatively, if the transactionary demand 
is interest elastic, there may still be a determinate positive rate. (32) 
The speculative demand for money 
The major Robertsonian criticism of 'liquidity preference proper' , 
that is the Keynesian speculative demand for money, is the narrowness 
of iTS conception. Keynes visualised the individual as having a straight-
forward choice between buying bonds or holding idle money balances. 
This was the crucial decision in deciding the level 6f the interest rate. (33) 
Robertson saw the choice as being much wider than this. (34) .:. Keynes' 
theory was to Robertson a 'College Bursar's theory', requiring a few 
wealthy individuals to choose between bonds and idle balanc~s on the 
basis of their conception of the difference between the actual and 
normal rates of interest. 
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What other choices are available to the individual? Robertson 
believed that the individual might prefer to hold a wide variety of 
real capital assets instead of cash or bonds. He would do this in an 
attempt to guard against the uncertainty associated with business 
life. (35) Real capital assets would include: 'both fixed capital and 
stocks of goods at all stages'. (36) The final choice depenaed upon the 
economic conditions of the economy, particularly the movement in the 
price level and the state of business confidence. (37) The significance 
. of this wider choice for our earlier analysis, (38) is that it makes the 
speculative demand schedule very unstable over time; as a consequence 
the LM curve will dance along the IS curve bringing continuous changes 
in the rate of interest and the level of economic activity. In terms 
of our earlier discussion of productivity and thrift, the implication 
of this criticism is that it is not the IS curve alone which moves as 
the marginal efficiency of capital, or the propensity to save, change; 
the LM curve will shift under the. influence of a change in business 
confidence or a movement in prices (which in Robertsonian theory can 
occur at less than full employment). It will also be sensitive to 
changes in the rate of return on real capital assets, which is also 
reflected in movements in the IS curve. For example. if the rate of 
return on assets increases. (Le. the IS curve moving to the right) the 
demand for speculative balances may fall in response to the increased 
attractiveness of holding such assets and the LM curve will move to 
the right. 
It is in this respect that Robertson talked of a revival of inter-
est in the use of 'V', and 'K' (of the quantity theory and Caml:)ridge 
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. (39) Equation respectively) in economic analys~s; the shift in the LI1 
curve would reflect a change in 'K' and therefore 'V'. If, for example, 
• the productivity of investment increases, the IS curve shifts to the 
right raising the rate of interest and increasing the level of real 
output (in the intermediate range of the LM curve). The rise in the 
rate of interest will induce .a change in 'K' and the increase in economic 
activity may bring a change in business confidence and a further change 
in 'K'; the change in 'K' will, in turn, influence prices, with again 
furti1er possible repercussions on business confidence and 'K'. Bearing 
this in mind, it Was logical for Robertson to believe that the varia-
bilityof 'K', in a dynamic Keynesian system, and the subsequent move-
ments in the LI1 curve which it brings, is much more worthy of attention 
than the consideration of movements along a stationery LI1 curve and the 
emphasis upon the elasticity of that curve uhich this creates. (40) 
But the above criticism is an attack upon a dynamic Keynesian 
system used in the analYSis of cyclical fluctuations. (41) The General 
Theory involves static analysis, with prices and business confidence 
remaining constant at any particular time; thus the LM curve is cor-
rectly portrayed as invariant. Undoubtedly, over time the value of 
'K' and the LH curve would move, as productivity and thrift change. 
HON much of the eventual change in economic activity or the rate of 
interest could be attributed to changes in liquidity preference, or to 
shifts in the IS curve, is largely a question of deciding the elasti-
cities of both IS and LI1 curves. For example, if the IS curve is per-
fectly elastic, any amount of movement in the LM curve will not influence 
the rate of interest, only the level of real output. Conversely, if 
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the LM curve is perfectly elastic, a movement in the IS curve cannot 
change the rate of interest. The elasticity of the IS curve depends 
largely upon the sensitivity of investment to changes in the interest 
rate. Robertson's views upon this have been explored elsewhere. (42) 
This leaves us with the q,-,estion~of the~elasticj.ty of the LM curve. 
How elastic is the liquidity preference function? 
When one att.8mpts to apply the General Theory to a partl;cular 
economic problem, it invariably involves stepping out of carpet slippers 
into r\mning shoes. There are obvious dangers in using static analysis 
to yield answers to questions involving economic dynamics. This is 
typified by the post-Keynes application of IS/LM analysis to economic 
policy. Fiscal and monetary policy changes result in shifts in either 
IS or LM curves or both, and one has to analyse the whole complex 
jungle of relationships taking the economy from one equilibrium to the 
next. This is t.he dilemma in which Robertson found himself when com-
menting upon Keynesian theory. He did not see the relevance of 'taking 
on' Keynesian economists in the statid field, when all the important 
questions were dynamic in nature. The criticisms .. hich .. e have seen so 
far of Keynesian economics display Robertson's disposition to highlight 
the dynamic consequences and limitations of the General Theory. His 
comments upon liquidity preference, as we have seen above, are not an 
exception to this general rule. 
In this respect it may prove to be a great pity, since the relevance 
of , the elasticity of the static LM curve has been stressed, and one really 
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needs to determine Robertson's view of this elasticity. Robertson's 
earlier defence of his lack of consideration of a static liquidity 
p~eference function was that liquidity preference is: 'bulging with 
dynamics, and that if used as an instrument of "comparative statics" 
(43) it gives precisely the wrong result.' He was content to elaborate 
the reasons why the liquidity preference function would not be stable, 
due to changes in economic variables which Keynes had assumed constant 
in his static analysis. 
But this anti-climax is avoided on two counts. Firstly, the influence 
of changes in productivity and thrift upon the rate of interest will be 
to change the interest rate through a shift in the IS curve (unless the 
LM curve is elastic). This is contrary to the General Theory; yet it 
! 
is to the General Theory that we can lock for the discovery of the less 
than perfectly elastic liquidity preference function(44) which validates 
this statement, Keynes believed that at a minimum rate of interest the 
liquidity preference function is perfectly elastic, but at interest rates 
above this minimum it becomes more inelastic. Furthermore, Keynes dis-
puted the relevance of the perfectly elastic portion of the curve to 
modern day economies in that he could find no previous example of such 
. (45) 
an economy operating in the liquidity trap reg~on. Robertson need 
not lay claim to discovering an inelastic LM curve, it ,/as already there 
in the General Theory. Secondly, in LEP, one finds that Robertson has 
a change of heart, whilst still concentrating upon dynmoic analysis, he 
does put one foot into the static field and gives an insight into his 
viel< on the elasticity of the liquidity preference function. 
• 
• 
I 
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Taking a wider defini t.ion of liquidity preference proper, to 
include the precautionary motive, and recognising the wider choice 
available to the saver, Robertson's ultimate conclusion is that: 'the 
existence of the liquidity trap is much less likely than it has lately 
been fashionable to suppose'. (46) Hence, even in a static, Keynesian 
system, Robertson believed that changes in productivity and thrift must 
result in a change in interest rate, as liquidity preference is affected 
by .real income changes which raise or lOl'er the proportion of the 
money supply being used for transactionary purposes. 
The concept of finance 
The conclusion has been reached that, by supporting Hicks' inter-
pretation of his theory, Keynes went a good way back towards the 
Robertsonian view that productivity and thrift help deteL~ine the rate 
of interest. The fundamental difference between Keynes' and Robertsonian 
theories that remains is observed in the transmission mechanism linking 
productivity and thrift and the rate of interest; for Robertson, prod-
uctivity and thrift work directly upon the interest rate by affecting 
the demand for, and supply of, loanable funds; for Keynes and Keynesians, 
they work indirectly by creating changes in real income, which, in turn, 
affect the demand for money and interest rates. A further development 
in tile debate however leads one to suspect that even this difference 
beb'een 'the two theories can be removed, and that Keynes' interest 
• I 
theory, in its eventual form, is not dissimilar to Robertson's theory. (47) 
In 1937 Keynes introduced the concept of 'finance' into his formula-
. (48) 
tion of the various demands for money. This introduction is an 
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illustration of the kind of confusion which can result from attempting 
to give a static theory a dynamic interpretation. In relation to the 
(49) General Theory it has been argued that Keynes, because of the ins tan": 
taneous adjustment of voluntary saving to an increment of investment, 
did not regard the financing of investment as a particular problem. 
The additional voluntary saving of the multiplier process would auto-
matically finance investment, without there being a need for forced 
saving. Once Keynes recognised that the multiplier process was not a 
static but a dynamic process, the problem of financing investment 
became more important in his theoretical structure. If instantaneous 
additional saving is not forthcoming, there is a need for 'finance' to 
facilitate investment until the act of saving is perfonned. Keynes now 
argued: 'Planned investment ...... may have to secure its "financial 
provision"before the investment takes place; that is to say, before 
the corresponding saving has taken place ••••• this service may be 
provided either by the new issue market or by the banks ••••• if he 
(the entrepreneur) accumulates a cash balance beforehand (i.e. before 
investment occurs) then an accumulation of unexecuted or incompletely 
executed invesbnent decisions may occasion for the time being an> 
extra special demand for cash .•••• let us call this advance provision 
of cash the "finance required by the current decisi.ons to invest"'. (50) 
This represents the birth of a further demand for money in Keynes' 
theory of interest. 
HmI far this ne,. concept provides a further reconciliation of 
Robertsonian and Kcynesian theories of interest depends upon two issues. 
~'iistly, it must be determinod how changes in the producti vi ty of 
341 
investment influence the demand for finance, and secondly, how the 
demand for finance relates to the interest rate. The first is easily 
resolved. Keynes would not dispute that the demand for finance is 
related to the productivity of investment. If this productivity 
increases, the demand for finance will also increase. It is the 
second issue which is more difficult to resolve, Keynes believed that, 
if the rate of'investment was constant, the demand for finance would 
also be constant; (51) more important, in these circumstances, the 
same finance could be used over and over again as part of a revolving 
fund. The finance used by one entrepreneur is recovered once the 
investment is undertaken. It is recovered through the creation of 
additional income and saving . which act so as to release the original 
finance to entrepreneurs just embarking on the investment process. 
Therefore, if the rate of investment is constant, this constant revolv-
il1g fund, according to Keynes, will have little impact upon the rate of 
interest; that is the current demand for money arising from this 
source will be equally met by the recovery from current actual invest-
ment of the finance utilised in a previous period, and will have a 
, (52) 
neutral effect upon J.nterest. 
However, the rate of int.erest is not left unaffected if the rate 
of investment is changing from one period to the next. If, for example, 
the rate increases, Keynes argues ti1at the increased demand for money 
will force up the rate of interest; (53) that is, unless the additional 
finance required is provided by the banking system through an increase 
in the money supply without the i.mposition of an increase in the rate 
of/interest. There l.s therefore an admission here by Keynes that changes 
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in the productivity of investment, by influencing the demand for 
finance, do affect the rate of interest. What is more, there is no 
i~dication that this is an indirect relationship; if the productivity 
of investment increases, this directly raises the rate of interest by 
I<orking upon the demand for finance; it does not require a movement 
in income to occur before the interest rate will move. 
This, in itself, is a major about turn. It is true that Robertson 
was unhappy with Keynes' discussion of finance and together with E. 
(54) . Shaw was responsible for clearing up a good deal of its confusion, 
particularly in relation to th.e mechanism by which the revolving fund 
. (55) 
came to be replen1shed. But this new Keynesian argument would fit 
easily into the Robertsonian framework already outlined. It has been 
shown(56) that Robertson believed that economic progress, because of 
the nature of capital, cannot be smooth. Industrial fluctuation is an 
inevitable feature of a capitalist economy. The prime feature of the 
cycle is the variability in the producti.vity of investment; therefore 
the demand for finance would be sometimes expanding, other times con-
tracting. It could not be regarded as a constant revolving fund. Its 
variability, in turn, would influence the course of interest rates 
over the cycle. 
In the end therefore there was ~lhat amounted to be a fairly sub-
(57) 
stantial recantation by Keynes of his position in t.he General Theory. 
In the concept of finance one has the force of a change in the produc-
tivity of investment having a direct role in the determination of the 
ley~l of interest rates. What iG di.sappointing about this particular debate 
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on finance is the failure by Robertson to bring the discussion around 
to the forced saving thesis of BPPL, and especially to exclude any con-
sideration of possible price changes in the provision of finance for 
planned investment. 
The rate of interest in the trade cycle 
Although Robertson did not regard the Keynesian theory of interest 
-as being dissimilar to his own, he di.d argue that it presented an 
inaccurate account of the course of interest rates through the trade 
cycle. (58) In this respect Robertson has misinterpreted the General 
Theory, although not the ensuing Keynesian analysis. This section ,';.11 
show that again there is little difference between Keynesian and 
Robertsonian theories on this question. 
Robertson's misinterpretation of the General Theory here arises 
from a failure to distinguish between short-run and long-run analysis. 
This can be examined by considering the relation between the money 
supply and the rate of interest over the cycle. The Robertsonian 
argument stresses that during the upswing of the cycle the quasi-
natural rate of interest will rise under the influence of the increasing 
• (59) productivity of l.nvestment. An expansion in th", money supply will 
take place in response to t.'le increased demand for loans (bringing 
forced saving). This expansion will prevent th", market rate of interest 
rising immediately to the new quasi-natural rat"" but the general move-
ment in the rate of interest. will be in an upwards direction. Therefore, 
during tht'> upsl'ling of the cycle an incrt'>ase in the money supply is 
, associutcd with an increase in the rate of interest. 
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Robertson accuses Keynes, and Keynesians, of accepting the reverse 
association during the upswing <Of an increase in the money supply 
o",curring alongside a decline in the rate of interest). This accusation 
is strongly supported if one takes at face value the passages from the 
General Theory, and from Mrs. Robinson's work, (60) used by Robertson to 
uphold his criticism. Keynes argues that an increase in the quantity of 
ca3h will create a decline in the interest rate except where the 
liquidity preference curve becomes perfectly elastic. Mrs. Robinson 
argues that during a phase of monetaL? expansion, the rate of interest 
will initially fall, but subsequently rise. It will not however rise 
beyond the level at which it stood at the beginning of the expansion. 
Both statements are taken by Robertson to refer to periods of 
cumulative expansion, (61~ in Mrs. Robinson's case this is correct, but 
it is doubtful that Keynes was looking beyond a short-run, or momentary 
position. The only fundamental difference between the Robertsonian 
and Keynesian (and Keynes') views ·on this issue is brought about by a 
difference in assUI:lption. Robertson begins his process of cumulative 
expansion >11 th an increase in the producti vi ty of investment.. The 
Keynesian argument assumes that the marginal efficiency of capital 
remains constant; for Mrs. Robinson an increase in the money supply 
will lower the rate of interest; this in turn will raise the level of 
investment. At and beyond full employment the increase in effective 
demand will raise prices, increasing the transactionary demand for 
money at each level of real output, lowering the speculative dema.nd for 
money and hence increasing the rate of interest. This is more easily 
. (62) in~erpreted by uSLng IS/LM curves: 
/ 
/ 
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LM 
- - .- - -. 
Initially equilibrium exists at r /Y. If the money supply increases 
o 0 
with the IS curve stationary, the equilibrium rate of interest falls 
to r l , and the level of real income rises to Yl under the influence of 
additional investment brought about by the lowering of the interest 
rate. If ~ is a full employment level of income, an increase in the 
money supply will only succeed eventually in raising prices and not 
real income; the LM curve, initially displaced to LMl will return 
tovlards LM, restoring the interest rate to the level existing before 
monetary expansion took place. (63) There is nothing in this argument 
, 
/ 
, 
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which is inconsistent with the Robertsonian approach, except in the 
transmission mechanism which connects the rate of interest ,·nd economic 
a~tivity; for Robertson, if the money supply increases, the supply of 
loanable funds increases at each rate of interest, and the market rate 
of interest will fall (if the demand for loanable funds curve is not 
displaced). Once this monetary disturbance has disappeared, the market 
rate of interest will return to the higher initial quasi-natural rate 
of interest (ceteris paribus). 
Equally one could slightly modify Mrs. Robinson's argument to bring 
a strong similarity with Robertson's thesis. Had she accepted that 
initially the productivity of investment increased, the IS curve would 
have been displaced to the right (IS1), an increase in the money supply 
would then only succeed in limiting the rise in the interest rate to r 2 
(if Y2 is a less than full employment level of income, prices will 
remain constant in the Keynesian model). If however full employment 
initially existed at YO' the rightward shift in both IS and LM curves 
would raise prices, and return the LM curve to its initial position 
(LM); the rate of interest would therefore rise further (to r 3) 
because of the change in the productivity of investment, and the 
increase in money supply, than it would do at less than full employment 
levels of income. There is little difference betlveon the argument at 
full employment here, in the Keynesian system, and Robertson's argument 
at less than full employment. 'file increase in the money supply acts so 
as to keep the market rate of interest below a new, higher quasi-natural 
rate brought about by the inorease in the productivity of invesunent. 
However, in the long run there will be a tendency for the market rate 
! 
/ 
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to move towards a quasi-natural rate • 
• 
But why should the productivity of investment increase in the 
cumulative expansion? In our earlier Robertsonian analysis(64) the 
change in productivity was taken to be unrelated to the change in the 
money supply. In his criticism of Mrs. Robinson's argument the implica-
tion is that it is raised by the change in the money supply. The banks, 
by expanding their willingness to lend, create a rise in prices or real 
output which, in turn, shifts the demand for investible funds to the 
right - raising the rate of interest. (65) But how this particular 
mechanism operates is left unexplained by Robertson. Neither is it 
clarified by his reference to Marshall's work. (66) One suspects, though 
it is only a suspicion, that the mechanism is produced by a lag in wages 
behind any increase in prices as the money supply expands; this raises 
the rate of return on investment, and redistributes income in favour of 
entrepreneurs, alternatively where real output increases and not 
prices, Robertson may be thinking in terms of the increase in demand 
created by greater income, working through the accelerator upon invest-
ment. Either· way it would be a surprising thesis for Robertson to 
advocate, since monetary forces now appear able to cause the cycle, not 
. (67) 
merely to exaggerate ~t. 
Robertson's criticism of Keynes and Robinson regarding their 
view. of the behaviour of the rate of interest through the course of the 
cycle, and, in particular, their view of the impact of monetary changes 
upon the interest rate, disappears once an increase in the productivity 
I 
of'investment is grafted on to the Keynesian picture of the ups>ling (and 
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a decrease in the downswing}. Mrs. Robinson's argument is only con ten-
tious on the grounds that it fails to recognise the movement in the 
productivity of investment through the trade cycle; but clearly this, 
as we have seen, is central to the Robertsonian thesis. Again the 
Robertsonian and Keynesian conclusions amount to the same thing in the 
. (G8) 
end - although the differences in the causal change still persist. 
The connection between the long-term and short-term rate of interest 
It appears that we are on the road to a more total reconciliation 
between the Robertsonian and Keynesian theories of interest; although 
each is using a different means of transport, both appear to be getting 
to tile same place in the end. However, there is still one collision 
along the way which has not yet been directly mentioned. This is the 
differing view as to the link between the short-term and long-term rate of 
interest. 
Interest theories usually proceed by assuming one market rate of 
interest; the theories we have seen have not been exceptions to this. 
In reality there exists both a short-term rate of interest - the rate 
for short period loans, indicated by the Treasury Bill rate, - and a 
long-term rate, indicated by the rate on government bonds., In a free 
enterprise economy Robertson believed that both rates ",ould influence 
each other, (69) but the stronger influence w'ould be exerted by the 
long rate upon the short rate. This again brings Robertson back to the 
forces of productivity and thrift. If, for example, there is an increase 
in the productivity of invesbnent, ne'" issues "'ill take place in the 
/ 
349 
market for long loans and the long rate will tend to rise. Speculators 
will be attracted away from the short-loan to the·long-loan market; thus 
the short rate is affected by movements in the long rate. (70) This is 
the dominant influence, since Robertson argues that the monetary author-
ities will not, in the long run, wish to go against the underlying con-
ditions operative in the market for loanable funds (determined largely 
by productivity and thrift) • 
Contrast this argument with that ofN. Kaldor. (7l) He would agree 
with Robertson that there is a gap between the normal long rate and the 
normal short rate, and that this gap reflects the additional uncertainty 
(72) in keeping bonds rather than assets closer to money and the greater 
liquidity of the latter. Secondly, both agree that it is discount 
which determines the amount of speculation in both markets. (73) Where 
they fail to agree is on the determinants of this gap. Kaldor believes 
that productivity and thrift will exert only a negligible influence 
upon the long rate, because of the influence of speculators upon the 
market. The long rate is influenced by the expected future short-term 
rates of interest over a long period; uncertainty as to future move-
ments in interest can only lead to the long rate being higher than the 
short rate. Any change in productivity or thrift will not bring any 
considerable change in the long rate in this theory, since it will not 
succeed in altering the average expected short rate, which determines 
the actions of the speculator, and in turn the long rate. 
This is a largely irreconcilable issue - but it does demonstrate 
the difference which still persisted between the manner in which 
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Robertson and Keynesians thought about problp.Ills within interest theory. 
Robertson continued to emphasise the importance of productivity and 
thrift; Keynesians concentrated upon liquidity preference, and the 
role of uncertainty and expectations in interest rate determination, 
To an objective bystander there is no reason why both arguments 
should not be correct on the connection between short and long rates. 
l-lhy should not the long rate be influenced by, for example, a change in 
productivity which alters the demand for loanable fundS, and by a change 
in expectation as to the future course of the short rate? Both are not 
mutually exclusive. 
The defence cf the Cambridge economists 
Critical comment by Robertson upon Keynes' liquidity preference 
theory was not directed solely as a d~fence of his own theory of 
interest. Robertson took upon himself the task of defending Cambridge 
economists - past {Marshall and Lavington} and present {notably P1gou} 
- from the Keynesian attack. This defence is exhibited primarily in 
Robertson's attempt, eventually successful, to persuade Keynesians of 
the importance of productivity and thrift in determining the rate of 
interest - an argUloent which was central to the interest theory of his 
fellow Cambridge econorr:ists. (74) 
But the defence was more than this. Keyncs portrayed his interest theory 
as a monetary theory, neglecting real forces; it was shown as a total 
contrast to the real theories of the earlier classical and Cambridge 
economists. Robertson felt this treatment of the Cambridge econoInists 
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in particular to be vastly unfair. (75) They too had recognised the 
importance of monetary forces acting upon the rate of interest and, 
atcording to Robertson, had been much more realistic and meaningful in 
their treatment of liquidity preference than Keynes had himself. But 
Keynes failed to acknowledge sufficiently this earlier work on liquidity 
preference. (76) It will be wise to dwell upon this defence a little 
lon<:1"rsince it highlights much of the source of Robertson's counter-
attack upon the liquidity preference theory~ The discussion will pro-
ceed in two parts. Firstly, there is a need to decide whether or not 
the Cambridge economists did in fact recognise liquidity preference and 
its influence upon the interest rate. Secondly, it must be decided 
whether their treatment of it was more cenvincing than that .of Keynes. 
The recognitien of liquidity preference, although net necessarily 
in the ferm prepeunded in the General Theer,[, weuld be cenfirmed, if 
Rebertsen ceuld show that the Cambridge econemists had accepted the 
existence .of hearding and its impact upon the rate .of interest. As a 
beginning .one must remember that the Cambridge ecenomists, frem Marshall 
.onwards, had censidered meney sitting, rather than money en the wing 
/ 
in their appreach te monetary theery; that is they had argued in terms 
of the ferces geverning the demand fer meney, as well as in terms .of 
the velocity of circulatien .of meney. (77) It was a legical extensien 
.of this appreach te censider the breakdewn .of the demand fer meney. 
The cenfirmation hewever is centained in the Cambridge econemists' 
preeccupatien with the threefeld margin. The interest rate did net .only 
influence the decisien te save er spend, it alse affected the decision 
t~hoard er disheard. (78) 
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How similar the concepts of liquidity preference contained within 
the Cambridge school, and in the General Theory are, is a matter of 
inl:erpreta tion. . (79) Marshall, Pigou and Lavington each wrote not only 
of the influence of productivity and thrift upon the interest rate, but 
also of the effect of uncertainty and hence expectations upon the rate. (80) 
The latter was central to Keynes' theory of interest. But did they 
recognise the speculative demand for money as it appeared in the General 
Theory? This is a point of con·tention. Robertson argued that Pigou and 
Lavington were kinder to speculative demand, giving it a much wider 
definition than that of Keynes. They did not concentrate upon the choice 
between bonds and cash and the influence of expectations upon this choice. 
As with Robertson, the choice ,',as much wider than this; in addition 
they sought to bring the precautionary demand for money into a direct 
relation with the rate of interest. Marshall ·too had included a dis-
cussion of the speculative motive in his analysis by considering the 
actions of bulls and bears on the stock exchange. (81) 
Therefore, the fundamental difference between the Cambridge school 
and Keynes' liquidity preference theory is largely a matter of emphasis. 
The Cambridge economists,were not totally neglectful of monetary forces 
in determining interest, but such forces did not occupy the degree of 
importance displayed in Keynes' theory. Keynes chose to exaggerate the 
role of speculative demand and, in so doing, heightened the role played 
by uncertainty and expectations and consequently the role of psycho-
logical factors in determining interest. The Cambridge economist chose 
to concentrate, but not exclusively, upon the fo!:ces of productivity and 
thrift in interest theory. 
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Conclusions - loanable funds versus liquidity preference 
The first, and most obvious, conclusion arising from this chapter 
is that the interest theories of Keynes and Robertson are not as radically 
(82) 
opposed as Keynes thought them to be. In the General Theory Keynes 
sought to totally ignore the forces of productivity and thrift acting 
upon the rate of interest to the benefit of liquidity preference and 
the supply of money; as· such, his theory was opposed to that of 
Robertson; but it has been one of the purposes of this chapter to show 
that Keynes' position changed substantially in ·the period after 1936. 
With Hicks' formulation of the Keynesian system, perhaps also persuaded 
by Robertson's critical comment, and with Keynes' introduction of the 
concept of finance, Keynes was no longer able to ignore the role of 
productivity and thrift in interest rate theory - although he was still 
able to maintain an emphasis upon liquidity preference and, in particular, 
the speculative motive. 
Not only did the Keynesian system eventually recognise the role of 
productivi ty and thrift, but the role was very similar to that displayed 
in Robertson's theory; an increase in the productivity of investment 
would tend to raise the rate of interest; the only exception to this 
being in the liquidity trap region; a fall in productivity would lower 
the rate of interest. Outside the liquidity trap, an increase in thrift 
would lower the rate and a decrease would raise it. Only in the extreme 
case of the liquidity trap region were the conclusions of both theories 
incompatible. However, one substantial difference did remain. This is 
to be found in the transmission mechanism linking such changes to the 
rate of interest; for Robertson, it was a direct relation, with changes 
working directly upon the demand for, and supply of, securities and 
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therefore the rate of interest. For Keynes and Keynesians, it was an 
indirect relation with changing productivity and thrift affecting the 
level of real income through the multiplier process and this in turn 
influencing the demand for money and the rate of interest. 
There is a second question ~hich this chapter has gone some way to 
answering. This is the question of the revolutionary nature of Keynes' 
theory of interest when'compared with the Robertsonian theory. The 
following observations in this chapter suggest that Keynes did not alter 
drastically the theory of interest: 
, 
, 
1) Keynes' recantation of the role of productivity and 
thrift after 1936, which took him much of the way 
back towards Robertson's theory. 
2) The recognition that the influence of liquidity preference, 
and of monetary forces in general, upon interest was 
3) 
not new to theory. It had not been a feature of 
classical economics, but it had its origins in the 
work of Marshall, Pigou and Lavington, as well as in 
the writings of Robertson. These economists had 
acknowledged the role of uncertainty and expectations 
in interest determination. Ivhat was different about 
Keynes' theory was his formulation of the speculative 
motive and his concentration upon the choice between 
bonds and cash. This took pride of place ever and 
above the non-monetary forces acting upon inter·est. 
Robertson's discussion of liquidity preference -
found in his formulation of hoarding - waS less 
sophisticated than that of Lavington, in particular, 
who, \'lith Pigou, accepted a much \'."ider approach to 
speculative demand (and arguably more realistic) 
than that of Keynes. The revolution is not to be 
found ~li th respect ·to liquidity preference. 
crucial to the classical theory of interest is the 
causal link between saving and the rate of interest. 
Keynes replaced this link with that bet\<een saving 
and the level of income and this gave rise to the 
multiplier process. It is this innovaticn which is (83) 
generally regarded 'as revolutionising monetary theory. 
The implication of this innovation is that there \'Iill 
be a different supply of savings curve (in relation 
to the rate of interest) for every level of income. 
• 
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Classical theory is invalidated as soon as income is 
taken to be variable. There can no longer be a stable 
equilibrium where the curves of the supply of saving 
and the demand. for saving for investment purposes 
intersect; so long as income is changing, the supply 
curve will be shifting. Similarly, theories of interest 
which recognise the difference between natural and 
market rates of interest are invalidated; the natural 
rate can no longer be regarded as a stable or equilib-
rium rate. But Keynes moved from one extreme to the 
other; having found a connection between saving and 
income he then proceeded to ignore the influence of 
the rate of interest upon saving. This was remedied 
in Hicks' IS/U1 curve analysis which introduced the 
indirect relationship between the.two, via the level 
of income. But had it not been remedied before in 
Robertson's dynamic theory of interest?(84) Robertson 
argued that both interest rates and the level of dis-
posable income would influence the level of saving. 
Neither income nor the rate of interest were assumed 
constant. (85) Both were free to fluctuate in his 
dynamic theory and to influence the level of saving. 
There was not a stable natural rate of interest in 
his theory, but a continually changing quasi-natural 
rate; (86) this was continuallY changing due to 
changes in productivity and thrift, and also monetary 
changes influencing the distribution of income. In 
other words, the demand for, and supply of, loanable 
funds curves were continuously moving over time, such 
that a stable equilibrium could never be reached. 
Keynes had provided nothing new in this respect in 
the General Theory. 
The meaningfulness of the liquidity preference theory of interest 
therefore depended very much upon the strength of the relationship Keynes 
thought he had found between saving and income and consequently upon the 
strength of the multiplier process. This strength, as Robertson pointed 
out, would be mainly affected by the stability of the propensity to con-
sume out of income. If this propensity varied (through interest rate 
changes), even though income might remain constant, the precision of the 
multiplier would be lost and the liquidity preference theory of interest 
would be in need of rebuilding to incorporate the link beb.een saving 
and interest. 
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It will be difficult, if not impossible, to convince Keynesians 
that this chapter has not been unduly pessimistic regarding Keynes' 
co~tribution to interest theory. Our conclusion at this stage is that 
Keynes merely chose a different way of telling the same story that 
Robertson had told two years earlier. (87) It was different because of 
its static, not dynamic, approach and of. its use of stocks rather than 
flows. But was it a more interesting, a more useful, way of saying the 
same thing? Robertson believed not for the following reasons: 
.1) His own theory could be regarded as a branch of the 
general theory of·pricing and therefore was consistent 
with the conventioBal classical approach.{·8P), 'I'he loan-
able funds theory "'as integrated within t.he Robertsonian 
system. Given a change in the productivity of invest-
ment, the forced saving process helped explain not only 
how prices and output might change, but also how the. 
rate of interest would be affected. The theory of 
interest in the General Theory was not integrated >lith 
the other theories it contained. In particular there 
was little attempt by Keynes, to relate the theory of 
interest to the theory of output and employment. Only 
later, under the influence of Hicks, are the two brought 
together, and the influences of the effects of changes 
in the productivity of investment upon both interest 
rates, and real income explored. It is then possible 
for Keynesians to argue that the liquidity preference 
theory is more compatible with 'general equilibrium 
analysis; (89) and that this theory would fit within 
the Keynesian framework. w~ich interest rate theory 
is more worth>lhile therefore depends upon the resolution 
of the broader issue of the Keynes versus classical 
frame>lork of analysis. 
2) The liquidity preference approach gave an exaggerated 
picture of the importance of the role of monetary 
factors in interest rate determination. It dwelt too 
long upon speculative demand and too little upon produc-
tivity and thrift. . 
3) Hm,ever, above all other reasons, it is the advantages of 
dynamic analysis and of flow rather than stock argu-
ments which convince Robertson of the superior strength 
of his theory. '1''''0 advantages dominate. Firstly the 
loanable funds theory accords more ",ith t.he manner in 
which businessmen and speculators actually think. They 
think in terms of flows rather than stocks. As B. TC\-l 
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has forcibly remarked, (90) having found himself teach-
ing a liquidity preference theory to his students: 
'when I leave the classroom and proceed to the Bursar's 
office to chat about stock market prospects, all my 
arguments seem to present themselves in terms of flows: 
I talk about such things as the volume and probable 
destination of the new money flowing onto the market, 
the volume and composition of the new issues which the 
market will be called upon to digest ••••• ,(91) 
Secondly, and more important, when one attempts to apply 
static analysis it invariably involves re-interpreting 
it in a dynamic fashion. Equilibria are never reached. 
It is the process of change which is important - the 
growth or fluctuation of a number 'of economic variables, 
- in particular prices, wages, output, employment and 
'interest. Similarly, economic policy considerations 
are dynamic - one needs to examine the impact of policy 
over time. Since Robertson was primarily concerned 
with industrial. fluctuation the dynamic approach to 
interest theory was more meaningful and could be more 
directly related to other"trade cycle analysis. What 
is more, the dynamic re-interpretation of a static 
theory does not always yield the same conclusions as 
static analysis. We have two very good examples of this 
in relation to interest theory. Once Keynes recognised 
that' additional saving would not be automatically and 
instantaneously generated to finance the investment of 
the multiplier process, he had to introduce the concept 
of finance into his analysis. This, in turn, involved 
a total re-examination of the role of the banking sector 
in the economic system. Secondly, Keynes, by ignoring 
the adjustment process, was free in the General Theory 
to imply that the supply of goods would be perfectly 
elastic at less than full employment and that prices 
need not increase as investment expands. In the 
Robertsonian system the time period under consideration 
determines the elasticity of supply. in the very short 
period, an increase in investment will succeed in 
raising prices, until additional output is forthcoming. 
The misleading nature of Keynesian static analysis has persisted 
right through to the present day. It is common ground for most economists 
to examine economic policy action in an IS/LM framework. Fiscal policy 
is viewed by shifting the IS curve, monetary policy by moving the L~ 
curve. It is precisely this kind of analysis which Robertson wa,s fighting 
/ 
;' 
/ 
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against. l'lhat Robertson believed - and it is also evident that Keynes 
(92) 
thought tbe same way to some extent - was that the LM curve was 
inlierently unstable as V and hence K varied as the level of output 
changed. The corollary of this is that it is impossible to reach any 
firm conclusions on the influences of economic policy by using IS/LM 
analysis, except by using very restricted assumptions. 
The choice of approaches therefore depends upon the problem which 
is to be solved. Robertson's preoccupation with the trade cycle justi-
fies continued fa.i th in the loanable funds theory. The Keynesian dis-
position to investigate the conditions necessary for equilibrium equally 
justified the maintenance of the liquidity-preference theory. But the 
final comment of this section rests with Robertson: 'the rate of 
interest - that central mystery about the importance or unimportance of 
>;hich it is so hard to keep pace >;ith the vagaries of high-bro>; opinion, 
though I find that, if one stands fairly firmly in the same place, 
high-bro>; opinion, like a hunted hare, has a >;ay of coming round in 
circles. Wicksell and Fisher and Marshall had taught us that the actual 
market rate of interest can be influenced by those who have it in their 
power to create or destroy money. It needed emphasising that it can be 
influenced too by those who have it in their power to use or not to use 
existing pools of money; and Keynes, with his immense intuitive under-
standing of the speculative markets, was the person destined to emphasise 
it. But it is a far cry from this to a "purely monetary theory of 
interest", or rather to an analysis "'hich passes off as a theory of 
interest "'hat is really only a theory of the divergences of the rate.of 
interest from some no~al level left: unexplained. I feel. sure we a.re on 
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the eve here of some retreat and re-integration towards which perhaps 
Lange above all haD shown the way. In some recent writings, such as 
Lerner's and I think Pigou's, there are lying about the disjecta membra 
of different theories of interest - productivity theories, abstinence 
theories, liquidity theories - which do not seem to have been remoulded 
into an intelligible whole'. (93) This brings together a good deal of 
~Ina:t has been said here! 
The stagnation thesis 
Much of the Robertsonian criticism of the last two chapters can be 
seen in relation to the 'stagnation thesis'. This thesis is based upon 
two propositions - the richer a community becomes: 
1) the more it will save out of real aggregate income. 
This stems at the micro level from Keynes' tentative 
assertion (94) that the greater a person's real income, 
the lower is his marginal propensity to consume. 
2) The fewer will be the profitable investment opportunities 
available; that is the marginal efficiency of capital 
will decline over time, as the most profitable invest-
ment outlets are used up first. 
Initially Robertson had some sympathy with this thesis in relation to 
. (95) the inter-war perJ.od. but later he was to attack t.he validity of both 
propositions. We have seen this attack in two features of the Robertsoni.an 
criticisms of Keynes. Firstly, Robertson argued that real income was not 
the sole determinant of consumption; any decline in the marginal pro-
pensity to conStL"lle, as real income rose, could be counteracted by a change 
in one or several of't.he other factors influencing consumption. Later he 
was able to use Duesenberry's hYP'?thesis, based upon the empirical evidence 
/ 
on·the consumption function, that in the long run the propensity was 
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fairly stable and equal to the average propensity to consume to support 
hl." s" (96) Vl.ew. Secondly, Robertson argued that periodically invention 
an~ innovation acted so as to increase the marginal productivity of 
(97) further investment. In other words, what the stagnation thesis was 
proposing was that the demand for loanable funds curve would shift con-
tinually to the left whilst the supply of loanable funds would move to 
the right as an economy progresses. Robertson' s response to this "as 
that both supply and demand may move in the opposite direction to that 
indicated by the stagnation e,esis - and thus there is no long-term 
tendency for the rate of interest to decline. 
I 
, 
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(95) Letter from DHR to JMK, lOth February 1935. (JMK, CW, Vol. XIII, 
p. 506) • 
(96) DHR, LEP-, p.424. 
(97) In LEP, (p.392), there is also a further reason given: 'many kinds 
of capital outlay .••.• depend on brcadly conceived estimates of 
the progress of whole regions'- not upon the demand for consump-
tion goods, and these outlays are sensitive to changes in the 
rate of interest. 
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CllAP'I'ER 13 
• The General Theory - A Revolution in Economic Theory or a 
Simplification of Robertsonian Economics? - Some Observations 
The last two chapters have emphasised Robertson's critical reaction 
to the General Theory, in particular his response to the static analysis 
of the multiplier and the liquidity preference theory. In this brief 
chapter some observations are made upon the similarity of Keynes' and 
Robertson's vlOrk, - compared with the typical classical system. It would 
be wrong to leave the reader with the impression that the Robertsonian 
and Keynesian theories are totally opposed to one another; indeed it is 
the purpose here to throw some light on the statement by T. Wilson that: 
'the polemical literature, both Keynesian and Robertsonian, leaves an 
exaggerated impression of the differences between their respective 
theories'. (1) I offer the contents of this chapter as food for thought. 
The most important theoretical conclusion which came from the General 
Theory was that an equilibrium level of employment could exist at less 
than full employment. This will arise where the level of aggregate spend-
ing in the economy is insufficient to support the aggregate level of the 
supply of goods and services which is capable of employing all available 
resources. As a direct result of this conclusion, the U.K. and other 
Western economies have seen fit to regulate aggregate demand in the post-
war period in order to achieve higher employment levels. This concern 
with effective demand is in marked contrast with early classical economics, 
\'lhere I on the basis of Say's la\'1, the very action of production is seen 
to generate the demand necessary to purchase it. But this concern is not 
alien to Robertsonian economics. The major cause of a depression .is the 
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'temporary. gluttability of wants', the saturation of the economy with 
capital goods. The only difference here between Keynes and Robertson is 
the Robertsonian emphasis upon the lack of demand for capital goods as 
the cause of unemployment, rather than the deficiency of demand for goods 
in general, or consumption goods in particular. Robertsonian and Keynesian 
remedies for unemployment are very similar - both especially advocate an 
artificial stimulation of the demand for capital goods by the introduction 
of public works policies. (2) A policy of wage reduction as a cure for 
unemployment is not a feature of Robertsonian economics. As Robertson 
himself admits, (3) he had no exaggerated respect even before 1936 for Say's 
Law and for the belief in an automatic movement towards full employment. 
He was not, in his early publications, preoccupied with the theory of 
price determination, but ,vith an explanation of the movements of output. 
and employment, as well as prices, through the course of the trade cycle. 
(4) This has been borne cut by earlier chapters. For Robertson, the 
inherent nature of capitalist economies, with their reliance upon the 
price mechanism and the investment process, means that fluctuation in all 
macro-economic variables is inevitable; if economic progress is to take 
place, unemployment is inevitable and indeed justifiable, to some extent. (5) 
Keynes sa>l the cause of the crisis as a downturn in the marginal efficiency 
of capital during the boom, exactly the cause emphasised by Robertson. 
Keynes suspected (6) that where he differed from the Robertsonian over-
investment thesis was in his recomlnencl.ation as to hO>l to prevent the dO>ln-
t 
(7) 
urn. 
Both theories lay strcss upon the significance of investment. In the 
General 'I'heory, it is the level of investment which, through the multiplier 
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process, determines the final level of total demand in tile economy, and 
consequently the level of real output and employment. The emphasis here 
is upon the role of investment in creating total effective demand, not 
upon its second role as the major determinant of tile level of productive 
capacity within the economy. Both roles are evident·in the Robertsonian 
system, although the former role was not as developed as in Keynes' multi-
plier theory; indeed Robertson would choose to highlight tile reverse 
relationship to that found in the multiplier, that is the influence of a 
change in conSlwer demand upon the level of investment. (8) Subsequent 
Keynesian analysis has also examined the dual role of investment and not 
specifically the demand side. (9) 
Robertson's claim to have found the multiplier process in tile work of 
Marshall and Lescure is not convincing;\lO) what is more convincing 
however is his arg~~ent that the multiplier is not unique in its deter-
mination of the level of income. \'lhat Keynes failed to appreciate was 
the instability of the propensity to spend out of income created by influ-
ences other than income upon consumption and saving, - the interference 
into the operation of the multiplier imposed by the acceleration principle 
and the dynamic, not static, nature of the multiplier proceEs. This made 
the financing of investment a crucial issue to be resolved - crucial in 
that whether or not finance "as forthcoming, and tile extent to "hich it "as 
forthcoming, determined, through the forced saving process, the resulting 
change in the price level and the interest rate brought about by an incre-
ment in investment. 
',l'he multiplier is little more than an oversimplification of the 
" 
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Robertsonian system. It only exists in the form described by Keynes where 
the following assumptions are made: 
• 
1) there is an instantaneous adjustment of saving to the change 
in investment, such that the availability of finance for 
investment is not a problem; in other words it has to be-
come a static and not a dynamic theory. Once this static 
analysis is disposed of (the multiplier process is no longer 
an adequate ans'ver to the forced saving thesis. There is 
no guarantee that the additional investment can be financed 
by a reduction in speculative money balances without a rise 
in either prices or the rate of interest. 
2) the supply of goods. is perfectly elastic such that any 
increase in demand created by additional investment does 
not raise prices at less than the full emplo}~ent level. 
This assumption, implied in the General Theory, stems from 
a use of static analysis; output is seen instantaneously 
to adjust to an alteration in demand without there first 
having to be a period of price adjustment. 
3) the acceleration principle does not operate; otherwise a 
change in consumer demand, caused by a change in investment, 
would in turn create further investment. This further 
investment would compete for the savings created by the 
original increment in investment, and lead to additional 
(to (1) above) difficulties in the financing of investment. 
4) current income is the sole determinant of current real con-
sumption. Once the other Robertsonian influences upon 
consumption and saving are introduced the stability of the 
marginal propensity to consume disappears and the multi-
plier is left in disarray. 
Once these assumptions are taken from the General Theory - that is 
once the theory is made to accord more with the true features of the 
economic system, one would suspect that the General Theory would move back 
a considerable way towards BPPL. 
Final.ly, in the last chapter, it was obse:rved that within two years 
of the publication of the General Theory,Keynes'position on interest 
theory hild moved some considerable Wily towards that associated with the 
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loanable funds theorist. It was Keynes purpose to deny the influence of 
productivity and thrift upon interest - this was to be the revolutionary 
nature of his interest theory. (11) Ilut he was unable to maintain this 
argument, since any change in productivity and thrift would lead to a 
change in income (through the multiplier) which would change speculative 
demand (given a constant supply of money) and alter the rate of interest. 
He could neither convincingly assume that transactionary or speculative 
demand would remain constant as income changed; or that the economy was 
permanently operating within the liquidity trap region. Hence, although 
Robertson and Keynes differed over the transmission mechanism operating 
within tlle theory of interest, they did eventually agree that both real 
and monetary forces acted in the determination of the level of interest 
rates. Although Keynes regarded his theory asa revolution in relation 
to early classical theory - it was clearly not a revolution alongside the 
Robertsonian version of the loanable funds theory. 
If the General Theory is no more than a simplification of the earlier 
Robertsonian system, why did not the revolution in economic theory come 
with the publication of BPPL in 19267 There are two possible explanations 
of this fact which dominate all others. Firstly, in presenting economic 
analysis, Robertson treated his theories as a.development of the work of 
earlier Cambridge economists. Keynes was keen, as Robertson was anxious 
to point out, that his theory differed substantially from that of earlier 
economists. In fact, it has been observed in the last two chapters, that 
the differences were not so extreme as Keynes would have wished everyone 
to believe. The General 'fheory was written with the objective of creating 
a revolution in economic theory; none of Robertson's major works had been 
/ 
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regarded by the author in this manner. This leads on to the second explana-
tion - and one of possibly greater conjecture. Robertson's writings before 
1936·are extremely difficult to understand. He avoids ·simplifying assump-
tions to the same degree that the majority of economists are anxious to 
shelter under their wings. The terminology which he uses is also complex 
and difficult to keep in the mind. (12) He is very much concerned with the 
detailed analysis·- as is ably demonstrated by his response to the General 
Theory. (13) He is never worried about the complexity of the picture of 
the economic system he is painting - so long as it is an accurate picture. 
Simplifying assumptions for Robertson do nothing but smudge the colours, 
distorting the final impressions created. As a consequence, as Keynes 
suspected of BPPL, very few economists ever really understood what 
Robertson was getting at - hardly the makings of a revolution. In addition, 
Robertson did not bring together all branches of his theory under one cover. 
The real theory is to be found in the 1915 study, the monetary theory in 
the books published in 1922 and 1926, and the bulk of interest theory in 
the 1934 article. Therefore there is nowhere, in one source, a com-
prehensive guide to his General Theory. 
These deficiencies in the prerequisites of a revolution in economics 
were admirably remedied by Keynes. A General Theory was presented within 
one book. What is more it was presented in a fashion in which fellow 
economists could begin to digest - not ahmys successfully judging from 
the various interpretations of it which resulted and still abound today 
(including sections of this thesis). Keynes was a populariser of economic 
theory/successfully reaching a wide audience; Robertson, particularly in 
BPPL and later wo·rk, was an academic's academic, consequently he did not 
;' 
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reach such a wide audience. The danger. of being a popu1ariser in this 
case is that it involved, as we have seen through Robertson's comments 
upon'it, a good deal of over-simplification of the economic system. One 
. (14) is reminded of H1cks' comment that the effect of the General Theory 
upon his mind had been profound, but that through the General Theory he 
had been led back to Robertson's work. How much this is true of post-war 
economics in the Western world. Post-General Theory developments have 
largely been such that· the simp1ifications of Keynes' work have been 
eliminated one by one leading us progressively towards a Robertsoniall way 
of doing things. Let me offer four examples. The static approach has 
been replaced by the dynamic analysis of growth models and mathematical 
models of the trade cycle and inflation. These recognise the acceleration 
principle and the consequences of time lags upon achieving ultimate 
equi1ibria. Secondly, empirical evidence has demonstrated the complex 
nature of the determinants of consmnption and given rise to the theories 
of Duesenberry, Friedman, Smithies, Ando and Modig1ianni on the relation 
between consmnption and present, past and future income/and has isolated 
the other factors determining consmnption. The liquidity preference 
theory has led to a wider interpretation of speculative demand - to the 
theory of portfolio behaviour. Finally, the current popularity of 
'monetarism', a recognition that prices can rise at less than full 
employment, and the disposition to return to an examination Qf the varia-
bility of V and K, is again a return to Robertsonian analysis. (15) 
, 
, 
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Chapter 13 -Footnotes 
(1)- T. Wilson, 'Robertson and Effective Demand and the Trade Cycle', 
Economic Journal, September 1953, p.555. 
(2) See p.400ff. 
(3) DHR, SIF, preface (1948 edition) also re-read the earlier pages of 
this thesis (PP.35-49). 
(4) See especially chapters 1-5 (Part I). 
(5) See pp.42-4. 
(6) JMK, GT, Ch. 22 is very illuminating on the similarities bet,.een DHR 
and JMK in their view of the trade cycle. 
(7) See p.400ft. 
(8) See pp.99-104. 
(9) I am thinking particularly of Keynesian Growth Models associated 
wi th R. Harrod and E. Domar. 
(10) See pp.288-90. 
(11) See p.304ff. 
(12) See pp.166-94. 
(13) See various articles in DHR, EMI. Remember J.R. Hicks' comment see p:138ff. 
(14) See p.138ff. 
(15) Why didn't Robertson write a General Theory after 1936? The answer 
to this question is found in a letter from DHR to T. WilsOll in 
which DIlR writes. 
I 
/ 
/ 
'I'm afraid there is no chance of my responding to your challenge 
and trying to produce a full length synthetic theory of Money or 
Fluctuation or What-you-will. -I am too old and too lazy! But 
even if I were young and less lazy, I think history has made it 
impossible. I believe that, once Keynes had made up his mind to 
to go the way he did, it ,.as myc_particular function to go for the 
-"dammed (jessant) dots" and to go on pegging away at them (as is 
still necessary). It will not be easy for anyone for another 
twenty years to produce a positive and constructive work which 
isn't in large measure a commenta~l on Keynes, - that is the 
measure of his triumph. For me, it would now be psychologically 
impossible, and the attempt is not I<orth making'. (Letter DHR 
to T. Wilson, 31.10.1953). 
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CHAPTER 14 
The Value of Honey 
The major omission from the Robertsonian analysis so far is the 
failure to enquire as to the determination of the price level. It has 
been seen that price changes are an integral part of the forced saving 
process - and by now there should be no necessity to elaborate the 
importance of this process both for the theory of industrial fluctuation, 
and for the Keynes/Robertson debate on the multiplier and interest 
theories; but the theory of ho>, the aggregate price level is determined 
is not part of the latter debate. The General Theory is a theory of 
employment, not an explanation of inflation. Prices are constant at 
less than full employment; for Robertson prices are free to vary even 
where unemployed resources exist. This chapter takes as its theme the 
Robertscnian explanation of price movements, but the objective is wider 
than this. In addition it will show the integration found between the 
theories of, interest and prices, the extent to which the Robertscnian 
theory of prices followed in the Harshallian tradition, and the reaction 
of Robertson to Patinkin's interpretation of the nco-classical theory 
of absolute prices. (1) 
The development of the theory of price determination can be seen 
by taking three of the major works, Money, .BPPL and LEP r by adopting 
this approach it is possible to contrast the simplicity of Robertson's 
work in 1922 with its sophistication and penetration in 1926, and also 
,to illustrate the consistency of LEP with the earlier work despite the 
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intervening Keynesian revolution. 
li Money (1922) 
It was the intention of this first work on monetary theory by 
Robertson to lay stress upon monetary theory 'as a special case of the 
general theory of value'. (2) As such the value of money(3) is determined 
in much the same way as the value of any of other commodity, that is in 
. (4) 
this case by the interaction of the demand for, and supply of, money. 
The demand for money is conditioned by the taste and habits of the 
community, and, given these conditions, the value of money must depend 
upon its supply. 
But the demand for money is distinct from the demand for any other 
(5) 
commodity in two respects. If an individual looses a unit of money, 
the total utility of the community is not necessarily diminished, as it 
would be if that individual lost a commodity. The individual, through 
his loss of money, is transferring purchasing power to the rest of the 
community by the subsequent increase in the real value of their money 
holdings. Secondly, if the supply of money is diminished, the value 
of the remaining units of money will be proportionately increased. (6) 
It is this characteristic of money which Robertson claimed gave rise to 
the 'quantity theory of money'. This theory he viewed as neither 
asserting that the value of money will always change proportionately 
with the supply of money (since the condit.ions of demand might change 
as a result of the change in the supply of money), nor that a change in 
the supply of money need be the only cause of the change in value 
, 
(conditions of demand might change independently of the supply of money). 
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Addi tionally, and equally important, the theory tells us nothing of 
cause and effect, but merely demonstrates the association of a change 
in the money supply with changes in the value of money. (7) The 
'quantity theory' does no more than emphasise the peculiarities of 
money, it does not provide any answers to the possible transmission 
mechanisms leading from the money supply to prices or vice versa. (8) . 
As a result of discovering 'more of the truth about the theory of 
(9) 
money', the second edition of Mone~ appeared in a very modified form 
in 1928. The changes were largely of approach, and detail, than funda-
mental changes in relation to the theory of money expressed. To a 
limited extent the sophisticated analysis of BPPL (1926) was included; 
the main exclusion being the detailed examination of i.nduced lacking in 
the latter, and its influence upon the proportional relationship 
betIVeen the money supply and the price level. (10) 
The major difference in approach IVas ·the introduction and emphasis 
upon the Cambridge equation in discussing the value of money, and the 
demotion of the quantity theory as a tool of analysis. A di.stinction 
is made between the stock and flow of money; the Cambridge equation 
considers the former by looking at 'money sitting'; the quantity 
theory is derived from an examination of 'money on the wing'. Th", 
two approaches are contrasted in the following equations: 
1 (a) P M = KR 
(b) PI 
M 
= 
KIT 
/ , 
2 (a) p 
(b) 
= 
= 
MV 
R 
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l(a) (b) refer to alternative statements of the Cambridge equation 
showing the distinction made by Robertson between K1and K , the pro-
portions of real income and real transactions which people wish to hold 
on hand in the form of money over the period. Similarly 2(a) (b) make 
a distinction between transactions and incomes velocity in the formula-
tion of the Fisher equation of exchange, reflecting the expression of 
the value of money in terms of its 'transactions value' and 'income 
value'. (11) 
The real balance approach of the Cambridge equation enabled the 
attention to be focused upon the motives for holding the stock of money. 
The demand for money, and hence the value of K and 1).; 'depends on the 
one hand ••.•• on the convenience and sense of security derived from 
the possession of a pool of money, and on the other, on the strength of 
the alternative attractions of increased consumption, or lucrative 
investment in trade capital or in Government or industrial stocks, 
against which these advantages have to b8 weighed up. Thus the magni-
tude of the demand for money, lik8 that of the demand for bread, turns 
out to be the result of a process of individual weighing up of competing 
. (12) 
advantages at the marg1n'. But this approach does not have advan-
tages over its 'money on the "ing' counterpart in all respects. 
Robertson was keen to point out that th8 'money balance' approach, 
utilising the vel-oci t.y of circula tion of money, is more useful in aiding 
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the working out of the manner in which actual prices change in real 
life, ~lhilst the real balance method aids the understanding of the 
psychological forces acting upon the value of money. (13) 
Robertson did not claim any originality for his theory of money; 
in 1922 he expressed his indebtedness to the writings of Pigou, Cassel, 
Fisher, Hawtrey and ~lithers, and to the oral tradition at Cambridge 
which had been handed down from Harshall to him through Pigou and 
(14) Keynes. Eshag has exhaustively documented the_influence of Marshall 
upon his pupils. (15) Both approaches to monetary theory utilised 
by Robertson have their origins in the work of Marshall, which,in 
(16) 
turn, can be traced back to his classical predecessors.. Indeed, 
Robertson had not in 1922 adopted the real balance approach despite 
its appearance alreadyinboth equation and verbal form in the work of A.C. 
Pigou. (17) By the time it first appeared in Robertsonian literature 
(1926), Keynes also had made use of it. (18) The determination of the 
individual's demand for money by a balancing of alternative uses of 
money at the margin, was also a common feature of the Carrbridge 1itera-
ture by 1928, having been seen in the work of Pigou, Lavington and 
(19) Keynes ; this also can be regarded as directly descending from the 
(20) 
work of Marsha1l. 
The transmission mechanism linking money with prices and the 'proportional 
re1ationsh~' 
The Robertsonian presentation of monetary theory was, however, 
much more thelU a. simple comparison of positions of equi1ibria. The 
di'sposition to analyse the process of adjustment rather than to stop at 
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comparative statics has. already been observed, and the theory discussed 
here is no exception to this; but the transmission mechanism linking a 
change in the money supply to pri.ces in both early editions of Money is 
considerably less developed than that found in BPPL. 
In the 1922 edition this transmission mechanism is married to the 
forced saving thesis. (21) This demonstrates clearly the intention to 
integrate monetary theoyy, as displayed by the development of the 
Cambridge and quantity theories, and the theory of inteyest (as more 
thoroughly developed later in terms of saving-investment analysis). 
The two theories are not expressed as competing, incompatible approaches. 
Let us take as an example an increase in the money supply which results 
from an increase in the productivity of investment. If productivity 
increases, businessmGn, due to the shortage of vOluntary saving, make 
calls upon the banks for additional loans. Given excessive liquidity, 
banks respond; the resulting loans are utilised to increase the demand for 
current production which is unable instantaneously to respond to the 
increased demand for it. As a consequence prices rise. Forced saving 
is imposed on those with fixed money incomes, who find themselves unable 
to undertake their previous level of consumption. This monetary expan-
sion, in turn, has the effect in this case of holding down the market 
f " "J t" "t "t 1 1 1 (22) rate 0 lnterest In re_a .lon to 1 S quasl-na ura eve. 
One question of obvious importance is the predictability of the 
association between changes in the money supply and prices. This depends 
" (23) 
upon the const.uncy of K in t.he Cilmbridge cquatlon. In some respects 
there is an apparent inconsistEncy in both editions of Honey which leaves 
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the Robertsonian view of this question in dispute. One reconciliation 
(24) 
of this inconsistency, would be, as far as Money is concerned, to 
suggest that Robertson had both a short-run and a long-run view of price 
determination; one might then suggest that K is variable in the former 
and constant in the latter •. But there is no convincing evidence to 
assist this conclusion. In the earlier edition we find the argument 
that the proportional relationship may not exist because of the changing 
conditions in the demand for money, or because of the lack of indepen-
dence of the demand for money from the supply. (25) Yet in the 1928 
edition one can observe a real balance effect in operation which acts 
to restore the initial level of real balances existing at the beginning 
of the forced saving process. As prices rise, individuals find the 
real value of their money balances diminished, and respond by diminish-
ing their consumption in order to re-establish this real value (i.e. 
restore the original value of K). Hence Robertson concludes that/at 
the end of a forced saving process: 'the volume of bank loans has per-
manently increased by, let us say, 10% and so has the volume of money 
in the hands of the public. But since prices have risen by 10%, the 
aggregate real value of the public's money supply is no greater than 
it was before'. (26) A clue to the unravelling of this inconsistency 
. (27) 
rests in the discussion of the hyper-inflation in Germany (1922-23). 
It is only in extreme circumstances that K will change; one such 
extreme is where the expansion of the money supply leads to expectations 
of furt.her price rises, and brings a diminution in the desired level of 
real balances. This, in turn, creates further inflation, and further 
expectations of price rises; . for a clarification of this one needs to 
gc on t.o BPPL. 
, . 
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2) Banking Policy ·and the Pr.ice Level (1926) 
Money is an undergraduate textbook, and the treatment of the theory 
of money within it reflects this fact. BPPL is much more rigorous in 
its content, and it contains analysis, which, although relevant, is not 
included in the later edition of Money. (28) In its pages there is a 
much more thorough attempt to integrate saving analysis and the theory 
of price determination. (29) Indeed in a letter to Patinkin, (30) 
Robertson expressed a hope that the omissions of Money will be excused 
on the basis of the elaborate accounl: contained in BPPL of the process 
of induced lacking, and the real balance effect. 
In BPPL it is the Cambridge equation which is favoured in the 
analysis of cyclical fluctuations. (31) The introduction of induced 
lacking, as well as the automatic lacking recognised (under forced 
saving) in Money, allows a detailed examination of the behaviour of K 
over the course of the cycle. It is clear that Robertson upholds the 
proportional relationship between the money supply and the price level. 
Proportionality is assumed to exist in the mathematical exercise to 
show the process of adjustment to a ne" equilibrium level as a result 
of the injection of new money by the government. (32) The justification 
of this assumption is that during periods of either moderate inflation, 
or deflation, characterised by monetary change, there will be a desire 
on the part of those individuals v,hose real balance level may have been 
disturbed by the injection or \'iithdrawal of money (and the resulting change 
in prices) to restore their original real balance level. In this case 
induced lacking,.which is voluntary and designed unlike automatic 
la<:ki_ng, leads the individual t.o adjust his expenditure on real goods 
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so as to restore the level of real balances existing before the process 
of mild inflation or deflation commenced. The proportionality of the 
money supply and the price level, assuming real income to be constant, 
can only exist once the equilibrium position has been reached; during 
the process of change, K is moving back to the equilibrium level which 
maintains this proportional relationship. At any point in time therefore 
it is unlikely that this proportional relationship exists. But there 
is more than this in BPPL; under the str~ng influence of Keynes, (33) 
Robertson argues that in certain circumstances K may not remain con-
stant for each successive equilibrium; (34) that is, there are forces 
creat.ing induced lacking which take the individual to a level of real 
balances which did not exist at the outset of the forced saving (or 
dissaving) process, and therefore leads to a new equilibrium level of 
K being established. Such forces are believed·to be operative in a 
period of 'rapid and violent inflation', (35) and one might logically 
assum~ also in a period of rapid and violent depression. In the former 
K will fall and in the latter it will rise. 
The reasons for this instability of K have been seen before, (36) 
and need only be summarised here. Initially in a forced saving process, 
as prices rise, the individual's level of real balances falls; his 
immediate reaction is to restore this real level, by curtailing con-
sumption - this is the first form of induced lacking. But the 
individual consumer may alter his vim. of the appropri~ level of his 
real balances as a consequence of the price rise. He may feel that 
further price rises are to follow, and will rush his purchases of goods, 
reducing his real hoarding in relation to his level of real income, 
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reducing K; for the entrepreneur there will also be an • expectat.ions· 
effect in that, if prices are expected to continue rising, he will 
increase his preference for keeping resources in goods rather than in 
the form of money, again reducing K. (37) By this action again we get 
an addition to the inflationary pressure of the initial monetary injec-
tion of the forced saving process" but there is a second reason why 
Robertson believed that K would change, and it is apparent that, had 
BPPL been revised, it would have commanded more weight. (38) The under-
lying assumption of the analysis of chapter 5 in which K is taken to 
be constant, is that the economy is made up of a group of small 
entrepreneurs, such that incomes quickly respond to price changes and 
hence real incomes are maintained. In this circumstance the redistri-
but ion effect of forced saving upon incomes is negligible, and less 
important in its effects on K than the expectations effect. Later 
on(39) this asstrnption is relaxed, and the inflationary process is seen 
to redistribute income away from the rentier and salaried classes, who 
respond by dishoarding to maintain their consumption level; this has 
the effect of reducing K. According to Robertson: 'their action may 
have a marked effect on the price level'. (40) It is apparent from his 
( 41) 
own admission however, that he had not fully thought through the 
consequence upon prices of the redistribution effect for an economy 
where the incomes of entrepreneurs are flexible, whilst the incomes of 
most of the factors of production are relatively fixed. Yet the lag of 
some incomes behind prices is crucial to the operation of the forced 
. (42) 
savlng process. 
There arc two further reasons which would reinforce the view that 
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Robertson did not See the proportional relationship persisting over 
time. Firstly, in the Robertsonian theory of interest, it has been 
demonstrated that real hoarding by the individual would vary with the 
rate of interest; fluctuations in the rate of interest have been shown 
to be a feature of industrial fluctuation, and the forced saving process. 
During an expansionary _ phase(43) therefore, the rate of interest will 
tend to rise, and this rise will: 
a) diminish the desire to dishoard; 
b) 'encourage entrepreneurs to finance purchases out of 
'windfall gains, rather than by borrOl<ing from the 
banks; 
c) diminish the level of demand for circulating capital 
which has to be financed through the banks. (44) 
Each will create a change in the proportion of real income that money 
balances command, that is the elasticity of the demand for money with 
respect to interest rates is not zero. Secondly, the proportional. 
relationship depends not only on the constancy of K, but also upon the 
constancy of T or R. Again it is clear from earlier sections, that 
Robertson did not believe that an assumption of full employment, or an 
automatic tendency of the economy to move towards full employment, was 
justifiable. (45) In BPPL he ,/as not concerned with presenting a theory 
of prices, but with an examination of the role of money in the cyclical 
process, that is its role in exaggerating the underlying real forces 
which cause fluctuations in output. A feature of any cyclical process 
is forced saving or dissaving, Hhich brings with it price movements; 
but output, and hence Rand T, would be continually changing over the 
cycle. In the forced saving process we have seen that the effects of 
I 
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monetary changes are not only upon prices, but also upon output. (46) 
Thus the values taken by R, T and K are not independent from P or M. 
One would suspect that the view of the meaningfulness of the simple 
'quantity theory of money' - and its judgement that the price level and 
the money supply remain proportional, did not change from the view 
expressed in Money (l922): 'no longer either a triumphant credo or a 
pestilant heresy, the "quantity theory of money" r<:>mains a dowdy but 
serviceable platitude'. (47) The complexity of the determination of the 
aggregate price level found in Robertsonian literature reflects a differ-
ing approach to economic analysis than that portrayed by the quantity 
theory. Robertson uses period analysis suitable to the discussion of 
cyclical movements, considering the process of adjustment of prices 
from one level to the next, the usual expression of the quantity 
theory is in the form of a comparison of long-run equilibria, in which 
proportionality attains. Whether or not Robertson would subscribe to 
the long-run view of the determination of-prices, depends upon the 
permanency of the expectations and redistribution effects on the 
desired real value of money balances. On this question unfortunately 
there is no evidence to offer in Robertsonian literature. 
3) Lectures On Economic Principles 
The notable feature of this work is its consistency with the theory 
of the value of money exprecsed in BPPL 30 years earlier. Robertson 
continues to maintain a faith in the Cambridge equation, that 'ancient 
ceremony' which 'makes the exchange value of money, considered as a 
special cas" of the general theory of valuc, the centre of the picture, 
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and sets out the factors for discussion in a very simple and modest 
(48) 
array of symbols'. Cumulative processes are then to be examined in 
terms of the variability of K, R, P and M. (49) The Keynesian approach, 
focusing attention upon saving and investment"and upon income and 
expenditure, is not to Robertson a better, more worthwhile,method of looking 
at· the cycle; indeed. there is no reason why both approaches cannot be 
utilised side by side, which is exactly what Robertson attempts to do 
in the inter-war period, and continues to do in LEP. Keynesians would 
argue that the stability of the propensity to spend justifies the use 
of the income-expenditure approach. The implicit conclusion of LEP is 
that this propensity is no mor.e stable than the propensity to hoard, 
and therefore is no more useful a tool of analysis. 
This is not to argue that Robertson believed K to be any more 
stable than he had suggested in BPPL. K, the 'Prince of Denmark in the 
Hamlet of the Cambridge equation', (50) is determined by five factors in 
a stable economy; these factors relate to business habits, the structure 
of industry, social and business life, the state of development of the 
markets for existing capital goods, and the rate of return on employing 
. , 
resources and alternative uses to holding money. If the supply of money 
is changed it is doubted that the elasticity of demand for money with 
respect to its value (1 + p) will be unity, such that the price level 
will move in proportion to the money supply. The conclusion is reached 
that it is likely to be less than unity; if, for example, the money 
supply is expanding, the individual is likely to diminish his stock of 
money in order to increase monetary expenditure in the face of a price 
rise, but not to such an extent that his initial level of real balances 
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is restored. In the more extreme circumstances (described in BPPL as 
rapid inflation or deflation), Robertson continues to witness the 
interference of the expectations and redistribution effects on the 
value of K, but the latter now appears to carry more weight. (51) The 
demand for money is neither independent of its supply, nor supply indep-
endent of demand. (52) What is not contained in BPPL is the recognition 
that the existence of administered prices would tend to create a greater 
effect of a change in the money stream upon. real income, rather than 
prices. The previous section has also illustrated the dependence of K 
upon the rate of interest, which Robertson again developed from BPPL and 
from the proddings of the Keynesian debate. 
Again therefore we have a demonstration of the consistency of 
Robertsonian economic analysis over the years. lie remained unchanged 
in his analysis of economic problems despite the Keynesian revolution, 
and continued to support period analysis, and his attempted integration 
of the theories of interest and prices through the forced saving thesis. 
His faith in the Cambridge approach was not dispelled by Hrs. Robinson's 
accusation that 'we have been telling the equation what is happening, 
. (53) it has not been tell~ng us'. In fact this was to Robertson the 
attraction of the approach; 'its complete generality' enabled the 
ordering of 'our thoughts about a great number of different sequences 
of events, some of them starting at one point of the causal chain and 
some at another - in some of them the rate of interest playing a prominent 
part and in others not'. (54) 
/ 
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The Patinkin paradox 
By way of comment and conclusion upon the treatment of the monetary 
theory it is relevant to examine Robertson's reaction to the issues relating 
to classical monetary theory raised by Professor Patinkin. (55) It is 
not proposed that the debate begun by Patinkin is surveyed 
through to its current state; it has not yet reached a conclusion, and 
perhaps never will whilst disagreement persists on the interpretation 
of the 'classical economics'; this survey in any case exists. in exten-
. (56) s~ve form elsewhere. 
The central issue in the debate relates to the classical dichotomy. 
. (57) Given that the classical econom1st accepts Say's law, that the act 
of supplying commodities constitutes also a demand for co~odities, the 
aggregate money demand for commodities in a period must be equal to the 
aggregate supply, such that the net demand for money is zero. This is 
the 'homogeneity postulate'. It will be zero at any particular collec-
tion of relative prices, irrespective of the level of absolute prices. 
The holding of money therefore on the real side of the classical system, 
in the determination of the demand for commodities, yields no utility. 
The dichotomy arises where, in presenting a theory of prices in the form 
of the quantity theory of money, the classical economists present money 
as yielding utility, and consequently consistency between the real and 
monetary theories would require that the demand for commodities be 
determined by absolute as well as relative prices. 
Predictably, the reaction of Robertson to this criticism, which 
was levied also at the nea-classical writers, was to come to the 
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defence of Marshall, and Marshallian economics. This is most evident 
in correspondence between Robertson and Patinkin. Robertson writes: 
'in the Cambridge tradition, the desire to hold command over resources 
in the form of money being a desire for a real source of utility, 
peoples' consumption programme will depend on absolute as well as 
relative prices'. (58) But this was not the point at issue. Patinkin 
did not deny that in the theory of money the neo-classical writers 
recognised the real balance effect; his criticism was directed at 
t~eir failure to utilise this argument in their examination of the real 
sector of the economy. This is illustrated by his reply: 'it is clear 
that in the discussion of the real sector of the economy it was assumed 
that behaviour was independent of the absolute price level and dependent 
only on relative prices'. (59) Robertson was still not convinced, 
however, of the inconsistency of the neo-classical theory, the 
correspondence proceeded to debate, inconclusively, the classical 
dispOSition to include the absolute price l.evel as one of the determin-
ants of the demand for commodities in value theory. 
What is more relevant here, is the weight of the Patinkin criticism 
in relation to Robertsonian economics. Archibald and Lipsey(60) have 
dismissed the validity of the classical dichotomy on the grounds that 
the real balance effect is irrelevant to comparative static. analysis 
which involves a comparison of long-run equilibria (utilising the 
quantity theory). The effect demonstrates "hat happens in disequilibrium 
and therefore is not needed in comparative statics; but the irrelevance 
of the real balance effect would not be the Robertsollian answer to the 
suc;rgested dichotomy. He did not utilise comparative statics in his 
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theory of money, and "as very much concerned "ith the disequilibria 
adjustments. The real balance effect, from which Patinkin provides the 
integration of monetary and value theory, was very much a part of the 
Robertsonian theory of money. If prices rise, the fall in the real 
value of money balances will stimulate a response by consumers to 
lower their consumption, and to restore the real balance to an appro-
priate level. The change in the absolute price level is affecting 
consumption through this real balance effect. This argument, as we 
have seen, was given in Robertsonian literature from Money through to 
LEP. 
But then Patinkin did not deny that the neo-classical economists, 
including Robertson, had recognised the real balance effect. What he 
did deny ",as that they utilised it to provide 'stability analysis'. (61) 
It is here ",here any reconciliation of the dispute meets an obstacle. 
What does Patinkin mean by 'stability analysis'? A logical definition 
would see such analysis as yielding the mechanism by which the price 
level will move to its new equilibrium level. Robertson clearly 
thought that the analysis of BPPL, in particular, constituted both the 
real balance effect and stability analysis. He wrote: 'I don't regard 
the failure to perform a little stability exercise in a book of the 
character of "Moneyll..... as any evidence against either me or my 
teachers! Personally, I should have hoped that there might have been 
accounted to me for righteousness the elaborate account in "Banking 
Policy and the Price Level" (p.49 and Appendix I, recapitulated in 
'Saving and Hoarding', reprinted in 'Essays in 110netary ~'Ileory', p. 78) 
of.how the public in an inflation performs "Induced lacking" to the 
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extent necessary to restore the equilibrium level of its real balances'. (62) 
Patinkin was not so convinced that the Robertsonian analysis qualified 
as 'stability analysis'; although he did concede that the appendix to 
~ 'might be used in this way'. (63) Taking the above definition of 
'stability analysis', the appendix does qualify. Until we have a clear 
agreement on what constitutes such analysis this would appear to be an 
irreconcilable issue. 
The subjection of Robertsonian economics to the classical dichotomy 
charge can therefore be counteracted by the observation of the 
extensive use of the real balance effect, and its possible use in per-
forming stability analysis. But the analysis of previous chapters 
enables a stronger defence of Robertsonian economics to be made. Firstly, 
Robertson did not uphold Say's law, and therefore, in theory relating 
to the real sector of the economy, he did not assume that the net demand 
for money would be zero. Money indeed does have utility - money 
balances are held for their own sake in the Robertsonian system - as the 
discussion of the three-fold margin indicated. (64) The level of real 
balances held has also been seen to vary Vlith the rate of interest. 
Secondly, Robertson does not argue that money is neutral in its effect 
upon economic activity. Changes in the money supply not only affect 
. (65) prices in the long run, but also the rate of lnterest, and the 
level of output. An increase in the flow of money may initially raise 
prices and not output. Output cannot respond immediately to additional 
monetary demand even if unemployed resources exist. The ultimate move-
ment in the price level depe~ds upon the speed with which output is 
. (66) 
able to react to a monetary stlmulus. The forced saving thesis 
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outlined earlier also, not only demonstrates that money works upon 
economic activity by affecting cash balances, but that it could, since 
unemployed resources exist, affect the level of output. The non-
neutrality of money is therefore not only guaranteed by the real balance 
effect, but by the much wider discussion by Robertson ot the links 
between lacking, in its various forms, and the level of demand, and 
output. 
The foregoing chapters indicate that it is not implicit in Robertsonian 
literature that any change in the money supply brings a proportionate 
h . . (67) c ange In pr~ces. The arguments relating to the forced saving 
process(68) do not support the conclusion that relative prices, and 
real balances, remain untouched by any monetary change. The only 
reasonable conclusion must be that Robertson is not guilty of the 
charge directed by Patinkin against classics and neo-classics. 
/ 
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PARTIII Theory and Policy - Some Conclusions 
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CHAPTER I 
Economic Policy and the Trade Cycle 
'I may say that by comparison with my own extremely libertarian 
position, Robertson seemed to me nearly as much an interventionist as 
did Keynes. Robertson clearly had a great belief in individualism, 
but So did Keynes. And when it Came to economic intervention, ••••• 
Robertson had a good deal of tolerance for it'. M. Friedman.' I) 
This thesis has concentrated upon Robertsonian macro-economics in 
a closed economy r in particular it has traced the development of, and 
influences upon, the theory of industrial fluctuation. By way of con-
clusion,this and the following chapter examine the policy implications 
which Robertson derived from his theoretical analysis. Again we will 
find, as with theory, a remarkable consistency in his economic policy 
recommendations throughout his lifetime. He stood resolute against 
the 'Treasury view' in his early publications, (2) and against what he 
saw as a Keynesian devaluation of the role of monetary policy during a 
period of demand pressure after 1945. His approach to economic policy 
is 'many-sided'. (3) Monetary and fiscal policy both had roles to play 
in alleviating the problems created by the trade cycle. 
Economic object~~ 
Robcrtson never claimed too much for his policy recommendations. 
He not only doubted that economic objectives could be attained, but 
also that these objectives could themselves be accurately defined. (4) 
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This reflects his view of the capitalist economy. Economic fluctuation 
is an inevitable feature of economic progress where that progress is to 
be founded upon private enterprise, and,in particular,upon the invest-
ment decision remaining largely in·the hands of the private individual. 
All that policy should attempt to do is to get rid of the undesirable 
fluctuation, as Robertson so aptly says: 'to limit the turbulence 
without destroying the vitality'. (5) There is no precise measuring 
rod available to discover when the fluctuation is desirable and undes-
irable. The indivisibility of investment, its longevity, its intrac-
tability, all impose an uneven distribution of investment over time 
and create unavoidable instability. In the interest of economic pro-
gress this may be desirable. What must be avoided are the additional 
stimuli given to fluctuation by the psychological forces of errors of 
optimism and pessimism, the monetary over expansion or contraction 
which may accompany bursts or deficiencies of investment, and the 
gestation period of investment disguising the capital equipment under 
construction and increasing the uncertainty of the business environment. 
The very nature of these forces does not allow an indisputable rule 
for judging where an expansion·or contraction of output, employment or 
prices goes too far and requires remedial action by the government. 
This lack of precise economic targets, hOHever, does not mean 
that the government should be complacent in avoiding inflation, or 
allowing unemployment to spread. There is a justification for govern-
ment interference in the private sector in regulating the cycle. 
Robertson tended to focus attention upon the problem of inflation 
throughout his ,,,riting, but at the same time he did not neglect the 
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• problem of unemployment. This emphasis upon curing inflation was 
founded on the belief that: 'if this (inflation) could be avoided, 
there was good hope that the worst evils of trade depression could 
thereby be averted'. (6) That is,the boom creates its own destruction, 
guard the boom from its eventual excesses and the depression can be 
prevented; undesirable unemployment need never arise. (7) It will be 
apparent however from what has gone before that Robertson did not 
disregard unemployment before or after Keynes' General Theory. His 
theoretical analysis did not assume full employment and he was adamant 
that the government must do something about unemployment and 'all that 
it meanS of suffering and demoralisation'. (8) He was to remark much 
later: 'it is now generally recognised that. this evil of complete 
and prolonged .unemployment consists not only in loss of income but in 
loss of status, and the feeling of being unwanted, - an evil which is 
not removable either by doles or the provision of obviously "made" 
work'. (9) He was somewhat distressed by Keynes' attempts to 'outbid 
the rest of us' (10) as an advocate of government policy to alleviate 
unemployment, and by Lord Beveridge's attempt to ,outbid Keynes as an 
advocate of high and stable employment in 1944; He proudly indicated 
the attention ,;hich he had paid to unemployment in 1915. 
What did worry Robertson was the disposition by economists to 
encourage employment to reach too high a level. He did not, as Samuelson 
, (11) 
clalms, argue that the state need not do too much about unemploy-
ment, although he did suggest reserves of unemployment to cope with 
any unexpected demand in the economy. (12) Robertson warned of the 
inflationary dangers of low unemployment long before the Phillips 
Curve depicted the strong inverse, empirical relation betl;een the rate 
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change of money wage rates and the level of unemployment. In 1957 he 
welcomed the abatement of rising employment,conscious of the pressures 
it was placing upon the stability of the general price level, and 
declared: 'If we want to prevent the continuance or recrudescence of 
inflation we should not try to work our industrial system with such a 
smal.l margin of unempl.oyment of this kind (transitional unemployment) as 
(13) 
we have been doing in recent years' , Similarly, as a member of the 
Cohen Council, he expressed no alarm at the .level of unemployment 
going beyond the 1.8% of January 1958, (14) in the interests of controlling 
inflation caused by excessive monetary demand. 
Policies for regulating the levels of output and employment 
The obvious starting point for building up the Robertsonian cure 
for cyclical unemployment is to consider what is the underlying cause 
of this type of unemployment in Robertsonian theory. Part I of this 
thesis laid the blame for unemployment upon the·dp.ficiency of demand 
for capital goods brought about by over-investment in the boom, and 
a consequent devaluation in the marginal utility of capital goods. 
This deficiency in demand prompted a li"lying off of . labour in these 
industries. In evidence to the Macmillan Committee, Robertson called 
(15) . for 'the temporary gluttability of wants' to be remed~ed by an 
';,levation in the demand for constructional goods', (16) Clearly in his 
early writings it is a deficiency in demand for capital goods which 
needs to be made good; Ilis later found faith in the acceleration 
principle (17) indicates that the deficiency could be put right in 'two 
ways, either by working directly upon the demand for capital goods, 
or' indirectly upon it by changing the demand for consumer goods >lhich 
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in turn would have an accelerator impact upon the demand for capital 
(18) goods. In this section we examine the Robertsonl.an recommendations 
for governmental regulation of the level of demand. 
a) The use of monetary policy 
Three aspects of Robertsonian theory presented in the foregoing 
analysis reveal the degree of effectiveness which Robertson attached 
to monetary policy in depression and over-expansion. Firstly, we have 
witnessed a continual stress upon real factors as the cause of cyclical 
fluctuations and the passive role of monetary factors in the cycle. 
Monetary factors could only exaggerate the amplitude of the cycle, and 
were not responsible for instigating fluctuation. (19) The successful-
ness of monetary policy therefore depended upon the ability of 
monetary factors to interfere with the real forces affecting the 
cycle. In 1922 Robertson had declared that: 'Honey is afterall a 
. (20) fundamentally unimportant subJect' , and even after the more rigorous 
analysis of ~ money is still regarded as a 'subject of secondary 
importance in the sense that neither the most revolutionary nor the 
soundest monetary policy can be expected to provide a remedy for those 
strains and disharmonies \.,hose roots lie deep in the present structure 
. (21) 
of industry and perhaps in the very nature of man h~mself'. 
But this rather pessimistic role for monetary policy is offset by 
two further aspects of Robertsonian theory which demonstrate the 
mechanism by IVhich a monetar>: change can influence the level of 
spending. The first was encountered in relation to the loanable funds 
. (22) theory of ~nterest. Newly created money entered into the supply of 
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loanable funds and brought with it the possibility of an inequality 
between the Robertsonian quasi-natural rate of interest and the actual 
market rate of interest for loanable funds. The gap between the two 
rates had repercussions upon the amount of investment taking place in 
a given period. This indirect transmission mechanism from money to 
investment through the rate of interest is usually described as Keynesian; 
although it did.appear in Robertsonian writings, and elsewhere/before 
the General Theory was published. Secondly/in the last chapter We have 
seen a second, more direct, monetary transmission mechanism in opera-
tion in Robertsonian theory. The Robertsonian statement of the quantity 
theory rendered also a direct relationship between the change in the 
money supply and the amount of spending undertaken in the economy; a 
change in the money supply need not necessarily work only upon the 
price level but also upon output and employment through the level of 
spending. The automatic and induced lacking created by a monetary 
expansion will have repercussions upon both constmlption and investment. 
Automatic lacking diminishes the real consumption of the fixed income 
groups, redistributes income, and therefore affects aggregate spending. 
Similarly induced lacking, and a consequent change in spending, may 
occur as consumers alter their hoards of money in response to expecta.;.. 
tions of further inflation, or to changes in the real value of their 
existing assets. Here \.;e have a more direct link, as in monetarism, 
between changes in the money supply and spending. These then are the 
theoretical clues as to the role of monetary policy. 
If the Robertsonian the~ry of interest is strictly applied, a 
monetary expansion should be able to depress the market rate of 
intcTest below' the qUusi-natural level and so stimulate investment and 
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employment. However, Robertson did not always feel that this was a 
realistic policy for promoting recovery. The market rate of interest 
may not be able to sink low enough to encourage an increase' in invest-
ment. 
(23) , This was the message strongly given in Money, and 1n several 
later writings. (24) This particular view was perhaps determined by 
Robertson's own experience of the, great depression. In his evidence to 
the Macmillan Committee he stated: 'r think that no purely monetary 
policy could have kept industrial activity at the, level of the 1920s'. (25) 
He conflicts with Keynes on this very point who argues that at a very 
low rate of interest there do exist investments which businessmen are 
prepared to undertake. Robertson,on the contrary,argued that,even at 
such low rates of interest, businessmen may not feel confident enough 
(26) to employ loanable funds in the purchase of capital goods. If the 
cheap money poli~J was to be introduced too early in a depression, and 
if businessmen did respond, there waS always the danger U1at the 
saturated investment outlets would be further burdened, and the 
depreSSion intenSified. (27) 
Although monetary policy was regarded as a 'blunt and clumsy 
1 (28) , , d f t d ' , b' weapon In a pcrlo 0 acu e epressl0n, Wllere USlnessmen are 
unwilling to borrow whatever the cost of finance, it may not be so 
impotent in a more moderate state of depression. Robertson remained 
convinced that investment was sensitive to changes in the rate of 
interest. He criticised J.M. Keynes and A. Hansen for wrongly COn-
cluding that the opposite was true, (29) and consequently believing 
that monetary policy woul'd be' ineffective. Similarly, he attacked the 
ne,o':"'Keynesians for heing too pessimistic on the contribution Hhich 
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interest rate policy can make to regulating investment. (30) He 
supported the Radcliffe Report findings that the investment plans of 
larger companies may be insensitive to changes in the interest rate, 
but still maintained that there was a wide margin of transactions which 
could be affected by a movement in interest rates. (31) His final pro-
noun cement on monetary policy to the Canadian Royal Commission on 
Banking and Finance confirmed his earlier views on its effectiveness; 
credit easing could stimulate investment under normal conditions; where 
business confidence was absent it could do very little to increase 
. (32) spend~ng. Nonetary policy was therefore no panacea in times of 
depression, it had a positive contribution to make to recovery, but it 
needed the strong assistance of other policies. (33) 
It may not be possible to make the business. horse drink from the 
money pool if it has no thirst in a depression, but it is possible to 
prevent it quenching its excessive thirst by turning off the money tap 
during the boom. Robertson was a strong advocate of restrictive 
monetary policy during periods of over-expansion and was very critical 
of postwar sceptics of the deflationary powers of higher interest 
rates. This is most forcibly illustrated by his comment upon both the 
early postwar cheap money policy and the findings of the Radcliffe 
Report. (34) He was very critical of the cheap money policy at a time 
when there was heavy demand pressure in the U.K. He attributed such a 
policy to the Keynesian vie,. that monetary policy would have little 
success in . (35) a period of over-expans~on, and called for an increase 
in the interest rate and restrictions on crec1i t expansion (such a 
policy was in fact adopted in 1951-52). lie disagreed with the con-
clusions of the Radcliffe Report, which he saw as being too pessimistic 
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on the potential success of monetarJ policy in an inflationary period. 
True/monetary policy had been ineffective in the 1950s, but this was a 
fault of the type of monetary policy implemented rather than a permanent 
condemnation of all shades of such policy. Robertson doubted that a 
situation of rising prices and profits, as existed in the 1950s, could 
be remedied by moderate changes in bank rate; what was required ~lere 
larger movements in interest rates. (36) In periods of inflation/when 
the .prospects of a high rate of return on investment predominate, 
businessmen are not too put off by a rise in interest rate of 1 or 2%; 
in a period of continued inflation some large firms find themselves 
with large cash reserves and are therefore not dependent upon e:xternal 
finance. Add to this the fact that in the 1950s a large proportion of 
investment was in the hfu,ds of the public sector, and as such waS not 
determined by interest rate considerations, one would not expect a 
moderate change in bank rate to have significant repercussions on gross 
. (37) ~nvestment. 
The role of monetary policy will be encountered again in the dis-
cussion of inflation. (38) l'Ihat can be concluded from this section is 
that Robertson neither completely condemned a monetary policy, nor gave 
it unqualified support. The success of monetary policy depended upon 
the extent of the depression and the mood of businessmen, and the 
severity with which monetary measures were imposed. But it was not a 
policy which could function alone in regulating the cycle; it needed 
the support of, in particular, fiscal policy in an acute depression. 
As a final comment. it is int.erest.ing to observe in the climate of 
current controversies between monetarists and Keynesians that Robertson 
was an ac1voca.tc of ,uj.scn-~t:ioE<l.ry monctury policy; he viewod the 
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economic system as being too complex to warrant any mechanistic kind 
of monetary policy of the type frequently associated with Professor 
M. Friedman. (39) But he was aware of the limitations of such discre-
tionary policy. By the time it had been introduced and its effects 
felt, it may well be too late. (40) The beauty of having a mechanistic 
policy, if it were practicable, was that it could prevent the ravages 
of the cycle, rather than attempt to cure them once they had appeared • 
. Later comment will also demonstrate this theoretical support for 
monetarist policies, combined with an awareness of the impracticability 
of such policies. (41) 
Fiscal policy and unemployment 
One of the most encouraged of Keynesian myths is the belief that 
in 1936 Keynes was the first economist to advocate fiscal measures as 
(42) 
a cure for unemployment. The emphasis which Keynes placed upon 
the importance of effective demand led to his strong recommendation of 
fiscal action; but this thesis has already emphasised the Robertsonian 
disposition to stress the importance of a deficiency of demand in 
bringing about the crisis; it was not unnatural therefore, for 
Robertson also to call for fiscal action as a cure for unemployment-
long before the General Theory appeared. (Although this was not reinforced 
by the recognition of the multiplier process as it was for Keynes) • 
Robertson was one of the first economists to strongly recommend 
public works policies in the U.K. In 1915 he called for increased 
government spending to bring about: 'an artificial elevation of the 
demand for constructional goods' (43) in times of crisis; this would be 
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necessary until private investment recovered. This support for fiscal 
action was not only consistent with his view of the causes of the crisis, 
but a confirmation of his agreement with the minority report of the 
Poor Law Commissioners, which had proposed the tendering of government 
contracts during times of bad trade. By 1926 Robertson was able to 
write of' the: 'once heretical but noW perhaps over-respectable policy 
of "public works'" • (44) Clearly Robertson may have been one of the 
first to propose public works policies before 1936, but he was 
certainly not the only advocate of such policies. 
His most thorough early analysis of .fiscal action came in his 
'd th '11 ' (45) eVl. en ce to e Ma cml. an CommJ. ttee • This demonstrated a number of 
Robertsonian policy beliefs in the pre-1936 period. Firstly, since the 
crisis was invariably caused by a temporary saturation of demand for 
capital goods, the solution available to the government was to temporarily 
raise the level of public investment. Government action therefore was 
to take place on the spending, rather than the taxation/side of its 
budget; there was no suggestion to reduce taxation as a stimulant to 
demand. Secondly, increased government spending. should be concentrated 
on building such things as roads and bridges; but,in particular, there 
was a very emphatic advocacy of a programme of housebuilding from the 
mid-1920s to the early 1930s. (46) Thirdly, it was not necessary to 
, , (47) insist on higher rates of return on investment l.n the publl.c sector. 
Finally, fiscal policy should not be subservient to monetary policy, 
although it should be planned in conjunction with monetary action. 
Economist.s have continuously debiltcd,for the greater part of this 
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century,the relationship existing between possible monetary and fiscal 
measures. Hore recently this debate has focused upon the 'crowding out' 
(48) 
effect. Robertson was always aware that fiscal action would have 
monetary repercussions. However, in ,the 1920s he >!as the foremost 
critic of the 'Treasury vie>!' that government expenditure, by utilising 
savings, would be withdrawing funds from the money market which would 
otherwise have. gone into private investment. This criticism was again 
most obvious in his evidence to the Macmillan Committee. In this he 
argued:::'the doctrine of temporary gluttability which I have tried to 
outline above is in direct conflict, not only with the so-called 
'Treasury view' that such a policy of promoting public works absorbs 
resources which would otherwise anyhow be employed by private enter-
prise, but also with a doctrine which has been maintained, for instance, 
by Mr. lIawtrey, that public works are: "a mere piece of ritual" 
achieving nothing which could not equally be achieved by the banking 
system acting alone, through a sufficiently great alteration in its 
terms of lending'. (49) 
Robertson believed that during a depression savings would not be 
otherwise employed in the private sector and therefore were available 
to be productively engaged by the government to stimulate employment. 
Public works policies had to be organised at times when they did not 
compete \,i th the private sector for resources. In this respect he was 
critical of the housing progrwnme introduced at the end of the first 
world war. It was justifiable on social grounds, but not from an 
. (50) 
economic stability standpo~nt: 
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Part II of this thesis allows us to enquire a little more deeply 
into this question. The 'crowding out' effect can be best illustrated 
by ~tilising the IS/LM framework: (51) 
r l .... ------- _. -- -------- ----
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If the economy is operating in region A, an expansionary fiscal 
policy which shifts the IS curve to the right (ISo to IS1 ) will not 
succeed in raising the level of real output·(yO). If public investment 
has been increased, the rise in the rate of interest (rO to r 1 ) is 
sufficient to dampen private investment to the full extent of e,e 
increased public investment. The Keynesian mechanism operating is as 
follows: increased public investment,in the absence of a monetary 
restraint, will increase output and employment through the multiplier 
process. However, if the money supply is fixed, any additional invest-
ment has to be financed in region A (where the speculative demand is 
zero), by t.he sale of government bonds. This raises the rate of 
interest and dampens the level of private investment. In region B, 
the Keynesian liquidity trap region, there is no monetary restraint on 
fiscal policy and increased public investment can be met by a reduction 
in the speculative demand for money wi thout an increase in the rate of 
interest. In region C we have an intermediate situation in ;lhich there 
is a dampening of the multiplier caused by' the monetary repercussions 
of fiscal policy in the absence of an expansion in the money supply 
(\;hich would shift the LM curve to the right). 
The relevant question here seems to be how far Robertson recog-
nised the monetary repercussions of a ~ change in the economy in 
the 1930s. An objective interpretation on the basis of Part 11 of this 
thesis seems to be that. Robertson was very much aware of the 'crowding 
out' effect. In terms of the loanable funds theory, increased public 
investment would shift the demand curve to the right; the rate of 
in~erest would increase, and the level of total investment would con-
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sequently be lower than it would otherwise be. If the government 
supported its public investment policy with an expansionary monetary 
policy, then the monetary restraint on fiscal policy would be prevented. 
The supply curve for loan able funds would shift to the right as the 
money supply is expanded and the increase in the market rate of interest 
would be avoided. This, in Keynesian analysis, would be tile equivalent 
of a rightward shift in the LM curve. The implications of Robertsonian 
analysis are therefore that the strength of fiscal action depends upon 
the elasticity of the LM curve (or alternatively the elasticity of the 
supply of loanable funds curve), and upon the behaviour of the money 
supply as fiscal policy is implemented. We have already seen 
(52) Robertson's views on the elasticity of the liquidity preference function. 
In addition We have also witnessed the Robertsonian belief that the LM 
curve is prone to instability. 
Indeed in an expansionary situation with the IS curve shifting to 
the right, Robertson would support the argument that the LM curve must 
be moving to the left (if the money supply is fixed). As output expands 
so too will the price level in Robertsonian analysis. Transactionary 
demand will increase for each level of real output, speculative demand 
will decline and a higher rate of interest will be needed to equate the 
demand for/and supply o~money. This would lead to even further 
monetary restraints upon the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal 
policy. This is shown below. Taking the intermediate case, if prices 
are constant (as they are ass~~ed to be in Keynesian analysis) income 
will increase from Y4 to Y5 ~ith an expansionary fiscal policy (185 to 
186), If the. velocity of circulation of money and prices change along 
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with output (as Robertson believed), the LM curve will shift to the 
left as a consequence of expansionary policy, and income in this case 
would contract from Y4 to Y7 under the influence of an increase in the 
rate of interest(r6} It seems to be indisputable therefore that 
Robertson was very familiar with the limitations which may be imposed 
upon the effectiveness of fiscal policy in curing unemployment by the 
monetary repercussions of that policy in the absence of compatible 
monetary measures. 
I After the publication of the General 'l'heory, Robertson saw a 
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dangerous reversal of economic policy away from monetary measures to 
a concentration upon fiscal action. Although he did not believe fiscal 
policy should be subservient to monetary measures/equally he did not 
feel that it should dominate such measures. This may have stemmed 
partly from his view of the monetary limitations of fiscal action, but 
his post-war writings indicate that he chose to emphasise the other 
limitations; the major limitation was to be found in the time lags 
inherent in fiscal policy. Robertson remarked: 'fiscal policy is by 
i.ts nature a somewhat cumb<l>rous and unwieldy one, working with a pro-
nounced lag and difficult to set moving ••••.• more than once or at most 
(53) twice a year' . In his evidence to the Canadian Royal Commission' 
on banking and finance he proposed that there should be scope' for 
changing taxes more frequently to avoid the delayed, and possibly 
(54) 
adverse, effects of tax changes. Robertpon continued to favour 
expenditure changes rather than tax changes in fiscal policy. Tax 
changes he regarded as being unhealthy. They needed to be administered 
with fairness and conSistency. In any case/they were needed to support 
other objectives of policy other than the objective of economic 
stabilisation. Tax changes might bring disincentive effects to work. 
In addition to all this/Robertson saw frailties in politicians; very 
. (55) few were capable of hand11ng tax changes successfully. 
Ilis vieW On taxation and stability changed very little in the post-
war period. Even in his evidence to the Canadian Royal CommissioI!, 
although he suggestGd: 'it ought to be possible to move rates of 
taxation, direct or indirect, upward or downward, according to circum-
(56) 
stances I. lIe proceeded t.O enlarge upon its limitations I and con-
cluded: 'it is well I think, thus to stake out a claim for Public 
417 
Finance as a serious subject in its own right, with a philosophy and 
experience of its own, and incapable of being pushed around, in the 
interests of stability, beyond a certain point \dthout damaging con-
sequences'. (57) 
Wage Flexibility and Full Emplox'IDent 
The Keynesian myth relating to the absence of support for fiscal 
policy in the pre-1936 period has been reinforced by the argument 
that the typical classical economist had great faith in wage manipula-
tion as a cure for unemployment. The demand for labour is seen to vary 
inversely with the marginal product of labour; a fall in the real wage 
paid to labour will increase the volume of labour that it will be profit-
able to employ. Unemployment must therefore be the consequence of too 
high a level of real wages. Such an argument was Bilor-made for 
Keynesian criticism. It failed to explore t.;'e repercussions of vlage 
reduction upon effective demand. A policy designed to lower wages 
would be impotent in its effects upon emplo~,",ent if it did not promote 
an enlargement of effective demand; from the preceding section it is 
apparent that Robertson could not be branded a typical classical econo-
mist/for he was conscious of the need to affect demand if employment 
was to be raised. But hovl did a reduction in real wages effect e:nploy-
ment in Robertsonian analysis? 
It is crucial in Robertsonian literature to distinguish bebleen 
micro-and macro .. economic anal:ysis, and betHeen theory and Dolicy. At 
the micro level Robertson continued throughout his >lritings to base his 
, 
discussion of the labour market upon the marginal productivity theory 
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of wages. In 1930 he defended what he called the 'orthodox' theory of 
wages against its critics; (58) In LEP he upheld the relationship 
between the marginal productivity of labour and the demand for labour 
found in classical literature; (59) But it is incorrect to suggest 
that support for" the marginal productivity doctrine implies that one 
is in favour of a policy of wage reductions to cure unemployment. On 
questions of macro-economic policy Robertson always stressed that the effect 
of wage reductions upon demand was the key to the suitability of wages 
policy. In his evidence to the Macmillan Committee he emphasised that, 
if crises were caused by the saturation of demand,the demand for 
labour would be inelastic; Even if wages fell, employment would not 
improve since there would not be any additional demand for goods and 
services coming forward. He used the depression in the shipbuilding 
industry to illustrate this point; no matter what the level of wages 
might be there would be no recover in the shipbuilding industry as the 
volume of shipping tonnage was already too excessive. In 1931 he was 
less certain on this question. Wage reductions should not always be 
resisted since they need not always be damaging to purchasing power; 
however, there was still an emphasis upon the link between wage level 
" (60) 
changes and effect~ve demand. This emphasis prevailed into LEP 
where Robertson was even less pessimistic as to the damage wage 
reductions may do to the volume of spending. (61) Indeed Robertson puts 
fOr1llard two arguments which may lead to increased effective demand as 
wages fall. The first is to be expected from the earlier discussion 
of induced lacking. A decline in wages which is accompanied by a fall 
in prices will bring an increase in the real value of the existing 
stock of money. People may be induced to spend more in order to restore 
419 
the real value of their money stock to its original level. This 
argument is normally associated with A.C. Pigou, (62) although we have 
witnessed its existence in BPPL. (63) Secondly, if a lag exists between 
wage reductions and any subsequent movement in prices or sales volume, 
businessmen may be encouraged to invest by an increase in the marginal 
efficiency of investment. In such a situation a wages policy may be 
more fruitful in promoting investment than would be a policy of cheap 
money. (64) 
Although in the end Robertson grew less averse to the theoretical 
case for wage reductions, he did not regard such a policy as a practic-
able possibility. (65) What was more significant as an answer to 
Keynesian criticism was the disposition of Robertson,even before 
1936,to judge wages policy in terms of its repercussions upon effective 
demand. Certainly not the disposition attributed to a classical 
economist by Keynesians! 
Investment planning 
It would be remiss to leave this chapter without a brief indica-
tion of the Robertsonian view of economic planning. Again we can look 
for clues to the earlier theoretical sections of ~~is thesis. The 
extremes of the cycle are to be seen in the wide fluctuations in 
output present in the capital good industries. Over-investment is 
the cause of the crisis, and this is primarily the result of uncertainty 
in the business environment. (66) But this did not lead Robertson to 
propose a totally planned economy, or indeed a total state respon-
sibility for investment. He was brought up within Cambridge to think 
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in terms of 'tinkering at the systems of private property and economic 
freedom', (67) not in terms of replacing the market by state control. 
But he did see the need for some form of indicative planning even 
in 1915. One must hasten to add that the purpose of such planning was 
not that associated with post-war attempts of planning in Britain and 
France. Its aim was not to foster higher '.rates of economic:growj;h; on 
the contrary,Robertson believed that it may. involve the sacrifice of 
higher growth rates on the 'alter of stability', (68) an approach which 
he favoured even in the 1960s. (69) Investment planning was a means to 
reducing the vast swings in the level of unemployment through the trade 
cycle; in other words an attempt to lower the average level of 
unemployment over the cycle. 
The form which investment planning might take is described in the 
following manner in the Study: 'the excesses of investment during the 
boom are admittedly due in no small measure to the prevelance of com-
petition and the ignorance on the part of each individual producer of 
the scale of the preparations which have been and are being made by 
his competitors. Combination, by pooling information and prospective 
markets and so facilitating a common investment policy, may be 
expected mat.erially to reduce the temptations to over-investment. 
Even, however, without actual combination, a somewhat saner and 
more centralised investment policy might perhaps be secured by a 
greater publicity and diffusion of information. It may be suggested 
that a detailed report of new contracts for structural work or machinery 
i~.any trade should be compulsorily submitted to the Board of Trade, 
i 
421 
who should be obliged to prepare in the Labour Gazette or elsewhere a 
. (70) 
monthly analysis of such reports'. Planning in this context, 
therefore, is no more than an attempt to educate businessmen as to 
~hat is hap~ening in their own and other industries; it is the pro-
vision of information on which a sounder investment decision can be 
undertaken. 
As a member of the Cohen Council, Robertson was against the 
return of physical controls upon investment in the late 1950s. He 
saw no reason for controlling essential investment. The insurmountable 
problem as far as Robertson was concerned was the inability to deter-
mine any sane criterion for deciding where investment was either 
essential or not. He could not, therefore, recommend selective con-
trols upon investment. (71) 
There ,<ere dangers present in any attempt to harmonise the 
investment plans of the private and public sectors. The gain may be 
greater stability in investment levels, but at the expense of more 
collusion between producers which may end 'in some conspiracy against 
. (72) 
the public or some contrivance to raise prices'. Thus Robertson 
was anxious that Mr. Lloyd should not take indicative planning too 
far in the early 196$s. 
Robertsonian policy aimed at both prevention and cure in relation 
to unemployment. The recommendation of investment planning was 
primarily concerned with preyenting the volatility of the capital good 
industries and consequently preventing the variability of employment 
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in tllese industries. Doubts on tile effectiveness of a cheap money 
policy in stimulating investment and the recovery of employment led 
Robertson to suggest that the artificial elevation of demand, tilrough 
fiscal policy, may be more successful. Cheap money may not sufficiently 
encourage businessmen to become more optimistic with regard to the 
returns available on investment projects; public investment programmes 
did not contain tile same element of chance in the stimulus provided to 
increase employment. Monetary and fiscal policies should tilerefore be 
combined in seeking the movement out of depression, but the senior 
partner must be fiscal activity in severe depressions. 
,/ 
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CHAPTER 2 
Robertson and the Price Level 
Finally attention is turned to the problem of inflation and in 
particular to two questions. The starting point must be to enquire as 
to what Robertson believed to be the justifiable behaviour of the price 
level. Having established this we need to consider the policy proposals 
which seek to accomplish this justifiable behaviour; this will involve 
a brief consideration of the cause of the price movements to be found 
in Robertsonian literature. 
How should prices behave? 
It would be convenient, if simplistic;, to argue that Robertson 
favoured price stability over the trade cycle. Although, as a compromise, 
Robertson did support a policy of price stabilisation, he did envisage 
occasions on which prices should vary either upwards or downwards. In 
1928 he wrote: 'the ideal banking policy might be one which was 
founded on the principle of price stabilisation as a norm, but which 
was ready to see the fruits of a prolonged and general increase in 
individual productivity shared in the form of lower prices, and perhaps 
to acquiesce in moderate price rises in order that advantage might be 
taken of discontinuous leaps in industrial technique'. (1) This view 
prevailed into the 1950s, although as a member of the Cohen Council, 
he did stress the importance of finding some means by which increased 
economic activity could benefit the cormnunity without prices having to 
ri~e. (2) 
428 
Again we can g.o back t.o Part I1 .of this tllesis t.o find the reas.on 
why prices might justifiably be a11.owed to rise in a peried .of recevery. (3) 
The majer cause .of the upturn is the app1icatien .of inventien te indus-
try. This can .only ceme abeut if the supply .of lacking is sufficient 
to finance the additional demand for capital which the invention creates. 
The f.orced saving thesis argues that in .order t.o supplement the ve1un-
tary saving taking place, banks must expand their credit creatien te 
accemm.odate the desirable enlargement in the demand fer capital. 'l'he 
censequence is a price rise which imp.oses autematic lacking upen the 
fixed inceme greups in the ecen.omy, as well as enc.ouraging induced lack-
ing. The price rise is essential if the invention is to be fully, and 
c.orrect1y, expl.oited in the interests .of aggregate ec.on.omic welfare. (4) 
But the price rise is ori1y.'of a temp.orary nature and will eventually 
be reversed when .output expands as a result .of the insta1lati.on .of 
additi.onal capital equipment; at which time the increased pr.oductivity 
generated by the additi.ona1 investment can be shared by all in reduced 
prices. 
Putting forward this view in the 1920s R.obertson f.ound himself 
arguing against the .o".th.od.oxy .of the time, and against Keynes. (5) In 
BPPL he stressed: 'it seems unreasonable te expect the banking system 
b.oth t.o ensure that appr.opriate additiens are made te the quantity .of 
Circulating Capital and te preserve absolute stability in ··.the price 
level' . (6). In cel'lIllents te Keynes he indicated that prierity sh.ou1d be 
given te previding the right quantity .of circulating capital - at the 
expense .of price stability. (?) His review .of Repke' s w.ork led him t.o 
d.oubt that effective expansien c.ould be carried thr.ough ~lith.out price 
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rises even where excess capacity existed. (8) Even in LEP he ,remained 
faithful to some extent to this advocacy of price rises during recovery, (9) 
- if major inventions were to be usefully exploited. But he concluded, 
'I would now hold that the pursuit of monetary equilibrium to be a 
sufficiently ambitious, and the wiser path. (10) 
He was very much aware of the disadvantages which inflation could 
inflict upon the community. As early as 1921 he emphasised the detri-
mental effect of inflation upon fixed income groups in the economy, 
and the advantage which inflation gave to debtors over creditors. He 
"ro"te of the damaging repercussions of inflation upon the Balance of 
Payments, and recognised the problem "hich it might create for state 
. (11) f~nance. As a consequence, in general, he advocated price stability, 
with price variations only justifiable in certain circumstances. As 
an author of the Cohen Report he >Tent a good deal further than in the 
19205 towards recommending price stability. (12) Forced saving, and 
the price movements which it creates, was taken to be no longer advan-
tageous in promoting economic expansion. (13) A rise in the price level 
should only be permitted as a consequence of increases in imported 
raw material prices, increased 'rates of indirect taxation, or in order 
to remedy price distortions. (14) 
The advocacy of price stability is complicated somewhat if the 
level of productivity is assuned to vary. Ideally Robertson believed 
that the price level of final goods should be allowed to fall with the 
'progress of technical effi~iency' • (15) The benefits of progress 
should be found in lower commodity prices, (16) and not in increased 
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money wages, nor in higher profit margins if money wages and prices 
re~ain constant as productivity increases. (17) Price stability ought 
to be achieved in relation to the prices of productive services, not 
in relation to final prices. The justification for th:i:s approach was 
to be found in the view that everyone should be able to share in the 
gains of increased productivity, not exclusively those workers who are 
employed in the higher productivity industries. (18) All can gain from 
lower final prices, no-one can gain directly from extra income in some-
one else's pocket. The advantage of allowing prices to fall rather 
than raising money wages is not only to be found in relation to 
avoiding the redistributive effects on income of wage rises for specific 
workers; it is also to be found in preventing the spread of wage 
increases on grounds of comparability of wages to industries where 
productivity is not increasing~19) By the end of the 1950s Robertson 
recognised the practical limitations of introducing a policy based on 
falling prices in the wake of increased productivity. At the end of 
the day the best one could hope for, - the ultimate compromise - was 
to keep prices steady as productivity rose; that is to keep wage 
increases in line with productivity changes. (20) 
HOI' to control inflation 
Policy recommendations for controlling inflation must depend upon 
the cause of the continual upward movement of prices. Two previous 
sections of this thesis indicate where Robertson put the blame for a 
falling vallUe of money. Firstly, the price rises which created forced 
saving originated from the willingness of the commercial banks to utilise 
excess liquidity in satisfying the additional demands for finance 
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caused by the improved productivity of investment. (21) Secondly, 
Robertson's faith in the Cambridge Equation (22) led him to emphasise 
the connection between the volume of money and the price level. 
Therefore it was not surprising that when writing of inflation he 
should lay the blame upon the monetary flabbiness of an economy. (23) 
However, an excess of money was not the initial cause of the disturbance 
in prices in Robertsonian theory. Inflation had two origins. One was 
to be found in the forces inherent in the trade cycle, in particular 
the real forces of invention and innovation. The other was present in 
the autono~ous increase in money wage rates which would have repercussions 
. (24) 
'lpon pr~ces. But whatever the initial cause Robertson believed that 
prices could not continue to rise without the support of an increasing 
(25) flow of money. 
This was most evident in Robertson's policy statements in the 
1950s. He saw great danger in the policy of maintaining a high monetary 
demand in order to keep unemployment at a minioal level. Inflation was 
caused in the 1950s by thecexcessiv€ :demand for.':goods and, .. services~ hpt by 
cost-push'elements independent of the state of demand. Trade unions 
were restricted in their ability to force up wage rates by the state 
of monetary demand; Robertson argued: 'while under a capitalist system 
wage claims will always be forthcoming, ••••• the scale on which they 
are pitched, and the force vlith which they are pressed, depends largely 
on the resistance which they expect to meet and which they do meet, 
and this again on the general state of monetary demand it is the 
business, and which it is ultimately within ,the power of monetar~l policy 
, (26) to control . Not only was a policy of n'straint on monetary demand 
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recommended, but this was to be imposed even if it involved a sacrifice 
in terms of unemployment, Robertson argued that Keynesian policies 
for full employment in the 1950s had fostered the inflationary process. 
The cure for one problem had been accomplished at the expense of intro-
ducing a further problem. This philosophy even penetrated the Cohen 
Report, and it was to receive much critical comment for sanctioning 
increased unemployment in the interests of higher stability. (27) 
Robertson remained firm on this belief and argued: 'extra unemployment, 
though an evil, would be a lesser evil than allowing the slide of the 
. . . d of' • l' (28) currency to contl.nue l.n e l.nl.te y • 
But did a control of monetary demand guarantee the 
prevention of the iilf.lationary process? Robertson believed not. The 
Cambridge Equation demonstrates that inflation can be associated not 
simply with a change in the money supply, but also with a change in 
the desire to hold money (a change in ~)... Although monetary policy 
could effectively be used to control the money supply, it could not 
directly effect the value of K. Changes in K can either offset monetary 
policy or reinforce it. Hence: 'the incalculable K of the public 
hangs like the sword of Damocles over the head of many amiable and 
ambitious schemes'. (29). The Cohen Report again emphasised this point: 
'Even if the quantity of money is not increased, the stream of monetary 
demand can be fed', by a change in V or K. It recognised that V had 
in fact been changing since 1945 and had been adding to the pressure 
upon the price level. 
In evidence to the Canadian COJP.lllission, Robertson upheld the 
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belief in monetary policy, but he stressed that monetary management 
should not be hesitant or indecisive. He praised the monetary control 
imposed in the U.K. in 1958 which dampened the inflationary pressure, 
but was critical of the premature relaxation of control in 1959 and 
1960 which allowed inflation to accelerate again and brought the -
introduction of an incomes policy. (30) He stressed the limitations of 
monetary policy, doubting that increased rates of interest dampened 
spending; he also suggested that large companies did not borrow to 
finance their spending but used either retained profits, or extracted 
dredit from their weak customers and suppliers. A monetary restric-
. d.on might therefore be counteracted by what would show itself in an 
increase in the velocity of circulation of money. We have seen 
before that there are a number of forces operating in Robertsonian 
theory which can alter K. It is not necessary to examine these again, 
but allow me to emphasise the expectations effect of an initial rise 
in prices which reduces K. This has its popularity today in the 
monetarist approach to inflation, but don't let us forget that it 
appeared in BPPL in 1926, .largely as a result of Keynes' counsel. 
In conclusion, therefore, it remained the disposition of 
Robertson to argue throughout the post-war period of inflation that: 
'control over the quantity of money is a necessary condition, even 
though not by itself a sufficient condition, for controlling the 
supply of loanable funds and hence the stream of total demand'. (31) 
/ , 
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Alternative approaches - fiscal and incomes policies 
Although fiscal policy had advantages over monetary policy as a 
cure for economic depression, it had not the same merits from 
Robertson's point of view as a means of stabilising prices. Fiscal 
policy was a vehicle of demand management, and as such it was relevant 
to controlling prices, but it was only of secondary importance to 
monetary policy. The disadvantage of taxation or government expenditure 
changes was that they represented cures for an already existing 
inflation; how much better it would be to prevent inflation occurring 
in the first place by regulating the money supply. Robertson remarked: 
'I do not of course dispute that such taxes may be an indispensable 
means of mopping up spilt milk; but I do suggest that they are very 
much in the nature of a pis aller, and by no meanS a perfect substitute 
for measures designed to prevent the spilling of the milk in the first 
instance'. (32) It was much wiser to adopt a monetary policy which 
would avoid price rises accruing through increased taxation which 
could in turn be used by trade unions as an excuse for raising their 
. (33) 
members' remunerat~on. Automatic taxation stabilisers might take 
some of the sting out of inflation, but they cculd not be sufficient 
to yield price stability. Discretionary tax changes designed to regu-
late demand and prices would also interfere with the other economic 
objectives to be achieved through taxation. (34) 
Robertson was even less enthusiastic in relation to incomes 
policy. At best such a policy could be a supplement to, but not a 
substitute for, monetary and fiscal policies. The drive could be taken 
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out of inflation by restricting monetary demand, this would be sufficient 
to make trade union demands for higher wages less optimistic, and 
diminish the need for an incomes policy. Robertson warned of the 
dangers of certain types of incomes policies. If wage rises were to 
be allowed to match increases in productivity, he believed the net 
effect may be inflationary; because 'some industries are inherently 
. (35) 
more susceptible to technological progress than others' , wage 
increases in these industries will exceed the average national rate of 
growth of labour productivity. An incomes policy which permits wage 
and productivity rises to be equated, and also allows wages to be 
raised on the basis of comparability, was bound to encounter difficult.ies. 
Effective demand would not only be raised by the increase of wages in 
some industries, but also the inflationary pressure would be heightened 
by attempts by other industries to emulate wage rises in the high prod-
uctivity growth industries in order to preserve 'existing relatives 
in the rel'/ard for effort'. (36) Robertson was equally CJ:i;;ical of 
inco!Iles policy which laid down a wage rise 'norm'. He believed that 
such a 'norm' rather than being fln average percentage rise, soon would 
come to be regarded as the minimum obtainable rise by trade unions. 
No-one familiar with incomes policy in the United Kingdom in the 1960s 
would now doubt the wisdom of Robertson's criticism. 
This opposition to incomes policy was not founded on the belief 
that such a policy could not cure inflation. Robertson recognised 
possible deficiencies which might be present in an incomes policy, but 
these could be remedied. It· is true that Robertson preferrc.ed prevent-
ing inflation to curing it - and monetary policy offered the best means 
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of doing this; but mote important, the underlying reason for Robertson's 
critical response to incomes policy is that he believed it interfered 
too much with the working of the free enterprise economy. Relative 
wages between industries should be the determining force in the dis-
tribution of labour. An incomes policy which altered the structure of 
relative wages stood the danger of damaging'the efficient utilisation 
of the labour force. Hence an incomes policy which could be enforced 
in the public sector and not in the private sector may curtail the 
supply of labour in the public sector, and promote an imbalanced 
economy. Similarly if wage differentials were not maintained on the 
basis of differences in profitability and productivity between indus-
tries, labour may not be redistributed in the most efficient manner. 
Short and long-term growth of the economy may suffer. Not Hurprisingly, 
Robertson was also critical of a profit.s policy which aimed at 
a uniform rate of profit over all industries. Again this would damage 
the efficient use of resources between industries. 
Some conclusions 
Again in this chapter we have seen that the Robertsonian approach 
to the solution of particular macro-economic problems, in this case 
inflation, is determined by the theoretical structure outlined in Parts 
I and II of this thesis. In the 1920s he did not categorically 
support price stability. In the interests of economic progress, if 
invention was to be fully exploited, pric8s may need to rise. Price 
variations of this kind should not be resisted. In the post-1945 
period he put rriore weight on the achievement of price stability as a 
compromise economic objective given that prices would be reluctant to 
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fall as productivity rose. The only realistic means of maintaining 
price stability was to be found in monetary policy; but even strict 
control on the money supply and the rate of interest could not guarantee 
a tight control of monetary demand. Monetary demand could still 
escape and ravage the price level if people accelerated the rate at 
which they got rid of money. 
/ 
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APPENDIX 1 
The Work of M. Labordere 
The "ork of M. Labordere is a much neglected contribution to trade 
cycle theory. It is evident that the article reproduced below had a 
very great influence upon Robertson "hen he wrote the 1915 Study. 
The strength of this influence can be judged by the fact that he 
reprinted the article as an appendix to the 1948 edition of A Study of 
Industrial Fluctuation. In correspondence also, notably to Mr. Comby, (1) 
re talked of his great admiration for thi.s particular article. 
As an introduction to the article Robertson "rote: 'The author 
of this article died in ripe old age in 1946. I o"e my acquaintance 
"ith his article, and later with himself, to Keynes, whom he used to 
visit from time to time in London. I am no't in a position to give 
much information about his life; but I kno" that he lived in Paris, 
and that he olmed some small farms in the Jura, "hose rent was fixed 
on the basis of an index-number, heavily weighted "ith the price of 
Gruyere cheese, which he spent much labour in devising. Besides this 
article, he wrote some pamphlets about stock exchange speculation (one 
entitled 'The Confession of the Slow-going Investor') , and a long 
series of bulletins (in their later years called 'Gleanings') about 
the international movements of gold. By the time I kneVl him he was a 
very strange but very likeable old man, rather deaf and with a long 
white beard, I,mch absorbed in a religion strangely compounded of 
Buddhism and Islam, and with peculiar political views \oihich debarred 
him from accepting food or drink at my hands (though not from arnicClble 
conversation) on a visit to Cambridge during the currency of 'sanctions' 
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in 1935-6. 
He always disclaimed any particular originality for this article; 
but he did not appear to have any acquaintance with the works of those 
economists whose approach has most affinity with his own, though he 
was quite interested to be told about them'. 
In writing this he admitted that its light style did not hide 
~Ir. Labord'ere' s eccentricities - but that beneath this playful treat-
ment readers would be able to appreciate his reqard and affection 
for him. It is apparent that Labordere was not familiar with the 
existing trade cycle theory when writing about the 1907 crisis - thus 
his shorta';)e of saving theory of the cycle was evolved independently 
from that of Spiethoff, in particular, which it closely resembled. It 
is also apparent that, under the influence of Robertson's later writings, 
and having sampled trade cycle literature at Robertson's suggestion, 
his position changed substantially by 1935 - such that he came more to 
accept Robertson' s theory of fluctuation and placed less emphasis on 
the lack of real saving to support investment during the expansion 
phase of the cycle as the cause of the downturn. This is demonstrated 
by a second, unpublished paper written by Labordere, dated August 30th 
1935, reproduced below. 
Labordbre's correspondence with Robertson is more than matched 
in volume by correspondence with J .K. Keynes. Correspondence with 
Keyncs howcv"Cr is much less interesting, and mainly relates to either 
arrangements for meetings in London, to the publication of an article 
, " (2) 
by Labordere in the Economic Journal, or more import.antly to 
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monetary statistics. (3) There is nothing in this correspondence to 
indicate that Keynes was influenced by Labord~re, certainly not to the 
extent to which Robertson was influenced. 
Labord~re' s view of trade cycle thoery is amusingly summarised in 
the following observation which he made in a letter to Robertson: 
'People all over the world who are looking for theories on commercial 
crises are very much akin to people looking for theories of drUrikeness, 
indigestion, hallucination, intoxication. The prioe of past excesses 
is always to be apid for some day whether excesses have been indulged 
in by an individual or a community'. ( 4 ) 
On the P~erican Crisis of 1907* 
or 
Real Capital and Apparent Capital 
The superficial observers, the public, only saw favourable signs 
on the horizon. Ina few months, new stocks and shares were subscribed 
to the value of four to five thousand million francs in the Uhited 
States. Then, suddenly, the New York stock exchange experienced a 
terrifying fall in March 1907, which recurred in August and continued 
further. In the united States, the banks have a lot of stocks and 
shares, of advances on securities in their portfolio; they thus were 
bound to be affected: however, nothing appeared on the surface. 
*This study appeared excep-t for some variations, in the Re\l"Ue de Paris 
,of the 1st February 1908. I am grateful to the SSRC for finance which 
" enabled me to have this artic le trans.La ted. 
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TOlmrds the middle of October, unfavourable rumours were circulating 
concerning a New York bank, called 'Knickerbocker Trust" which had 300 
million francs deposited there by 21,000 depositors. The depositors 
hastened to withdraw their deposits; on 22nd October the pay desks of, 
the bank closed dO\~n; they were bankrupt. 
It was established that the directors had used a part of the bank's 
capital in distasteful personal affairs. 
At the same time, unfavourable reports were circulating around 
another New York bank, the "Trust Company of America" with more than 
200 million francs deposited,'and the depositors came running. The 
bank was saved by a syndicate of New York bankers, eager to save it in 
the general interest of business, that is to say in their interest, 
and to acquire some of the securities at a low price. 
The bank did, in fact, sell some of its securities outright to 
this syndicate, took the money in cash and was able to cope with 
withdrawals. It kept its cash desks open, or rather half open, as 
it only let the cash flow out extremely slowly. But in the end it 
did payout. 
The directors were guilty of having immobilized in fixed assets 
the greatest part of the assets of tho bank, albeit in respectable 
undertakings. 
Then, from one, end of the United States to the oth8r, the public 
realised that the banks had immobilised their capital, more often 
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through excessive optimism plain and simple, but sometimes through 
over-optimism, which - on the part of the directors - was not unbiassed. 
Then, from one end of the united States to the other, everyone had 
in mind the great moral crusade carried out by Mr. Roosevelt, denouncing 
the corruption of financiers, too frequently hand in glove with the 
bankers. 
One saw at this time how, in one country, the exclusive cult of the 
dollar destroyed the dollar. The high degree of moral uprightness 
,Which is always accompanied by some contempt for the dollar, is the 
basis of credit, the theoretical amount of dollars of credit exceeding 
the actual dollars, in gold or silver. For a country, taken as a whole, 
the high degree of moral honesty has a hard value in gold dollars. 
Never was this truth more clearly demonstrated. 
The moral crisis inevitably led sooner or later to a credit crisis. 
The American crisis is first of all a moral crisis, which was 
transformed into a crisis of credit, which became a financial crisis, 
its visible, tangible form: this now begins, and will increasingly 
do so in the future, to lead to commercial crisis and industrial 
crisis. 
Hence, up and down the United States, private individuals turned 
up at the banks to withjral'l whatever they had deposited there; they 
withdrew a relatively small portion but which appears 
, 
; 
no precise 
,figure is known - to havc-~ exceeded a thousand milli.on francs. 
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The cash drawn out was not redeposited in any other bank. In 
actual fact, from one end of the United States to the other, all the 
banks suspended their payments in cash, that is to say, they stopped 
pa~ing out. They did not stop completely, they paid out a small 
amount as a matter of principle, but limited the amount withdrawn by 
each customer to what they judged to be strictly necessary. If the 
law had been applied to the letter, all the banks would have been 
adjudged bankrupt. There was a tacit moratorium. Very few banks 
went bankrupt. Only those where the abuses had been too gross, 
legally answerable, or those whose assets had suffered too obviously, 
went bankrupt. 
Cash as against the cheque or bank credit was at a premium, which 
fluctuated between 1 and 5 per cent. In some respects, the economic 
life of the country was as if suspended. ~~e cause of the harm, the 
immobilization of some of the assets of the banks, had an effect "hich 
acted on the cause in its turn: with some of the assets immobilized, 
almost all of the assets became frozen on account of the interruption 
of business. The 1st January, 1908 ~arked the return of payment in 
specie: the premium on current coin had disappeared. But it was not 
finished for all that. 
~'he dramatic side of the crisis is macabre. The New York Herald 
of 4th December told us that in one single week 69 more people died of 
heart attacks in New York than during the corresponding week in 1906: 
doctors blamed the crisis for these additional deaths. One can see how 
many extra people would have died over the country as a whole. These 
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people did not wish to die. But many others wanted to die. Suicides 
multiplied. 
In the United States, everying is done on credit; you can 
imagine what a bank crisis can be like. 
During a period of almost uninterrupted prosperity, since the 
election of MacKinley in November 1896, bank deposits (we include the 
savings banks under this heading) had progressed, soaring upwards in 
the last few years by 5 thousand million francs a year, tmtil a figure 
of around 60 thousand million francs was reached. Of these 60 thousand 
million, 25 thousand million in round figures were payable at maturity 
or with notice, and 35 thousand million at sight.* The number of banks 
was more than 10,000. 
The size of the deposits in the banks is explained up to a certain 
extent by the l1ealth of the United States; in 1906, goods imported 
amount:ed to 6,603 million francs and exports to 8,991 million francs; 
the agricultural production in one year was 35 thousand million francs; 
the industrial and mining production 90 thousand million francs. t 
We will not deal l1ith the history of the American crisis today; 
l1e will simply see in the American crisis a favourable opportunity for 
*The exact proportion of on sight deposits ~lith regard to all of the 
deposits in the USA is nOI1 knmm. 
tWe reproduce thi.s fi.gure of 90 thousand million francs, taken from an 
interviel1 with Hr. Fo;ller appearing in the New York Herald, l1ith 
reservations. Hr. FCI11er is the president of the Parliamentary 
Connnittee for banks in the Ilouse of RcpreRen-tativ2s. This figure of 
90 t:hcusand million j_s probably fanciful, 0I11.ng to the difficulty in 
,'drawing up even approximate statistics in such a corrtplicated matter. 
, 
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philosophizing •. 
In what follo~lS, we will endeavour, by analysing the concept of 
cris1s, to open up horizono, not to economists and financiers, who under-
stand these phenomena a hundred times more clearly than "e do, but to 
the public, to the simple laymen that Vie are, "ho are desirous of 
acquiring kno"ledge. 
We will begin I<ith two allegories: the 'country gentleman' and 
the 'city I<ithout money': and we will depict what could be a crisis 
in a social state so primitive that money I<ould not exist there. 
(I) 
Once upon a time, a long, long, "hile ago, there was a country 
gentleman, who lived off his lands. It was so long ago that the use 
of money was still unknown. 
He lived very peacefully. All his lands belonged to him. The 
people ,,'ha lived on them were his serfs; however I he condescended to 
pay them for a day's "ork. The products of the soil "ere varied in 
nature. The "omen spun. Even the ,,,eavinq of clothes took place in 
the outbuildinqs of the castle. When the years ~lere qood, there 
could be such a larqe abundance of taxes in kind that a wide-ranqinq 
use of the unconsumed part of the revenue in kind was then contemplated. 
This part of the revenue in kind did, in fact, consti.tute spare capital 
in kind. Hence, workers from the neighbouring villages or pa"sing 
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adventurers were hired and paid with the spare capital in kind, which 
they partly consumed'on the spot, and took away ,the rest, either to 
consume themselves elsewhere or to exchange for other products. 
Meanwhile, the work of these workmen had served to transform this spare 
capital in kind into permanent capital in kind: sometimes it would be 
a dry meado>1 irrigated, waste land cleared of stones, sometimes marsh-
land drained, or a pool dug for storing fish. 
These varied tasks belong to different categories: the field care-
fully cleared of stones could be covered with ears of corn the follOl;ing 
year: nothing prevents the meadow, where numerous little channels wer0 
dug during the summer months, from providing extra food for the herds as 
from SepteffiLer: but the vine planted will not give fruit until four 
years time; a planation of trees will not be ready for felling until 
20 years later or more. There are hence many types of permanent capital 
in kind, not one of which will bring into the barn or in the cellar of our 
country gentleman the net returns in kind at the same time as another. 
These capital investments have thus a more cr less differing yield 
according to their category. 
These capital investments can, moreover, be successful or unsuccess-
ful: all plantations do not grow: vines are terribly delicate: an 
irrigation dam can be carried away. Our gentleman will be satisfied 
wi th having improved his estate though less than he had hoped. However, 
we are goingtQ see how this gentleman, before money, before credit, 
in the era of th~ most elementary and restricted barter I antidcluvian 
fossil by definition, can have his crisis, just like a larg8 contemporary 
country has just hail. 
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In the Spring he was in a ~ery good mood; he had a lot of corn, 
oats, nuts, wine, cheese, fruit left from previous harvests. He said 
to himself, rubbing his hands: 'How am I ever going to get through all 
that, as really none of these things keeps indefinitely?' Furthermore, 
once again the heavens favoured him and the harvests looked good. So, 
that year, he began making temporary investments in kind, expiring in a 
few months. Here is what thes~ investments consisted of: for some of 
the annual crops requiring little labour, he substituted crops requiring 
a lot more, such as vegetables; in the same spirit, he had the dry 
meadows ploughed and sowed barley tllcre; he did not omit to have a dress-
ing given to his vines hoping to increase the fruit. This varied work 
"as· paid for in kind out of the surplus from previous harvests. 
The inhabitants of the place, handsomely paid for the additional 
.~rk, were not loth to undertake the work. They were inspired to work 
more quickly, and to work a greater number of hours; the women and 
children, who had kept out of the "ay of hard work during the previous 
years, joined in now. Then passing adventurers, foreigners chased from 
their country by famine and tramping the world's highroads, did not 
hesitate to offer their services to our gentleman, who gave them a 
favourable welcome. 
It is then that our gentleman, gathering confidence and thinking 
that thc supplies accumulated during the previous seasons were inexhaustible, 
undertook the draining of a marsh, the plantation of a wood and that of 
a vineyard, and the clearing pf stony wasteland almost at the same 
moment; finally he took it into his head to build a new village so as 
to accommodate new families of workers on his estates. 
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In the presence of such a transformation of spare capital in kind 
into permanent capital in kind, our gentleman, who saw himself already 
becomi.ng very rich - in kind - did not feel any joy. Nothing but the 
sight of his workers intoxicated him. From now on, he thought a lot of 
himself, employed in his own service more people, increased his farm--
yard and his game, sowed flowers in matchless flower beds, finally, he 
began building a new residence for himself. It was the climax. He no 
longer even had the excuse in his excessive undertakings of converting 
spare. capital in kind into permanent capita_I in kind, he was in truth 
, consuming it, it was as if he had become a gigantic Gargantua, "ho would 
eat indefinitely his corn from his own barn, drink the wine from hio O'.>m 
cellar. 
NOW, what became of him? 
Towards the end of summer, he noticed that his supplies, his reserves 
of corn, wine and all the products, the abundance of which were his pride 
and joy, or in other words, that his spare capital in kind, was running 
out. Hhat was he to do? Should he stop the construction of a dam half 
completc?d and risk the spring floods destroying work that, too weak yet 
by itself, would not fail to give way under the strain? Hith the "inter 
snow what would become of the houses without roofs intended for the neW 
inhabitants of his lands? A thing half finished dies and carries away 
with it all traces of the human labour that it represents. 
It \-las tcrI.'ible.. Our gentleman ruthlessly s~crificed some schemes; 
he cut his lossen. Elsewhere, he was D.ble ·to finish after a fashion. 
/ 
Here, we are only speaking of the use ful work, intended for the more 
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complete development of his lands. For, as concerns the unnecessary, 
. there was no questcion about it. One by one, he sent at<ay ~11 the people 
in his personal service, his lawns were neglected, grass invaded U,e 
flower beds; his new residence, the plans for which he had designed 
himself with so much love, stayed at the foundations stage. 
Immediately, at the first warning, he had withdrawn the ~urkers 
from there without the slightest hesitation. There was no" no question 
of glamour, vanity, comfort! 
However, the workers still had to be fed. He had come to fear that 
there was not enough corn left in his barns, wine in his cellars, bacon 
in his larders to pay the work at present in progress and strictly 
necessary for the next season, so he had to sacrifice a lot of sheep 
and cattle, as meat was needed. He was very sorry to see his herds so 
depleted and wondered if, the following year, he would not have to let 
his lands lie fallow, for want of oxen for ploughing. 
So that it how his grand, his laudable, enthusiasm of the past 
spring ended, but his mania for projects and his intoxication with 
action left him, "ith a delightful memory. All his thoughts, all his 
being had lived in the future at that time, as if transported on the 
wings of a fairy. lie had forgotten the present, the land, reality. 
How had that been possible? lIis parents, in his childhood, had often 
spoken of crises to him, as a thing to be constantly feared. But he 
had believed that humanity, ~rom generation to generation, became wiser 
and that he himself represented this wiser humanity_ CY'ises, they were 
for the old people; they had seen t.hem ..••. like the flood. But. since 
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then the world had progressed a.nd changed, all the circumstances were 
different and he was different to his ancestors. As if the world and 
men ever changed! He acknowledged it now and indulged in serious 
reflections on his conduct, not without some humility. 
Winter passed by. When, in the spring, the work in the fields 
began again, he noticed that his workers, spoilt by him the previous 
year, when he paid no attention to anything and had contempt for thrift 
as all people do when they have some intense passion in their heads 
had retained the habits picked up and remained very demanding, 
. insatiable. He did not expect this disappointment and had to sacrifice 
more than one head of cattle whether he liked it or not, to provide an 
increase in salaries in kind. 
Also, that year, what he was able to save in the form of spare capital 
in kind, supplies, increases in herds by the rearing of young animals, 
was much reduced. At the slightest sign of a bad harvest, he was even 
afriad of getting into severe financial difficulties. Didn't the vines 
have to be cultivated, which, planted the previous year, would naturally 
only yield at a later date? He felt this responsibility heavily. Also, 
he had to stop having even the slightest servicing or repair work done, 
which carried out at once, would have enabled far greater expenses in 
the future to be prevented. 
While thinking, too late, of the programme of work and development, 
which he had attempted to carry out during the previous year which he 
hereafter called the terrible year - he could not help thinking more than 
once of other work, other development, far. more urgent and useful, although 
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often more modest, which he now despaired of being able to undertake, 
in his present poverty. 
The years passed, blotting out the bitter memory; once again he 
found himself with abundant reserves of spare capital in kind but for 
a long time yet, although at the prime of life, he did only dare to dev-
ote a part, always moderate in amount, to new building work with the 
timidity of an old man. 
The years continued to go by. This time, he was really old. NOW, 
one day he >laS walking in his huge estates with his children; he lavished 
wise advice on them and did not fail to warn them about crises. Children 
and grandchildren listened with holy terror. They crossed a thick weod 
and one of the grandchildren said "Was it a long time ago, Grandfather, 
that you planted this wood?" Then, the grandfather replied: "Yes, my 
child, it was the year of my crisis". They passed by a fish pond and one 
of the grandchildren said: "How much work 'was necessary Grandfather, to 
dig this pond, which gives us so many good fish?". And the grandfather 
replied: "I started digging it the year of my crisis, the devil had a 
hold of me that year; I would never have dared at any other time of my life, 
to tackle such an ambitious project, but it all turned out alright in the 
end, for all that". Remarks of a similar nature 'tiere made in front of a rich 
meadow f the former drained marsh, in front of a series of enormous terraeGs, 
which showed that entire fields had been conquered from the mountain, in 
front of a ',densly populated and prosperous village. So much and so often 
that the old man had to acknowledge that nature, while driving us mad at 
times - moments of madness which are follo't<lcd by crisis - sometimes has its 
own hi.dden reasons. 
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Once upon a time there was a city without money. All accounting 
was done in goods. Nevertheless, there was a complexity of industries 
there which was not in any way inferior to what the United states of 
America could offer in 1907. It was isolated from the rest of the 
world, except that vagabonds came by sea to offer their services to it. 
At this time, there existed a large socialis·tic concentration. The 
public offices for finance, all powerful had become so paternal· 
that no-one was afraid of being questi.oned, did not fail to keep a 
record of all the incomings and outgoings of private individuals •. An 
incalculable amount of data was condensed into three national accounts: 
the account 'expenses of everyday life', the account: 'disposable 
savings' *, and the account I initial expenditure I.. The "-lay in which 
these account.s were kept needs some explanati,on. 
An army of workers with its general staff was occupied in building 
factories, towns, new railway lines, clearing the land for cultivation, 
delVe loping and preparing mines for working. This army was in the pay 
of the 'initial expenditure' account. The goods consumed by it were 
supplied to the • initial expendi1:ure' account from the 'disposable 
savings' account. 
The goods consumed by others than the workers of the army of 
'initial expenditure' were entered in the account 'expenses of everyday 
life' and supplied moreover b'y t.he account 'Disposable savings'. 
*Our imaginary account 'disposable savings' acts technically as a 
~'Goods' account., 
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The materials used by the workers of 'initial expenditure' I.ere 
supplied to the account 'initial expenditure' by the account 'disposable 
savings' • 
The materials used by others than the 'initial expenditure' 
workers to ensure the operation and the servicing of the existing pro-
duction machines were moreover also supplied to the account 'expenditure 
of everyday life' by the account 'disposable savings' • 
Thus,it is seen that the account 'disposabl.e savings', where the 
less important stocks of goods were placed, contained the goods forming 
the working capital of everyday life, as well as those which in excess 
of the requirements of everyday life, were consequently meant to be in 
the account • initial expenditure'. Al.l production therefore came 
into the account 'disposable savings', sometimes to come out again 
straightaway, to disappear into the account 'expenses of everyday life' 
or to be fixed in the 'initial expenditure', sometimes to remain there 
more or less for a long time. 
It will not escape anyone that these methods of accounting, 
conceived and applied by a very forward-looking administration, was one 
of the best which could enable economists of that time to study crises. 
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It was the end of a period of prosperity; the economists studied 
the account 'disposable savings'; this is what they saw; far too 
many lUxury items, velvet, lace, all kinds of chiffon, motor cars for 
pleasure. These objects could only be transferred to the account 
'initial expenditure' in the very unlikely case of their being 
necessary to excite the superior personnel of the 'initial expenditure' 
,to work. There was already fu' abundance of steel, rails, copper, lead, 
and all these products - despite appearances to the contrary - were not 
tranr:,:'ferable to the account t initial expenditure'. In fact, let us 
,imagine for example the account 'initial expenditure' under the heading: 
railways under construction: this, steel, these rails, this copper, this 
lead could not be transferred to this account unless, at the same time 
there were proportionate quantities of cotton goods, sugar, alcohol 
and flour necessary for the payment in kind of the workers who would 
work on the construction, in the account 'disposable savings'. Thus the 
goods saved, in order to be transferable'to the account 'initial expendi-
ture' must form harmonious units, in relation to the latter account. 
Borrowing an image from chemistry, let us say that units are com-
pounds. ~Ihen you put into a corn field portions of nitrogen, phosphoric 
acid and potassium, the most abundant of these three elements will only 
be transformed into corn to a certain extent - the balance, the excess 
of this quantity, being unuseable for this crop - regulated by the pro-
portion in the chemical composition of the corn of this element ",ith 
the least abundant element in the soil which Hill be entirely transformed 
into corn. This image can be adapted for our case. 
Thus' it is possible t.o find in the account I disposable savings t 
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goods which are not transferable ta the accaunt of 'initial expenditure', 
these being in excess in proportion to the amounts required in tl,e units, 
as decided by the account of 'initial expenditure'. 
Therefore the following two principles can be proposed, 
In our 'city without money' the crisis occurs because the account 
'disposable savings' is short of gaods which it owes ta the account 
'initial expenditure'. The account 'initial expenditure' had to some 
extent drawn on the account 'disposable savings' and the latter had 
accepted to some extent this drawing; it can na longer fulfil its 
abligatians, it goes bankrupt. There is a break-down .of the equilibrium, 
there is a crisis, the economic machine partly stops, the cagwheels 
groan and break. 
At this moment the excess goads in the accaunt 'dispasable savings' 
are liquidated at much reduced rates compared ta other gaads which are 
called by the account of 'initial expenditure'. Thus we can see -
second principle - that what is called overproduction is not overproduc-
tion in the absolute sense of the word (humani.ty cannat produce too 
much): it is a disporportion in the production of various goods. A 
crisis is a breakdawn in harmony in the production of the warld, it ois 
as if one wanted a breakdmm in the harmony of the work of humanity, it 
is an organ of producti.on hypertraphying at the expense .of others, it 
is the broken harmony .of the elements. If He wish to regard things 
poetically, it is .one episodq in the struggle between the future and 
the present, .of the future which wants to come tao quickly, to equip 
the earth taa quickly for too large a humanity, and .of the present 
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which must first of all create enough to eat but wants enjoyment. In 
the convulsions ef the crisis, the future, in the form ef the account 
I initial expenditure I calls to it eyerything it can, tears everything 
it can away from the present, everything >mich the present has given 
away easily. But the present does not give up any longer. The devour-
ing dream is conquered and declines •.••. 
The crisis has come to its origin, it has become inevitable because 
of wanting to do too many things too'quickly at the same time.' Why 
this gluttonous appetite? Did we not see in our first allegory, that 
of the COU;,try gentleman, that an isolated property owner, although its 
master, can and must make mistakes, of which the fatal result is crisis? 
How much more so, with more reason, in the case of a large community? 
Here we must take into account the contagious impulses called crm-m 
psychology, which increases errors much more than proportional to the 
number of individuals. It is necessary to take into account that a 
large and complicated cowmunity has naturally, much less of a clear 
understanding of what it is doing than one man. To take a striking 
example: our country gentleman, ,.hile organising his hunts, sowing his 
flo,.er gardens, building a new house, was perfectly aware that he was 
working unnecessarily. In society, on the other hand, what appears, 
superfluous to one allows someone else to get what is necessary for 
him and therefore becomes, in his opinion, of practical use: the 
manufacturer who produces for hire a block of flats in which each 
aI?artrnent brings in a rent of 20,000 francs, does not think for one 
. minute thut he ir; Harking for the sup0rflui t.y of society; he only sees 
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its USe to him which is positive; the same goes for a producer of motor 
cars. That is "hy, in times of prosperity the spendings of the initial 
expenditure which should become a permanent source of provision for the 
enjoyment of luxury, are much more disorgani"ed than the expenditure on 
luxuries themselves. These spendings of the initial expenditure repre-
sents in a way the wastefulness multiplied by self-interest and greed. 
Finally, our country gentleman, when he undertook a piece of work, had 
only himself to consider, he could escape from his obligations. Society 
is not so: someone has undertaken to carry through some work of the 
initial expenditure and has provided others to subscribe the capital for 
it, that is, to provide the necessary goods, and the goods have to come 
because it is in 'his' interest. Society is committed: with a thousand 
heads, it i!. drawn on by a blind force; when the crisis is unleashed 
society still has to give birth to the enterprises to which capital 
has already been assigned, though forceps have to be used to force such 
a birth to take place. Thus we should not be surprised that even in a 
city without money, the crises can be terrible. 
We can foresee the consequences of crisis by recalling the adven-
tures of the country gentleman. 
The account 'initial expenditure' calls: I do not mean these false 
accounts of • initial expenditure', used to produce articles of ephemeral 
luxury; I m0an these serious accounts of 'initial expenditure' which 
produce objects of powcr and life in the city without money. 
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The account 'disposable savings' is going to have to re-establish 
the stocks of goods which are inadequate. 
To do this the production of surplus goods is, halted; the work of 
initial expenditure, designed to multiply even further the production 
of those goods already in surplus, is halted - for this production and 
these projects of the initial expenditure were consuming goods which 
were in short supply. The pity is that it is not possible to go ahead 
straightaway, en bloc, with these cuts in production, these cuts in the 
projects of the initial expenditure. A luxury block of flats which has 
been started will always be the more useful for spending the amount 
which it costs to put on a roof, or finish t.he last storeys. A fac;:tory 
for producing luxury goods will be completed in the hope that ·it can be 
used for another purpose or in the hope that, once built, it can wait 
for better times. 
In order not to lose an investment forever, one adds a little. We 
run after our investment, almost always a fatal course: And besides, what 
are the surplus goods, to what extent are they in a surplus? Consumption 
comes tumbling down, how can one judge the level at which the equilibrium 
will be established? All the conditions are topsy-turvy. And besides, 
how can one know how much the production of an industry should be re-
duced, or which of the industrialists engaged in this industry will 
suffer most from the destructive influence of the reduction. Certainly 
someone will go under and it onl.y remains to be seen •••.• who. It will 
not be a question of drawing lots, in the song of the little ship, where 
the survivors chose straws to determine which of them should be eaten 
by the others, but a hard struggle in which the carefully hidden agonies 
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will last for months and in which the strongest will survive. While 
waiting, every banker hopes that hin client will pull through, while 
naturally every industrialist hopes for himself. 
Calm is gradually re-established amid agony and sorrow, and the 
turbulence subsides. 
Ah yes, it would be simpler and less painful if instead of having 
to re-establish the quantities of goods which were in short supply to 
the account 'disposable savings' one could indirectly, by restraining 
consumption, have increased production, to raise it* to the level a~ 
which it would be in proportion to the production of the goods in 
surplus: 
But we should not· dream: goods in the account 'disposable savings' 
in short supply are not so because their production has been neglected; 
not at all; this production too has been carried to excess, but there 
were rigid limits. For example, the goods in short supply were agricul-
tural products, the production of which does not increase, by design, 
as much as that in industry or even mining. 'rhe last two streaked madly 
ahead, and the big ~Jns of agriculture could not keep pace. So the 
equilibrium was brokenw' 
Did K8 not say that our city without money saw every year, flowing 
towards its shores, hundreds of thousands of vagabonds in search of 
*For a country in the world, every article, even luxury goods, which is 
or can be sold abroad is equivalent to production for home use of any 
kind: corn, cotton;. etc. 
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fortune or any kind of work and employment? Indeed the accoun·t 
'disposable savings' of the city without money no longer has enough 
agt.icultural products for these products themselves, or for those 
products as transformed by exchange into other products, to be able to 
pay the hordes of newcomers, who were indispensable if the railways 
were to be rebuilt and, by means of these rebuilt railways, land made 
accessible and, by means of these accessible lands, new agricultural 
wealth created. 
I 
" \, 
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(IIIl 
In short the crises were brought about by the very false notion 
which at a given moment, a human society will conceive around its true 
savings, with its savings in kind actually a"ailable. We have seen 
that all the goods saved - although materially there - could not be 
considered as available as they do not meet to any purpose whatsoever 
at the time. It is therefore necessary to make a choice: it is not 
possible to consider one part of the goods saved as what we call, in 
the absence of any idea of money or monetary expressions, real available 
capital. 
When the monetary symbol intervenes, it is going to cause great 
mistakes. 
This is how. 
In the monetary state of humanity it seems that there is nothing 
more real than the funds one has available in the banks. But no: 
these are apparent available assets, which do not necessarily bear any 
constant relation to the actual capital available, as we have defined 
it above. 
Let us: consider t in or:der to convince ourselves of this, the origin 
of part of the deposits in the banks. * A bank at a qivcn moment, had 
*On thts sDbject 'see the lecture given by I1.E:.H. Holden, r:1anaging 
dir"ctor of the London City and Midland Ilank, to the Association of 
Liverpool Ilankers on the 18th December 1907, I'Ihich appears in a book-
let under the title 'The Depreciation of securities in relation to 
'Gold l , edited by Blades, East and Blades, 23 l'Ibchurch Lane, IDndon, EC .. 
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ten million dollars in deposits and a reserve in cash of two million 
dollars. It said to itself that such reserves were unnecessary, as 
the public, far from drawing their deposits, were adding to them every 
day, so much so that the grm1th in deposits on one day covered the 
"ithdrawals of the same day. It decided that it was really naive to 
keep such a reserve of unproductive dollars and that a reserve represent-
ing 10% of the deposits instead of 20% was more than enough for the 
demand. Then it "ent to find a railway company which had bonds to 
sell; it took three million dollars worth of bonds. It said: "Now 
yoti have three million dollars deposits with us; come and dra" them 
when you like". 
Then it went to find speculators on the stock exchange. It said: 
"Give me five million shares; I "ill then advance you four million 
against this guarantee". The speculators gave over their shares and 
found themselves "ith deposits of four million dollars 'at the bank. 
Finally the bank went to find businessmen and said to them: "Give me 
three million of your promissory notes; having done that you will have 
deposits at the bank of three million". 
When all these negotiations were complete, the bank still had 
reserves of two million in cash, but it had twenty millions in deposits 
instead of ten. Ten million had been born. 
There is the birth of money. 
Money is born in a deposit. 
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The deposit, once created, is acquired. It can be lost by the 
bank which has created it but then it re-appears in the course of 
trade in other banks. Taking all the banks in one country together it 
is still there; it is money in circulation. 
This is how the available capital is formed which we have good 
reasons to call: apparent available capital. 
An excess of specie, an excess of gold was sufficient: gold is 
the grain from which deposits spout. 
During the last period of prosperity, from 1897 to 1906, gold 
flowed into the United States, in return for their huge exports of 
goods. The banks found themselves with part of this gold and made 
deposits out of it. 
But to create deposits it is necessary to have two ingredients: 
gold - which they had - and loans. This suppcses a material against 
which one can lend; shares, goods, promissory notes of traders and 
industrialists. 
'l'his material, the banks found, went on indefinitely. Did not the 
loan have in itself a force which would create again the material on 
which the loan could be made. The money is lent on the goods; ."ith 
this money the borrower makes the goods; so it goes on. 
This would be true even if the price of the articles did not go 
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up. But the price of things does go up. This increase works in tl<O 
ways: it makes things more valuable, it seems that it makes things 
and the production of things more desirable; it excites the producers 
to double and triple their output. Therefore more realities against 
which they can borrow are offered to the banks. And more hot air is 
'also offered to the banks as security for loans - for an exaggerated 
rise in the value of a share and of an article, «hich has happened so 
quickly, is indeed more hot air. So it can be seen that the most 
active provider for the banks is the speculation that they quite rightly 
foster ••••• since they make loans to it. 
A thousand million lent for speculation makes the price rise - in 
a period oP rising prosperity - co~siderably more than a thousand 
million placed in savings, that is, because this thousand million 
speculated is mobile; it is an army evolving «ith a terrifying capacity, 
with a limitless faith, which creates heroism - of little merit - with 
a skill which makes it always choose as an objective the weak points, 
the less well-protected positions, that is the shares and goods on 
which the largest and most rapid increase I<ith·the least effort is 
possible at that particular moment. Thus the rise is I<herever possible 
successfully ffiastered. A posi tion once taken remains taken even t.'oough 
the troops have withdrawn to ravage unsatisfied elsewhere. That is 
because prices remain up out of habit: like everything human, they 
have a force of inertia. 
'J:'hus we finu. ourselves in the presence of a vast range of increases 
in values: increases in values of shares, of property, of factories, 
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of goods. We are also in the presence of a vast range of new shares, 
new factories, new goods. The banks make loans on these things; they 
make loans on the increase in value of these things, since the things 
only exist, in their opinion, in the form of their monetary expression 
and in the amount of this expression; by doing this they solidify, 
materialise a part of the appreciation in the form of deposits, of 
apparent available capital. 
Now if we recall the temperament of the citizens of the United 
States of America, their dynamism, their fine and even excessive 
ardour in tune with the excesses of their climate, their rapid and 
changing life, without roots, which makes them people of the moment, 
for whom the future like the past, tomorrow like yesterday, are never 
sufficiently sacred, their exclusive passion for money which hypnotizes 
them, blinds them even to money itself, their individualism which 
demands that everyone looks after himself with sometimes too little 
regard for the whole which is harmony, art, truth, - and one will 
understand that in ten years of an almost continuous "crescendo" of 
prosperity, the United States of America had accumulated, in the form 
of deposits in the banks, a mass of apparently available capital out 
of all proportion at the time with their actual capital available. 
* 
* * 
Mistakes, one will say" "lies, false principles" the theorists 
, ... i11 cry. IIPoor discipline, poor working method" the serious bankers 
will say. 
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Is it so true? Let us rather listen. 
The grave European banker says to his little cousin i.n America 
who is so young, so new to the game: "Look hOl< I make my assets; 
look at it. I have drafts with several signatures which represents 
goods actually in circulation. And I choose them, these drafts. Not 
all goods are right for me, Above a certain proportion I deliberat.ely 
avoid all goods for which demand is intermittent or the production of 
which, for the moment, appears to me to be tarnished by evidence of 
surplus. And that is not yet the end of my choosiness. All prices 
are only temporary expression ·of value. There are no goods which 
cannot come down in price. My paper covers goods. That is well and 
good, I should not be satisfied with anything less. I need, in addition 
to an actual guarantee, a personal guarantee, &nd not an illusi.onary 
personal guarantee, such as the personal guarantee of a debtor who, 
with debts on all sides, only having small assets, will see his fortune 
disappear at the slightest fall in price of his goods, oh no! but 
rather the personal guarantee of a debtor who is well up in his business 
and his fortune, sensitive on honour, always having an eye on his 
business interests, the other on his moveable income and always being 
on the right side of the safety line. 
"Such are the unalterable principles which govern the composition 
of my trading portfolio". 
"I also have an"ther portfolio, a portfolio of loans on securities. 
But I impose strict limitations on this port.folio of loans on securities 
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which, if one allowed it, would tend to grow indefinitely. I do not 
allow it to overshadow my trading portfolio, which remains my principle 
means of acquirng assets, to which the portfolio of loans on shares 
must always remain only an accessory". 
"Whilst making sure I observe this proportion, I base myself on 
whatever is most reliable in the respective characters of the opera-
tions of discount on bills and on loans against securities". 
"The natural ending to the loan on a security is the sale of the 
security. This ending only occurs in a normal, and easy way, withcut 
bringing about unease in the community, if circulating cash. relieves 
speculation of its worrying side by repurchasing the security which it 
had been holding temporarily on credit. Now who can tell. the force of 
absorption of cash in securities or even its total force of absorption? 
Cash alone pays for the security and, by doing so, releases the loan 
on the security - in savings, that is in worJe, in goods, in a living 
reality. And if cash, the strength and tendencies are beyond T!1y control, 
is not there behind my loan against securities on hand to release it, 
my loan against securities is no longer alive, that is it is no longer 
ready for selling off without prejudicing the community and, on the 
rebou.."1d, harming men. 
Am I Dot also right? 
"1 am also right, to mistrust all exaggeration in my loans against 
securities while I watch with satisfaction the increase in my portfolio 
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of trading discounts? Trade bills are only a representation of the 
goods; suitably chosen, merchandise is ah/ays sure of finding a taker". 
"Already distrustful with regard to loans against securities I am 
even more so, for the same reasons, as regards stocks and shares. I 
limit my shares portfolio to a very few things". 
"Such are the principles thanks to .,hich I sleep in peace, al.,ays 
sure of being able to repay my deposits, at any hour, at any minute. 
The apparent capital available which is entrusted to me, remains the 
true, faithful and proportional representation of gold and of living 
goods, which can al.,ays be transformed into human work". 
"And now little American cousins, bankers of the new world, what 
do you do?" 
"You collect in your portfolio representation of the deposits, -
that is, something which is sacred for a banker, - what? Trade bills 
with only one signature, simple bills which, while they may cover the 
goods, might also cover the expenses of the initial expenditure or, 
worse still, personal expenses, expenditure on 1uxuries!U 
"And from .,hom do you buy these bills? From traders and indus-
trialists who borrow ten or twenty when they have one, who place their 
point of honour - other countries other customs no doubt - in the 
audacity of their enterprises, while our traders and industria.lists 
in France and England place their point of honour in keeping their 
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word, in the invoilable security of any obligations they have accepted". 
"Not content with a similar lack of principles in the composition 
of your trading portfolio, you do not impose any limit on your port-
'--folio of loans against securities, much less to your portfolio of 
stocks and shares ll • 
"But you deserve a hundred times wha"t has happened to you: Remember 
the sacred principles of the eternal political economy, return to sound 
reason" . 
That is certainly what could be the language of a wise European 
banker. 
But on the other side of the Atlantic a banker could reply: 
"The money which we lent rather easily - we grant you that point -
during the period of prosperity, the money which we have imagined, if 
you like, has not gone up in smoke, far from it. It has been crystal-
lized in the form of undertakings. What would have become of our 
initiatives without the easy credit for which we are being criticized?" 
"You say that we are a people of fools, that we do not economise. 
The truth is that we economise in a different way from yours. vIe have 
had to economise since "'le have created, since our country is covered 
with mines, factories, railways, towns, fields as far as the eye can 
see, ,.·/here there "'/as nothing but desert. 
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"But ho\"l and wher.e have vie economised?" 
"It could be like this, we think". 
"During these periods of excessive prosperity, for which you 
criticise us so much on accolli,t of their somewhat artificial origin, 
we get carried away. So we undertake huge projects; \1e think \1e can 
undertake others and carry on ad infinitum. We are intoxicated by the 
limitless potential of our country, - very natural intoxication -
intoxicated by our own activity. We lose contact with reality, 
investing more, and much more, capital than the real available economies 
made to date allow for bringing our projects to fruition. 
The crisis breaks out. 
"We have to retrench. Our speculators and our.traders or indus-
trialists - traders and industrialists* all more or less being specu-
lators - are ruined, or almost so. They have hardly any money. They 
have to do without. Safety comes from these privations. The economy 
of the nation is perhaps only the sum of these privations Which, taken 
individually, are not savings as such". 
"At the end of the period of prosperity, the apparent capital 
*Thc case of an industrialist who, working on credit, goes ahead with 
his produotion of, let us say, rubber boots is identical to that of 
a speculator who buys on credit a similar quantity 0:[ rubber boots 
to that which the industrialist produces and at. a price equal to the 
. cost price - per boot - of the industrialist. 
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available was only a hollo\< mask which remained to be filled with real 
solid material. ~le recognise this. And afterwards?': 
"The real available capital will re-appear. The dimensions of the 
'mask will be reduced. The container and the contents will adapt them-
selves in a common efforts. We shall return to the truth. The country 
will have saved tbe real available capital, and our speculators, those 
of yesterday or those who will succeed them, - what do individuals 
matter! will reappear, t.hen begin again to increase their incomes". 
"If we look at it closely, we inves.t our savings before we have 
made them" .. 
"You in Europe invest your savings after you have made them; that 
is more down to earthll. 
"Despite appearances, we are not a dmm to eartb people. We work 
on £antasyll. 
"But tell me, is one system better than anotber? Systems are 
judged by their results, as trees are judged by tbeir fruit. We 
hmericans do not burden ourselves witb theories. Is it not said tbat 
our country has developed at a prodigious speed? It was simply what 
we had to do. The course of things for you however, in Europe, is 
dull and peaceful. \~e go in fits and starts. Our economic life runs 
like a majestic river, sometimes running over into gigantic lakes, 
sometimes restrained, sometimes flowing into gorges, bubbling and 
, 
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roaring in waterfalls to make the world tremble. Is it a misfortune? 
Or is it not rather a fact of nature which we must encourage?" 
* 
'" * 
~risis breaks out like a clap of thunder, the. scenery falls Clown. 
It is the real available capital which could not be seen anywhere, 
the very existence of >lhich we were beginning to doubt, which suddenly 
erupts into our perception at the moment >lhen the crisis breaks out. 
So we can no longer doubt it. 
It shows itself >lith all the brutality of the real >lorld. ,It 
upsets everything. ·It is like waking up from a dream, the dream of 
available apparent capital. And >lhat a dream! Why did it not arrive 
earlier? It is that the apparently available capital is exchanged for 
,itself. Shares, property, factories change hands at incredible prices, 
/ 
hut in the end they only exchanged among themselves. The spasm, the 
rearing, has come when it was necessary to create on a large scale. 
Earlier i t ~laS the time for trifling with capital, the time for caresses 
and promises. NO>l the moment of birth-pangs has come. Nature again, 
takes up its rights. It appears completely bare, brutal and cruel. 
It wanted its ends; it has dra>ln men by its usual deceits, by the 
channs and the blandishments of the rise j,n vlaue. Huge amounts of 
capital have been set aside for huge projects. But the time for 
" 
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trifling is over. The apparent available capital must become embodied 
in living merchandise, in human work. The truth must re-appear under 
the lying expression. Truth, which in fact is real available capital. 
With the means at our disposal for measuring and expressing value 
still in such an imperfect state, the true extent· of this capital and 
the true extent of its demand do not become clear. 
The.relationship between the existence of and the demand for goods 
is expressed by a price, as ths.·deg","ee of pressure is. expressed by the 
level of the liquid in the pressure gauge: goods are visible. The 
relationship between the existence of and demand for apparent available 
capital is expressed by the rate of interest: the apparent available 
capital is visible. In the imperfect state of organisation of humanity, 
the amounts of available real capital, which are individually visible 
are collectively invisible, indeterminable. The demand for them, like 
the extent of their existence is indeterminable at any given moment. 
However a perfect being, who would see into the affairs of 
humanity, would know these figures, and he would knm< the relationship.: 
there would be for him, at any time, a rate of interest 011 the real 
available capital. This rate, imaginary for us, but which in truth 
exists, could be called the real (theoretical) rate of interest. 
Several months before the crisis, the real (theoretical) rate of 
interest obviously shows evidence of extreme tension, while the rate 
/ 
of interest of the apparent available capital - which we shall now call 
/ 
" 
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the apparent rate of interest - does not present any evidence of 
unusual tension and thus ceases to give any serious indication of the 
rate situation. In other words, before the crisis, the gap between 
the real (theoretical) rate of interst and the apparent rate of 
interest is very large; the curve of the real (theoretical) rate of 
interest is Hell above the curve of the apparent rate of interest: 
that is the moment when the public believes in extreme prosperity and, 
fooled by the apparent abundance of capital. available, in an extreme 
abundance of money. On the other hand several months after the crisis 
the real (theoretical) rate of interest shows evidence of extreme 
slackening and its curve is not very far above that of the apparent 
rate of interest, and even perhaps below it. The difference between 
the real (theoretical) rate of interest and the apparent rate of 
interest is a very distinct one: on the one hand it is only a question 
of the available real capital, that is the goods considered in them-
selves; on the other hand it is only a question of the apparent 
available capital that is, a monetary expression. There is nothing 
to stop one imagining an intermediate rate of interest between these 
two clearly separated rates of interest· a rate of interest Hhich would 
be a translation into goods of the apparent rate of interest. We will 
call it "rate of interest, real equivalent to the .apparent rate of 
interest" • 
Let us suppose that in the world, as opposed to gold whose value 
we will consider intact and irreducible, there was only one type of 
merchandise, the substance ol: all the goods which exist at present, 
and replacing all of them: its price at any time would represent the 
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average price of all goods existing at present. The price of this 
ideal unique merchandise or merchandise substance, would be, for 
humanity, the representative number of material life, it is understood. 
We could also call it quite simply: "The representative number" 
(something like the English "index number"). 
Let us imagine ourselves at a time when the "representative 
number" is high, that is when the price of merchandise-substance is 
expensive, far above its usual price range. Such a time will obviously 
correspond to the peak of a period of prosperity, - since prosperity 
is synonymous with an increase in prices. - Capital loaned at this 
time would be converted into relatively few units of merchandise-
substance. If the loan is long term, the interest converted into units 
of merchandise-substance at the average price of the period covered by 
the loan will be converted into relatively large numbers of units of 
merchandise-slllstance. As the amount of the capital lent and that of 
the interest stipulated are only monetary expressions, in fact units 
of merchandise-substance have been lent so as to receive units of mer-
chandise-substance every year. The "rate of real interest equivalent 
to the apparent rate of interest" will be the percentage proportion of 
the number of units of merchandise-substance collected on average 
each year to the number of units of merchandise-substance originally 
lent. At the peak of a period of prosperity, the "representative 
number ll being near its maximum, the "real rate of interest equivalent 
to the apparent rate of interest" "ill therefore be higher than the 
apparent rate of interest. Perhaps, but this is simply a hypothesis, 
it will be located somewhere between the latter and the real (theoretical) 
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rate"of interest. On the other hand when the "representative number" 
is near its minimum, I,hich would coincide with a period of deep 
industrial depression the real rate of interes.t equivalent to the 
apparent rate of interest will be lower than the apparent rate of 
interest. 
The variations in the difference between the apparent rate of 
interest and the "real rate of interest equivalent to the apparent rate 
of interest" are the indication of an effort made automatically in the 
"orld of economic phenomena to move towards equilibrium. In times of 
prosperity, when the figures for apparent capital increase, the price 
of goods increases, thus attenuat.ing 'the exaggeration of expenses, if 
the reality of things is seen beneath monetary symbols. 
In times of depression, when the figures of apparent capital con-
tract, the price of goods, by contracting as well, attenuate the con-
traction of expenses, i"f one still looks at the reality beneath the 
monetary symbols. 
This is how the world goes. Such is the simple history of economic 
evolution throughout time, in all countries, a rhythm similar to the 
beats of the human heart. 
Real capital, apparent capital: The inner truth of things, the 
lie of out"Tard forms: Pale formulas hiding behind great quantities of 
human excitement and sorrow!. 
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The American crisis of 1907 has come to remind those who were 
ready to doubt the eternal re-starting of life, of which only the cos-
tume changes from age to age, and the eternal re-starting of crises 
like wars. We seemed to be entering a safe harbour. The excesses of 
paper money, the excesses of metal money becoming metal paper money, 
had been avoided. And then one comes across another stumbling block, 
the excess of deposits in the banks which comprises in itself -
implicitly the excess of transfers and cheques, ephemeral money, 
daily money, money all the samE;!, money which can be bad money or excess 
money. 
* 
* * 
Can one foresee crises?* Can one follow the path of these sul>-
terranean causes which, during the period of prosperity prepare, from 
the other side of this crater which is the crisis, the period of 
depression and vice versa? 
The only rational method would consist of following the fluctuations 
of the real available capital and of the real (theoretical) rate of 
interest. But these fluctuations will always escape us. In practice 
*It is true and great service in the public interest which M. Jacques 
Siegfr.;'ed gave by indicating in his article in the "Revue des Deux 
Mondes" of the 15th December 1906 the imminence of the crisis. M. 
Fernand Maroni, in the "Journal des Debatesn , has also rendered a 
great service. No-one else has more perception or can render more 
precisely than 11.[0'. Maroni the nuances of the money market. M. 
l\rthur Raffalovich many times showed the American crisis to be inevit-
able, amongst other things in an admirably prophetic letter, addressed 
/in December 1906 to a local financier. 
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we are limited to processes of a primitive empiricism, but which, 
handled carefully, render great services. 
We have seen that human imagination, credulity and greed, allied 
to a laudable appetite for action, can lead, as in recent years in the 
United States, to a dangerous build-up of excessive apparent available 
capital. On the other hand, no amount of imagination can swell the 
stock of gold. The stock of gold represents reason. Thus, when the 
apparent available capital, that is the portfolio of the banks or the 
deposits in the banks - two inter-related terms form an a:nount out 
of all proportion with the basic stock of gold, there is cause to be 
worried. 
At first only wise men are worried and put out warnings in vain. 
The public becomes aware of the danger when it is too late. In this 
respect, it has happened this time as it has always happened, as it 
must always happen by definition, for, if the public could foresee 
crises, this foresight >!ould be a prevenuative remedy. However, all 
crises have their own specific character. Perhaps, if one wanted to 
characterise the American cri.sis of 1907, one could say tha·t it is 
particularly simple, without secondary influences, that it is a kind 
of crisis in all its purity: that is why it makes such a good subject 
for study. 
Paris, February 1908. 
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The unpublished Paper by 
M. Labord~re, dated August 30th, 1935, 
It is a truism (tautology) to say that, in the event of a crisis 
occurring, there is a sudden shortage of real liquid assets - a sudden 
chasm and accompanying whirlwind. The insufficiency of real liquid 
assets for'the smooth working of the economic machine, for the time 
being, results not from the fact that there is any lack of consumer 
goods nor of ability to increase at will the output of consumer goods 
but from the fact that the bulk of real liquid assets consisting in 
existing capital goods and implicit goods, that is to say potential 
capital goods, - goods, so to 'speak, in the womb of existing factories, 
mines or fields and in the brains and muscles cif their operatives -
has suddenly, catastrophically, decreased; since a good which is no 
more in demand, to all intents and purposes, ceases, at least for the 
moment, to be a good - alias a commodity. That sudden shortage of 
the mass total of real liquid assets i.e. liquid assets conceived in 
terms of commodities creates a cow~otion first and then an enduring 
vacuum. 
When in 1908 I wrote in a magazine article, inevitably too short" 
on account of the very nature of the magazine, to be explicit that 
real liquid assets had been thoughtlessly squandered on capital 
expenditure in excess of present and nearby requirements I should be 
construed as meaning that if the same energy used up in excess capital 
expenditures had been used up normally in judicious capital expenditures 
having ahead safe and well defined outlets for the goods to be turned 
, 
out or in producing linHs of consumer goods such as are more or less 
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permanent requisites for men living reasonably in a reasonable world 
there would have been no such sudden disappearance of ~. (explicit) 
or potential (implicit) liquid assets, of man-values for instance. 
I have long since realised, as you very correctly point out, that 
my thoughts and accordingly my expression in 1908 were far too material, 
inadequately evolved in the abstract and to that extent misleading. 
If it were not for the fundamental lie of money as it is used or 
rather misused and in the absence of debts of any kind except commercial 
bills representing goods in actual circulation an economic mistake 
resulting in a crisis then of manageable proportions could be seemingly 
corrected simply in letting loose the natural fall of prices so that 
the upkeep of the jobless, logically incumbent to the state, may be 
made very light, until the natural forces of adaptation work out the 
absorption of the jobless. 
There is nothing in the above that is not co~~onplace: the prin-
ciple that goods are only a circulating capital in .as much as there is 
for them a ready demand is, I think, one of the accepted fundamentals 
of the economic theories of the eighteenth century - and of common 
sense. 
/ 
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The excesses of stock exchange speculation closely linked with 
the excesses of credit, creating all round a feverish atmosphere, are 
apt to shroud tangible economic realities. As an instance, the unstable 
condi tions prevailing on the world money markets in tlte early months 
of 1920 caused people to overlook the enormous consumption possibilities 
then existing due both to reconstruction and to wide fields of activity 
opened up by new scientific inventions. Therefore the depression 
which ~ollowed the crisis of May 1920 was of short duration. In a 
sense the crisis itself was a mistake.. Wild speculation activities 
had to be corrected and the genuine economic activities of the world 
halted for a moment in stupor. 
The cnisis of October 1929 tells a quite different tale: the 
excesses of stock exchange speculation upheld by political and banking 
complicities for a long time veiled the fact that the economic funda-
mentals of a crisis were strikingly in existence along time before the 
crisis broke out (avril 1933, tableau de la production, des importations 
et des exportations de l'or en 1931 pages 5 to 24). 
The form of my 1908 article is not mine either: it is but a pale 
reminiscence of If the Economics It of Xenophon .. 
Geneva, Sept. 1st, 1935. 
Again the phenomenon of the crisis may be compared to a ship 
having on board at the botto~ a permanent cargo and at the top a.n 
evanescent cargo. The permanent cargo is tile reasonable consumers 
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expenditures and the reasonable ventures; the evanescent cargo is the 
consumer expenditures and the ventures of the wildcat description. 
Come the crisis, the evanescent cargo vanishes so that the ship, being 
no longer steadied, starts rolling about dreadfully and gives to on-
lookers the impression of being at the point of capsizing at any moment 
- but she does not capsize after all. 
Summing up, my 1908 allegory, viewed in the light of the experience 
gained from the 1920 and 1929 .cris8s and accordingly corrected, reduced 
to its proper proportions, and the above allegory learn us nothing, 
teach uS nothing, may be ornamental but are devoid of meaning and use-
fulness. They are nothing more than playthings of the mind (jeux de 
l'esprit). They do not amount to more than to say: if you do not 
want to get drunk, Hark ye! Beware! do not drink unreservedly whisky 
or the like. 
I 
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Appendix 1 - Footnotes 
(1) Letter from DIlR to M. Comby. DIIR wrote: 'beneath the playful 
treatment (of Labordere) there lies a real regard and affection'. 
(2) M. Labordere, 'The Hechanism of Foreign Investment in Prance and 
its Outcome 1890-1914', Economic Journal, Vol. 92, pp.525-542. 
(3) In particular with statistics relating to gold production. He 
also had a special interest in Indian currency statistics. 
(4) Letter from H. Labordere to DHR, 16th Juno, 1938. 
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'APPENDIX 2 
The Early Views of the Under-Consumption School 
Sismondi had formulated ideas on the subject of commercial crises 
as early as 1803, but perhaps his greatest work was 'Nouveaux Principes 
d'Econmie Politique', which was published in 1819. In this he attempted 
to explain the depression that followed the ,Napoleonic Wars in Britain. 
He observed thatno one was able to spend on consumption according to his 
needs. The cause of the depression was therefore the insufficient level 
of consumption, which Sismondi took to be tha result of a maldistribution 
of income, and the inadequate remuneration of the working classes. 
Principles of Political Economy, written by Malthus and published 
in 1820, reflected many of the earlier ideas of Lord Lauderdale, (1) who 
had been concerned more specifically with the aftermath of the war on 
the British economy. l·lalthus saw the problem of crisis and unemployment 
as being the consequence of inadequate demand, and was therefore an 
attack upon Say's La"ioJ. Production will not necessarily create its own 
demand because saving dOES not ensure a demand for capital goods. The 
depression after the Napcleonic Wars was, according t.O 11althus, due to 
the decline in government expenditure "hich had not been offset by 
increased conf;'wners f expendi Cl.:re. The solutio'i1, was to raise the level 
of demand, which he saw as requiring either a r!~eistribution of income, 
a great:cr divcrsi. ty of consumer goods .. or the development of thE! service 
industries, each of which w-ould raise the propensity ~o consume. Nalthu8, 
lik'e Sismondi, believed that under-consumption could be remedied by pro-
viding a more "quit"bl.e distri.bution of income. 
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J.A. Hobson had very little to add to these earlier theories. (2) 
He believed that there exists an optimu~ rate of saving. Depression 
is caused by too much saving in relation to the optimum rate of saving, 
suoh that too little is spent on consumer goods. 'There exists a nor-
mal tendency to save and apply to capital purposes an excessive pro-
portion of the general income'. 
Under-consumption is taken to mean over-saving. Again a portion 
of the blame for under-consumption is placed upon the maldistribution 
of income. The higher income groups tend to save a larger proportion 
of their income which during propensity will create over-saving. The 
argument for a more equitable distribution of income is therefore put 
forward: 'A solution of the problem can only be found by such economic, 
social, and political reforms as secure a drastic redistribution of the 
product of industry'. 
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Appendix 2 - Footnotes 
(1) An Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Public Wealth (1804). 
(2) See 'The Industrial System' (1909) and later 'The Economics of 
Unemployment' (1923). 
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APPENDIX 3 
The Derivation of IS and LM Curves (I) 
The IS Curve 
The IS curve shows all the combinations of real income (Y) and the 
rate of interest (r) which uphold real market equilibrium; that is all 
combinations which equate saving (S) and investment (I}!2}The diagram-
matic method of derivation below is not that of Hicks, but it more 
clearly demonstrates the various branches of Keynesian theory, and the 
influence of changes in saving and investment curves upon 'the IS curve . 
• The construction is based upon the following equational represen-
tation of real market equilibrium, assuming a simple econor.lY in vlhich 
there is no foreign trade or government interference. 
a) S = I - quadrant (2) below. All possible points of equality 
are shown by a 45 degree line given that the scales of 
both axes are the same. 
Quadrant (3) below Le. saving is functionally r81ated to the 
level of real income. Keynes argued that this was a di.rect 
relation. The diagram below assumes a direct linear rela-
tion between saving and real income, with dissaving occur-
ring at low levels of real income. (S = -a + s.Y where-a 
is autonomous dissaving at ~ero income, and s isr·the marginal 
propensity to save). 
Quadrant (I) below. In Keynes' analysis investment is inversely 
related to the level of interest ral:es. Again the diagram 
below assumes a linear relationship. (I = b - dY where b, 
d are constants). 
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Hence for equilibrium 
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Taking a particular rate of interest (ro), Quadrant 1 indicates 
that the level of invesOlent undertaken at ro is 10. This level of 
investment generates an equal level of saving through the multiplier 
process (So), which arises at a level of real income (Yo). 'rhus saving 
and investment are only equal at a level So = 10, where the rate of 
interest is ro, and the level of income is Yo. At a lower level of 
interest rate (rl ) more investment (11 ) will occur. This creates a 
high level of real income (Yl ), which in turn yields an amount of saving 
(Sl) equivalent to the level of investment. The lower level of interest 
rate (rl ) requires a greater level of real income if the equality 
between saving and investment is to be maintained. If this procedure 
is followed for every rate of interest, the IS curve can be derived and 
is found to be downward sloping (as in quadrant (4». 
The IJ1 curve 
The LM curve shows all the possible combinations of the rate of 
interest and the level of real income which provide for money market 
equilibrium, that is ,;here the demand for (Md) and supply of money (Ms) 
are equated. 
The curve is derived from the following Keynesian relationships, 
given the equilibrium condition expressed in (a) below: 
All possible points of equality are shown in quadrant (2) 
below which assumes that the supply of money is const.ant 
and that the demand for money can be divided betlveen 
transactionary plus precautionary (~\), and speculative 
demands (M2) in the manner indicated by lino TS. 
Ml 
M10 
M11 
r 
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Quadrant (3) assumes that transactionary and precautionary 
demands are directly related to the level of real income. 
{Again the diagram assumes a linear relationship exists 
'\ = tY
r 
where t is the slope of the line). 
Quadrant Cl) shows the inverse relation between speculative 
demand and the rate of interest expressed in Keynes' 
liquidity preference theory of interest. (r ) is the 
maximum rate of interest expected by savers max at which 
speculative demand is totally absent; (r.) is that level 
below which it is felt that the rate of .mln interest will 
not fall and therefore the speculative demand curve becomes 
perfectly elastic. 
TUis states the equilibrium condition. 
T Ml 
M = 1 f3 (Yr ) 
'],0 
---------- ,- - --
I 
I 
I Mll I 
.. _----
__ 1- .. L __ M = M 
I I s d ( 3) I 
I (2) 
I I I 
I I I 
Yd Y I Y IM20 (M 21 S 1, I 
I M2 
LI1 r I 
maXI 
(4) I 
I 
112 ~ f 4 (r) 
I I 
rO - - - - - - - I" - /r -
rl~·-:- r _L _ I-
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,Again, taking a particular rate of interest (ro), quadrant 1 shows 
the level of speculative demand at this rate (M20). Quadrant 2 gives 
the transactionary demand for money (M10) available out of a fixed money 
supply. This transactionary demand takes place at a level of real 
income (Yo). The combination ro/Yo therefore yields equilibrium in the 
money market (Md = Ms). A low rate of interest (rl) is consistent with 
a higher speculative demand (M21 ). Less money is available for trans-
actionary purposes (Ml).) in quadrant 2 and this transactionary demand 
takes place at a lower level of real income (Yl). A lm<er rate of 
interest (rl) therefore yields monetary equilibrium at a lower real 
income level (Yl ). The LM curve slo)?es in the opposite direction to'"the 
IS curve. 
/ , 
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Appendix - References 
(1) See A. Hansen, op cit., J .R. Hicks, op ci!.. 
(2) No government spending or taxation, and no foreign trade takes 
place. 
/ , 
I 
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